CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

CHINA TASK

FORCE REPORT

SEPTEMBER 2020

CHAIRMAN MICHAEL McCAUL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

1972

President Richard Nixon visits the People’s Republic

of China (PRC) in February and meets with Chairman

Mao Zedong

1979

Then-President Jimmy Carter grants full diplomatic

relations with the PRC

1984

President Ronald Reagan visits the PRC

1989

Tiananmen Square massacre

1993

Clinton launches what’s known as “constructive

engagement” with the PRC

1996

The PRC attempts to inﬂuence the 1996 election

through illegal campaign donations

2000

U.S. and the PRC normalize trade relations and the

PRC joins the World Trade Organization

2008

The PRC becomes the largest foreign holder of U.S.

debt, passing Japan

2010

The PRC becomes the world’s second largest

economy, only behind the U.S.

2014

Chairman Xi Jinping calls for “absolutely no mercy” in

Xinjiang, laying the groundwork for massive

concentration camps

2015

President Obama hosts Chairman Xi for a state visit,

where the PRC pledges they do “not intend to pursue

militarization” of the South China Sea

2018

In response to IP theft and other harmful trade

practices, President Donald Trump begins to place

taris on imports from the PRC. The PRC retaliates with

taris of their own, kicking o a trade war

2019

March: Hong Kongers begin to protest the Hong Kong

extradition bill

May: U.S. Commerce Department places Huawei on its

“Entity List,” restricting its access to U.S. technology

November: In response to the brutal crackdown by the

police, President Trump signs the Hong Kong Human

Rights and Democracy Act

2020

The CCP covers up the coronavirus outbreak, allowing

the virus to turn into a pandemic

June 30th: The PRC passes a new national security law

imposing severe punishments for anyone both inside

and outside Hong Kong for encouraging democratic

ideals, obliterating the long-standing “one country, two

systems” policy

July 14th: In response to the Hong Kong national

security law, President Trump ends the U.S.’ preferential

trade status with Hong Kong

July 23rd: U.S. orders the PRC to close its consulate in

Houston, calling it a hub of espionage. The PRC

retaliates by closing the U.S. embassy in Chengdu

TIMELINE: 40 YEARS OF

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

CHINA TASK FORCE

September 30, 2020

The Honorable Kevin O. McCarthy

Republican Leader

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Leader McCarthy,

Pursuant to your May 7, 2020, announcement on the formation of the China Task Force (CTF), which you

empowered me to Chair, I submit to you the report.

The greatest generational challenge we face today is the threat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).As a

result of the COVID pandemic that has so far killed one million people worldwide, and decimated the world

economy, America has woken up to what many of us have been talking about for some time - that the CCP

is our strategic adversary and has been going to great lengths to spread its deception and malign inﬂuence

around the world.

You charged the 15 Members serving on the CTF, representing 11 committees of the U.S. House of

Representatives, with examining six CCP-related challenges: Ideological Competition, Supply Chains, National

Security, Technology, Economics and Energy, and Competitiveness. The CTF conducted over 60 brieﬁngs with

current and former top administration ocials on both sides of the aisle, business executives, Ambassadors,

and various outside experts. In total, the CTF engaged with more than 130 leaders to listen to their insights and

solutions. After months of virtual and socially distanced, in-person classiﬁed and unclassiﬁed brieﬁngs, the CTF

drafted this report with 82 key ﬁndings and more than 400 forward leaning recommendations.

For over six months, you discussed the creation of a bipartisan task force to develop long-term solutions

to address the malign behavior of the CCP.Unfortunately, when the time came to begin this eort last May,

Democrat leaders decided it was “a diversion” and refused to participate. However, as you know, the CTF

repeatedly invited Democrats to join our eorts on this pressing challenge.For example, in July, the CTF

invited all Members of the House to present their ideas or bills for consideration; only Republicans showed

up.In addition, we invited all Members to provide examples of CCP activity in their districts (e.g., IP theft); only

Republicans responded.

I believe the report would have been even further enriched by Democrat participation. The CCP does not

respect ideological dierences and we are always stronger as a country together. In that spirit, the CTF

prioritized recommendations that have bipartisan support and have already moved forward in the legislative

process. As a result, well over half of the legislative recommendations are bipartisan and more than one-third

have passed either the House or the Senate. This report is the blueprint for bipartisan action Congress and

the Administration can take now to address the greatest national and economic security challenge of this

generation.

I commend you for creating this Task Force and I look forward to working with you and my colleagues on both

sides of the aisle to implement the Task Force’s recommendations.

Sincerely,

Michael T. McCaul

Chairman, China Task Force

Look, we have to admit a hard truth.

We must admit a hard truth that should

guide us in the years and decades to

come, that if we want to have a free

21st century, and not the Chinese

century of which Xi Jinping dreams, the

old paradigm of blind engagement with

China simply won’t get it done.

We must not continue it and we must

not return to it.”

The United States wants an open and

constructive relationship with China,

but achieving that relationship requires

us to vigorously defend our national

interest. The Chinese government has

continually violated its promised to

us and so many other nations.

- U.S. President Donald J. Trump,

“Remarks by President Trump on Actions Against China”

May 29, 2020

America had hoped that economic

liberalization would bring China

into greater partnership with us and

with the world. Instead, China has

chosen economic aggression...”

- U.S. Vice President Mike Pence,

“Remarks by VP Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China”

October 4, 2018

- U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo,

“Communist China and the Free World’s Future”

July 23, 2020

Rep. Adam Kinzinger

Illinois

Rep. Andy Barr

Kentucky

Rep. Chris Stewart

Utah

Rep. Elise Stefanik

New York

Rep. Darin LaHood

Illinois

Rep. Jim Banks

Indiana

Rep. Liz Cheney

Wyoming

Rep. John Curtis

Utah

Rep. Mike Gallagher

Wisconsin

Rep. Anthony Gonzalez

Ohio

Rep. John Joyce

Pennsylvania

Rep. Guy Reschenthaler

Pennsylvania

Rep. Denver Riggleman

Virginia

Rep. Michael Waltz

Florida

Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy

California

China Task Force Chairman Michael McCaul

Texa s

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CHINA TASK FORCE

The China Task Force would like to thank the many individuals and organizations who made the review possible. While some

are not listed by name in this report, their inputs were not forgotten and helped shape the ﬁndings and recommendations

contained herein. Most important the Task Force would like to thank the many sta members who contributed to the ﬁnal

product for their hard work and dedication to country.

Luke Murray, Leader McCarthy Republican Sta Lead

Brendan Shields, Chair McCaul Republican Sta Lead

Special thanks to Committee and Member oce sta who contributed to this ﬁnal report:

Bryan Burack, Dan Markus, Davis Pace, Chris Farrar, Laura Fullerton, Jenny Gorski, Leslie Shedd, Caroline Campbell, Lauren

Gillespie, Sophie Seid, Sarah Markley, Kim Lehn, Jenn Wickre, Angela Ellard, Tim Kurth, Kimberly Betz, Michael Koren, Forrest

McConnell, Anthony Chang, Phil Poe, Josh Snead, Nick Vance, Alex Ricci, Derek Harvey, Lindsay Ratli, Hunt VanderToll, Jenna

Liits, Troy Dougall, Chas Morrison, Stephen Hostelley, Matt Tucker, Austin Weatherford, Michael Mansour, Ashley Sntoskiewicz,

Mike D’Orazio, Jason Eagleburger, Patrick Hester, Cam Madsen, Walker Barrett

METHODOLOGY

The China Task Force (CTF) conducted an expansive survey of U.S. interests relating

to the People’s Republic of China, to clarify the scale and urgency of the threat of the

Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) global malign behavior and develop a speciﬁc and

actionable response plan. A summary of its recommendations can be found in Appendix I.

The CTF conducted brieﬁngs with current and former administration ocials on both sides

of the aisle, business executives, Ambassadors, and various outside experts. In total, the

CTF met with more than 130 leaders in over 60 engagements to gather information, learn

about their perspectives and ask questions.

The 15 Members of the China Task Force represented 11 committees in the U.S. House

of Representatives. Their diverse experience ensured the China Task Force could best

address this multi-faceted challenge. The Members were assigned to six pillars to address

the various aspects of the China Challenge: Ideological Competition, Supply Chain Security,

National Security, Technology, Economics & Energy, and Competitiveness. Sta from the

committees and personal oces supported the Members by providing policy expertise in

addition to facilitating brieﬁngs and conducting research. While the full CTF held over a

dozen of brieﬁngs, the bulk of the engagements were handled at the pillar level.

The CTF’s overall goal was to use the information gathered to assemble a comprehensive

report and action plan to illustrate to the American public how Congress and the

Administration can best address the growing dangers of the CCP.

Where practicable, the CTF cited publicly available sources, due to the fact that most of

the China Task Force’s brieﬁngs were either closed to the public or classiﬁed. The ﬁnal

report was submitted to Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy on September 30, 2020, to be

considered and prepared for ﬁnal release.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Generational Threat of the Chinese Communist

Party

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) more than 40 years

ago, the United States has sought to draw the PRC into

the community of nations as a responsible stakeholder.

U.S. leaders pursued a strategy of engagement based

on the assumption that expanding the bilateral economic

relationship with the PRC would advance the U.S. national

interest and lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to

change. This engagement strategy often turned a blind eye

to the CCP’s human rights violations, economic malfeasance,

expansionist aggression, and empty promises, as well

as the CCP’s deep commitment to a hostile Communist

ideology that drives this malign behavior. This strategy has,

simply put, failed.

In just the past year alone, the CCP has violated an

international treaty and dismantled Hong Kong’s civil

liberties; continued its oppression of ethnic minorities,

including Uyghurs and Tibetans; increased its military

buildup, conducted increasingly belligerent provocations,

and violated other nations’ sovereignty at sea; engaged in

fatal skirmishes to conduct a land-grab on the Indian border;

and asserted new territorial claims over Bhutan. Moreover,

by silencing doctors and suppressing medical information

from the world, the CCP allowed a local outbreak of a virus

to turn into a global pandemic, killing almost one million

people to date and devastating the global economy. This

pandemic exposed various U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities,

the dangers of U.S. overreliance on the PRC, and the need

for a more robust domestic medical and technological

manufacturing capacity.

This series of wakeup calls has revealed how CCP ideology

is undermining the core principles of the international

system and putting Americans’ safety and prosperity at risk.

Leniency and accommodation of the CCP and its oppressive

agenda is no longer an option. To preserve democracy and

freedom around the world, the U.S. must act decisively with

our allies to regain the initiative. Addressing such malign

conduct can no longer be one of many priorities for our

respective governments, but rather the organizing principle

of the free world.

Assessing the Chinese Communist Party Threat

Recognizing the urgency and magnitude of the CCP’s threat

to American values and interests, Republican leaders in the

U.S. House of Representatives set out to develop a policy

action plan for Congress and the Administration to better

combat this multifaceted challenge. Despite numerous

and repeated invitations over a series of months, House

Democrats refused to join or contribute to this vital eort.

The GOP had no choice but to move forward independently

due to the exigency of the threat.

Fifteen Members representing 11 Committees addressed

he U.S. strategic competition with the CCP by focusing

on: Ideological Competition, Supply Chain Security,

National Security, Technology, Economics and Energy,

and Competitiveness. The CTF conducted brieﬁngs with

current and former administration ocials on both sides of

the aisle, business executives, Ambassadors, and various

outside experts. In total, the CTF engaged with more

than 130 leaders to provide insights and solutions for its

comprehensive action plan.

Results of the Review

After months of virtual and socially distanced, in-person

classiﬁed and unclassiﬁed brieﬁngs, the CTF drafted

this report with 82 key ﬁndings and more than 400

forward leaning recommendations. The CTF prioritized

recommendations that have bipartisan support and have

already moved forward in the legislative process. As a

result, well over half of the legislative recommendations

are bipartisan and more than one-third have passed either

the House or the Senate. This report is the blueprint for

bipartisan actions Congress and the Administration can

take now to address the greatest national and economic

security challenge of this generation.

Key CTF Recommendations Include:

Ideological Competition

• Evaluating whether the CCP’s crimes against Uyghurs

amount to genocide, fully implementing sanctions

laws enacted in response to the CCP’s Hong Kong

crackdown, and taking further speciﬁc actions to

respond to the full range of CCP human rights

violations, from religious freedom violations to

forced organ harvesting.

• Coordinating a whole-of-government oensive

information statecraft campaign to counter the CCP’s

propaganda machine by using truth and our values to

undermine CCP’s lies and malign ideology.

• Ensuring our citizens are aware when they are watching

or listening to CCP sponsored and

censored media and entertainment content.

• Countering the CCP’s global malign inﬂuence by

requiring transparency and accountability within the

United Nations system, including at the World Health

Organization.

• Funding technologies and the distribution of devices

that help democracy ﬁghters maintain digital security,

ensure mobile access, and reconstitute websites after a

cyberattack.

• Highlighting the CCP’s rampant environmental

destruction, including its status as the world’s

largest carbon emitter.

Supply Chain Security

Better securing our medical and national security

supply chains by:

• Providing aggressive, smart, and targeted

tax incentives to accelerate our research and

development (R&D) and production of crucial

medicines, medical supplies, ingredients, tests,

and vaccines;

• Creating a grant program necessary to catalyze

domestic production of important technologies and

designing tax incentives to secure U.S. supply of

advanced semiconductors; and

• Overhauling the federal permitting process for

mineral development and prioritizing advancements

in mineral reﬁning so neither industry nor the

Defense Industrial Base are reliant on the CCP.

National Security

• Working with the DoD to modernize force structure,

posture, operational concepts, and acquisitions in order

to deter CCP aggression in the Indo-Paciﬁc and around

the world.

• Ensuring modernization of all three legs of the nuclear

triad as well as development and ﬁelding of conventional

capabilities critical to counter the PLA in the Indo-Paciﬁc,

including ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles.

• Underscoring the need for a minimum three to ﬁve

percent real growth in the defense budget per year

in order to deter and defeat the PLA and other key

adversaries.

• Increasing focus on how the U.S. military protects space

capabilities and carrying out space exploration goals by

leveraging private sector investments.

• Cutting o material support of CCP military industrial

base companies, including divestment from companies

with ties to the CCP’s military.

• Safeguarding the U.S. electoral process and the integrity

of our elections with various measures, including the

identiﬁcation of foreign malign actors and ensuring any

individuals who engage in interference are inadmissible

for entry to the U.S. or deportable if already present.

• Providing more resources for investigations, criminal

prosecutions, and other actions against CCP sponsored

IP theft in addition to closing loopholes the CCP has

exploited in our visa system.

• Enhancing federal counterintelligence capabilities and

bolstering Mandarin language capacity.

Technology

• Taking a whole-of-government approach to assess the

security risks posed by the PRC in 5G networks and

increasing cooperation between the U.S. and its allies

and partners in identifying and countering them.

• Supporting the formation of a new D-10 group of leading

democracies to develop and deploy 5G and subsequent

generations and establishing a reimbursement program

for companies to remove equipment from their

communications networks that poses a national security

risk.

• Securing international leadership in the technologies of

tomorrow, including AI, quantum, 5G, and autonomous

vehicles.

• Sanctioning PRC telecommunications companies

engaged in economic or industrial espionage and any

PRC entity that tries to hack COVID-19 researchers

working on a vaccine.

Economics and Energy

• Ensuring no U.S. taxpayer dollars support any PRC state-

owned enterprises.

• Harmonizing export control policies with our partners

and allies to keep critical technologies, including

semiconductor manufacturing equipment and R&D, from

our adversaries. 

• Applying heightened scrutiny for investments in U.S.

companies or operations from the PRC.

• Strengthening trade relationships with our allies to

establish U.S. standards and counter the PRC’s inﬂuence.

• Pursuing trade policies that deter and protect against the

PRC’s theft of IP.

• Enforcing reciprocal treatment of PRC investment into

the U.S. to restore symmetry in bilateral investment rules.

• Ensuring PRC companies are held to the same ﬁnancial

disclosure standards as American companies when

listing on U.S. stock exchanges.

• Working to deepen our trade ties with Taiwan and

resolving speciﬁc outstanding trade issues so the

Administration can take steps to launch trade agreement

negotiations once those issues are addressed.

• Strengthening the Development Finance Corporation,

Export Import Bank, and other government eorts to

more robustly counter the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative

and debt trap diplomacy.

• Continuing to advance U.S. energy security in order to

be a global counter against the PRC, particulary on the

nuclear energy front.

Competitiveness

• Doubling the funding of basic science and technology

research over the next 10 years.

• Increasing coordination and funding for STEM education

to create a more capable, skilled workforce.

• Strengthening the protection of sensitive research

at America’s colleges and universities and leading

research institutions which includes restricting all federal

employees and contractors from participating in foreign

talent programs.

• Requiring colleges and universities to annually report all

donations from the PRC.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION �� 1

• The Chinese Communist Party

• We Must Stop Ignoring the CCP’s Ideology

• The Rise of the CCP and Its Authoritarian Embrace Affect the Lives of Every American

• A Generational Call to Action

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION �� 8

• Introduction

• Ideological Warfare

• U.S. Diplomatic Resources

• Malign Inﬂuence and United Front Work

• Human Rights

• Global Corruption

• Environment and Conservation

• International Organizations

• Information Statecraft

• Ideological Allies

CHAPTER II: SUPPLY CHAIN ��20

• Introduction

• Defense Industrial Base

• Sensitive and Strategic Materials

• Semiconductors

• Supply Chain Diplomacy

• Health, Medical Supply, and Pharmaceutical Security

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY ��28

• Introduction

• Defense

• Critical Infrastructure and Cybersecurity

• Counterintelligence and Illicit Activities

• Election Interference and Domestic Inﬂuence

CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGY �� 53

• Introduction

• Emerging Technologies

• Space Exploration and Technologies

• Privacy Risk and Consumer Protection

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY ��67

• Introduction

• Offensive Tools: Setting a Positive Agenda and Advancing U.S. Trade and Commercial Interests

• Defensive Tools: Protecting U.S. Industries and Technology from Malign Inﬂuence

CHAPTER VI: COMPETITIVENESS �� 80

• Introduction

• Supporting U.S. Innovation Through Macro-Level Competitiveness Measures

• Developing an American Workforce to Compete

• Protecting the Integrity of American Research and Innovation

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER INVESTIGATION ��89

APPENDIX II: SUMMARY OF COVID-19 ORIGINS REPORT �� 108

APPENDIX III: ACTIONS ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN AND UNUSED AUTHORITIES �� 114

APPENDIX IV: TASK FORCE ACTIVITY �� 116

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES �� 119

The Chinese Communist Party is

heading even faster and further

in the wrong direction – more

internal repression, more predatory

economic practices, more heavy-

handedness, and most concerning

for me, a more aggressive military

posture.”

- U.S. Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper

Munich Security Conference

February 15, 2020

- Director of the U.S. Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), Chris Wray

“China’s Attempt to Inﬂuence U.S. Institutions”

July 7, 2020

Many of the distinctions that we hold

dear and that are so ingrained in

the way we operate in this country

are blurred – if they exist at all – in

China. I’m talking about distinctions

between the Chinese government

and the Chinese Communist Party,

distinctions between civilian and

military sectors or uses, distinctions

between the state and their business

sector.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In his farewell address in January 1989, President Reagan

reminded all Americans that “as long as we remember

our ﬁrst principles and believe in ourselves, the future

will always be ours.” He went on to reassert that U.S.

policy toward the Soviet Union—or any totalitarian

regime—must be based on facts and deeds, not wishful

thinking and promises. The Great Communicator’s words

remain touchstones of American wisdom and strength.

Six months later, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

slaughtered thousands of innocent students peacefully

assembling on Tiananmen Square to call for democratic

reforms. Yet the very next month, the U.S. National

Security Adviser secretly went to Beijing to meet with

the CCP’s top leader Deng Xiaoping, who ordered and

oversaw the massacre. Visiting again just ﬁve months

later, the same U.S. ocial toasted his CCP hosts three

miles from the scene of the massacre at Tiananmen,

saying his delegation had “come here today as friends to

resume our important dialogue.”

U.S. leaders quickly abandoned President Reagan’s

advice to remember our ﬁrst principles, and successive

administrations helped build the strength of the CCP

despite its outright hostility to U.S. values.

Ignoring the

CCP’s own stated goals and actions, U.S. leaders justiﬁed

this decision on the faulty assumptions and empty

promises that greater levels of trade and investment

between our two countries could induce the CCP to

liberalize its political system and economy.

If this policy of unprincipled engagement

continues, the U.S. stands to lose the future to

today’s communist superpower.

This overly optimistic policy has already resulted in

countless factories across our nation being shuttered and

millions of Americans losing their jobs. The stakes are as

urgent as they are existential, as the CCP sets its sights on

the crown jewels of American economic and technological

competitiveness—including artiﬁcial intelligence (AI),

semiconductors, and quantum computing. A two-million-

person military with a nuclear deterrent capable of placing

all the continental U.S. under threat is shifting the balance

of military power towards the CCP as its ambitions

become increasingly global. The CCP is jeopardizing

the transparency and accountability of an international

system that was meant to prevent crises like the COVID-19

pandemic.

To secure the future, the U.S. must apply President

Reagan’s wisdom. Our approach to the People’s Republic

of China (PRC) must be rooted in American principles and

based in reality. This starts with acknowledging that the

CCP is completely committed to a hostile communist

ideology that seeks to eliminate any perceived threats

to its security—chief among them the values that underpin

American society and the U.S.-built international system.

Communist ideology dictates the CCP’s every decision

and action. Ethnic and religious minorities are being

blindfolded and shipped to concentration camps, once

free people in Hong Kong have had their civil liberties

stripped away, democracies like Taiwan are being

intimidated by hostile military drills, and people of faith

in Tibet and throughout the PRC are having religious

scripture rewritten according to ‘Xi Jinping Thought’.

These realities, which have been largely ignored by

previous U.S. administrations, must be the starting point

for U.S. policy toward the CCP, otherwise our nation risks

losing the freedoms that past generations fought and won

for us. The time for debate is over, we must act.

The Chinese Communist Party

The U.S. will not be able to come to grips with China

today without an understanding of the CCP. The CCP

is the world’s longest-ruling communist party and will

commemorate its 100th anniversary in 2021. To extend his

regime’s survival, General Secretary Xi Jinping cautions

his CCP members that the Soviet Union collapsed not

from military or economic strain, but from losing its

devotion to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Central to the CCP

belief system is a dogma that communism is superior to all

other governance systems, including democracy. When

speaking for domestic audiences, CCP leaders constantly

reiterate their unswerving loyalty to Marxist theory, and

state that the totalitarianism of the CCP is the essence of

their government.

The leadership of the CCP is

the essence of Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics… the

Party is the highest political

leadership power.”

– Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 2019

Yet, since the U.S. established diplomatic relations with

the PRC in 1979, U.S. government policy has downplayed

the fact that the PRC is a communist nation. Indeed,

Americans have used a Western lens to analyze the

PRC and our own language to describe it. The U.S.

government and media routinely refer to Xi Jinping as

the PRC’s president, which confers an implicit democratic

legitimacy to his position. However, Xi does not hold the

title of “President”—the position does not even exist in the

PRC government—and is never referred to as “President”

in Chinese-language media. Of his three titles—General

Secretary of the CCP, Chairman of the Central Military

INTRODUCTION

Commission, and Chairman of the PRC—his government role is always listed last because it is the least important. As a

result, Americans and others have failed to understand that General Secretary Xi’s power comes from the CCP, not the

people of the PRC. Some analysts even argue that the PRC is no longer truly communist because the CCP embraced

capitalism. Yet CCP leaders themselves tell a very dierent story.

The CCP never embraced capitalism and in fact argues that it is a tool of the West intended to undermine the CCP’s

grip on power and doomed to fail. Even Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the PRC’s economic reforms and growth, said

“capitalism would get China nowhere.”

More recent CCP documents make clear that “what China is doing now still

truly is Socialism,”

and the current CCP leader, General Secretary Xi Jinping, explicitly promotes China’s model as a

superior alternative to capitalism.

CCP leaders have never called their economic reforms ‘capitalist,’ but only ‘opening

up.’ ‘Opening up’ is not capitalism, but simply proﬁt-driven zero-sum globalization of their communist economy, which

remains dominated by state-owned enterprises, tightly managed by industrial policy, and closed to outside competition.

The CCP remains adamant that its governance is still communist. “Upholding Marxism-Leninism” is one of the CCP’s

non-negotiable bottom lines.

Marxism-Leninism, the same ideology which governed the Soviet Union, is the fundamental

concept behind Communism. It rejects the Western democratic idea of individual liberty, and instead preaches the

fantasy of an all-powerful state enforcing a Utopian egalitarian society “from each according to his abilities, to each

according to his needs.” In reality, every time Marxism-Leninism, or Communism, has been instituted as a system of

national government, it has led to totalitarianism and mass murder, from the Soviet Union, to the Khmer Rouge regime in

Cambodia, to North Korea.

“Under communism, individuals are merely a means to be used toward the achievement of the ends

of the collective nation state. Thus, individuals can be easily sacrificed for the nation state’s goals.

Individuals do not have inherent value under Marxism-Leninism. They exist to serve the state; the

state does not exist to serve them.”

– National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien

The CCP is a proud practitioner of the bankrupt communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism and applies it onto the PRC

through a system of government called “socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (SWCC). The main idea of SWCC is

simple: the CCP controls everything. In a July 2020 article titled “The leadership of the CCP is the most essential feature

of SWCC,” General Secretary Xi Jinping repeatedly described his political system by writing “the Party, the government,

the military, the people, and academia – east, west, south, north, and center – the Party leads everything.”

SWCC is quite

simply and literally the absolute totalitarianism of the CCP.

General Secretary Xi does not exaggerate. SWCC means that in the PRC today, the CCP controls every aspect of

government, business, society, and personal life. The PRC’s entire civil government is subservient to the CCP. All

companies are required to establish CCP cells in their operations and support CCP security agencies. All civil society

groups must be approved and report to the police. All religious organizations are directly controlled by the CCP—an

ocially atheist organization. The CCP is instituting a dystopian social credit system to monitor and score every citizen’s

personal behavior and requiring the use of brainwashing apps to enforce the study of “Xi Jinping Thought.” “East, west,

south, north, and center” is not an exaggeration.

We Must Stop Ignoring the CCP’s Communist Ideology

The U.S. and the free world must understand and accept the reality of the CCP’s loyalty to communist ideology, because

it reveals that the CCP can never be a trustworthy partner, a “responsible stakeholder,”

or even a ‘competitor’ that plays

by the same rules. The CCP’s obsession with absolute control means that free people and free societies will always

be the enemy of the Party. At home or abroad, the CCP does not allow its power to be constrained by laws, rules, or

norms, instead using force and coercion. The CCP’s communist ideology, and the totalitarianism that results, causes the

CCP behaviors that are most threatening to the American way of life – humanitarian atrocities, the erosion of democracy,

territorial aggression, and theft of American intellectual property (IP).

The COVID-19 pandemic is the clearest example yet that the CCP’s ideology is a direct threat to the U.S. and all people

around the world. The severity of the pandemic is the direct result of the CCP’s obsession with its control and reputation.

Its response from the critical early stages of the outbreak to today has relied on coverups, arrests and blame-shifting,

rather than transparency. Ocials inside the system, including at the local level, are disincentivized from sending

negative information upward within the government, lest they are scapegoated or punished for incompetence. The CCP

downplayed the crisis and continues to hide key information from the world. The result was a global disaster. The CCP’s

communist ideology itself brought the world to a deadly, painful, and costly standstill.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

“Every Communist must grasp

the truth; “Political power grows

out of the barrel of a gun.”

- “Problems of War and Strategy”

[Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 224.]

(November 6, 1938),

The pandemic is far from the only sign that the free world

is in an irreconcilable clash of systems with the CCP.

When the CCP’s ideology demands total control, anything

dierent or independent is a threat to be eliminated. The

Party cannot tolerate allegiance to a higher power and is

committing horrible atrocities against Muslim Uyghurs, has

destroyed the way of life of Tibetan Buddhists, and seeks

to re-write Christian scripture to align with “Xi Jinping

Thought.” The Party violated international law to dismantle

civil liberties in Hong Kong because their system of total

control cannot tolerate free thinking people. The CCP is

also trying to subvert the international system to redeﬁne

human rights as the collective wellbeing oered by the

state, rather than the fundamental rights inherent to every

individual human being.

The threat of the CCP’s ideology is not limited to

human rights; it also drives its economic misconduct. Xi

believes that the rise of independent oligarchs created

independent centers of power in the Soviet Union,

contributing to its collapse. The CCP embeds its members

in every company and organization. It directs the economy

to pursue state goals through industrial policy like “Made

in China 2025.” The CCP’s paranoia about achieving

economic and technological self-suciency has led to

an historic level of IP and technology theft. Because the

CCP derives its political legitimacy from economic growth

and job creation, market forces and fair competition are a

security threat to its regime.

Nor does the CCP’s desire for total control end at the

PRC’s borders. The CCP’s national security law deﬁnes

national security as the “absence of international or

domestic threats to the state’s power.”

The CCP has

enshrined in law its belief that it will not be secure until all

threats foreign and domestic are eliminated, and therefore

external aggression is legally required.

Internal documents also reveal that the CCP explicitly

considers constitutional democracy, internationally

recognized human rights, liberal economics, independent

journalism, and civil society to be threats.

This view of national security and systematic desire to

eliminate American values makes genuine mutual beneﬁt

impossible because the CCP believes that strengthening

other centers of power, wealth, inﬂuence, or ideas will

undermine its own power. The totalitarianism of the CCP

must be universal and unchallenged. Therefore, the CCP’s

greatest threats to the U.S. cannot be handled through

engagement, negotiated away, or whitewashed as “win-

win cooperation,” because they stem from the CCP’s

ideology itself. Yet for decades, U.S. policy towards the

PRC has tried to do just that.

The Rise of the CCP and Its Authoritarian Embrace

Aects the Lives of Every American

Decades of ignoring CCP ideology has contributed to

a world that is more hostile towards bedrock American

principles than at any time since the Cold War. The CCP’s

degradation of individual liberty and democratic principles

is not a theoretical challenge or one that only matters

inside PRC borders. It already reaches into the daily lives

of average Americans. Using deception and coercion, the

CCP and its hostile ideology is securing footholds across

our society—including in our universities, businesses,

entertainment, and media. Continuing to recklessly

disregard the CCP’s malign inﬂuence in American life

will erode our morals, threaten our privacy and security,

undermine our economic and technological leadership,

and harm our academic institutions.

On September 25, 2015, during CCP

General Secretary Xi’s state visit to the

United States, President Obama and Xi

gave remarks to the press in the White

House Rose Garden. The two leaders

announced that they had agreed “neither

the U.S. or the Chinese government will

conduct or knowingly support cyber-

enabled theft of intellectual property,

including trade secrets or other

conﬁdential business information for

commercial advantage.” Xi also pledged

that “China does not intend to pursue

militarization” of the South China Sea.

Neither of these promises to the American

people were made in good faith. Today,

“China is using cyber-enabled theft as

part of a global campaign to ‘rob, replicate,

and replace’ non-Chinese companies in

the global marketplace,” according to

Assistant Attorney General John Demers.

Meanwhile, the PRC’s military outposts

in the South China Sea have been proven

“capable of supporting military operations

and include advanced weapon systems,”

according to the Pentagon.

INTRODUCTION

Morals

America derives its strength and dynamism from its

ﬁrm commitment to a moral leadership that seeks the

protection of universal and inalienable rights for our

people and those around the world. However, the CCP’s

integration into nearly every channel of global trade

and commerce is forcing American consumers to make

decisions incongruent with their own values.

Right now, upwards of a million Uyghurs and other

religious and ethnic minorities in the PRC are being

held against their will in concentration camps in the

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (”Xinjiang”). CCP

authorities are tearing families apart, subjecting targeted

ethnic groups to forced abortion, forced sterilization, and

involuntary birth control, as well as other forms of heinous

abuse and indoctrination.

These abuses appear to meet

the legal deﬁnition of genocide, and U.S. Secretary of

State Michael Pompeo has referred to these crimes as

“the stain of the century.”

Less well-known is that these concentration camps are

being used as a feeder system for forced labor not only in

Xinjiang but throughout the PRC economy. The Australian

Strategic Policy Institute found in 2020 that the supply

chains of at least 82 global brands, including Apple, Gap,

and Nike, are using forced Uyghur labor.

Because many

global brands source cotton and yarn from Xinjiang, it is

estimated that 1 in 5 cotton garments sold globally could

be tainted with Uyghur forced labor.

It is almost certain

that the closet of every American has clothes spun with

cotton produced by the slave labor of a people subjected

to ongoing crimes against humanity.

Consequently, any product labeled “Made in China” may

be perpetuating the erasure of a people and culture in

Xinjiang. Every consumer purchase is setting a precedent

that the CCP’s moral vulgarity can be overlooked because

it is a critical spoke in our global economy. If Americans

let the CCP succeed in degrading our morals through

commerce, we also allow the CCP to degrade the

principles on which our country was built.

Privacy and Digital Security

CCP-controlled digital products and services are growing

in usage around the world, including in the U.S. By using

these products and services—from Huawei to Alipay—

consumers are giving these companies access to our

most sensitive information, from our bank accounts to our

private conversations.

These companies are not private, independent actors

like their American competitors, but de facto arms of the

state that can be used to serve the CCP’s ideological

and geopolitical goals. A complex web of PRC laws and

policies gives the CCP the right to take any private sector

technology for military use, obtain any data collected

by a private enterprise, and compel any organization

or individual to carry out intelligence operations. For

example, Zhang Yiming the founder of ByteDance, a

nominally private PRC-based technology company, said

“technology must be led by the socialist core value system”

and “strengthening the work of Party [CCP] construction”

in his company is a primary way to “introduce correct

values into technology and products.”

Zhang, who also

created TikTok, one of the largest social media platforms

in the U.S., extolled the virtues of “further deepening

cooperation with authoritative [CCP propaganda] media”

and ensuring their message is “broadcast forcefully.”

Furthermore, these CCP technology companies are

reﬁning instruments of digital repression, including

through dystopian surveillance, social credit, and

predictive policing systems, that subvert the freedoms

and liberties of their own citizens. In addition to lining the

streets of the PRC, these CCP products and services are

powering surveillance systems in at least 63 countries—

many of which are participating in the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI).

The paranoia of this system and need for

absolute control by the CCP is exempliﬁed by the arrest

of Luo Daiqing, a 20-year-old undergraduate student

from the PRC, who, while studying at the University of

Minnesota prior to returning home, tweeted pictures

of General Secretary Xi as various cartoon characters,

such as Winnie the Pooh. Unfortunately, this is one

case of many. In 2017, a 24-year-old college student at

the University of Washington, U.S. green card holder

and member of a Muslim minority group, was arrested

while visiting her father in the PRC and imprisoned in a

concentration camp for using a virtual private network to

submit her homework.

The cruelty and absurdity by which the CCP uses

technology to imprison its own citizens should strike

fear in Americans that use these products and services.

Already Feroza Aziz, a 17-year-old American teenage

girl, had her account suspended on TikTok, for posting a

video, disguised as a makeup tutorial, in which she talked

about the atrocities in Xinjiang. In addition to removing

users from its platform, TikTok is also reportedly blocking

content based on CCP censorship standards, including

ﬁltering out news about the Hong Kong pro-democracy

demonstrations.

If a totalitarian regime can successfully

silence the voices of Americans—especially those residing

in our own country—our own fundamental freedoms and

democratic institutions are in danger.

Economy and Technology

The previous U.S. policy of engagement—based on

hopes over evidence without recalibration—considered

economic interdependence with the PRC to be the means

by which the U.S. could change CCP ideology through

the creation of a middle class that demanded political

liberalization. However, today interdependence has

become a vulnerability. By becoming a critical link in

the supply chains of essential everyday items Americans

rely on—from pharmaceuticals to nearly every type of

electronic device—the CCP has dramatically increased its

leverage over the U.S.

The COVID-19 global pandemic laid bare the dangers of

reliance on the PRC, as it nationalized control of medical

supplies that the world depended on, directed its global

network of embassies and associations to stockpile

medical supplies in foreign countries and send them

back to the PRC during the outset of the pandemic, and

threatened to suspend the export of pharmaceutical

ingredients and plunge America into “the mighty sea of

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

corona virus.”

This crisis revealed that the CCP treats

supply chains and commerce—in this case access to

essential medicines and personal protective equipment

—as tools of coercion.

The supply chain risks exposed by the pandemic were

a wakeup call to all Americans, but pale in comparison

to the incipient risks of broader CCP ambitions—control

of the science, technology, and innovation necessary

for critical sectors of the 21st century economy. AI,

semiconductors, quantum, 5G, and robotics are only a

few of the industries the CCP aims to monopolize. Plans

such as Made in China 2025 are being implemented using

what Assistant Attorney General for National Security

John Demers calls the CCP’s “rob, replicate, and replace”

policy. The idea is simple: steal American IP, replicate the

product or service, and replace the American company.

The policy is so pernicious that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) is opening a counterintelligence case

with links to the PRC every 10 hours.

Our economic reliance on the PRC too often requires

appeasing CCP ideological dictates. Hollywood regularly

censors its scripts in order to screen movies in the PRC.

In the credits of ‘Mulan,’ Disney gave special thanks

to numerous CCP entities involved in committing

and covering up its atrocities in Xinjiang, including a

CCP propaganda bureau and an entity subject to U.S.

sanctions. The NBA groveled before the CCP when the

General Manager of the Houston Rockets used Twitter—

an American social media platform blocked in the PRC—

to support the Hong Kong protests. Marriot Hotels ﬁred

a Nebraska-based employee for “liking” a tweet by a

Tibetan group that oended the CCP.

Corporate abasement is shortsighted. PRC industrial

policy documents such as Made in China 2025 illustrate

that the PRC buys Boeing planes not to see the U.S.

company become a ﬁxture in its airline industry, but out of

necessity and with the goal to force the company to move

more production to the PRC to extract its technology and

eventually replace it with its own domestic champion—

state-owned Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China

(COMAC). An ocial at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce

starkly observed that success of these plans, which

require technology transfer on a massive sale, would

mean “the U.S. and other countries…become just

commodity exporters to China—selling oil, gas, beef and

soybeans.”

Put another way, the CCP plans to hollow

out and supplant the industrial and innovative capabilities

needed for our economic and military survival.

Academic

American universities meant to foster free speech are

increasingly being subverted to promote, or at least not

oend, CCP ideology. Through Confucius Institutes,

monitoring of students, and direct interference by PRC

diplomats, the CCP is trying to force its views upon our

institutions of higher learning.

The CCP’s Confucius Institutes currently operate on at

least 75 U.S. college campuses, in addition there are

around 500 Confucius Classrooms in grade schools and

high schools across the U.S.

Framed as simply language

and cultural centers, Confucius Institutes censure

discussions on Tibet and Taiwan and interfere in broader

campus events at the behest of the CCP. In 2009, a CCP

Politburo Standing Committee Member and ideology czar

said the Confucius Institutes “are an important part of

China’s overseas propaganda setup.”

In addition, PRC citizens who aspire for freedom of

expression at our universities are monitored and

silenced. When Yang Shuping, an undergraduate student

from the PRC studying in the U.S., expressed her gratitude

to the University of Maryland during her commencement

speech for teaching her “free speech” and that her “voice

mattered,” she was forced to apologize after CCP state

media and nationalistic internet users attacked and

criticized her.

PRC diplomats are contacting our universities directly to

inﬂuence their programming and speech and CCP military

ocers are using covered identities to steal American

research. Between 2010 and 2013, ocials from the

PRC’s Chicago consulate contacted the University of

Wisconsin-Madison to complain it was hosting “too many

Taiwan-related events.”

Ambassador O’Brien explained

in a speech on CCP ideology and global ambitions that

when the University of California at San Diego (UCSD)

hosted the Dalai Lama as a commencement speaker in

2017, Beijing banned PRC students from visiting UCSD

on government funds.

In July 2020, four researchers

from the PRC were charged by the Department of Justice

(DoJ) with visa fraud after lying about their work for the

CCP’s military. One of the individuals, Wang Xin was

the equivalent to a major in their army and was ordered

“to observe the layout of the UCSF lab and bring back

information on how to replicate it in China.”

Americans are not the only ones at risk

Americans reject allowing the CCP’s communist ideology

to aect our way of life. Nine-in-ten U.S. adults see the PRC’s

power and inﬂuence as a threat.

Each new or uncovered

CCP transgression brings Americans’ understanding of

the threat into sharper focus. The delusion that the CCP

could possibly emerge as a responsible stakeholder

is vanishing as its actions and behaviors more closely

resemble a massive criminal network. CCP totalitarian

aggression extends well beyond the United States and

aects the core of the rules-based international system.

INTRODUCTION

The CCP is Eroding the Foundation of the International

System

The U.S. has always been committed to a foreign policy

that bolsters the open, transparent, and rules-based

international order. Since the end of the Second World War,

this international system has lifted hundreds of millions of

people out of hunger and poverty, sparked unprecedented

technological innovation, and largely fostered peace

between and among democratic countries. However, the

values and missions of the international organizations that

comprise our global system must be reinvigorated and

cannot continue to appease totalitarian dictates.

The CCP is Degrading Governance at International

Institutions

For decades, the naivete among many international

organizations about the CCP’s ideology and goals has

led to dangerous contradictions and absurdity. The theory

that accommodation and leniency toward the CCP’s

rampant violations would somehow hasten cooperation

or at least chasten its zero-sum impulses has proved ﬂat

out wrong. Looking back, it was a mistake to presuppose

that a hardened Marxist-Leninist party would adhere to a

system whose values threaten its survival. Rather than

encourage the CCP to reform its internal governance and

external behavior, international institutions’ disregard of

CCP ideology and appeasement of CCP misconduct is

turning these institutions against the very principles they

were created to uphold.

The institution responsible for global health, the World

Health Organization (WHO), was a co-conspirator in

covering up the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China,

parroting CCP propaganda and disinformation—including

that the virus was not transmitting from human-to-human

despite evidence from Taiwan and others to the contrary.

When forced to make a determination on whether to

declare a Public Health Emergency of International

Concern, which is critical to combating the spread of a

pandemic, WHO Director-General Tedros declined to

make the declaration, likely at the behest of the CCP;

ﬁve days he later traveled to Beijing to praise the CCP’s

“transparency” in sharing information.

The institution responsible for global trade, the World

Trade Organization (WTO), has been unable to force the

PRC to live up to its original commitments since it joined

the body nearly 20 years ago. In addition, WTO rules are

inadequate to deal with many of the CCP’s pernicious

policies. Without these brakes, a country whose domestic

economy is structured to compel technology transfer

and sponsor IP theft is now the world’s second largest

economy, while still self-identifying as a developing

country at the WTO.

The institution responsible for lending to the developing

world, the World Bank, counts the PRC, the world’s top

exporter of high-tech products and second largest

economy, as one of its top recipients of loans. At the end

of 2019, the World Bank approved a ﬁve-year lending

plan of more than $1 billion to the PRC. Whereas there

are 88 World Bank projects worth more than $11 billion in

the PRC, countries like the United States and Japan have

none.

The institution responsible for global telecommunications

standards and interoperability, the International

Telecommunications Union, is led by a national from the

PRC, a country that ﬁrewalls its domestic internet from the

world and requires all of its own telecommunications ﬁrms

to be tools for spying, surveillance, and censorship.

The institution responsible for protecting human rights

globally, the United Nations Human Rights Council, has

given a seat on its consultative council to the PRC, a

country responsible for concentration camps, atrocities

targeted by ethnicity, and depriving more human beings

of fundamental human rights than any other government

in the world today.

Continued acceptance of the CCP’s malign ideology and

behavior has changed the international system from one

that promotes freedom and openness into one that allows

their degradation. If this blatant abuse of international

rules and norms continues unchallenged, these

organizations are likely to either become meaningless or

disappear. This outcome is indeed not coincidental but

part of a CCP design to parasitically extract maximum

self-beneﬁt from the current system, while building an

alternative governance model to eventually ﬁll the void

after its collapse.

The Belt and Road to Dependency

The BRI is the cornerstone of the CCP’s vision for an

authoritarian world order. Characterized by debt-trap

diplomacy, bribery, resource extraction, and opaque

ﬁnancial and commercial agreements, the BRI is modern-

day colonialism. Reﬂecting the CCP’s corrupt and zero-

sum ideology, the CCP is the primary beneﬁciary and deals

with BRI participants from a position of leverage rather

than as partners. Over time, the PRC plans to become the

global center of trade, commerce, and technology, with

a network of vassal states whose political and economic

survival are reliant on the CCP. The global economy of

sovereign states generally abiding by a rules-based order

would be replaced with satellite states whose survival is

inextricably linked to the survival of the CCP’s opaque and

murderous regime.

The CCP is making strides toward this goal. The CCP

and its companies have stakes in at least 40 ports

globally, including military dual-use locations in Sri

Lanka, Djibouti, and the Panama Canal. Along the BRI,

companies like Huawei and ZTE—known threats to U.S.

national security—are building the digital infrastructure

that powers communications systems and undergirds

critical infrastructure from farming to ﬁnance. Linking all

these digital and physical assets is a constellation of PRC

satellites that form the Beidou navigation system—the

PRC’s version of GPS. To complete this digital ecosystem

is a range of AI surveillance products and services that

can provide the CCP with access to massive data sets

and give autocrats sharper instruments to oppress their

people.

By outsourcing key elements of their societies to the CCP,

corrupt and naive leaders are allowing for the piecemeal

formation of a CCP world order. Sovereignty and rule of

law will be replaced with dependency and rule by might.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

The CCP’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi put its foreign policy

succinctly, “China is a big country and other countries are

small countries, and that’s just a fact.”

A Generational Call to Action

The policy of engagement that typiﬁed prior

administrations’ approach to the PRC set aside and

ignored the CCP’s communist ideology and instead

American and international institutions—from businesses

to universities to the United Nations (UN) itself—grew

to accommodate it. Indeed, these groups, captured by

the promise of proﬁt, created a lexicon of dismissals

that attempted to rationalize relations with a murderous

regime.

Companies naively aligned their long-term

corporate strategies with CCP ﬁve-year plans and

industrial policies that aimed to replace them. Consultants

sold executives on corporate strategies to appear “less

American” to gain favor in Beijing.

Now, as policymakers seek to reclaim vital supply

chains and protect critical technologies from malign

uses—including repressive surveillance and advanced

weaponry—some of these groups who recklessly tied

their ﬁnancial future to a dictatorial regime are still

advocating for the CCP. Some U.S. academic institutions

say that new rules banning agents of the CCP’s military

from obtaining U.S. master’s degrees in military ﬁelds

are “counterproductive.”

Some U.S. businesses are

publicly and privately pushing back on a series of rules

to restrict the ability of Huawei—a CCP company indicted

for a multitude of crimes—to obtain U.S. technology.

Emblematic of this continuing divergence with the national

interest, the CEO of KLA-Tencor recently tried to reassure

analysts that the company would be able to dodge U.S.

Department of Commerce (DoC) regulations to continue

sales to potential military end-users in the PRC.

U.S. policy towards the CCP, its malign ideology,

and the dangerous aggression it drives stands at a

pivotal moment. The CCP has exploited our so-called

engagement policy and reversed the theory of economic

entanglement—or the idea that high levels of trade and

investment between countries could promote peace and

deter aggression. Cornerstone American institutions are

working against the U.S. national interest in service of

the CCP’s long-term goals. American technology, know-

how, and investment

is empowering a regime that is

launching what has been called a silent invasion against

our societies and is eviscerating liberal values globally.

Today, economic entanglement is increasing the risk of

conﬂict and aggression by holding liberal countries back

from meaningfully responding to CCP transgressions—

be they economic, diplomatic, or military—for fear of

economic reprisals.

Americans and the World Must Stand Up to the CCP

The U.S. and our allies and partners can no longer

acquiesce to CCP blackmail. Liberal, democratic societies

must go back to their ﬁrst principles and stand up to this

generational revisionist power. Taken together, the free

world is still the leader in technology, talent, market size,

and capital. The world is waking up to the nature and

goals of the CCP but needs to be alert to the exigency of

the threat. More than 200,000 Americans have lost their

lives from COVID-19. Had the CCP followed global health

protocols—deliberately put in place to avoid a global

pandemic—hundreds of thousands of innocent people

could still be with their families and friends. Instead doctors

were silenced and the WHO acquiesced to the CCP. The

free world must accept that it built up a morally bankrupt

regime that is now responsible for a global pandemic,

commands hundreds of nuclear weapons, leads a more

than two-million-person military, and directs the second

largest economy in the world. The stakes are existential.

The banner of socialism with Chinese

characteristics is now flying high and

proud for all to see… It offers a new option

for other countries and nations who want

to speed up their development while

preserving their independence; and it offers

Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to

solving the problems facing mankind.”

- Xi Jinping, 19th CCP National Congress, 2017

Coordinated, decisive action must be taken to protect

the values that underpin the safety and durability of free

societies. Americans cannot do this alone. Democracies

must deal with the CCP in full acknowledgment that their

actions are dictated by their adherence to a communist

ideology. Addressing such malign conduct can no longer

be one of many priorities for our respective governments,

but rather the organizing principle of the free world. The

free world needs a uniﬁed approach that safeguards our

markets, ﬁnancial systems, technologies, and peoples

from CCP exploitation. Government, industry, academia,

and civil society must come together to implement policies

that protect and strengthen our people and institutions

from CCP aggression and subversion.

In his inaugural address President Reagan reminded

Americans that “freedom is never more than one

generation away from extinction.” That maxim has a

striking resonance today. A unique and exceptional threat

by a totalitarian regime marks an emergency for liberal

democracies. Xi Jinping himself frames the period between

2017 and 2022 as the pivotal moment for the CCP’s long

term plan of “national rejuvenation,” to overtake the U.S.

by 2049, the 100th anniversary of communist rule in China,

and achieve “[a] world in which China’s preeminence is

achieved and recognized, and China is unconstrained.

A world, in short, with China at its center.”

3132

Without

immediate, sustained, and comprehensive action we

risk President Reagan’s cautionary point that “one day

we will spend our sunset years telling our children and

our children’s children what it was once like in the United

States when men were free.”

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

CHAPTER I:

IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Introduction

A contest of two types of ideology is

intensifying.”

- Xi Jinping,

2014, Declassiﬁed in 2020

Nowhere is the U.S. strategic competition with the CCP

starker than in the ideological domain. CCP leaders

themselves believe the Party stands existentially

threatened by “false ideological trends” arising from

constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society,

free markets, independent journalism, dissidents, and

even the Party’s own checkered history. This is a lesson

that CCP General Secretary Xi has taken directly from

the collapse of the USSR, which he attributes to its lack

of ideological vigor. As Xi has put it, “The wavering of

idealistic faith is the most dangerous form of wavering. A

political party’s decline often starts with the loss or lack of

idealistic faith.”

This totalitarian vision has led to extreme repression in

the PRC, most notably in Xinjiang where a million or

more Uyghurs are languishing in concentration camps

where they are forced to undergo extensive ideological

“re-education,” among countless other abuses.

Even outside of Xinjiang, the CCP’s nascent social

credit system, which seeks to score every aspect of life,

from the purchases individuals make, to their internet

history, relationships, conscientiousness, and loyalty and

usefulness to the Party, reinforces both the CCP’s desire

for total control and its habitual insecurity.

The impacts of this insecurity are not limited to PRC

borders. The CCP has long emphasized the importance

of United Front Work, which consists of “a range of

methods to inﬂuence overseas Chinese communities,

foreign governments, and other actors to take actions or

adopt positions supportive of Beijing’s preferred policies.”

However, in recent years, United Front Work has taken

on even greater importance within the CCP hierarchy,

and Xi himself has singled it out as a “magic weapon” to

promote the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

This magic weapon can take a variety of forms, but typically

involves co-opting elites in foreign governments as well

as in international organizations in a way that subtly but

steadily reshapes the international system away from

western or universal values and towards a Sino-centric

international order that reﬂects the CCP’s deep paranoia

and authoritarianism.

Corruption is central to the CCP’s strategy to reorient the

values of the international system in a way that makes

the world safe for its authoritarianism. In recent years,

United Front networks have featured prominently in the

alleged bribing of two former Secretary Generals of the

UN General Assembly, as well as international advocacy

in support of BRI. The CCP has also made frequent

use of bribery when it comes to foreign governments.

For instance, as former Sri Lankan President Mahinda

Rajapaksa racked up Chinese debt in support of a highly

questionable port in his hometown of Hambantota, the

PRC state-owned enterprises ﬁnancing the deal poured

at least $7.6 million into bank accounts aliated with his

campaign. The CCP’s goal, in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, is

to create a network of like-minded anti-liberal, or at least

corrupt, states that owe their political power to Beijing.

The good news is that this competition is playing out on

grounds favorable to the U.S. Given the choice between

Beijing’s totalitarian system, international bullying, and

rampant corruption, American values provide an eective

contrast with a track record that speaks for itself. Unlike

the CCP, which has clients but no friends, the U.S. leads

the world’s largest alliance system. While a competition

between the U.S. and the PRC may well be a near-peer

contest, a competition between the PRC and the U.S.

together with U.S. friends and allies is not. The central

challenge for the U.S. is to inspire its friends and allies

to join the U.S. in actively contesting this 21st century

adversary.

Here again, the U.S. is on favorable ground. The nations

the U.S. most needs on its side across Europe and

Asia largely share similar values. While these countries

may hold dierent perceptions of the CCP threat, they

should all share a common revulsion towards the CCP’s

totalitarianism and crimes against humanity, particularly in

Xinjiang. If the U.S. treats the PRC as just another rogue

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

international state – unpleasant but wrong within normal

boundaries – U.S. allies may not be particularly convinced.

Instead, as the Reagan Administration’s National Security

Decision Directive-75 put it, “U.S. policy must have an

ideological thrust which clearly arms the superiority

of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and

freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise,

and political democracy over the repressive features of

Soviet Communism.” U.S. policy today needs that same

kind of ideological thrust that both conﬁdently asserts and

elaborates upon the superiority of our values, calls out the

CCP for its abuses, and most critically of all, uses shared

values to win allies over to our point of view.

Ideological Warfare

[T]he kind of order Beijing desires is not

one where its socialism system is merely

secure, but also covered in glory. Xi’s

aim is not simply, in the colorful phrase

some Western scholars have used, ‘a

world safe for autocracy.’ Rather, the

Party seeks an order in which China’s

achievements as a great power are

not only recognized but also credited

to its particular brand of socialism and

lauded as a moral triumph both for

socialism and for the Chinese nation.”

– Professor Daniel Tobin,

Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

Key Finding:The CCP seeks to denigrate democracy and

overturn the post-Cold War consensus that democratic

governance is the preeminent route to liberty and

prosperity. In its place, it seeks to champion socialism

with Chinese Characteristics as a legitimate form of

government and spread its authoritarian model across

the developing world.

The CCP understands that Western values such

asdemocracy, human rights, capitalism, and independent

journalism are an existential threat to Party rule. The Party

is fanatically committed to blocking these values from

reaching PRC society through the Great Firewall and its

extreme control on information. At the same time, the

Party conducts propaganda oensives to discredit these

ideas in front of audiences both foreign and domestic.

During the 2019 U.S. government shutdown, for example,

PRC state media argued that not only was American

democracy unable to solve issues such as the income

gap and political polarization, but that U.S. institutions

themselves were to blame for American decline. As

the CCP-controlled Global Times put it, gridlock and

stagnation was “an inevitability of U.S. democracy.”

The CCP holds its system up as the natural alternative

to aging and ineective democracy. On the occasion of

the CCP’s 19th National Congress, a column in Xinhua

criticized Western democracy, emphasizing how the

CCP’s model leads to “social unity rather than the

divisions which come as an unavoidable consequence

of the adversarial nature of western democracy today.”

At the same time, it emphasized that under the CCP’s

benevolent rule, the PRC has seen “unparalleled growth

and staggering achievements” and contrasted the Party’s

96-year run with the frequent changes in leadership

in democratic societies. In his keynote at the National

Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping said, “ the banner

of socialism with Chinese characteristics is now ﬂying

high and proud for all to see… blazing a new trail for other

developing countries to achieve modernization. It oers

a new option for other countries and nations who want to

speed up their development…”

CCP leaders are explicit about the goal of this messaging:

they want foreign countries to develop along the PRC’s

model, and not the U.S.’. In recent years, the CCP has

expanded eorts to export its technologically enabled

authoritarianism abroad. In one of the most telling

examples, ZTE has been working with the Venezuelan

government to create a “fatherland card” that mirror’s

the CCP’s social credit system. The more countries that

employ PRC technology to monitor and oppress their

populations, the safer the world will be for socialism with

Chinese characteristics.

Recommendation: The Administration

should clearly and publicly state

an intention to break the CCP’s

totalitarianism. In order to eectively

respond to the CCP’s ideological

challenge, the U.S. needs to borrow

from the Reagan Administration’s

strategy against the Soviet Union.

President Reagan’s policy was guided

by an overarching objective as timely

now as it was then: America’s goal

must not be indeﬁnite coexistence with

a hostile Communist state, but rather,

the end of the Party’s monopoly on

power. All policies should ﬂow from this

north star.

Recommendation: The Administration

should revise and reissue the

2020 “U.S. Strategic Approach to

the People’s Republic of China” to

incorporate the principle above. This

document states that the U.S. approach

to the PRC has two objectives:

reinforcing “our institutions, alliances,

and partnerships,” and compelling

Beijing to “cease or reduce” harmful

actions. This second objective is

not achievable so long as the CCP

maintains unchallenged totalitarianism

in the PRC, because its malign conduct

is an intrinsic product of its ideology.

Recommendation: The Administration

should continue directly attacking the

legitimacy of socialism with Chinese

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Characteristics, as National Security Adviser O’Brien did in his June 2020 speech in Phoenix, Arizona.

It is not enough to criticize CCP behavior, which is ultimately driven by its ideology. The CCP’s

continued commitment to Marxist-Leninist communism is at the heart of its challenge to the U.S. and

the international system, but also a vulnerability the CCP seeks to obscure to the outside world. The

more that the world understands that the CCP is preaching the bankrupt legacy of communism, the

more countries will make decisions in favor of their own sovereignty, which is in the U.S. interest.

Recommendation:The Administration should continue reasserting that democratic freedoms are the

right of every human being, whether they live in Shanghai, Xinjiang, or anywhere else in the world.

Freedom is not the exclusive domain of one nation or one people, and the CCP’s enslavement of

one-ﬁfth of mankind threatens both U.S. interests and values. In two seminal speeches at Westminster

and later at Moscow State University, Reagan laid out the case for why the democratic world must

stand united, and why the Russian people were no less worthy of those freedoms than Americans.

On the hundredth anniversary of the May 4th movement, Deputy National Security Advisor Matt

Pottinger gave the spiritual successor to President Reagan’s Moscow State speech by talking directly

to the people of the PRC– in Mandarin – about China’s many contributions to democratic values and

international order. The U.S. should emphasize this message, along with President Reagan’s appeal

for democratic solidarity, whenever possible.

Recommendation: Congress should continue developing comprehensive, omnibus legislation for

competition with the CCP which recognizes that the CCP is a threat across the full range of U.S.

interests. Such eorts include S.4272, the STRATEGIC Act, which would advance a competitive strategy

towards the CCP with concrete provisions to combat CCP economic and industrial policy, revitalize

U.S. technological competitiveness, safeguard U.S. institutions from undue inﬂuence, maintain the

integrity of international organizations, and bolster deterrence and allied defense cooperation.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its use of diplomatic authorities to pressure

the CCP for its restrictions on U.S. diplomats, properly identify CCP propagandists operating in the

U.S., and highlight the CCP’s malign ideology. Such actions have included the designation of CCP

propaganda outlets as foreign missions and the establishment of travel disclosure requirements for

PRC diplomats in the U.S., which are partially reciprocal to restrictions U.S. diplomats face in the PRC.

U.S. Diplomatic Resources

Key Finding: Successive administrations have announced plans to “pivot” to, “re-balance” towards, or otherwise

prioritize the Indo-Paciﬁc since 2013. Backed up by the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense

Strategy, there is bipartisan consensus that the Indo-Paciﬁc is the U.S.’ prevailing foreign policy and defense priority

for the foreseeable future. Despite this, the allocation of diplomatic resources for the region has failed to reﬂect this

strategic priority.

The Indo-Paciﬁc continues to receive a disproportionately low share of foreign assistance resources in each ﬁscal year

relative to its share of the globe’s population and its relevance to U.S. strategic interests. For example, in 2015 a $1.7

billion increase in foreign aid appropriations for Africa was more than the entire amount of U.S. foreign aid received by

all countries in the Indo-Paciﬁc region that year. In its most recent budget, the two regions that make up the Indo-Paciﬁc,

East and South Asia, were the Administration’s smallest requests apart from Europe. The FY2021 budget requested

more funds for the Western Hemisphere than for the entire Indo-Paciﬁc region, allocated more than three times the Indo-

Paciﬁc’s funding for Africa, and more than six times as much for the Near East.

The U.S. competition with the CCP is global, and the allocation of foreign assistance resources involves many

considerations, including needs in less-developed areas all over the globe. Ultimately, the lodestar of U.S. foreign aid

decisions must be the U.S. national interest. Successive administrations have concluded that the Indo-Paciﬁc is the

primary priority for the national interest, and the Indo-Paciﬁc is the region most susceptible the PRC’s geopolitical, military,

and economic might. The 2018 National Defense Strategy made clear that the CCP “seeks Indo-Paciﬁc regional

hegemony in the near-term,” a way-point toward the “displacement of the U.S. to achieve global preeminence in the

With the ink on the CCP’s sham national security law for Hong Kong barely dry, the world is witnessing how the CCP’s totalitarianism

doesn’t stop at PRC borders. In September, 12 democracy activists were arrested at sea while trying to ﬂee Hong Kong, and instead

of being returned to Hong Kong, were brought to the PRC to face its opaque, CCP-controlled courts. The CCP has also issued arrest

warrants for pro-democracy activists living outside of Hong Kong, including a United States citizen, simply for exercising their right

to free speech. U.S. citizen Samuel Chu recently woke up to media reports that he was a wanted fugitive under Hong Kong’s national

security law for “inciting secession” and “colluding with foreign powers.” Under this new law, the CCP is attempting to criminalize

speech everywhere, not just in Hong Kong. As Chu said when he heard this news, “[W]e are all Hong Kongers now.”

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

future.” Averting this future requires treating competition with the CCP, and accordingly treating the Indo-Paciﬁc, as a

deciding factor in resource decisions, not coequal with other interests. However, the last decade of foreign aid data does

not reﬂect a prioritization of the Indo-Paciﬁc.

It is important for the Administration and Congress to have a full accounting of what federal funding beneﬁts and

counters the CCP. A recent directive from the Oce of Management and Budget (OMB) requiring federal agencies to

compile such information is a helpful step. In addition, last year Congress appropriated $300 million for a “Countering

Chinese Inﬂuence Fund,” but as the ﬁscal year draws to a close, it is not clear whether the Administration has obligated

the full amount to counter the CCP, or whether Congress will continue to replenish the Fund at its original amount in

ongoing appropriations processes.

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should prioritize competition with the CCP as

a deciding factor for federal resource decisions, including for foreign assistance and foreign service

personnel allocations for the Indo-Paciﬁc.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.7937, the Countering CCP Malign Inﬂuence Act, which

would authorize the new Countering Chinese Inﬂuence Fund at its original appropriated level of $300

million and require the Fund to be overseen by a regional expert. In the interim, the Department of

State (DoS) must immediately improve its management and implementation of the Fund. Currently,

it appears that the Fund is controlled by the Department’s Oce of Foreign Assistance, rather than

regional experts, and that the full amounts available in the Fund are not being obligated to counter the

malign inﬂuence of the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.8058, the Chinese Research Funds Accounting Act,

which would direct the Comptroller General to conduct a study on federal funding made available to

entities in the PRC or controlled by the CCP. OMB should continue its eorts to create an inventory of

all programming across the U.S. government that involves collaboration with CCP controlled entities

or the transfer of federal funds to such entities, including through intermediaries such as NGOs. OMB

should also continue its eorts to measure the totality of funding being used to counter the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of Titles V, VI, and VII of the bipartisan Eliot

L. Engel Department of State Authorization Act of 2020, which is included in H.R. 6395 in the FY2021

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Speciﬁcally, these provisions would ensure new stringent

research and evaluation metrics are employed to measure the eectiveness of U.S. messaging

and develop new training for public diplomacy ocers to counter malign messaging from strategic

competitors. It would also extend authorities at the Global Engagement Center so that it can continue

its work countering CCP and other propaganda; designate a point of contact at every foreign mission

charged with monitoring and reporting corrupt activities in each host country and require DoS to

consolidate all corruption reporting and indices into one publicly available database, which will give

added focus to the extensive corruption perpetrated by the CCP; and ensure that the IT resources at

DoS are more secure and better able to resist malicious penetration by foreign actors, including the

PRC. It would also require an interagency-created list of dangerous telecommunication contractors

that DoS would be prohibited from contracting with.

Malign Inﬂuence & United Front Work

Key Finding: Using covert, coercive inﬂuence to advance its interests inside other countries is an intrinsic part of

the CCP’s nature. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) cultivates and controls pervasive networks of

aliates around the world. Through overseas “United Front Work,” the CCP has gained eectively unchallenged

direction over vast swaths of the world’s Chinese diaspora organizations and Chinese-language media, providing

infrastructure for corruption, political interference, and malign inﬂuence.

Recommendation: Congress should create a new sanctions mechanism speciﬁcally tailored for the

UFWD, which can be used to apply visa and asset blocking sanctions on UFWD ocials and aliates

who are responsible for CCP malign inﬂuence operations which threaten U.S. national security.

Recommendation: The Administration should prioritize counter-United Front programming through

the Indo-Paciﬁc Transparency Initiative, an interagency foreign assistance initiative to promote good

governance in the Indo-Paciﬁc which was announced by the Vice President in 2018. The Administration

should develop and fund speciﬁc counter-UFWD programs under the Initiative, and DoS should update

and reissue its fact-sheet on the Initiative to publicize these eorts.

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should prioritize legal assistance for foreign

inﬂuence transparency, foreign agent registration, and political donations (in a similar manner to the

existing focus on foreign investment screening regimes) using the Transparency Initiative and other

existing foreign assistance programming.

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should commission and fund country-speciﬁc,

open-source, and unclassiﬁed studies of CCP malign inﬂuence, including United Front Work. The few

existing examples of such work have been critical in exposing undercover People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) scientists operating abroad and documenting United Front networks, and further such eorts will

be essential in uprooting United Front and other malign activity around the world.

Recommendation: The Administration should explore options for making the U.S. funded International

Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok a regional hub for law enforcement cooperation and

training regarding CCP United Front activity. Following the Hong Kong Police Force’s ejection from

ILEA as part of the Administration’s response to Beijing’s National Security Law for Hong Kong, the

Academy is now free of PRC participation and could be a helpful, pre-existing platform for counter-

United Front eorts.

Recommendation: DoS should use existing diplomatic and foreign assistance resources to counter

the UFWD, including but not limited to the items listed below. Congress should conduct oversight of

these items and if necessary, legislate further reporting requirements to drive Administration action.

Working together, DoS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) should:

• Prioritize assistance to law enforcement bodies handling foreign interference such as election

interference, in a similar manner to existing programming for counterterrorism and human

tracking units.

• Ensure all embassies and consulates are equipped to monitor and understand what is happening

in Chinese diaspora communities.

• Continue and expand recent eorts to assign dedicated personnel to select embassies to monitor

CCP activities at a regional level. The information gathered should be appropriately shared

outside of the Department with other government entities.

• Support Chinese diaspora civil society organizations that are independent of CCP control.

• Train politicians, public ocials, reporters, and business ﬁgures in UFWD awareness, related

political and criminal risks, and how to avoid contributing to foreign interference.

Human Rights

Key Finding: Human rights are a dimension of the free world’s competition with the CCP, no less than security or

economics. At home, the CCP is the world’s most accomplished human rights abuser, depriving 1.4 billion human

beings of their fundamental rights. Internationally, the CCP is advancing its revisionist deﬁnition of human rights that

substitutes collective material advancement for individual liberties. The CCP’s threat to human rights extends far

beyond its domestic borders, threatening the national security of the U.S. and its our like-minded partners. The CCP

is perfecting, modeling, and distributing a system of repression that empowers authoritarian regimes like itself and

degrades the values on which democracy is built.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue and expand enforcement actions in line with

its “Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory,” a notice issued by DoS, Department of Treasury (DoT),

DoC, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to highlight “the risks for businesses with

supply chain links to entities complicit in forced labor and other human rights abuses in Xinjiang and

throughout China.” Examples of such enforcement actions include the use of Withhold Release Orders

from U.S. Customs and Border Protection to block imports made with forced labor. The Administration

should regularly update the Business Advisory and issue further such advisories when appropriate.

For private sector and consumer audiences, the Administration should continue elaborating the

costs of entanglement in an economy rife with human rights violations, which will help degrade the

proﬁtability of CCP abuses.

Amid worsening repression by the Chinese Communist Party, many Uyghurs have ﬂed the PRC. A now public extradition request sent

to the Turkish government by the CCP conﬁrmed what many Uyghurs living outside of the PRC have long feared- the CCP is pressuring

foreign governments to deport Uyghurs back to the PRC where they will be subject to the CCP’s brutality. Enver Turdi, a Uyghur who

is named in the extradition request, ﬂed to Turkey in 2014 after being targeted by the CCP for telling the truth about the CCP’s human

rights abuses. He said: “I spend most of my nights in fear. I usually don’t sleep until after 1am because I am afraid they will come for me

and my family.”

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The Administration should

reexamine all export licenses issued pursuant

to DoS’ International Trac in Arms Regulations

and DoC’s Export Administration Regulations

to entities in Hong Kong prior to July 2020. The

Administration has stopped granting Hong Kong

dierential export control treatment following

the Secretary of State’s determination that Hong

Kong is no longer meaningfully autonomous from

the PRC, and the President’s Executive Order on

Hong Kong Normalization directed the termination

of license exceptions and suspensions for Hong

Kong. However, preexisting licenses for the export

of sensitive technology to Hong Kong remain in

eect and should be reexamined following the

expansion of the CCP’s police state into Hong

Kong.

Recommendation: The Administration should fully

implement recent bipartisan sanctions laws to

respond to CCP human rights violations, including

the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (P.L. 115-330),

the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy

Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-76), the Uyghur Human Rights

Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145), and the Hong Kong

Autonomy Act (P.L. 116-149). Recent high-proﬁle

actions, such as the sanctioning of Chen Quanguo

under the Global Magnitsky Act, are positive steps,

but the enacted laws speciﬁcally crafted to respond

to CCP human rights violations have not been fully

enforced. For example, the President’s Executive

Order on Hong Kong Normalization incorporates

some, but not all, elements of the Hong Kong

Autonomy Act. Rigorous implementation of such

authorities against CCP human rights abusers, as

well as the companies and plutocrats that facilitate

these abuses, will encourage other countries to

multilateralize their sanctions eorts and coalesce

behind U.S. eorts to hold the CCP accountable.

Recommendation: The U.S. should evaluate

whether to modify, strengthen, or make permanent

a limitation in the current appropriations law that

prohibits certain types of bilateral cooperation

between the U.S. and the PRC without a

government certiﬁcation. Currently, the U.S.

government must certify 30 days in advance that

a bilateral interaction will not result in the transfer

of technology, data, or other information with

national security or economic security implications

to the PRC or a PRC-owned company and will not

involve knowing interactions with ocials who

have been determined by the U.S. to have direct

involvement with violations of human rights.

Recommendation: Congress should secure ﬁnal

passage of H.R. 6210, the Uyghur Forced Labor

Prevention Act, a bipartisan measure to help

prevent the CCP from using American consumers

to subsidize human rights abuses against Uyghurs,

with reﬁnement as necessary during Senate

consideration.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4331, the Tibetan Policy

and Support Act, a bipartisan measure which

would reject CCP eorts to install a handpicked

successor to the Dalai Lama who is loyal to the

CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7805, the Stop Predatory Organ Tracking Act,

a bipartisan measure which would authorize the

imposition of visa sanctions on ocials complicit

in organ tracking. Furthermore, Congress

should require an interagency assessment of

forced organ harvesting speciﬁc to the PRC, and

if necessary, single out and sanction the ocials

who run the PRC’s organ transplant system.

Recommendation: The Administration should

levy Global Magnitsky sanctions on ocials

from the United Front’s Religious Work Bureau,

as appropriate, to apply consequences for the

oppression of Christianity. Under General Secretary

Xi Jinping, the CCP’s UFWD was given control of

all religious aairs in the PRC in 2018, including the

PRC’s only state-approved churches, and recent

reports have indicated that the CCP is attempting

to re-write Christian scripture to incorporate “Xi

Jinping Thought”. Meaningful consequences

would help draw necessary attention to the CCP’s

oppression of the house church movement and its

regulation and perversion of Christianity overall.

Recommendation: DoS should consider issuing

a determination that the CCP’s crimes against

Uyghurs amount to genocide. Recent research

has revealed that the CCP has suppressed Uyghur

birth rates through forced sterilization and birth

control, which may support a determination that

the CCP’s crimes constitute genocide under the

UN genocide convention.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

legislation calling on companies to disclose

to American audiences that entertainment

productions, such as ﬁlms or sporting events,

that are distributed or intended to be distributed

in the PRC, have had their content approved by

CCP censors. The legislation should also call on

companies to disclose entertainment partnerships

or investments from CCP-controlled entities.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

5725, the Hong Kong Be Water Act, a measure

that would impose Global Magnitsky sanctions

on Hong Kong and PRC government ocials

responsible for suppressing or facilitating the

suppression of Hong Kongers’ freedoms of

speech, association, assembly, procession, or

demonstration. These sanctions would build on

those imposed by DoT pursuant to Executive Order

13936 and those mandated under the bipartisan

Hong Kong Autonomy Act (P. L. 116-149) through

the freezing of assets of state-owned enterprises

that undermine the autonomy, basic liberties, and

human rights of Hong Kongers.

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Recommendation: Congress should support the Administration in its pledge to “reallocate admissions

within the refugee ceiling set by the annual Presidential Determination to residents of Hong Kong based on

humanitarian concerns, to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law…” as stated in The President’s

Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, issued on July 14, 2020. In addition, Members of Congress have

begun developing legislation aimed at humanitarian assistance for Hong Kong dissidents who are in need of

protection. The vetting process for such dissidents must ensure proper counter-intelligence screening.

Recommendation: Congress should pass Section 1284 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, a

bipartisan provision reﬂecting the text of H.R. 7307, the Foreign Advanced Technology Surveillance

Accountability Act. The Act would require DoS’ annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

to include information on the use of surveillance and advanced technology to suppress rights.

Global Corruption

Key Finding: The CCP channels corruption as a tool of domestic control and geopolitical advantage. The U.S. and like-

minded democracies remain among the most attractive destinations for kleptocrats to stash their ill-gotten gains, hide

assets from the dictators they prop up, and escape the authoritarian system they help build. Globally, and especially

in the developing world, the CCP deploys strategic corruption, using bribes and kickbacks for geopolitical advantage.

Recommendation: Congress should pass the following pieces of bipartisan legislation:

• H.R. 3843, the CROOK Act, which would create anti-corruption points of contact at embassies to

report on corruption related to BRI;

• H.R. 3441, the Kleptocrat Exposure Act, which would empower the Secretary of State to publicly

name and shame foreign persons who have had their U.S. visas revoked for human rights

violations or signiﬁcant acts of corruption;

• H.R. 4140, the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, which would allow the U.S. to extradite foreign

ocials who engage in corruption against a U.S. person;

• H.R. 4361, the Justice for Victims of Kleptocracy Act, which would instruct DoJ to compile and

publicly list assets which have been seized from corrupt ocials; and

• H.R. 2167, Protecting U.S. Businesses Abroad Act, which authorizes visa sanctions on foreign

individuals or entities that engage in certain forms of corruption, expropriation, or extortion

against a U.S. investor in a foreign country.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 2514, the Coordinating Oversight, Upgrading and

Innovating Technology, and Examiner Reform Act, a bipartisan measure to strengthen anti-money-

laundering and counter-terrorism-ﬁnancing laws.

Environment/Conservation

Key Finding: The CCP is preying on the international community’s prioritization of climate change, posturing itself as

an essential partner to collect undue credit and discourage nations from responding to malign CCP behavior. The

CCP claims a self-interested, hollow, and revisionist deﬁnition of environmental leadership, in which the CCP gains

geopolitical clout for empty gestures while wreaking global environmental havoc for its own advantage.

Despite pushing a narrative about the importance of developing renewable energy resources, the CCP is continuing to

export some of the most environmentally damaging technologies through BRI. While seeking to decrease the use of

coal at home, the CCP has dedicated over $50 billion through BRI to develop coal projects across 150 countries in the

last seven years. Over 70percent of coal-ﬁred power plants being built today are dependent on PRC ﬁnancing.

Publications like the CCP’s 2018 Arctic white paper are ﬁlled with references to sustainable development and climate

change, yet the CCP is keen to saddle developing countries with long-term debt and power plants that emit the highest

volumes of CO2. The same Arctic white paper also sought to establish the PRC as a “near-Arctic state,” a non-existent

and unrecognized categorization. This attempt to grant the CCP legitimacy in seeking more access to the fragile Arctic

ecosystem is greatly concerning in light of the PRC’s track record of disregard for environmental concerns and illegal

ﬁshing activities elsewhere.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the PRC ranked ﬁrst out of 152 countries

in terms of illegal, unreported, and unregulated ﬁshing worldwide. PRC ﬂeets have decimated ﬁshing stocks o the

shores of North Korea, violated U.N. sanctions prohibiting ﬁshing in North Korean waters, and are now threatening

ﬁsheries o the coast of Africa and around the Galapagos Islands. Not only do these eorts deplete the resources of the

communities that have historically depended on them, but they endanger ecologically sensitive areas, providing further

evidence of the CCP’s blatant disregard for the environmental impacts of its eorts to economically compete with the

U.S.

Recommendation: The Administration should establish a program to highlight the CCP’s environmental

hypocrisy, along with the millions of dollars the U.S. continues to spend each year to promote

environmental conservation globally through U.S. foreign assistance programming. This program

could involve DoS public diplomacy eorts, as well as eorts from the U.S. Agency for Global Media

(USAGM).

Recommendation: The Administration should issue a plan to respond to the CCP’s perpetuation of

global climate change as the world’s largest carbon emitter by a massive margin. The U.S. has a strong,

bipartisan legacy of advancing environmental conservation while promoting economic strength. The

U.S. needs to reclaim global environmental credibility and leadership. Simply pointing out the CCP’s

hypocrisy is unlikely to dissuade the international community from viewing the CCP as a partner on

climate change, rather than the antagonist it is.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its eorts to counter and expose CCP attempts

to perpetuate and whitewash its environmental malfeasance through the UN system and International

Financial Institutions (IFIs).

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 4636, the Partnering and Leveraging Assistance to

Stop Trash for International Cleaner Seas Act (PLASTICS), a bipartisan measure which would advance

global eorts to prevent and reduce marine debris and plastic waste.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 5859, the Trillion Trees Act, a bipartisan bill which

would establish a commitment to a global eort to plant one trillion trees by investing in national

and international reforestation and authorizing reforms to improve forest management, utilize wood

products, and increase global carbon sequestration.

International Organizations

Key Finding: To advance its own interests, the CCP is undertaking a concerted strategy to subvert the U.S. built,

post-WWII international system to its ideological and geopolitical advantage. The CCP seeks to install its handpicked

personnel in key positions and redeﬁne the norms the UN was built to preserve. A U.S. counterstrategy, in partnership

with its key allies, should push the CCP to change its behavior and stop its eorts to revise the UN, while demonstrating

the strength of democracies and reasserting democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law.

In June 2019, a PRC candidate soundly won the director-generalship of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO),

cementing PRC leadership over four of the 15 major technical agencies within the UN system. No other nation leads

more than one. The CCP triumphed over candidates supported by democracies through a corrupt process, leveraging

BRI investment promises and trade threats to secure votes.

The CCP is undertaking expansive eorts to hijack the UN system to serve the CCP’s advantage, legitimize its communist

ideology, and add a veneer of credibility to its corrupt dealings. In addition to securing key leadership positions, the CCP

seeks to install its personnel into key posts within organizations it controls, such as IT, IG, and HR departments, while also

outpacing the U.S. in support for mid- and entry-level positions in the UN. Such CCP-supported personnel unabashedly

denigrate the impartiality that is required of UN ocials. In one instance, a former UN Under-Secretary-General bragged

about using UN security to expel a Uyghur from a UN seminar, saying “We have to strongly defend the motherland’s

interests.”

In addition, the PRC utilizes the Junior Professional Ocer (JPO) program to place PRC nationals within the UN career

sta. While the program is designed to help countries increase their representation in the civil service, the CCP abuses the

program to place CCP loyalists in key positions. Within the UN Secretariat, the PRC sponsors 45 JPOs – in comparison,

the U.S. only sponsors two. Currently, the U.S. sponsors approximately 65 JPOs across the entire UN system, a number

that pales in comparison to the PRC. It is important to increase the number of U.S. sponsored JPO slots to provide an

alternative to the CCP’s practices and ensure the independence of the international civil service.

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

To serve its self-interest, the CCP uses this presence to wield inﬂuence well beyond what its modest ﬁnancial contributions

would otherwise allow. Since 2016, PRC personnel have sought to insert the CCP’s communist ideology into UN

resolutions and other documents in order to reshape international norms to better support the CCP’s totalitarianism,

expansionist economic policies, and foreign policy objectives, as well as shield the CCP’s human rights abuses and

corruption from external criticism. The CCP also uses its UN presence to exclude Taiwan and cover-up its COVID-19

malfeasance.

In the aftermath of the FAO election, the U.S. has upscaled its eorts to counter CCP subversion of the UN system. The

Administration established a new Special Envoy for UN Integrity, to coordinate interagency and like-minded eorts. The

Administration has taken a more deliberate approach to UN elections, begun eorts to support more U.S. personnel

in the UN, and drawn attention to the insidiousness of CCP ideology in the UN. These eorts have already brought

success, most notably the overwhelming defeat of the CCP’s preferred candidate to lead the World Intellectual Property

Organization (WIPO). However, CCP eorts to reshape the world in its own image will persist, and this new U.S. approach

must be continued and expanded.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.7939, the United Nations Transparency and

Accountability Act (UNTAA), which would counter malign inﬂuence operations within the UN system,

coordinate the election of U.S. and U.S.-supported candidates for leadership within the UN system,

support the employment of U.S. citizens as international civil servants, and require transparency and

accountability to Congress for U.S. contributions to the UN system.

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to place more American

personnel in the UN system. The Administration should ensure that the presence of U.S. personnel

is appropriately prioritized and coordinated, while Congress should ensure that these eorts are

appropriately funded. Currently there is no interagency clearinghouse for coordinating the placement

of U.S. personnel in the UN, a shortcoming the UNTAA seeks to address. Beyond this, there is no

established funding mechanism for Junior Personnel Ocers, a main entry-level mode of UN

employment. Candidates for mid-level entry into the UN system from U.S. government employment

encounter hindrances involving their retirement beneﬁts and time-in-grade.

Recommendation: Congress should authorize the Administration’s recently created position of Special

Envoy for UN Integrity. The Special Envoy position, created in 2019, is the ﬁrst role that speciﬁcally

focuses on evaluating and countering malign activities in the UN system, as well as coordinating

interagency and multilateral response.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R.7733, the Li Wenliang Global Public Health

Accountability Act, which would authorize

ﬁnancial and visa sanctions on senior foreign

ocials who conceal information about public

health crises such as COVID-19, implementing

direct consequences on individuals who hamper

the response to pandemics.

Information Statecraft

Key Finding: The CCP is undertaking massive global

eorts to control information and its means of

transmission in order to cement its power, conduct

propaganda and disinformation campaigns, promote its

geopolitical objectives, and build its “discourse power,” or

its ability to conduct ideological warfare. The CCP seeks

to control information, the technologies and platforms

that transmit information, and the laws and norms

that govern information to advance an authoritarian

information model that acts as a transmission vector for

authoritarianism.

The 2017 National Security Strategy described such

eorts as “weaponiz[ing] information to attack the

values and institutions that underpin free societies,

while shielding themselves from outside information.”

The National Security Strategy (NSS) considers these

activities, as well as the U.S. response, to be “Information

Statecraft,” a form of diplomacy in which information is

used to attack and defend authoritarian and democratic

ideology.

The U.S. used Information Statecraft to great eect to

challenge the legitimacy of Soviet communism. But until

very recently, the U.S. had abandoned the explicitly

competitive frame of Information Statecraft towards the

CCP. Going forward, the U.S. must increasingly apply

Information Statecraft to reduce the CCP’s discourse

power, challenging CCP eorts to promote its ideology,

shield itself from outside information, control information

globally, and execute propaganda and disinformation

campaigns.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R.7938, the USIA for Strategic Competition

Act, which would draw on the Cold War-era

experience of the U.S. Information Agency and

the Active Measures Working Group by requiring

a whole-of-government oensive information

statecraft strategy to attack the CCP’s discourse

power, discredit the CCP, and use truth and

values to combat CCP lies and malign ideology.

Recommendation: The Administration and

Congress should continue fully funding DoS’

Global Engagement Center (GEC) and ensuring

the GEC is not budgetarily reliant on the

Department of Defense (DoD). The GEC was

established by Congress to respond to foreign

adversaries’ disinformation and propaganda and

plays a key role in analyzing and responding to

CCP eorts to shape the information environment

to its authoritarian advantage.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R.6621, the Open Technology Fund

Authorization Act, a bipartisan measure which

has been incorporated into the FY2021 House

and Senate-passed NDAAs. The Act would foster

the development of technologies to penetrate

closed authoritarian information ecosystems

such as the CCP’s Great Firewall. The U.S. should

continue to fund security-tested and open-

sourced technologies and their distribution that

help dissidents maintain digital security, ensure

mobile access, and reconstitute websites after

a cyberattack. The Administration should fully

fund the Open Technology Fund in accordance

with the most recent Congressionally approved

spend plan, and sources of funding for the

development and innovation of such tools should

be expanded to include foreign government,

foundations, and the private sector.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

legislation calling on social media companies

to disclose when CCP and other state

propaganda is disseminated on social media

platforms. Certain social media companies have

instituted policies to label state media that is

editorially controlled by hostile governments;

such practices should be followed by other

entities in this sector. Furthermore, state media

in traditional formats, such as print, radio, and

television, should also carry clear and prominent

disclaimers indicating their funding streams and

lack of editorial independence.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

legislation calling on U.S. media organizations

to disclose when they receive payments for

advertisements from companies or news outlets

with strong ties to adversarial governments,

such as the CCP. These practices grant an

asymmetric advantage to PRC state media, as

no U.S. government entity would be able to

purchase such advertising space in the PRC.

Recommendation: The Administration

should increase existing foreign assistance

programming to expand investment mechanisms

for investigative, unbiased media in capital-poor

countries where the CCP saturates the media

landscape, such as in Africa and the Paciﬁc

Islands. CCP-controlled media entities are willing

to pay to inﬂuence such populations and hold

direct investments in local media organizations.

If further attention reveals that existing foreign

assistance resources are insucient, Congress

should authorize and fund programming to

support independent local investigative media,

including Chinese-language media, in areas

subject to signiﬁcant CCP malign inﬂuence.

CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.6570, the Online Consumer Protection Act, to warn individuals

when they download an app that is stored in a country that poses a national security risk, such as the PRC.

By informing consumers where their data is stored, they can make a decision as to whether they would like to

continue downloading the app.

Ideological Allies

Key ﬁnding: The U.S.’ extensive networks of allies and security partners, based on common principles, is an asymmetric

advantage over the CCP. These allies and partners are awakening to the CCP threat, and the U.S. should amplify and

reinforce defenses of shared values and national sovereignty in the face of CCP aggression.

Thanks in large part to CCP’s pandemic cover-up, increased territorial aggression, growing human rights violations, and

belligerent rhetoric, the political center of gravity in many allied capitals is shifting to ground more favorable to the U.S.

The EU-China Leaders’ Meeting on September 14, 2020, oers an illustrative example; an event originally expected to

advance an investment agreement with the PRC instead featured European leaders urging transparency concerning

COVID-19, reasserting the need for economic fairness, and reinforcing fundamental human rights with speciﬁc attention

paid to Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Later in September, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany joined the U.S.,

Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia in formally rejecting the CCP’s illegal claims in the South

China Sea. The U.S. should expand the advantage of our shared values through increased outreach to allies and partners

on all fronts, from inter-parliamentary diplomacy to ﬁnding new ways to create economic ties between like-minded

nations. The free world’s joint vision of an alternative to CCP hegemony will be essential to avert a world built in the

CCP’s image.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its eorts to issue multilateral or coordinated statements

with like-minded allies on malign CCP activities. Recent examples include the joint U.S., Australia, Canada,

and United Kingdom statement on the CCP’s national security law for Hong Kong, and Australia’s call for an

independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 virus. Such statements help underscore that the

CCP’s malign activities are a shared threat to the free world at large, not just U.S.-PRC competition, as well as

foster a common understanding among democracies and other partners of the CCP’s true nature, its ambitions,

and the stakes of strategic competition with the PRC.

Recommendation: The Administration should issue further deﬁnitive statements on CCP activities which are

illegal under international law. For example, DoS’ July 2020 statement, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the

South China Sea,” clariﬁed that the CCP’s territorial aggression in the Sea is illegal, lent weight to international

law, supported the sovereignty of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, and facilitated like-

minded democracies following suit. The Administration could take similar action regarding the CCP’s illegal

conduct in other areas, including around the Senkaku Islands and along India’s border.

Key Finding: Taiwan is a critical focal point in the free world’s confrontation with the CCP, and under a more direct

threat of CCP armed aggression than any other U.S. partner. In Xi Jinping’s words, the forced annexation of Taiwan

is “critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and is the CCP’s overarching objective to overcome the PRC’s

colonial legacy. Xi has implied that he aims to control Taiwan during his rule.

The CCP is diligently working towards this objective; which would be a signiﬁcant blow to U.S. security and global

democracy. Taiwan is a bona ﬁde democracy and a de facto sovereign nation and U.S. security ally. The U.S.

relies on Taiwan as a defense link in the First Island Chain, the sole source of the most advanced semiconductor

technology, and a champion of democracy under the CCP’s shadow. CCP control of Taiwan would undermine U.S.

security alliances globally, gut our technology supply chains, and strike a grave blow to democracy worldwide.

However, despite Taiwan’s drastically increased signiﬁcance to our national destiny over the last forty years, the core

elements of U.S. Taiwan policy have remained stagnant since Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. At that

time, Taiwan was an authoritarian state with no relevance to critical U.S. supply chains. Major improvements are required

to update U.S. policy in keeping with Taiwan’s modern-day signiﬁcance to U.S. national security.

Recommendation: The Administration should allow Taiwan to change the name of its diplomatic oce

to the “Taiwan Representative Oce” or a similar title. Taiwan’s primary diplomatic organization inside

the U.S. is currently called the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Oce,” an anachronistic

title that does not reﬂect the fact that the U.S. enjoys broad, substantial relations with all of Taiwan, not

just its capital city.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 2002, the Taiwan Assurance Act, a

bipartisan bill which would require the Administration to review longstanding restrictions on Taiwan

relations and make these rules available to Congress. Since 1979, the U.S. has maintained “unocial”

relations with Taiwan but has also abided by numerous self-imposed restrictions that are not required

to maintain “unocial” relations, such as restrictions on where U.S.-Taiwan meetings may take place

or which U.S. ocials may visit Taiwan.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R.353/S.249, a bipartisan bill which

would the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the WHO.

This legislation has passed both chambers of Congress and would help prioritize Administration

eorts to promote Taiwan’s participation in the WHO, which is all the more urgent given that Taiwan’s

marginalization from international health cooperation contributed to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.6287, the Taiwan Symbols of Sovereignty (SOS) Act, a

bipartisan measure which would permit government ocials and armed service members from Taiwan

to display or wear Taiwan’s ﬂag for ocial purposes in the U.S. “Unocial” relations with Taiwan do

not require the U.S. to prevent the display of Taiwan’s ﬂag, but longstanding policy has done so

nonetheless.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.7414, the Taiwan Fellowship Act, a bipartisan measure

which would establish a fellowship program in Taiwan for small numbers of qualifying U.S. government

employees. The program is modeled on the longstanding and successful Mansﬁeld Fellowship for

Japan, which has facilitated closer government-to-government ties by allowing U.S. personnel to gain

experience inside Japan’s government.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6974, the Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act of 2020,

which would condition any International Monetary Fund (IMF) shareholding increase for the PRC on

Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the Fund’s activities. Taiwan’s importance to the global economy

and the signiﬁcance of its foreign exchange reserves calls for normalizing the country’s relations

with the IMF. Moreover, IMF membership is open to countries even when they are not recognized as

member states of the UN.

Recommendation: Congress should pass Section 1851 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, a bipartisan

provision reﬂecting the text of H.R. 6014, the Employment Fairness for Taiwan Act of 2020, which

would require the U.S. to use its voice and vote at the IFIs to ensure that Taiwan nationals are not

discriminated against in employment decisions.

Photo Credit: Nicolas ASFOURI / AFP

CHAPTER II: SUPPLY CHAIN

CHAPTER II:

SUPPLY CHAIN

Introduction

The CCP-enabled pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities of the U.S. supply chain, including the dangers of our

reliance on the PRC and the need for a more robust domestic manufacturing capacity. In the early days of the pandemic,

the CCP demonstrated its control of PPE supply chains by forcing U.S. producers in the PRC—like General Motors and

3M—to produce PPE which they quickly hoarded for themselves to the detriment of the U.S. and the world. When other

countries decried the CCP’s mishandling of COVID-19, they weaponized their stranglehold on the global supply of PPE.

Beijing used the stockpile to try and buy forgiveness from other countries for their complicity in the global suering and

even threatened to withhold needed supplies from the U.S.

One of the CCP’s primary industrial initiatives is to become the global leader in speciﬁc emerging technologies like

robotics, transportation, bio-pharmaceuticals, new materials, and other industries critical to national defense. Their plan

seeks to advance the PRC’s position in the global manufacturing value chain by leading emerging technologies and

reducing reliance on foreign companies. This makes the American manufacturing and defense industrial base more

vulnerable and places increased importance on the U.S. industrial base to become less dependent on the PRC.

An area where the U.S. has fallen behind is in advanced semiconductor manufacturing which enables countless

technologies and drives innovation. While the U.S. is the global leader in IP and design of semiconductors, most chips

are not manufactured in the U.S. In fact, nearly 90 percent of the world’s semiconductors are produced outside of the

U.S. Meanwhile, the CCP is spending hundreds of billions of dollars with the goal to establish itself as the global leader

in all segments of the semiconductor supply chain, including the production of chips. Speciﬁcally, the Made in China

2025 plan directs the CCP to produce 40 percent of the semiconductors it uses by this year—increasing to 70 percent by

2025. This level of dominance could ﬂood the global semiconductor market with inexpensive, PRC chips, and heighten

their ability to control this ubiquitous component of so many of today’s technologies.

Additionally, the PRC controls the bulk of the global supply of critical and strategic minerals which are vital to many

components that enable America’s defense industrial base and economy. The demand for these minerals should steadily

increase as global economy adopts new technologies—placing the U.S. and its allies at a growing disadvantage unless

critical steps are taken to shift production and sourcing away from CCP controlled entities. The risk of supply disruptions

is ampliﬁed by U.S. dependence on them and in many cases, our paucity of domestic supply. Simply put, lack of action

to address this challenge puts the U.S. more and more in a strategic corner.

Fortunately, Congress has taken a number of recent actions to reduce the negative consequences of U.S. reliance on the

CCP’s ambitions on chips and critical minerals through the FY2021 NDAA. The NDAA includes provisions of the bipartisan

Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) Act, H.R. 6395, to boost advanced semiconductor

manufacturing and research and development (R&D). Overall, a revitalization of U.S. manufacturing industries, with

domestic companies to develop and produce leading edge advanced materials, advanced semiconductors, and

automated systems, will provide the necessary tools to develop new weapons systems and consumer products in a more

strategically advantageous manner. The NDAA also includes provisions to scale back our dependence on PRC minerals

by prioritizing trusted sources and reducing use of certain PRC materials. These are important steps to secure America’s

critical supply of sensitive and strategic materials and scale back its dependence on the PRC.

Congress also passed the bipartisan Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act that takes steps to

advance biomedical R&D and manufacture critical medical supplies in the U.S.

The Administration has also worked to ensure that Americans have better access to PPE and other vital medical supplies

while reducing U.S. dependence on PRC products and supply lines by granting the Development Finance Corporation

(DFC) Defense Production Act (DPA) authority. This streamlining allows the DFC to expedite the production of necessary

medical supplies and grant contracts to companies who produce medicines in the U.S. to ﬁght COVID-19. This is all the

more important because the PRC produces a substantial portion of the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) found in

U.S. marketed medicines.

While Congress and the Administration have taken important steps, it will require a continued, whole-of-government

approach along with the private sector to strengthen and diversify U.S. supply chains to sustain the health, well-being,

and prosperity of Americans. This combined eort is necessary to safeguard national supplies, rebuild U.S. industry, and

work collaboratively with allies to create a safe supply chain network.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Key Finding: The CCP represents a signiﬁcant

and growing risk to the supply of materials and

technologies deemed critical to U.S. national security,

and U.S. dependency on the CCP has created

gaps and vulnerabilities in the industrial base that

must be eliminated. Greater transparency and U.S.

understanding of the CCP’s penetration into the U.S.

defense industrial base is required.

A healthy industrial base is a critical

element of U.S. power and the National

Security Innovation Base. The ability of

the military to surge in response to an

emergency depends on our Nation’s

ability to produce needed parts and

systems, healthy and secure supply

chains, and a skilled U.S. workforce.”

– 2017 National Security Strategy”

The U.S.’ manufacturing and defense industrial base

supports economic prosperity and global competitiveness

and arms the military with capabilities to defend the nation.

The U.S. manufacturing and defense industrial base must

be secure, robust, resilient, and ready to provide for our

national security. A comprehensive and detailed strategy

focused on eliminating the gaps and vulnerabilities in the

national technology and industrial base is the ﬁrst step to

ensuring a secure, robust, and resilient industrial base.

Without this, DoD’s eorts are temporary and ineective.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

section 845 of H.R. 6395 in the House passed

FY2021 NDAA, which would limit funds until DoD

develops a national security strategy for the

defense industrial base in order to assess gaps

and vulnerabilities to the national technology

and industrial base. Current law requires DoD to

develop a comprehensive and detailed national

security strategy for the defense industrial

base.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section

1254 of H.R. 6395 in the House passed FY2021

NDAA, which would extend the requirement

for public reporting of CCP military companies

operating in the U.S., including a list of each entity

determined to be directly or indirectly owned,

controlled, or beneﬁcially owned by the PLA,

or a military-civil fusion contributor to the CCP

defense industrial base.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section

1255 of H.R. 6395 in the House passed FY2021

NDAA, which would direct a federally funded

research and development center to conduct

a study on the defense industrial base of the

CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should encourage

companies that make up the defense industrial

base, as part of the terms of their contract with

DoD, to participate in a threat intelligence

sharing program that would be housed at DoD

component level.

Recommendation: Congress should support

DoD’s Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certiﬁcation

program to seek and identify cybersecurity

threats and vulnerabilities within the information

systems of defense industrial base companies.

Recommendation: Congress should consider

legislative proposals to eectively cut o

material support for CCP military industrial base

companies. For instance, H.R. 7064, the Stop

Funding the People’s Liberation Army Act, would

require divestment from certain companies with

ties to the CCP military. Since the U.S. seeks

access to the PRC market for benign trade and

investment, but state control over the economy

in the PRC is pervasive, Congress should

ensure that restrictions on ﬁnancing for CCP

military industrial base companies are targeted,

eectively administered, and designed to achieve

clear national security goals. These eorts should

also permit DoS and DoT to calibrate actions,

including in partnership with U.S. allies, as part

of a comprehensive strategy to counteract the

CCP’s military ambitions.

Sensitive and Strategic Materials

Key Finding: The CCP is seeking to control global sensitive

and strategic materials, upon which U.S. national

security, economic growth, and energy independence are

on dependent on. The U.S. must secure the U.S.’ critical

supply of sensitive and strategic materials in order to

reduce its reliance on the CCP.

The PRC dominates the world’s production of most critical

sensitive and strategic minerals, increasing the risks of

price spikes and supply disruptions to the U.S. economy.A

2018 DoD report describes the PRC as a “signiﬁcant and

growing risk to the supply of materials and technologies

deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security.”

Areas of concern to the U.S.’ manufacturing and defense

industrial base include a growing number of widely

used and specialized metals, alloys, and other materials,

including rare earth metals.

CHAPTER II: SUPPLY CHAIN

Rare earth metals are critical elements used across many of the major weapons systems the U.S. relies on for national

security, including lasers, radar, sonar, night vision systems, missile guidance, jet engines, and alloys for armored

vehicles.

The PRC is also the single sole supplier for a number of specialty chemicals used in munitions and missiles.

Additionally, the CCP’s control over private entities in the PRC creates numerous potential vulnerabilities for their foreign

customers.

For example, the PRC provides 58 percent of the rare earth metals imported into Japan, and in the past

has limited exports of rare earth elements to Tokyo in retribution to disputes between the two countries.

U.S. import

dependence on the PRC creates signiﬁcant risks to the U.S. economy and national security. The demand for critical

minerals and rare earth elements will continue to grow with adoption of new technologies. Steps should be taken

to increase secure and reliable U.S. supplies of sensitive and strategic materials and reduce susceptibility to supply

disruptions.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The U.S. should pass section

824 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which

would mandate a preference for sourcing rare

strategic and critical materials, including rare

earth materials, from the National Technology

and Industrial Base (as deﬁned in section 2500

of title 10, U.S. Code).

It would also require DoD

and DoS to issue guidance on the elimination of

U.S. dependency on rare earth materials from

the PRC by Fiscal Year 2035.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

section 823 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA,

which would expand the prohibition on acquiring

certain sensitive materials from the PRC.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

section 826 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA,

which would mandate where printed circuit

boards can be manufactured and assembled.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section

835 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which

would expand the prohibition on government

procurement or use of any commercial o-the-

shelf drone or certain unmanned aircraft systems

from foreign entities subject to inﬂuence or

control by the PRC.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

section 829 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA,

which ﬁnds that aluminum production capacity

in the U.S. is critical to U.S. national security

and designates aluminum as a specialty metal.

Congress should also pass section 830 which

would require the Secretary of Defense to

report on how authorities under the Defense

Production Act of 1950 could be used to

provide incentives to increase activities relating

to reﬁning aluminum and the development of

processing and manufacturing capabilities of

aluminum, and whether a new initiative would

further the development of such processing and

manufacturing.

Recommendation: Congress and the

Administration must remove regulatory barriers

to domestic mining, in part to ensure a sucient

domestic supply of critical minerals and rare

earth elements for multiple applications,

including renewable energy infrastructure,

electric vehicles, and telecommunications

equipment.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7061, the American Critical Mineral Exploration

and Innovation Act, which would overhaul

the federal permitting process for mineral

development and prioritize advancements in

mineral reﬁning. The bill also supports R&D

for new mining and mapping techniques and

other technologies to advance critical minerals

development. Cutting red tape and supporting

innovation in the U.S. will ensure a domestic

supply of critical minerals and rare earth

elements and avoid a U.S. dependency on the

PRC for them.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

8198, the National Security Through America’s

Resources and Permitting Reform Act of 2020,

which would include as a covered project eligible

for FAST 41 permitting, projects related to the

extraction, recovery, or processing of critical

minerals, rare earth elements, micro-ﬁne carbon,

or carbon from coal, coal waste, coal processing

waste, pre-or post-combustion coal byproducts,

or acid mine drainage from coal mines for the

purposes of securing the economic and national

security of the U.S.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to prioritize initiatives, including DoS’

Energy Resource Governance Initiative, that

strengthen cooperation with allied countries in

the mining and energy sector with a speciﬁc focus

on mining sector governance, strengthening

private investment, and securing supply chains.

These initiatives should involve allies in the

Western Hemisphere, including Canada, Peru,

Chile, and Brazil.

Semiconductors

Key Finding: The PRC is the largest market for

semiconductors in terms of consumption and has

ambitious goals for the continued development

of its domestic semiconductor industry. The U.S.

should encourage trusted vendors to invest in

new, advanced semiconductor fabrication in the U.S.

and with trusted allies and partners.

Semiconductors are the tiny chips that power modern

technologies and are driving digitization. They enable

a wide variety of products from smartphones and

computers to cars and industrial equipment, while also

making possible emerging technologies such as AI,

quantum computing, and 5G. Although the U.S. is a world

leader in the IP for, and design of, semiconductors, nearly

90 percent of the global fabrication of semiconductors

occurs outside the U.S. Under the Made in China 2025

industrial plan, the PRC aims to produce 40 percent of

the semiconductors it uses by 2020 and 70 percent by

2025 and has been pouring money into portions of its

domestic semiconductor industry.

At the same time,

United

States

Rest of

the World

U.S. Falling Behind: Annual Chipmaking Capacity Growth Rates

11%

Source: Bloomberg, Semiconductor Industry Association/Boston Consulting Group Report

CHAPTER II: SUPPLY CHAIN

the CCP is spending hundreds of billions of dollars to

dominate all segments of the semiconductor supply

chain, including the fabrication of chips. Unless the U.S.

takes bolder action, the U.S. may forever lose its ability

to make semiconductor chips to the PRC. By providing

funding, investment tax credits, and support throughout

the semiconductor supply chain – from R&D to fabrication

– the U.S. can supercharge private investment, create

thousands of high-paying jobs, and safeguard our national

security.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

certain advanced semiconductor manufacturing

incentives found in the provisions of the

bipartisan H.R. 7178, the CHIPS for America Act,

including relevant sections included in the House

and Senate passed FY2021 NDAA. For example,

the bill includes establishment of a DoC grant

program designed to incentivize investment

in domestic advanced semiconductor fabs, as

well as provisions to bolster and coordinate

federal support for advanced semiconductor

R&D. Additionally, Congress should support

a study of semiconductors technologies in

the U.S. industrial base and provide funding

for the development and adoption of secure

semiconductors and secure semiconductor

supply chains.

Recommendation: Congress should design and

pass tax incentives to encourage more domestic

production of advanced semiconductors.

Recommendation: The Administration and

Congress should seek to make substantial

direct and indirect investment in semiconductor

and electronic component assembly in the U.S.

sucient to meet the needs of defense and

critical infrastructure systems. This is essential

to undermine the PRC’s control over the U.S.’

capacity to rebuild after a cyber incident and

prevent the introduction of malicious components

during the manufacturing process.

Supply Chain Diplomacy

Key Finding: The CCP’s massive subsidies and state-

directed predatory industrial policies have undermined

critical supply chains, and in some cases hollowed out

critical industries in the U.S. and other countries. The

U.S. response so far has been too slow and reactive;

it has failed to establish a threat-speciﬁc supply chain

strategy and expand partnerships with allies, like-

minded nations, and the private sector to shift key

supply chains to aordable and more secure locations

while maximizing the competitiveness of U.S. industries

producing these products.

U.S. allies and other trading partners share many of the

U.S. concerns that they are overly reliant on the PRC for

key products in their supply chains.

In many cases, our allies have become more concerned

about the CCP’s abuses than ever before as the CCP has

retaliated against them for speaking out against their

actions.

For example, shortly after the Government of

Australia called for an independent investigation

of the origins of COVID-19, the PRC retaliated

against important agricultural products from

Australia.The PRC blocked certain beef imports

from their four largest slaughterhouses and

levied 80.5 percent tariffs on barley imports

from Australia, actions that Australian Prime

Minister Scott Morrison described as attempts

to coerce Australia and undermine its values.

This dynamic creates more opportunities for the U.S.

to work cooperatively with these trading partners to

develop resilient supply chains outside of the PRC for key

products. Given that the U.S. share of the PRC’s exports

has declined over time, the U.S. increases its leverage

when it works closely with like-minded countries that are

also major export markets for the PRC.

Such partnerships

to secure key supply chains are unquestionably in the U.S.

interest because they maintain the competitiveness of

export-oriented U.S. industries

and maximize the ability

of U.S. companies to determine the most ecient place

outside of the PRC to produce key products.

Recommendation: The Administration should

establish a threat-speciﬁc supply chain

strategy and expand partnerships with allies,

like-minded nations, and the private sector

to shift supply chains to aordable and more

secure locations. DoC should work through the

National Telecommunications and Information

Administration, and other agencies as directed

by the President, to implement Executive

Order 13873, Securing the Information and

Communications Technology and Services

Supply Chain.

Recommendation: Congress and the

Administration should make securing the supply

chains of the most strategic products for national

security and health requirements a top priority

in bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral trade

and economic discussions with allies and other

trusted trading partners, by taking such actions

as:

• Working closely together to prioritize cooperation

in existing fora, including the G7 and the Asia-

Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation forum.

• Using the consultation mechanisms in the 20

current U.S. Free Trade Agreements to work with

partners to address supply chain security.

• Securing priority supply chains in ongoing

and future trade negotiations, including those

currently underway with the United Kingdom

and Kenya.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

• Completing ongoing analysis to identify the highest priority products to secure supply chains and enhance

cooperation with allies in doing so, including through the International Trade Commission’s analysis pursuant

to the April and August 2020 bipartisan requests from House Ways & Means and Finance Committee leaders

to provide more detail on supply chains for COVID-19 related products and the conditions of competition, to be

used to work with allies and the private sector.

• Prioritizing the establishment of robust government and private sector cooperation to secure key supply chains

in all Congressional dialogues with governments of allies and trusted trading partners.

• Working together to develop a uniﬁed U.S. position to partner with other WTO members that are like-minded

about the threat the PRC poses to critical supply chains to reach plurilateral agreements to secure key supply

chains.

Health, Medical Supply, and Pharmaceutical Security

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a new light has been shone on the over-reliance on certain countries, speciﬁcally

the PRC, for our drug supply chain. Our dependence on certain countries – both for raw materials and manufacturing

assistance – creates a serious health and security vulnerability for our country.

Millions of U.S. consumers take life-saving or life-sustaining drugs that contain ingredients made in the PRC, even if

ﬁnished drugs themselves are not made in the PRC.

U.S. consumers, including the U.S. military, are reliant on drugs or

active ingredients sourced from the PRC, which presents economic and national security risks, especially as the CCP

aims to become more competitive in new and emerging therapies.

If a nation monopolizes the production of a drug and wishes to retaliate against the U.S., it could substantially increase

drug prices or radically reduce supply in an attempt to cause shortages, limiting access to critical medications. In a time

of crisis, such possible actions could cost American lives.

Through passage of the bipartisan CARES Act, Congress has already taken steps to further advance biomedical

research and promote the development and manufacture of necessary medical supplies in the U.S. Congress and the

Administration must continue to work together to strengthen and diversify U.S. supply chains to sustain the health, well-

being, and prosperity of Americans.

The CARES Act allowed the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) to more easily partner

with private sector on R&D by removing the cap on other transaction agreement authority. To “prevent, prepare for,

and respond to coronavirus, domestically or internationally,” the CARES Act appropriated the following to the National

Institutes of Health:

The CARES Act also appropriated $12.7 billion to the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund to remain available

until September 30, 2024, for the development of necessary countermeasures and vaccines, prioritizing platform-based

technologies with U.S.-based manufacturing capabilities, the purchase of vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, necessary

medical supplies, as well as medical surge capacity, and related administrative activities addressing blood supply

chain, workforce modernization, telehealth access and infrastructure, initial advanced manufacturing, novel dispensing,

enhancements to the U.S. Commissioned Corps, and other preparedness and response activities.

CHAPTER II: SUPPLY CHAIN

Key Finding: The PRC is actively developing, producing,

and controlling the most important medical and

pharmaceutical products, leaving physical and economic

health in the U.S. vulnerable to the CCP’s priorities.

Additionally, U.S. supply chains for certain medical

and pharmaceutical products have become too reliant

on the PRC, undermining our medical and national

independence. To mitigate the PRC’s dominance in

the medical supply chain, it is imperative that the U.S.

develop market-based incentives without imposing

sweeping government mandates or controls in order to

increase U.S. domestic manufacturing and cooperation

with trusted allies and partners.

The Administration has taken important steps to help

increase the production of medical supplies in the U.S.,

both in the near and long-term. A key example was the

use of authorities under the Defense Production Act

to secure domestically produced ventilators and grant

contracts to companies to produce ﬁnished drugs

APIs, including those needed to respond to COVID-19.

Moreover, the Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS) announced a partnership with industry in May 2020

to expand U.S.-based manufacturing of API and medicines

needed during the COVID-19 response and future public

health emergencies. These actions will help mitigate and

prevent current and future drug shortages which have

been exacerbated by the pandemic.

To avoid reliance on the PRC, the U.S. must address the

issue of overreliance on undependable countries to

produce certain medications. According to the Food and

Drug Administration (FDA), manufacturing of many APIs

has moved out of the U.S. into foreign countries over time

and the PRC has 13 percent of facilities that manufacture

APIs for U.S. marketed drugs.

However, data limitations hinder our ability to fully

understand our reliance on overseas manufacturing. Dr.

Janet Woodcock, Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation

and Research (CDER) at the FDA, in her 2019 testimony

before the House Committee on Energy & Commerce,

stated:

These limitations mean that, although CDER can describe

the locations of API manufacturing facilities, we cannot

determine with any precision the volume of API that

the PRC is actually producing, or the volume of APIs

manufactured in the PRC that is entering the U.S. market,

either directly or indirectly by incorporation into ﬁnished

dosages manufactured in the PRC or other parts of the

world.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section

712, a bipartisan provision of H.R. 6395 in the

FY2021 NDAA, which would require the next

National Security Strategy to include the provision

of drugs, biologics, vaccines, and critical medical

equipment. It would also require a classiﬁed

report on the vulnerabilities to the medical supply

chain of the U.S. from foreign countries like the

PRC.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

Section 1808(f) of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021

NDAA, a bipartisan provision reﬂecting the text

of H.R. 6399, the Securing America’s Vaccines

for Emergencies (SAVE) Act. This legislation

would require the President to deliver a national

strategy for use of the Defense Production Act

in order to ensure the supply of medical articles

essential for national defense.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

section 750L, a bipartisan provision of H.R.

6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require

DoD, in consultation with other relevant federal

agencies, to conduct a targeted study and submit

a classiﬁed report to Congress on DoD’s Joint

Development Formulary (JDF), which would

include a core list of pharmaceutical items that

are required for contingency operations, identify

barriers that may limit DoD from procuring

necessary items, and identify international

military partners who can help manufacture them.

It is crucial the U.S. track the ingredients and

components of pharmaceutical, biologics, and

medical devices to ensure transparent business

practices and compliance with FDA regulations

where necessary and appropriate.

Recommendation: The Administration should

quickly implement section 3112 of the CARES

Act, which requires drug manufacturers to report

drug and API volume and will provide needed

insight into the amount of drug products the U.S.

received from foreign countries Additionally, the

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,

and Medicine should act swiftly to begin the

study required under section 3101 of the CARES

Act. This study requires the National Academies

to examine and issue a report on U.S. medical

product supply chain security. The report will

provide more clarity on how to improve supply

chain resiliency and address vulnerabilities.

Recommendation: Congress should pass,

H.R. 6670, the Prescription for American Drug

Independence Act, which would require the

National Academies to establish a committee

of drug supply chain experts, convene a public

symposium to analyze the impact of U.S.

dependence on foreign manufacturing of critical

drugs, and recommend strategies to reduce

dependency on foreign manufacturing while still

ensuring a diversiﬁed supply chain.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

legislation to require the National Academies of

Science, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct

a study on why pharmaceutical manufacturing

has moved o-shore, what products (such as

APIs) were or were not historically manufactured

in the U.S., and what market incentives would

need to change to increase domestic drug

manufacturing.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass the bipartisan H.R. 4866, the National Centers of Excellence

in Continuous Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Act, which directs the FDA to designate National Centers

of Excellence in Continuous Pharmaceutical Manufacturing to work with the FDA and industry to craft

a national framework for continuous manufacturing implementation. Congress and the Administration

should encourage the development and use of advanced manufacturing technologies which can

reduce drug shortages and quality issues. Advanced manufacturing technology can be scalable

to rapidly produce vaccines and medical countermeasures, shorten supply chains, and speed

development of therapeutics.

Recommendation: The Administration should promote the use of the Centers for Innovation in

Advanced Development and Manufacturing (CIADMs) Program. BARDA has existing authorities under

the Public Health Service Act to support the manufacturing of products needed in public health

emergencies and for bioterrorism response through the use of the CIADMs Program. These public-

private partnerships can provide domestic infrastructure in the U.S. capable of manufacturing medical

countermeasures on a commercial scale, as well as vaccines and therapeutics for the prevention and

treatment of pandemic inﬂuenza and other infectious diseases.

Recommendation: Congress should pass the bipartisan H.R. 6531, the Medical Supplies for Pandemics

Act, that would allow the Strategic National Stockpile to enter into joint ventures with domestic

manufacturers to establish new or expanded manufacturing lines for personal protective equipment.

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation to continue to promote policies intended to

prevent and mitigate drug shortages, such as legislation that would allow the government to enter

contracts with pharmaceutical distributors in which the distributors would secure, manage, and

replenish a supply of drugs that are at high-risk of shortage.

Recommendation: Congress should pass provisions of the bipartisan H.R. 6930, the Manufacturing API,

Drugs, and Excipients (MADE) in America Act, to require a GAO study to assess whether the diering

regulatory requirements across countries creates ineciencies in drug manufacturing, enhance

transparency of facility inspection timelines, and codify FDA’s advanced manufacturing technologies

program. This legislation would make regulatory processes more ecient and incentivize domestic

production.

Key Finding: The CCP uses a full range of policy tools to incentivize or mandate more inﬂuence over the medical and

pharmaceutical industry. Allowing supply chains for key medical products to be concentrated in the PRC is much

riskier than sourcing from otherwise aordable and more secure partners or encouraging domestic production.

Changing U.S. tax incentives to relocate such key supply chains back to the U.S. will be instrumental for the U.S. to

compete with the PRC in this market.

Congress should pass aggressive, smart, and targeted tax incentives to accelerate U.S.R&D and production of crucial

medicines, medical supplies, ingredients, tests, and vaccines.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7767, the Domestic Medical and Drug Manufacturing

Tax Credit, which cuts the U.S. tax rate in half for income from domestic manufacturing and sale of APIs

and medical countermeasures through a tax credit and provides a 30 percent investment tax credit

for new investments in advanced manufacturing equipment used in the U.S. to manufacture drugs and

medical products.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7555, the More Cures Act, and H.R. 7556, the Start-

ups for Cures Act, which create R&D incentives for biotech companies that are engaged in infectious

disease drug development or research and provide refundable R&D credits for infectious disease

vaccine and drug research for pre-revenue biotech companies in order to remove obstacles that

prevent innovators from starting U.S. companies to work to cure diseases.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7537, the Infectious Disease Therapies Research and

Innovation Act of 2020, which creates earlier investment and stronger research in critical therapies

and vaccines by amending the passive loss rules currently in the tax code in order to help these

smaller ﬁrms raise private funds from more investors at an earlier stage.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7505, the American Innovation Act of 2020, which

would make it easier for America’s innovators to start new drug companies that can research and

develop new cures and treatments by providing special tax treatment for start-up costs and by

preserving valuable tax attributes like R&D credits.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER III:

NATIONAL SECURITY

Introduction

The Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy and

the 2018 National Defense Strategy rightly describe the

PRC as a revisionist power that threatens U.S. security,

inﬂuence, and interests. Indeed, in 2017, Xi Jinping

announced that the PLA was “at a critical stage in the

path toward being a world power.” The national security

threat posed by the CCP has only increased in recent

years. Today, the CCP is developing and militarizing illegal

manmade islands in the South China Sea, expanding

its reach across the Middle East and Africa, bullying its

neighbors, and seeking to construct military bases around

the world to project power and challenge the U.S. and

other nations.

The PRC is undertaking aggressive military

transformation to become a modernized

force by 2035 and emerge as a world-class

military by the end of 2049.

The growing

challenge posed by the CCP today is likely the

military challenge of the century.

The CCP is also seeking to be the global leader in

technology. To achieve this goal, the CCP steals IP,

conducts industrial espionage and state-sponsored market

manipulation, and exploits the openness of the U.S. higher

education system to extract information for both military

and economic applications using non-traditional intelligence

collectors and military personnel.

This malign activity is not new; the CCP have been stealing

our technology for decades. For example, in the late 1970s,

the CCP began an aggressive and multifaceted campaign

that resulted in the theft of classiﬁed design information on

our most advanced thermonuclear weapons and related

technology. In the 1990s, they conducted an espionage

campaign targeting ballistic missiles and space programs.

They have honed their practices over the years and are

now more aggressive than ever.

The CCP uses a range of predatory and unlawful tactics

that often involve trade secret theft and the forced transfer

of IP. Attorney General William Barr has noted that “[a]

bout 80 percent of all [U.S.] federal economic espionage

prosecutions have alleged conduct that would beneﬁt the

Chinese state, and about 60 percent of all trade secret

theft cases have had a nexus to China.”

The CCP has demonstrated the capability and willingness

to conduct cyber-attacks against the U.S., putting American

consumers and U.S. critical infrastructure at risk. A resilient

cyber ecosystem is essential for reducing the risk of a

signiﬁcant attack on military and critical infrastructure

systems and the open economy. Coordinated government

action and new legislative solutions are required to meet

this rapidly evolving threat.

Additionally, the CCP seeks to inﬂuence communities,

businesses, and local and national elections in the U.S.

in order to foster favorable attitudes and policies toward

the CCP while undermining democracy. Most recently,

a U.S. intelligence leader stated that “China prefers that

President Trump—whom Beijing sees as unpredictable—

does not win reelection” and that “China has been

expanding its inﬂuence eorts ahead of November 2020

to shape the policy environment in the U.S., pressure

political ﬁgures it views as opposed to China’s interests,

and deﬂect and counter criticism of China.”

The Administration and Congress have stepped up

eorts to highlight and expose the threats and challenges

posed by the CCP, but more must be done. It is critical

that the Administration continues to prioritize strategic

competition with the PRC in its ocial strategic documents

and implements whole-of-government and whole-of-

society eorts aimed at protecting U.S. national security

and upholding U.S. values. U.S. military modernization

and defense investments, along with measures to

safeguard U.S. critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks,

protect research security and IP, and defend against

malign CCP inﬂuence in the democratic system, are

essential to ensuring that the U.S. and its citizens are

not put at further risk. These eorts are fundamental

to safeguarding American values and the international

rules-based order that the U.S. has fought to achieve and

maintain alongside its allies and partners.

Defense

Military Modernization

The PLA ground, air, naval, and missile forces have

become increasingly able to project power during

peacetime and in the event of regional conﬂicts. The PLA

will almost certainly use this growing ability to attempt to

shape international perceptions of the PRC as a regional

power and global stakeholder.

To that end, the PRC

is developing capabilities such as a new long-range

bomber, land-based aircraft, aircraft carriers, and long-

range missiles. It is also rapidly advancing its nuclear triad,

space and counterspace capabilities, and cyberspace

activities.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

For example, as of 2020, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is the largest navy in the world. The PLAN consists of over 300 ships,

making it larger than the 293 vessels comprising the deployable battle force of the U.S. Navy.

The PLAN has improved

survivability through the introduction of the Type 094 class ballistic missile submarine (SSBNs), capable of carrying 12

modern JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of approximately 7,400 km.

Additionally, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is closing the gap across a broad range of capabilities, such as aircraft performance,

C2, electronic warfare, and advanced air-to-air long-range munition development and procurement. The PLAAF has

ﬁelded at least 800 fourth-generation ﬁghters and is believed to have begun low-rate production and limited ﬁelding

of J-20 ﬁfth generation stealth ﬁghters. Plans are also underway to accelerate development and production of another

ﬁfth-generation stealth ﬁghter, the J-31, along with continuing research for advanced next generation ﬁghters. According

to the DoD, the PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces and continues to modernize their forces with the

delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The PRC is leading in hypersonic technology due in part to Beijing’s strategic investments in its industrial base, exploiting

U.S. research centers, and IP theft.

8990

Hypersonic glide weapons challenge U.S. early warning, tracking and identiﬁcation

capabilities and complicate our ability to counter and defeat an attack. Some of the PRC’s most signiﬁcant developments

have been in air-to-air missiles, which have wide range and electronic radars that make evasion dicult for ﬁghter jets.

In 2017, combat modeling by RAND Corporation found that, for the ﬁrst time, the PRC had achieved parity with the U.S.

in air superiority for a conﬂict close to its mainland, including over Taiwan.

The PRC has developed its conventional missile forces unrestrained by international agreements. The PRC now has

more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles, while the U.S. “ﬁelds one type of conventional ground-launched

ballistic missile with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers.” The PRC possesses ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges

between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, while the U.S. does not ﬁeld any ground-launched cruise missiles.

Additionally, the PRC is making considerable investments to modernize and expand its nuclear forces, including by

developing a new generation of road-mobile ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable delivery systems.

The PRC is

pursuing its own nuclear triad featuring ground and sea-based platforms, as well as a nuclear capable air-launched

ballistic missile that is under development.

Warning of the PRC’s nuclear ambitions, then-Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley said:

Over the next decade, China will likely at least double the size of its

nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion

and diversiﬁcation of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history.”

The PRC has also

emphasized the utility of low-yield nuclear weapons, as DoD has noted, “in order

to increase the deterrence value of China’s nuclear force without deﬁning speciﬁc

nuclear yield values.”

The PRC has been able to make technological strides through its strategy of “military-civil fusion,” under which the

CCP mandates the fusion of the defense and civilian industrial sectors—forcing any and all technology to potentially

be diverted for military purposes. Companies are legally bound to adhere to this strategy, which Xi Jinping “personally

oversees.”

While the U.S. has for years assumed that it has, and will continue to retain, an overall military advantage over the PRC,

that gap is closing, as mentioned above. In some cases, the PRC has already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—

the U.S. in several military modernization areas, according to the DoD.

Congress must continue to support DoD’s

investments in air, sea, land, and space, including critical munitions such as long-range precision and strategic ﬁres.

Congress must also ensure that DoD is maintaining, training with, and upgrading these capabilities to secure a state of

readiness. Congress must continue to push for DoD to support emerging technologies, ﬁnd winners, and integrate them

into DoD’s warﬁghting capability. H.R. 6395, the bipartisan FY2021 NDAA, makes progress in many of these areas, but

U.S. defense investments must increase for the U.S. to maintain its edge.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Key Finding: The CCP is rapidly developing a military force capable of winning regional conﬂicts and is expanding its

military footprint globally. The PRC has set benchmarks for completing military modernization by 2035 and becoming

a world class military by 2049, which could complicate U.S. military operations in a contingency or conﬂict.

Recommendation: The U.S. must close capability gaps with the PLA in certain areas and maintain its

competitive advantage in others. Doing so will require steady investments in the capabilities required

for a joint campaign and joint warﬁghting operations along with their supporting infrastructure.

Recommendation: In addition to the investments needed to acquire critical U.S. defense systems, the

U.S. must prioritize activities that sustain these capabilities, including training, maintenance, mechanical

upgrades, and procurement. Doing so will ensure these capabilities remain fully operational. Both the

House-passed and Senate-passed FY2021 NDAAs include many of these activities and enhancements.

Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of the FY2021 NDAA and continue supporting sustainment.

Key Finding: The PRC has large quantities of ground-based missiles due in large part to not being party to the recently

terminated Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The PRC is now the leading theater range missile power with

both dual conventional and nuclear delivery capabilities.

Recommendation: Congress should cease all limitations on DoD’s ability to develop and ﬁeld

conventional ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles and should support Administration eorts

to work with Indo-Paciﬁc allies to regionally base U.S. intermediate-range missiles. This capability

is critical for the U.S. to regain the advantage and bolster deterrence in the Indo-Paciﬁc. Congress

should fully fund the Long-Range Precision Fires requirement of $267 million in the FY2021 and $760

million over the FY 2022-2026 period described by Indo-Paciﬁc Command (INDOPACOM) in its report

to Congress pursuant to Section 1253 of the FY2020 NDAA.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Key Finding: The CCP has been modernizing its nuclear

forces steadily since 1996, increasing the quantity of its

arsenal as well as improving quality. The CCP’s nuclear

stockpile, currently publicly estimated to be in the low

200s, is expected to at least double over the next decade.

The PRC is developing or modernizing its air, sea, and

land-based nuclear capabilities in pursuit of a “nuclear

triad” and has also emphasized the need for lower-

yield weapons. U.S. military nuclear modernization,

meanwhile, has lagged.

Recommendation: U.S. nuclear modernization

is imperative for ensuring eective deterrence

and maintaining U.S. military superiority over

the PRC. Nuclear modernization must be fully

funded to ensure the nuclear triad and other

capabilities are eective, safe, and credible.

Further delays on any of the legs of the triad

would have grave consequences for the security

of the U.S. and its allies. Nuclear Command,

Control, and Communications modernization is

the fourth leg of modernization and is also vitally

important. Upgrades to infrastructure and an

active industrial base are needed to support the

nuclear enterprise. Emphasis should be placed

on the following investments:

• Ground Based Strategic Deterrent

• Columbia-class submarines

• Long Range Stand O Weapon

• Field dual-capable B-21 heavy bombers

• Develop W-93 sea-launched warhead

• Develop submarine-launched cruise missile

• Modernize nuclear command control and

communications infrastructure

• Recapitalize National Nuclear Security Administration

infrastructure

• Ensure the nuclear security enterprise produces no less

than 80 war reserve plutonium pits (the ﬁssile core of a

nuclear warhead) per year by 2030

• F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft that are conﬁgured to

perform either conventional or theater nuclear missions

Recommendation: As the CCP develops new

nuclear and asymmetric military capabilities—

including its medium-and intermediate-range

ballistic and cruise missile force, anti-satellite

capabilities, oensive cyber weapons, and space

operations—the U.S. should continue pressing to

bring the PRC into arms control negotiations.

Key Finding: The CCP is using electronic warfare,

counter-space, and cyber capabilities to disrupt,

paralyze, or destroy U.S. operational capabilities and

early warning, navigation, and communication systems.

Additionally, the CCP is using emerging technologies,

including hypersonics, robotics, quantum computing, AI,

and machine learning to gain operational advantages

against the U.S.

Recommendation: The U.S. must prioritize the

development of emerging technologies while

also increasing its ability to defend against

them. This includes substantial investments to

maintain anti-access/area denial capabilities

and investment in AI, lethal autonomous

weapons, long-range strike weapons, directed

energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum

technology to achieve air, space, and maritime

superiority early in a conﬂict.

Recommendation: Congress should evaluate

whether DoD has the appropriate authorities

and ﬂexibility to make changes to its budget and

fund experimentation of emerging technologies

for DoD use. Such experimentation would guide

new investments, prioritize winning solutions,

and acquire and integrate them quickly into our

military doctrine and planning.

Predictable Strategy-Based Defense Budget

-- Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis said in 2018:

As hard as the last 16 years of war have

been, no enemy in the field has done as much

to harm to the readiness of the U.S. military

than the combined impact of the Budget

Control Act’s defense spending caps, worsened

by operating for 10 of the last 11 years

under continuing resolutions of varied and

unpredictable duration.”

Key Finding: The CCP’s approach to funding security

requirements and its military has been deliberate

and substantial. Its increased military spending has

allowed for steady, sustainable expenditure growth

and qualitative improvements throughout the PLA.

By contrast, U.S. defense budget uncertainty and

underfunding continue to gravely undermine military

readiness and lethality.

The CCP’s military spending increased by an average of ten

percent per year from 2000 to 2016, with approximately

ﬁve to seven percent growth in 2017 and 2018.

“In 2019,

the CCP announced its annual military budget would

increase by 6.2 percent, continuing more than 20 years

of annual defense spending increases and sustaining

its position as the second-largest military spender in the

world”.

The U.S. defense budget, however, has been

constrained by inconsistent appropriations, uncertainty

about future budgets, and macro-level ambiguity in U.S.

government expenditures. Congressional continuing

resolutions have exacerbated uncertainty, both for DoD

and the supply chain. Without correcting or mitigating

budget instability, it will be increasingly challenging

for DoD to eectively implement the National Defense

Strategy and ensure a secure and viable supply chain,

which is critical to sustaining U.S. military dominance.

According to the bipartisan National Defense Strategy

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Commission, “Without additional resources, and without greater stability and predictability in how those resources are

provided, DoD will be unable to fulﬁll the ambition of the National Defense Strategy or create and preserve U.S. military

advantages in the years to come. There must be greater urgency and seriousness in funding national defense.”

100

Recommendation: Congress must pass a stable, strategy-based defense budget that is on time

to allow the military to make deliberate funding choices and plan programmatically. A predictable

budget is required for DoD to execute programs, fund legacy systems with lethal and deterrent value,

modernize existing capabilities, and develop emerging capabilities. The bipartisan National Defense

Strategy Commission recommends that the base defense budget must grow by three to ﬁve percent

above inﬂation through the Future Years Defense Program per year at minimum to adequately resource

the NDS. Consistent funding will help ﬁx years of setbacks to military modernization and readiness

caused by sequestration, inadequate budget deals, and reliance on continuing resolutions.

Recommendation: Congress should require DoD to provide a classiﬁed budget exhibit that

demonstrates how the defense budget is aligned with and supports the National Defense Strategy,

with emphasis on competing with and deterring the PRC. Congress should also require the Secretary

of Defense to conduct an independent assessment along with an outside assessment to examine

whether there is proper alignment and delegated decision-making authority within DoD’s current

processes and organizational structure so that DoD can most eectively prioritize and implement

National Defense Strategy objectives to compete with the PRC. If the assessments determine

organizational reform is needed, they should provide recommendations.

Operational Concepts

--INDOPACOM Admiral Phil Davidson said in March 2020:

A new warﬁghting concept must deliver a similar sense of assurances

to our allies and partners today that Air Land Battle provided to NATO member

states in Europe in the 70s and 80s.”

101

Key Finding: The CCP’s ability to escalate using conventional and nuclear capabilities across multiple domains, as

well as its gray-zone tactics between peace and war, pose novel challenges to U.S. military strategy and operational

concepts and could constrain U.S. options to respond in potential contingencies or conﬂicts.

DoD warned in a September 2020 report that the PLA “is developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct

oensive operations within the Second Island Chain, in the Paciﬁc and Indian Oceans, and in some cases, globally.” The

same report further noted that CCP leaders are “encouraging the PLA to embrace new operational concepts,” all while

modernizing force structure, advancing combat readiness, and increasing the PRC’s global footprint. U.S. military joint

operating concepts

102

that align with current and future investments and are designed to defeat speciﬁc PLA capabilities

are critical for establishing deterrence and ensuring victory in conﬂict. Additionally, the capability to sustain the Joint

Force across all domains in a denied environment is essential for the U.S. to defeat CCP aggression in the INDOPACOM

area of responsibility. DoD must develop and test joint concepts, including testing technologies and logistics required

to transport forces and capabilities forward.

Recommendation: Congress should exercise greater oversight of DoD’s investments to ensure

capabilities align with operational challenges. The Joint Force, comprised of the relevant services

and combatant commands, must develop joint, modernized operating concepts to overcome the

challenges posed by the CCP, such as PLA gray-zone aggression, hybrid warfare eorts, and the

potential for rapid escalation in the nuclear, space, and cyber areas. Logistics should be a core element

of military strategy and operational concept development.

Recommendation: Congress should require DoD to report on operational concepts that address

scenarios involving highly escalatory approaches from the PLA against a defense partner like

Taiwan or against a treaty ally like Japan. Additionally, DoD should be required to describe how it

plans to perform multiple missions in dierent theaters on a near-simultaneous basis, any gaps and

vulnerabilities within that plan, and resources or authorities required for mitigation.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The capability to sustain the Joint Force across all domains in a denied environment

is essential for the U.S. to defeat CCP aggression in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility. DoD

must prioritize the development of forward sustainment and rearming concepts to support the Joint

Force. DoD must take into account the technologies and the logistics required to transport forces and

capabilities forward that will be most critical to operationalizing these concepts. Further, the services

must develop supporting concepts and begin investing in capabilities that support distributed and

redundant logistics closer to the point of need. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of

Sta should provide to Congress a detailed and consolidated plan to integrate joint training range

exercises and the speciﬁc infrastructure and logistic priorities for the Indo-Paciﬁc region as required in

section 1704 of H.R. 6395 in the bipartisan FY2021 NDAA.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Posturing Against CCP’s Aggression in the Indo-Paciﬁc Region and Globally

--“Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy affirm the Indo-Pacific as

critical for America’s continued stability, security, and prosperity. The U.S. seeks to help build an

Indo-Pacific where sovereignty and territorial integrity are safeguarded, the promise of freedom is

fulfilled, and prosperity prevails for all.”

—Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 1, 2019

Key Finding: The CCP’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait highlight

Beijing’s intentions to use coercive actions and force, if necessary, to advance its territorial objectives in the

Indo-Paciﬁc region.

The CCP is engaging in a campaign of coercion in an eort to assert control of the Indo-Paciﬁc region. The CCP has

pursued unlawful militarization of disputed spaces in the region, including by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and

long-range surface-to-air missiles on the Spratly Islands, conducting military exercises around the Paracel Islands, and

patrolling near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands with maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft. The CCP also

continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities that would be needed for a potential military campaign

against Taiwan. The PLA has conducted increasingly provocative naval and military aviation operations in the vicinity

of Taiwan. In response, since late January 2020, American B-1B and B-52 bombers, usually operating in pairs, have ﬂown

about 20 missions over key waterways, including the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.

103

November 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the U.S. has conducted more freedom of navigation operations

in the past year or so than in the past 20-plus years.”

104

In this April 21, 2017, photo, PRC structures and an airstrip on the man-made Subi Reef at the Spratly group of islands in

the South China Sea are seen from a Philippine Air Force C-130. (Source: Francis Malasig/AP)

A dynamic and distributed presence that includes access locations across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania

in the Indo-Paciﬁc region is necessary to maintain international rule of law, quickly and forcefully respond to any PLA

aggression, and achieve U.S. strategic objectives to deter the CCP and their malign agenda there. Dynamic basing of

maritime and air forces, pre-positioning of equipment, expeditionary capabilities, multi-domain operations, and other

investments are critical to properly posture in the region. Indo-Paciﬁc Commander Admiral Davidson’s independent

assessment to Congress titled Regain the Advantage outlines several resourcing requirements for implementing the

National Defense Strategy that aim to enhance Joint Force lethality, force design and posture, strengthen allies and

partners, exercises, experimentation, and innovation, and logistics and security enablers.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass the “Indo-Paciﬁc Deterrence Initiative” as proposed in

H.R. 6613 and the contents for the initiative, which are included in the FY2021 House and Senate

NDAA. The initiative, which is similar to the European Deterrence Initiative to deter Russia, would

require DoD to submit to Congress a future years defense plan and budgeted funding for certain

activities and capabilities in the Indo-Paciﬁc region. Congress should both authorize and appropriate

funds to increase rotational and forward presence, defend U.S. bases such as Guam, improve military

capabilities, defense infrastructure, basing, logistics, and assured access, enhance the storage and

prepositioning of equipment and munitions, and increase bilateral and multilateral military training and

exercises with regional allies and partners.

DoD should look to maintain its hardened military bases and forward-deployed troops in the First Island Chain as well

as ﬁnd new areas to operate in the Second Island Chain in the Indo-Paciﬁc region in order to bolster deterrence and

signal U.S. resolve and commitment. DoD should develop and/or maintain expeditionary airﬁelds and ports in order to

better the U.S.’ ability to counter the PLA during a potential conﬂict and increase deterrence. Congress should support

this eort by suciently funding military construction, prepositioning, strategic airlift, tanker support, and surge capacity

in the Indo-Paciﬁc.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to publicly identify the CCP’s actions in Indo-

Paciﬁc waters as unlawful and should continue to promote frequent and sustained U.S. freedom of

navigation operations in the region, including conducting more joint patrols with other countries in

the South Paciﬁc and Southeast Asia, as well as European nations including France and the United

Kingdom. Further, Congress should arm that it is the policy of the U.S. to support lawful commercial

interests and activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and support in international fora

the legitimate cases and grievances brought against the PRC by regional states and stakeholders.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3508, the South China Sea and East China Sea

Sanctions Act of 2019, a bipartisan measure which opposes actions by the CCP to pursue illegitimate

claims and to militarize the South China Sea, supports continued U.S. actions to expand freedom of

navigation operations and overﬂights, and imposes sanctions against PRC entities responsible for

PRC’s activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In August 2020, the Administration added

24 PRC companies to a government list that bans them from buying American products, citing their

role in helping the CCP military construct artiﬁcial islands in the disputed South China Sea.

105

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7423, the Taiwan Defense Act, which requires DoD to

report on the U.S. military’s ability to conduct combined joint operations to deny the CCP the ability to

execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.

Recommendation: Congress should continue to encourage and approve arms sales to Taiwan. It should

also support Taiwan’s acquisition of asymmetric capabilities for self-defense and the implementation

of its Overall Defense Concept. Congress should support S. 878, the “Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019.”

Congress should also pass language included in the House and Senate FY2021 NDAA that supports

Taiwan’s continued pursuit of asymmetric capabilities and concepts as well as regular U.S. sales and

transfers of defense articles to Taiwan, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure DoD and the inter-agency takes steps to expand defense

and security cooperation with Taiwan. H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA requires DoD to brief Congress

on its policies with respect to commencing bilateral military exercises with Taiwan, including naval and

air exercises that seek to enhance cross-strait deterrence, utilizing ship visits, and any other matters

that would deepen and expand defense cooperation with Taiwan.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its eorts to clarify and reassert the U.S.’

longstanding security commitments to Taiwan. Speciﬁcally, the Administration should reinforce its

stated policy in the Taiwan Relations Act, which is “to maintain the capacity of the U.S. to resist any

resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic

system, of the people on Taiwan.” Since the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC, U.S.

undertakings regarding Taiwan have all been predicated on the requirement that Taiwan’s future be

determined by peaceful means, but the CCP continues to reassert its willingness to use force against

Taiwan and continues to conduct increasingly belligerent military provocations. To build deterrence

against further CCP aggression, the Administration has already taken steps to clarify U.S. security

commitments to Taiwan by declassifying Reagan Administration documents supporting robust arms

sales, and such eorts should continue.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Key Finding: The CCP is expanding its global security footprint through the acquisition and leasing of ports, airﬁelds,

and critical information and technology infrastructure around the world. These eorts pose a threat to global U.S.

military operations.

Outside of the Indo-Paciﬁc region, the CCP is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing

infrastructure to allow the PLA to project military power at greater distances.

106

According to DoD, beyond its current base

in Djibouti, the CCP is very likely already considering and planning for additional overseas military logistics facilities to

support naval, air and ground forces in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

107

Infrastructure projects

such as ports, airﬁelds, and rail projects, along with Digital Silk Road projects, enable the CCP to gain a greater foothold

in the Middle East, South America, Africa, and Europe. While in the near-term, a conﬂict or crisis in the Indo-Paciﬁc

itself is more likely and requires changes to force posture, the U.S. must carefully review the CCP’s global footprint,

which could complicate U.S. military eorts to maneuver in the future. DoD has stated that a global PLA military logistics

network could interfere with U.S. military operations and provide ﬂexibility to support oensive operations against the

U.S.

108

The U.S. should engage with allies and partners and use diplomatic, economic, and military tools to mitigate

CCP’s ability to disrupt or counter the U.S.’ global posture in strategic locations.

Recommendation: Congress should require DoD to biannually update the report mandated in the

FY2018 NDAA to assess the foreign and non-military activities of the PRC that could aect regional and

global U.S. national security and defense interests. DoD’s “Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications

on China’s Expanding Global Access” should serve as the basis for regular updates.

Recommendation: Congress should encourage the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and other

parliamentary assemblies around the world to collaborate and examine how CCP investments in

critical infrastructure, information, and technology could impact their defense and national security,

allied and partner military operations and capabilities, and secure communications.

Recommendation: The Administration should build a coalition of partners and allies around the

world to share knowledge on key strategic locations where the CCP is seeking to secure military

footholds. The Administration should direct the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to work

with this coalition to provide alternative options to host nations that may be considering CCP military

infrastructure projects such as naval ports and airﬁelds that may be sovereign debt traps.

Allies and Partners

Key Finding: Allies and partners are force multipliers and are fundamental for deterrence, peace, and stability.

Upholding these relationships through exchanges of information, bilateral or multilateral military exercises, and

coordination in security cooperation eorts is in the U.S.’ national interest.

Around the world, but especially in the Indo-Paciﬁc, regional allies and partners are fundamental to ensuring readiness

and lethality. This is the case for allies like Japan and Australia, who have long been actively looking to safeguard their

nations from malign foreign inﬂuence. It is also the case for key partners like the Freely Associated States, where the CCP

is aggressively looking for a foothold.

Allies and partners around the world are also critical for countering the CCP’s expanding global footprint and other

activities that could have a military orientation. Currently, the CCP is increasing its eorts to secure new military

partnerships and compete with the U.S. through foreign military sales and military training programs around the

globe. Enabling U.S. allies and partners to better defend their own sovereignty and serve as critical force multipliers will

allow for greater deterrence. Additionally, promoting interoperable military systems among allied and partner nations

and fostering closer defense and security cooperation is critical for winning global strategic competition.

Recommendation: The U.S. must continue to uphold its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Paciﬁc

through close dialogue and military cooperation in order to ensure eective deterrence.

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration must ensure commitments with the Freely

Associated States are extended beyond 2023, including Compact of Free Association funding to the

Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. The

U.S. should also seek new opportunities for security agreements with non-traditional partners to allow

for a more distributed footprint.

Recommendation: Congress should fully fund eorts in the House-passed and Senate-passed NDAAs

to build partnership capacity through security cooperation programs and the Indo-Paciﬁc Maritime

Security Initiative. Congress should support DoD in utilizing security cooperation programs with

the speciﬁc aim of great power competition and determine which countries world-wide should be

prioritized for this aim.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The U.S. should improve predictability of arms sales with allies and partners and

expand military training with allied and partner nations. Doing so will improve interoperability with

the U.S., support and protect American values, advance U.S. national security and foreign policy

interests, and promote the U.S. as the partner of choice. To these ends, Congress should continue to

support professional military education for foreign partners carried out by DoD, including an increase

in funding for the Department of State International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

Recommendation: The U.S. should expand forward presence and improve interoperability with allies

and partner nations through the use of joint training and exercises, including by bringing together and

regularizing multilateral exercises with like-minded nations such as Australia, Japan, India, and other

interested nations.

Space and Cyberspace Capabilities

Key Finding: The CCP is looking to become a space superpower. The PRC now launches more satellites than any other

nation in the world. The CCP has integrated management over cyberspace, space and electronic warfare under the

PLA’s Strategic Support Force. The CCP’s intent is to reduce the eectiveness of U.S. and allied militaries by reducing

U.S. competitive technological advantage.

In 2015, the CCP ocially designated space as a new domain of warfare in its defense white paper, and in 2019, the

CCP described space as a “critical domain in international strategic competition.” Beijing has since devoted signiﬁcant

resources to military space applications, such as accelerating its ﬁelding and operations of space capabilities, including

more counterspace systems entering production and being ﬁelded to operational units. It has also formed operational

military units with anti-satellite missions to conduct training and exercises. The CCP has signiﬁcantly increased its

research and development of capabilities that threaten the U.S.’ ability to use space as an enabler for military operations

on earth, such as data/command links, ground-based systems, and user equipment. Additionally, the CCP continues

to invest in improving capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, satellite communication,

satellite navigation, and more.

In order for the U.S. to maintain a strategic advantage in space, there must be greater focus on joint space warﬁghting

operations, how the U.S. military protects space capabilities, what future space architectures to invest in, and the

intelligence needed to support joint space operations.

Recommendation: Innovative space architectures and secure dynamic edge processed networks in

space will be essential for the U.S. to anticipate, deter, and ultimately respond, counter, and defeat the

CCP in a future conﬂict. DoD must move faster in acquiring space capabilities.

• Congress should pass section 1610 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require DoD to

develop more distributed military and Intelligence Community (IC) satellite architectures so that the

loss of any one satellite does not present a catastrophic loss.

• Congress should pass section 1604 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require the

Secretary of Defense to develop an operational plan and acquisition strategy for responsive

satellite infrastructure. To these ends, Congress should require DoD to develop the ability to rapidly

replenish satellites that may be lost to CCP attack. This includes launchers that can quickly be

brought to launch, a reserve of communications and sensing satellites that can service a large

number of combatant command requirements in a time of conﬂict, and the rapid acquisition of

resilient government systems that can meet very speciﬁc exquisite IC requirements.

• Congress should pass section 1605 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would encourage the

development of a domestic small class rocket launch industry. The U.S. must develop policies and

requirements that encourage responsive and reliable access to space through the development

and launch of DoD small-class payloads.

• The U.S. should develop capabilities to respond to CCP activities in space that are rapid, scalable, and

require an operational plan for unpredictability (e.g. revealing capabilities at a time of its choosing

to impose cost on malign activity.) The U.S. should also further develop oensive counterspace

capabilities to act as a deterrent and to degrade CCP space-based C4ISR capabilities.

• Congress should give DoD acquisition authorities similar to the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA)—speciﬁcally, its NASA Space Act Agreements—to incubate space technology

across the domestic and international landscape. The rapid growth of both the U.S. commercial

space market and allied and partner space capabilities provides the U.S. with a unique opportunity

to leverage these capabilities and to integrate them into U.S. architecture planning and capability

acquisition.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Recommendation: DoD must normalize space warfare as a key joint competency and develop

operational intelligence to support space operations.

• Like other combatant commands in other warﬁghting domains, space commanders and their forces

need agreed-upon delegated command authorities across the DoD and IC to defend satellites. They

must develop standing rules of engagement authorizing response options at all orbital regimes,

and, according to the operational environment, routinely train and exercise on them.

• Congress should provide DoD with appropriate rapid acquisition authorities for space that will allow

the Space Force to develop, acquire, test, and deploy new technologies at the speed of relevancy.

• Congress should encourage DoD to develop budget structures that accurately capture space

investments in a transparent manner.

• Congress should pass section 1603 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which seeks improvements

to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities so that the U.S. can leverage existing commercial

solutions to ﬁll validated SSA requirements while the Space Force-developed “C2 program”

continues execution.

• Congress should require DoD to develop Foundational Military Intelligence for space, which includes

both order of battle analysis and areas such as emerging strategic technologies, infrastructure and

logistics, defense acquisition, and many others. Such analysis has atrophied since the end of the

Cold War. Longer-term analysis is necessary to understand how CCP satellites and space systems

work, how they acquire their targets, how they are networked and controlled, how many there are,

and where they are located. Increased investments in foundational space intelligence functions

at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center would provide an integrated point of contact for

the space acquisition community to send requirements and receive end-to-end adversary system

architecture analytics, as well as increase resources and training to enable eciencies in analytics.

• Just as the U.S. military defends freedom of navigation on earth, the U.S. should develop policies to

determine DoD’s role in defending all U.S. space capabilities during peace and all phases of conﬂict,

including intelligence, civil, and commercial space systems and activities.

Key Finding: While U.S. military power has so far deterred CCP military aggression below the threshold of the use of

military force, malign CCP cyber activities have continued with few consequences. Left unchecked, these activities

threaten the security of classiﬁed information, the ability of our weapons systems to perform their intended missions,

and more.

On a day-to-day basis, cyberspace is the most contested domain in the U.S.-PRC competition. Currently postured U.S.

forces are failing to deter signiﬁcant CCP cyber-attacks. While many of these attacks, such as the theft of the background

investigations of nearly 20 million individuals from the Oce of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Equifax data

breach that exposed sensitive data on nearly 150 million Americans, have focused on civilian or private targets, the U.S.

military has not been immune from compromise.

109

In 2013, the Defense Science Board revealed that CCP hackers had

at least partially compromised more than two dozen major weapons systems, endangering the backbone of the U.S.

military.

110

More recently, 2018 public reports indicated that the CCP stole large amounts of data regarding undersea

warfare from the systems of a Navy contractor.

111

A 2018 Government Accountability Oce (GAO) report found that many key DoD weapons systems face critical cyber

vulnerabilities.

112

If the CCP believes it can disarm or otherwise disable key U.S. military capabilities—including nuclear

command, control, and communications—the consequences could be dire. Therefore, the U.S. must be prepared to

defend forward in cyberspace in day-to-day competition to counter adversarial cyber campaigns, as well as stand ready

to prevail in crisis and conﬂict.

Recommendation: Congress should direct DoD to perform a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) structure

assessment and deﬁne authorities for cyber operations. Currently, the CMF consists of about 6,200

individuals across 133 teams, a requirement that was deﬁned in 2013. Since then, the CCP has conducted

numerous high-proﬁle attacks against public and private networks. It is long past time to update this

force structure assessment while reviewing additional authorities that may be eectively delegated to

U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency (NSA), and various DoD components.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1621 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would

direct DoD to create a Major Force Program category for the training, manning, and equipping of U.S.

Cyber Command. Functionally, this would be similar to the Major Force Program category aorded to

U.S. Special Operations Command. Requiring a new budget justiﬁcation for the Cyber Mission Force

under U.S. Cyber Command would provide Cyber Command with greater budgetary and acquisition

authority.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1628 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, which

would require DoD to assess the need for, and requirements of, a military cyber reserve, its possible

composition, and its structure.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

The assessment should consider talent management, current and projected cyber workforce

shortcomings, retention, and other elements. This reserve component would ensure DoD has cyber

surge capacity to mobilize in the event of a crisis.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1629 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would

require DoD to conduct an annual cybersecurity vulnerability assessment of all segments of the nuclear

command and control system. This requirement would amend Section 1651 of the FY 2018 NDAA

by broadening the required assessment to include quality assurance and the active identiﬁcation of

cyber vulnerabilities that require mitigation. Given the stakes, Congress must ensure the U.S.’ nuclear

deterrent is not eroded by perceived cyber vulnerabilities.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1630 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would

require DoD to annually present a plan to assess major weapons system cyber vulnerabilities. This plan

would include an after-action report that describes eorts to address vulnerabilities across systems

and mission areas. It would also include best practices drawn from the annual cyber resiliency of

nuclear command and control systems assessment required by Section 1651 of the FY 2018 NDAA.

Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Security

Key Finding: The threat the CCP poses to U.S. critical infrastructure is real and growing. Lifeline sectors, including

defense, energy (electricity, oil, natural gas, nuclear), ﬁnancial services, transportation, telecommunications, and

water are critical to national security. The U.S. must prioritize eorts to elevate and monitor security concerns and

test its response. Mitigation measures must be continuous, adaptative, and forward-looking.

The CCP remains willing and able to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure in the U.S. for days or weeks.

113

Conditions

exist for a cybersecurity “Sputnik moment”, a state-backed cyber oensive of unparalleled proportion and impact. The

CCP defense decision-makers will see little distinction between the military and civilian eects of a state-sanctioned

cyber oensive targeting U.S. infrastructure. The CCP’s cyber capabilities and objectives are distinct from other strategic

competitors and remain eective, persistent, and numerous.

The U.S. must dispose of the notion that only defense-adjacent companies need to consider the CCP in their threat

models.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), NSA, FBI, and other federal agencies must work closely

with critical infrastructure partners to remediate vulnerabilities and prepare contingency plans for zero-day attacks or

unforeseen compromises.

APT 10’s (aka Cloud Hopper) success at compromising corporate networks through managed service providers highlights

the need to evaluate and harden network connections to external services.

114

Systematic compromises of vendors and

service providers highlight the need to examine downstream relationships, including subcontractors, to evaluate the

risk and potential compromise (electronically or organizationally) of essential support systems. Critical infrastructure

operators must be prepared to ask new and more detailed questions about their own IT support contracts and supply

chains. The CCP’s expanding cyber capabilities will also challenge state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and

could impact their ability to deliver essential services. Work is already underway at CISA and other agencies to evaluate

precisely what infrastructure and services depend on outside contractors and subcontractors to handle, process, or

access essential government information at rest and in-transit.

Recommendation:Congress should require DHS and the FBI, in coordination with other appropriate

federal departments and agencies, to conduct a study mapping CCP investment and contracts

with lifeline sectors in the U.S., including energy (electricity, oil, natural gas), transportation,

telecommunications, and water companies, and any other sectors DHS and FBI deem as critical

infrastructure. DHS and FBI should partner with the private sector to build a thorough understanding

of CCP’s connections to critical infrastructure while protecting U.S. security.

Recommendation: The National Telecommunications and Information Administration, in coordination

with CISA and the NSA, should undertake a comprehensive review of core internet vulnerabilities,

including Border Gateway Protocols (BGP), to begin the remediation and removal of technologies and

entities compromised by CCP security services.

Recommendation: Congress should codify the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium

Commission reﬂected in H.R 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA to strengthen the federal government’s ability

to secure critical infrastructure and respond to 21st century threats.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Recommendation: Congress should direct CISA, in coordination with the National Telecommunications

and Information Administration, to report to Congress on any additional resources, facilities, and

authorities required to threat hunt across the .gov domain.

Recommendation: Congress should establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics within DoC. The Bureau

would be charged with collecting, processing, and disseminating statistical data on cybersecurity,

cyber incidents, and the cyber ecosystem to the American public, Congress, federal departments and

agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. This statistical analysis would inform a

variety of essential functions, including the creation of more accurate cyber risk models for the private

sector and more eective federal cybersecurity policies.

Recommendation: Congress should codify into law the concept of “systemically important critical

infrastructure” so that entities responsible for systemically critical systems and assets are granted

special assistance from the U.S. government and shoulder additional security and information-sharing

requirements. Congress should direct DHS, in coordination with other appropriate federal agencies

and departments, to develop a process to identify key systems and assets underpinning critical

functions. Priority should be given to critical functions that support or underpin national security,

government, or military operations, constitute essential economic functions or underpin the national

distribution of goods and services, and support or underpin public health and safety.

Key Finding: A resilient cyber ecosystem is essential for reducing the risk of a signiﬁcant attack on military and critical

infrastructure systems and the open economy.

As much as 85 percent of the U.S.’ critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. While federal, state,

and local governments have important roles to play in securing these assets, ultimately, the private sector must function

as the “supported command.” Far from leaving the private sector to sink or swim on its own, the federal government

should work to bolster collective defense and national resilience to ensure the private sector has the tools and resources

it needs to reduce the risk of a catastrophic cyber-attack.

In order to support a more resilient cyber ecosystem, the federal government must put procedures and resources in place

ahead of time rather than scramble to improvise in the aftermath of a signiﬁcant cyber strike on critical infrastructure.

Without a roadmap and relevant authorities to restart the U.S. economy in the event of a signiﬁcant cyber disruption,

precious time will be lost navigating between national and local requirements. At the same time, critical infrastructure

may be subject to damaging but less signiﬁcant cyber-attacks that fall below the threshold of a declared disaster. The

federal government needs additional authorities and resources to assist public and private entities facing signiﬁcant

cyber distress to aid in their recovery.

Recommendation: The Administration should develop and maintain, in consultation with the private

sector, a continuity of the economy plan, to ensure the continuous operation of critical functions of the

economy in the event of a signiﬁcant cyber disruption. This plan will analyze national critical functions,

prioritize response and recovery eorts, identify areas for investments in resilience, identify areas

for preserving data, and expand education and readiness of the general public. This proposal was

included in section 1086 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA.

Recommendation: Congress should codify a “Cyber State of Distress” in the event of, or in preparation

for, a signiﬁcant cyber incident or series of incidents to enable the Secretary of Homeland Security

to coordinate asset preparation, response, and recovery operations. When this declaration is issued,

responding federal departments and agencies will be able to increase, scale up, or augment the

capabilities through a cyber response and recovery fund. This declaration is necessary to enable the

federal government to respond to signiﬁcant cyber incidents that fall below an Emergency Declaration

or Major Disaster.

Recommendation: Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to protect U.S.

critical infrastructure by authorizing CISA to notify U.S. private and public sector entities put at risk by

cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the networks and systems that control critical assets. Current authorities

are limited to criminal contexts and fail to address circumstances where systems are vulnerable but

not yet compromised. Granting CISA the power to serve administrative subpoenas to the owners of

systems with known vulnerabilities would help prevent breaches and mitigate future intrusions.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Counterintelligence and Illicit Activities

--FBI Director Christopher Wray stated:

We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is

opening a new China-related counterintelligence

case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000

active FBI counterintelligence cases currently

underway across the country, almost half are

related to China.”

115

Key Finding: U.S. prosecutions of CCP economic

espionage and theft of U.S. trade secrets have risen

sharply over the past several years, requiring greater

resources. 

In a response to a surge of CCP malign behavior targeted

at the U.S., DoJ rolled out its China Initiative in 2018 to

better counter the CCP’s threats to national security,

reinforce the Administration’s overall national security

strategy, and better align DoJ’s resources to respond to

these threats and challenges. The China Initiative has

strengthened U.S. eorts to aggressively investigate and

prosecute cases of CCP economic espionage and theft

of U.S. trade secrets. Attorney General Barr remarked

that “[a]bout 80 percent of all [U.S.] federal economic

espionage prosecutions have alleged conduct that would

beneﬁt the Chinese state, and about 60 percent of all U.S.

trade secret theft cases have had a nexus to China.”

116

DoJ has won convictions and brought indictments

in notable recent examples of CCP economic

espionage. Hao Zhang, a PRC citizen who stole

trade secrets from two U.S. companies for the

CCP, was convicted of economic espionage, theft

of trade secrets, and conspiracy to commit both

oenses.

117

In another case, Zha Rong and Chai

Meng, two CCP intelligence ocers working

with co-conspirators and insiders, were charged

with conspiracy to steal sensitive commercial

aviation technology related to airplane turbofan

engines.

118

Additionally, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi,

both PRC hackers purportedly working with the

CCP’s Ministry of State Security, were indicted

on 11 counts of conducting a long-running global

hacking campaign since 2009. They targeted

defense companies, dissidents of the CCP, trade

secrets, and other valuable data, including most

recently “vulnerabilities in the networks of

biotech and other ﬁrms publicly known for work

on COVID-19 vaccines, treatments, and testing

technology.”

119

In July 2020, DoS ordered the closure of the PRC’s

Consulate General in Houston, Texas due to the CCP’s

economic espionage and IP theft.

120

Secretary of State

Michael Pompeo noted that “there were spies operating”

from the Houston Consulate and “it had truly become a

den of spies.”

121

While brieﬁng reporters on the Consulate’s

closure, senior U.S. government ocials further explained

how the Consulate was “implicated in an investigation

of grant fraud at a Texas research institution” and that

ocials working for the Consulate “were directly involved

in communications with researchers and guided them on

what information to collect.”

122

These pervasive threats posed by the CCP will take

a uniﬁed whole-of-government and whole-of-society

approach and should be addressed with urgency.

Important eorts like those laid out in the National

Counterintelligence Strategy for 2020-2022 should be

continued across government.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

that the DoJ’s China Initiative has the necessary

resources and tools to confront the CCP’s

malign behaviors, to include investigations and

prosecutions of counterintelligence threats

posed by the CCP.

Recommendation: The FBI should develop more

tailored or sector-speciﬁc unclassiﬁed training

and other education resources to enable more

eective security measures against CCP-

directed espionage. The FBI should establish

a secure online portal to enable dissemination

of training materials and should provide local

ﬁeld oces additional funding and personnel

to conduct the necessary outreach to improve

awareness of CCP threats. Congress should

examine measures to codify a Higher Education

Initiative in the FBI’s Oce of Private Sector to

direct the FBI to conduct proactive outreach to

institutions of higher education and National

Academies to investigate agents of foreign

governments participating in federally funded

research.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

legislation that provides additional support for

Mandarin language and other major Chinese

dialects at DoJ, including mid-career courses

to maintain or enhance language proﬁciency,

so that it can better investigate and prosecute

cases implicating the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should support the

study of the CCP throughout academia, including

by improving the teaching of China’s history and

culture to counteract CCP propaganda. Some

National Resource Centers authorized in the

Higher Education Act should shift their focus

onto Chinese history, language and culture

to strengthen our understanding of China

and counteract CCP machinations. Statutory

language would help, but the Administration can

also realize the importance of this strategic shift

in the next award cycle.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Recommendation: The Administration should

ensure that the federal government’s PRC-

focused open source publications are best

addressing their customers’ needs regarding

this growing multifaceted threat. These eorts

will help better inform Department and Agencies

analysis and decision making. Consideration

should also be given to evaluating key

Departments and Agencies needs for dedicated

open source centers for their speciﬁc focus

areas and missions.

Recommendation: Congress should authorize

military counterintelligence organizations within

the services and DoD counterintelligence

entities, such as the Defense Intelligence

Agency and the Defense Counterintelligence

and Security Agency, to support the FBI in

investigations of CCP espionage against DoD

and the Defense Industrial Base.

Recommendation: The Director of National

Intelligence (DNI) should establish small

counterintelligence cells composed of IC

professionals at federal agencies and elements

targeted by the CCP. The mission of the

counterintelligence cells should be to expedite

dissemination of threat information to the

elements of the U.S. government targeted by

CCP espionage and to provide feedback to

the counterintelligence enterprise on threat

activity.

Recommendation: DNI and DoD should examine

the CCP’s intent and the threat to U.S. research

and produce an annual report on sensitive

research targeted by the CCP. The report should

describe targets, methods, goals, and objectives

of CCP espionage and cyber operations.

(National Laboratories and research universities

would likely comprise the bulk of these targets,

but there would likely be business research on

the list too.) This classiﬁed document should

be disseminated appropriately to inform FBI

and whole of government eorts to protect U.S.

innovation.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

3997, Safe Career Transitions for Intelligence

and National Security Professionals, which would

ensure that government leaders, members of

industry, or academia experts are not employed

by certain covered entities, such as Huawei

and ZTE, within ﬁve years of holding a security

clearance.

Key Finding: Greater collaboration and information

sharing with allies and partners is critical to eectively

and eciently respond to security threats and challenges

posed by the CCP and hold the CCP responsible for its

track record of malevolent actions against the U.S. and

other nations.

Recommendation: The Administration should

seek greater collaboration with Five Eyes

123

allies in sharing and releasing information of

CCP sponsored counterintelligence activities.

The Administration should also coordinate with

other partners to ensure that their own critical

infrastructure and technology remains free from

CCP inﬂuence operations or counterintelligence

activities.

Chinese Surveillance Activities

Key Finding: The CCP is using social-media platforms

and mobile applications to collect information on

Americans, which threatens U.S. national and economic

security.

According to the Director of the FBI, “China is using social

media platforms—the same ones Americans use to stay

connected or ﬁnd jobs—to identify people with access to

our government’s sensitive information and then target

those people to try to steal it.”

124

In one notable example, a CCP intelligence ocer

allegedly used a fraudulent LinkedIn account, which

is a platform focused on professional networking, to

attempt to recruit Americans with access to government

and commercial secrets.

125

The CCP has also inﬂuenced

mobile applications to remove users that criticize the

CCP’s agenda. National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien

explained that, “[o]n TikTok, a Chinese-owned social

media platform with over 40 million American users . . .

accounts criticizing CCP policies are routinely removed

or deleted.”

126

Additionally, NSA O’Brien highlighted how

Twitter has suspended over “23,000 CCP linked accounts

for spreading propaganda on Hong Kong and COVID-19,”

which was a supplemental action to Twitter previously

removing “more than 150,000 CCP linked accounts

that were used to spread anti-American disinformation

and generate the illusion of popular support for Beijing’s

policies in the U.S.”

127

Recommendation: Congress should build the

federal government’s capacity to quickly identify

and, when appropriate, disrupt eorts by the

CCP to exploit legitimate mobile applications and

internet platforms for malign activities against

not only government employees and ocials,

but also the American public.The Administration

has taken important steps in these and related

areas. Speciﬁcally, the DoS’ Clean App, Clean

Network and Clean Store initiatives, and the

overall Clean eort, should be supported.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

6896/S. 3455, the bipartisan No Tik Tok on

Government Devices Act, which bans federal

employees from using TikTok, a CCP-controlled

video-sharing mobile application, on all

government-issued mobile devices.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

The DHS, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. military have already banned

the use of TikTok on federally-used phones. Similarly, the Government of India has implemented a

prohibition on the use of TikTok and other PRC origin mobile applications.

Key Finding: The CCP is using its hacking capabilities to collect Americans’ sensitive personal information as

evidenced by large data thefts of Anthem (a U.S. health insurance company), Equifax (a consumer credit reporting

agency), Marriott International, and OPM. The CCP is also using technology platforms to conduct surveillance and

collect sensitive data from Americans and its own people.

The CCP has conducted cyber-attacks against the U.S. government and U.S. companies to steal personal information

about Americans.

According to National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien:

The Party is collecting your most intimate data—your words,your actions,

your purchases, your whereabouts, your health records, your social media posts,

your texts, and mapping your network of friends, family, and acquaintances… [I]

n 2014, the CCP hacked Anthem insurance, collecting sensitive information on 80

million Americans. In 2015, the CCP hacked OPM, which holds security clearance

information, acquiring sensitive data on 20 million Americans who work for the

federal government. In 2017, it hacked Equifax, obtaining the names, birthdates,

social security numbers, and credit scores of 145 million Americans. In 2019, the

CCP hacked Marriot, gathering information on 383 million guests, including their

passport numbers.”

128

The CCP collects this data to leverage Americans to advance its interests. This systemic pattern of abuse is deeply

troubling.

Earlier this year, DoJ charged four members of the PLA who were allegedly engaged in the three-month hacking

campaign acquiring names, birth dates and social security numbers of millions of Americans.

129

The individuals were

indicted for computer fraud, economic espionage, and wire fraud.

130

At the time that DoJ announced the charges against

these individuals, Attorney General William Barr stated that the attack “was a deliberate and sweepingintrusioninto

the private information of the American people” and that the “hack ﬁts a disturbing and unacceptable pattern of state-

sponsored computer intrusions and thefts by Chinaand itscitizens thathave targeted personallyidentiﬁable information,

trade secrets,and other conﬁdentialinformation.”

131

The CCP also uses various technology platforms to monitor and

likely collect data on Americans and its own people. For example, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company

and Zhejiang Dahua Technology Company are two of the world’s largest makers of video surveillance products—both

companies are inextricably tied to the CCP. In October 2019, the DoC imposed export licensing requirements on both of

these companies, along with 26 other PRC entities, based on their role in “human rights violations and abuses in China’s

campaign targeting Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Region (XUAR).”

132133

Furthermore, unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) produced by Da Jing Innovations (DJI), a PRC company, accounts for

nearly 80 percent of drone sales in the U.S. In 2017, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the investigative component

of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, issued an alert warning that DJI drones are “[l]ikely providing U.S. critical

infrastructure and law enforcement data to [the] Chinese government.” That alert “assesse[d] with high conﬁdence [DJI]

is selectively targeting government and privately owned entities within [infrastructure and law enforcement sectors] to

expand its ability to collect and exploit sensitive U.S. data.” In May 2019, CISA issued a similar warning that PRC-made

drones pose a “potential risk of an organization’s information.” In June 2019, a senior ocial for DJI testiﬁed before

the Parliament of the United Kingdom that if the PRC legally required DJI to turn over data captured on DJI drones, the

company would do so.

Several federal departments and agencies have banned or ceased to operate DJI drones. For example, the U.S. Army

banned the purchase and use of DJI drones in 2017. In January 2020, following a review of its drone ﬂeet, the Department

of the Interior (DoI) temporarily retired non-emergency drones. According to Secretary of Interior David Bernhardt’s

order, “information collected during UAS missions has the potential to be valuable to foreign entities, organizations, and

governments.” The FY2020 NDAA banned the purchase and use of PRC-made drones across the U.S. military.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Recommendation: Congress should pass the section 1256 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA that

requires the President to produce a whole-of-government strategy to impose costs on and deter CCP

cyber-enabled corporate espionage and personal data theft.

Recommendation: The Administration should strictly enforce its October 2019 export licensing

requirements on PRC-surveillance ﬁrms. The Administration should also encourage other allies and

partners to take similar actions given considerable security risks posed by these companies.

Recommendation: Congress should require federal law enforcement entities to share information with

state and local law enforcement agencies regarding likely security concerns surrounding drones with

a nexus to the CCP. Congress should further encourage states and local governments to consider

banning or limiting the use of drones produced by, funded by, or linked to the CCP.

Intellectual Property (IP) Theft

Key Finding: The CCP seeks to overtake the U.S. as the global leader in technology through IP theft, industrial

espionage, and other hostile acts, which are conducted through ocial state actions as well as unocial/covert state

actions and policies that incentivize malign activity by non-state actors in the PRC.

134

135

Under the CCP, foreign businesses seeking to operate or invest in the PRC are forced to disclose and transfer IP and

technology, such as valuable trade secrets, to companies as well as authorities in the PRC.

136

These policies, such as

denying necessary licenses, unless they comply with this forced technology transfer, prevent or restrict foreign businesses

from accessing the PRC market.

137

The PRC government also interferes with contractual negotiations between domestic

companies and foreign companies, forcing foreign companies to disclose sensitive technical information and preventing

them from utilizing standard measures to protect their IP and technology.

138

The CCP further uses investments in foreign companies, such as by PRC state-owned enterprises or PRC companies

subsidized by the government, to acquire or gain access to foreign technology and R&D for the beneﬁt of the CCP.

139

In 2013, Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI) acquired Complete Genomics, an American innovator in gene sequencing

equipment.

140

BGI has been the recipient of substantial government subsidies and economic assistance, and its leadership

includes multiple former CCP ocials.

141

As a result, the CCP eectively subsidized BGI’s acquisition of a U.S. company,

which provided BGI with advanced gene sequencing technology.

142

In addition to the biotechnology sector, the CCP has

pursued similar strategies in the automotive, aviation, electronics, energy, industrial machinery/robotics, and information

technology (IT) and communications sectors.

143

The CCP conducts intelligence operations in the U.S. and leverages PRC nationals employed by U.S. companies,

educational institutions, and other organizations to steal technical secrets.

144

For example, the CCP has deployed

intelligence operatives to the U.S. with fraudulent identities to deceive U.S. businesses into divulging sensitive technical

information, exploited PRC nationals employed by U.S. businesses to release malware into company networks, and used

state-owned enterprises to engage in trade secret misappropriation.

145

One recent instance of IP theft involved Yi-Chi Shih and his co-conspirator, Kiet Ahn Mai, who conspired to illegally

access protected trade secrets and other information from a restricted computer system of a U.S. technology company

using fraudulent identities. These individuals caused export-controlled semiconductor chips with military applications to

be shipped to a PRC company despite export licensing requirements imposed on that company for “illicit procurement of

commodities and items for unauthorized military end use in China.” Mai pled guilty, and Shih was convicted on 18 counts

in 2019, for their roles in this conspiracy to steal U.S. IP and circumvent U.S. export controls on sensitive technology with

national security implications.

146147

The CCP orchestrates cyber intrusions into the systems of U.S. companies and institutions to illegally access protected

information.

148

149

CCP military intelligence units and CCP-backed hackers have conducted numerous cyber-attacks that

compromised sensitive information and stole technical secrets from U.S. businesses operating in industries that the

CCP has targeted for accelerated development, including steel manufacturing, nuclear power, semiconductors, and

satellite technology.

150

151

In 2014, ﬁve CCP military hackers were indicted by a federal grand jury for stealing trade

secrets and other sensitive information from six U.S. businesses for eight years to beneﬁt PRC companies and state-

owned enterprises.

152

These hackers used social engineering tactics to compromise employees and gain access to

protected information, such as conﬁdential and proprietary technical and design speciﬁcations for nuclear power plants,

commercial secrets relating to the development of advanced steel alloys, and sensitive information relevant to ongoing

legal and trade disputes with PRC competitors.

153

Although DoJ has indicted PRC companies and individuals for cyber-

related economic or political espionage, DoT has not yet imposed ﬁnancial sanctions on PRC entities or individuals for

cyber-related IP theft or similar cyber-attacks.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The Administration should rigorously enforce all of the IP provisions of the Phase

1 trade agreement with the PRC, including those concerning technology transfers, trade secrets,

pharmaceutical-related IP, geographical indications, trademarks, and counterfeit goods. This

enforcement should include full use of the agreement’s innovative enforcement mechanism, which

requires timely consultation about potential breaches and re-imposition of certain U.S. taris in short

order if the PRC fails to fully abide by the agreement.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to vigorously investigate and identify PRC

entities and individuals engaged in IP theft and industrial espionage, such as through the China

Initiative at DoJ. The Administration should expand the use of strong penalties for IP theft and industrial

espionage, including criminal prosecution and economic and ﬁnancial sanctions. The Administration

should work more closely with U.S. businesses to improve the detection of IP theft and obtain more

information about the scope and nature of such activities, including cyber intrusions.

154

Congress

should reinforce the Administration’s authority in these areas and/or supplement existing resources,

if necessary.

Recommendation: The Administration should exercise the powers outlined in Executive Order 13694,

“Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Signiﬁcant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,”

to use property-blocking sanctions against both the perpetrators and beneﬁciaries of cyber-enabled

IP theft by the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should require the Administration to provide an annual report to Congress

identifying PRC businesses and organizations that have engaged in pervasive or repeated acts of IP

theft or industrial espionage against the U.S. For each entity identiﬁed in the report, Congress and the

Administration should work together to ensure that proportionately severe sanctions are imposed and

other appropriate actions are taken.

Recommendation: Congress should increase funding and support for federal departments and

agencies—including DoJ, DHS, DoT, and DoC—to step up investigations, criminal prosecutions, and

other actions against PRC entities/individuals for violations of relevant U.S. laws regarding IP theft.

Congress and the Administration should also pursue trade policies that deter and protect against IP

theft, and provide more protection for U.S. companies operating abroad.

Recommendation: Congress should continue to support measures and programs that provide U.S.

companies with tools to protect their technology and IP from CCP activities, including the Defend

Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center),

and the IP Attaché Program of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce (USPTO). Congress should amend

the DTSA to clarify that its reach encompasses individuals and conduct outside of the U.S. when

an appropriate nexus with the U.S. is found.

155

Congress should also amend the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act to prevent PRC companies working with the CCP from abusing its provisions to avoid

accountability in U.S. courts for IP infringement and theft.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure that relevant laws (e.g., the Computer Fraud and Abuse

Act) provide all necessary authority to empower the Administration to eectively address the CCP’s

increasingly sophisticated cyber activities and combat the CCP’s continued use of cyber-attacks

against U.S. businesses to steal their IP and technology. Congress and the Administration should work

together to ensure sucient resources and incentives are made available to both government and

private entities for the development and deployment of improved defenses to cyber-attacks.

Recommendation: The Administration should promote greater cooperation and coordination among

federal departments and agencies to detect and prevent acts of IP theft and industrial espionage,

including increasing information-sharing and expanding the role of the IP Enforcement Coordinator in

the Executive Oce of the President to help organize comprehensive government-wide responses to

serious incidents and to help prevent further incidents.

Key Finding:The CCP seeks to damage or destroy the value of the IP of U.S. businesses, thereby inﬂicting economic

harm to the U.S., while simultaneously enabling PRC ﬁrms to proﬁt from the theft of that IP. Moreover, the CCP seeks

to disrupt the U.S. economy by exploiting the IP systems of the U.S. to give PRC ﬁrms an edge over U.S. competitors,

such as by raising costs or creating obstacles for U.S. businesses.

The CCP facilitates the activities of PRC entities that are ﬂooding the U.S. and other markets with counterfeits of U.S.

products. In FY 2019, approximately 92 percent of IP-related seizures by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

originated in the PRC (including Hong Kong).

156

Counterfeit goods harm U.S. businesses by diverting sales from authentic

products, undermining prices for authentic products, and infringing IP rights protecting authentic products, such as

patents and trademarks. In addition, counterfeit goods degrade the value of IP rights, such as by associating valuable

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

trademarks with counterfeits that suer from inferior

quality and health and safety risks. The economic harm

of counterfeiting is substantial; billions of dollars of

counterfeit American products enter markets worldwide

every year.

157

PRC entities also are seeking to jam the U.S. trademark

registry with numerous fraudulent trademark registrations.

Since 2013, trademark registration applications

originating in the PRC have surged more than

twelve-fold.

158

Reports indicate that PRC provincial governments

are paying their citizens to obtain U.S. trademark

registrations, and that the applications for those

registrations often contain fraudulent information.

159

As a result, U.S. businesses seeking to avoid infringing

legitimate trademarks are forced to assess thousands

of fraudulently obtained trademarks in the U.S. registry,

raising compliance costs.

Recommendation: Congress should strengthen

the ability of relevant agencies and departments

of the U.S. government—including CBP and the

IPR Center—to detect and prevent the importation

of counterfeit or infringing goods from the

PRC. These steps include providing further

resources to those agencies, encouraging and

facilitating further cooperation and information-

sharing among U.S. government entities and

U.S. businesses (e.g., via the IPR Center), and

increasing funding and support for the eorts

of U.S. authorities to identify and prosecute the

criminals involved in the production, importation,

marketing, and/or sale of counterfeit goods from

the PRC.

Recommendation: The Administration should

coordinate with the governments of other

nations to enhance anti-counterfeiting eorts

and protection of IP rights, and hold the CCP

accountable for facilitating counterfeiting

activities and failing to take reasonable

measures to prevent them. These eorts may

include coordinating trade policies toward the

PRC, sharing intelligence and other information

about counterfeiting activities, and organizing

joint eorts to improve detection and interdiction

of counterfeit goods. The Administration

should also continue to maintain pressure on

the CCP to take meaningful steps to curb the

activity of PRC entities producing or tracking

in counterfeit goods, including by monitoring

and enforcing PRC compliance with the Phase

1 trade agreement and continuing to address

anti-counterfeiting measures in future trade

negotiations.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R. 6196, the Trademark Modernization Act,

a bipartisan measure which would provide

U.S. businesses and the USPTO with the tools

necessary to combat fraudulent trademark

registrations from the PRC and purge any

fraudulent registrations that have already been

entered. Congress and the Administration should

work together to provide sucient resources

and any additional authority necessary to the

USPTO to address the CCP’s campaign against

the U.S. trademark system. The Administration

should also ensure that the next potential phase

of trade negotiations with the PRC government

includes an agreement by the PRC to end its

practice of providing incentives for PRC entities

and individuals to fraudulently obtain U.S.

trademark registrations.

Recommendation: The Administration should

act to limit the CCP’s inﬂuence over international

IP policy at WIPO and ensure U.S. interests are

protected, such as in the areas of international

patent cooperation and administration over the

Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), geographical

indications, and overlaps between IP policy and

international trade.

Immigrant Visas for CCP Members

Key Finding: CCP Members seeking to engage in illicit

conduct in the United States have utilized, and will

continue to utilize, programs and loopholes in U.S.

immigration law and policy in order to enter the country,

remain here long-term, and eventually become U.S.

citizens.

One immigration program overwhelmingly used by PRC

nationals, and linked to members of the CCP, is the EB-5

Immigrant Investor Visa Program. The program provides

green cards to foreign nationals who invest a certain

amount of money in commercial enterprises that “beneﬁt

the U.S. economy and create” not fewer than ten full

time jobs for U.S. citizens or other individuals who are

authorized to work in the U.S.

160

Between 2012 and 2018,

80 percent of the nearly 10,000 EB-5 visas available each

year went to PRC-born investors.

161

The vast majority of

the EB-5 backlog currently consists of PRC investors.

162

DoJ has prosecuted multiple PRC nationals who have

misused the EB-5 program – either by using laundered

money for the investment or by perpetrating visa

fraud during the application process. Current statutory

language governing the program, however, is insucient

to prevent national security threats, including investment

in EB-5 projects, and use of the program to obtain green

cards, by CCP members. 

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation building on the reforms to the EB-5 Immigrant

Investor Program implemented by the Administration in its November 2019 regulation. Such reforms

must ensure that the Administration has the statutory power to deny, terminate, or revoke EB-5

designations based on national security concerns.

Key Finding: The Immigration and Nationality Act does not speciﬁcally prevent members of the CCP from using the

U.S. immigration system to gain a foothold in the United States.

While U.S. immigration law contains an inadmissibility ground for a foreign national who is a member of or aliated with

“the Communist” party, the provision is not speciﬁc to the Chinese Communist Party, and waivers are available.[i] Thus,

a member, or past member, of the Chinese Communist Party can become a lawful permanent resident in the U.S., as can

his or her close relatives. As FBI Director Christopher Wray has noted, “the Chinese government tries to entice scientists

to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China….” And they use the U.S. immigration system to do so. For

instance, scientist Hongjin Tan, a PRC national and U.S. green card bolder, pleaded guilty in February 2020, to crimes

related to his theft of trade secrets. Cases such as these may be preventable if CCP membership speciﬁcally precluded

a foreign national from being eligible for a green card.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7224, the End Communist Chinese Citizenship Act,

which prohibits members of the CCP or its successor, or those aliated with the CCP or its successor,

from obtaining green cards. H.R. 7224 would, however, maintain the exemption for involuntary

membership, which allows green cards to CCP members when an aliation was either against their

will, or only when younger than 16 years of age.

Illicit Fentanyl

Key Finding: Illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances are predominately sourced from the PRC and Mexico.

These lethal drugs continue to fuel the U.S. opioid crisis. In 2016 and 2017 alone, more Americans died from opioid

overdoses than U.S. servicemember deaths in the entire Vietnam War. Strikingly, deaths involving synthetic opioids

such as fentanyl from 2017 to 2018 rose by 10 percent and accounted for 67 percent of opioid-involved deaths in 2018.

Fentanyl, a synthetic opioid analgesic, remains the leading catalyst behind the ongoing opioid crisis in the U.S. and is

involved with more deaths than any other illicit drug.

163

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that drug overdose deaths rose from 38,329 in 2010

to 70,237 in 2017, followed by a decrease in 2018 to 67,367 deaths.

164

Among the 67,367 drug overdose deaths in 2018,

46,802 involved an opioid – nearly 70 percent.

165

Furthermore, from 2017 to 2018 deaths involving synthetic opioids

rose by 10 percent from 28,466 to 31,335 and accounted for nearly 67 percent of opioid-involved deaths in 2018.

166

Expectedly, most recent cases of fentanyl-related overdoses are associated with non-pharmaceutical fentanyl and are

driven by the availability of the drug.

167

Drug tracking organizations and their chemists modify versions of the base

fentanyl molecule to create new but similar-acting or sometimes more powerful substances, in order to circumvent legal

controls under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that “[f]entanyl and other

highly potent synthetic opioids” are “primarily sourced from China and Mexico” and “continue to be the most lethal

category of illicit substances misused in the U.S.” though it also noted that there are “new source and transit countries

emerging” as key players in the production of illicit fentanyl.

168

The DEA’s most recent 2020 intelligence report assessed

that “China remains the primary source of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances tracked through international

mail and express consignment operations environment, as well as the main source for all fentanyl-related substances

tracked into the U.S.”

169

The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271) requires that the United States Postal Service (USPS) provide

advanced electronic data such as basic information, to include the name and address of the sender and recipient, on

70 percent of all packages mailed from foreign posts and 100 percent of all packages mailed from the PRC.

170

According

to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aairs’ Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, for January

2019, USPS collected data on 76 percent of packages from the PRC and 57 percent of data on packages from all foreign

posts.

171

Prior to that, in all of 2018, USPS obtained data on 70.7 percent of packages from the PRC and a bit over 50

percent of all international packages.

172

Following talks between President Trump and General Secretary Xi Jinping at the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires,

Argentina, on April 1, 2018, the PRC ocially announced the class-wide scheduling of all forms of fentanyl as a class of

drugs, eective May 1, 2019.

173

However, despite some positive developments, concerns remain regarding the PRC’s

ability to eectively implement and enforce its drug laws.

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Recommendation: The Administration must continue to encourage diplomatic and law enforcement

cooperation with the PRC to hold illicit fentanyl and other drug trackers accountable for circumventing

important U.S. and PRC regulations and enforcement protocols.

Recommendation: Congress must ensure eective implementation by the USPS and DHS of the

bipartisan Synthetics Tracking and Overdose Prevention Act (P.L. 115-271).

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 6284 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, Blocking

Deadly Fentanyl Imports, a bipartisan measure which would expand reporting requirements related

to foreign nations that produce illicit fentanyl, to include publicly identifying countries that are major

producers or trackers of these poisonous drugs. This legislation would further require foreign nations

to criminalize the illicit production of fentanyl and prosecute violators. Should nations fail to cooperate

with U.S. narcotic control eorts they would risk becoming ineligible for U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign

aid and development loans.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 4963/S.2764, the Stop the Importation and Manufacturing

of Synthetic Analogues Act, a bipartisan measure which would update the CSA to provide prompt

action to stop the unlawful importation and distribution of synthetic drugs. This legislation would

modernize the CSA by creating a new “Schedule A” to allow for an expedited pathway for the Attorney

General to schedule certain drugs considered to be used in the same illicit way as already scheduled

or prohibited drugs. Substances would be temporarily or permanently added to “Schedule A” if those

substances have a chemical structure that is substantially similar to an existing controlled substance

in Schedules I through V, and have an actual or predicted physiological eect on the human body

equal to or greater than an existing controlled substance in Schedules I through V. Furthermore,

this legislation establishes penalties for illegally importing or exporting a Schedule A substance and

includes provisions to allow for legitimate research on substances placed on Schedule A.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 2935/S. 3148, the Stopping Overdoses of Fentanyl

Analogues Act, that would close a loophole in current law to amend the CSA to list fentanyl analogues

as Schedule I controlled substances, deﬁned as drugs with no currently accepted medical use and

a high potential for abuse. Congress previously passed the Temporary Reauthorization and Study

of the Emergency Scheduling of Fentanyl Analogues Act (P. L. 116-114), which extended the status of

fentanyl analogues as Schedule I controlled substances under federal law until May 6, 2021. Without

permanently banning all fentanyl analogues as Schedule I controlled substances, many drug trackers

operating in the PRC will continue to skirt the law by modifying the chemical composition of fentanyl.

Research Security

Key Finding: The CCP is engaged in a whole-of-society eort to target and extract information and technology from

U.S. institutions of higher learning, research institutions, and businesses. Lax security around sensitive technology

research and the desire of U.S. institutions of higher learning for additional sources of funding allow the CCP to take

advantage of U.S. educational systems and research institutions.

The CCP’s whole-of-society eort carries the full weight of CCP security services while PRC law requires its citizens to

“support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work.”

174, 175

Research programs at U.S. colleges and universities are

increasingly targeted by students and researchers acting as “non-traditional collectors.” These students, ranging from

undergraduates to postdoctoral researchers, are generally untrained in espionage techniques but are asked to actively

target sensitive dual-use technologies and other emerging research during their time in the U.S. The stated goal

for these operations is to exﬁltrate research data from the U.S. to the PRC. Many students and researchers are legally

bound to participate in technology transfer programs to beneﬁt the CCP defense-industrial complex and state-run

companies upon their return to the PRC.

176

Recommendation: Congress should ensure that DHS and DoS have the authorities necessary to

improve visa security programs and processes, and to prevent entry of foreign nationals with known

ties to CCP defense and intelligence services traveling to the U.S. from the PRC to engage in sensitive

technology research. HR 8310, the Countering China’s Theft of American Research and Innovation

(CCTARI) Act; HR 8346 the Academic Research Protection Act; H.R. 2713, the PLA Visa Security Act;

H.R. 7326, the Protecting America from Spies Act; and H.R. 1678, the bipartisan Protect our Universities

Act oer a range of solutions to better vet those seeking to work with sensitive technologies at U.S.

institutions and protect taxpayer investment in critical research from being shipped back to the PRC.

Recommendation: Congress should require institutions of higher education to disclose appropriate

information on individuals participating in research on sensitive technologies after entering the U.S. to

identify individuals who may have circumvented initial visa security screening.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: DHS and DoJ must use additional investigative tools and coordination with

companies and research institutions to identify individuals located within the U.S. who are national

security threats with known ties to CCP defense and intelligence services and who are engaged in

sensitive technology research and technology transfer.

Recommendation: Congress should limit all federal funds to institutions of higher education with

Confucius Institutes unless such institutions impose policies to protect academic freedom, prohibit the

application of any foreign law on campus, and grant full managerial authority of the Confucius Institute

to the institution. Restrictions on these organizations are included in Sec. 1797 of H.R. 6395 in the

FY2021 NDAA and Sec. 1090 of the S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA.

Recommendation: Congress should address the CCP’s use of various nontraditional intelligence

collection platforms in the U.S., including students, nongovernmental organizations, tourists, and

businesses to collect information on research. Congress should require the National Counterintelligence

and Security Center and the FBI to enhance their eorts to provide the public and stakeholders with

information about CCP intelligence collection methods so universities, businesses, and private citizens

have the information needed to protect sensitive information and research.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 228 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would

require DoD to maintain a public list of “foreign talent programs” that provide a threat to national

security interests as deﬁned in the FY2019 NDAA.

Recommendation: Congress should support a regulation, reportedly being drafted by the

Administration, to prevent certain student visa holders from being initially admitted to the United

States for the duration of their schooling – no matter how long that schooling lasts. The regulation

would require such student visa holders to apply for extensions of their admission every two or four

years.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 229 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would

require any individual applying for federal research grants or funds to disclose all sources of foreign

funding.

Election Security and Domestic Inﬂuence

Election Interference

We assess that China prefers that President Trump – whom Beijing sees as

unpredictable – does not win reelection. China has been expanding its inﬂuence efforts

ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the U.S., pressure political

ﬁgures it views as opposed to China’s interests, and deﬂect and counter criticism of

China. Although China will continue to weigh the risks and beneﬁts of aggressive action,

its public rhetoric over the past few months has grown increasingly critical of the current

Administration’s COVID-19 response, closure of China’s Houston Consulate, and actions

on other issues. For example, it has harshly criticized the Administration’s statements and

actions on Hong Kong, TikTok, the legal status of the South China Sea, and China’s efforts

to dominate the 5G market. Beijing recognizes that all of these efforts might affect the

presidential race.”

177

-- August 2020 statement by National Counterintelligence Security Center Director, William Evanina

CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Key Finding: The CCP has attempted to interfere in past

elections and continues to inﬂuence election dynamics

and outcomes.

The CCP is engaging in domestic inﬂuence campaigns

in the U.S. to create more favorable policies toward the

PRC by attempting to inﬂuence politics and elections

outcomes at the local, state, and federal level. U.S. law

enforcement investigations into CCP eorts resulted

in numerous criminal convictions for campaign ﬁnance

violations during the 1996 presidential campaign, wherein

several individuals, including Johnny Chung, were in

league with CCP intelligence ocials and attempted to

inﬂuence U.S. elections to beneﬁt one candidate.

The CCP has also directed well-documented interference

campaigns in Taiwan’s 2018 local and 2020 presidential

elections through hacking, disinformation campaigns,

media manipulation, and diplomatic pressure. According

to the Hoover Institution, in 2017, the Australian Security

Intelligence Organization warned the major political parties

that two of Australia’s most generous political donors had

“strong connections to the Chinese Communist Party” and

that their “donations might come with strings attached.”

For example, one donor leveraged a $400,000 donation

in an attempt to soften the Labor Party’s position on the

South China Sea.

178

Additionally, Senator Sam Dastyari, a

rising politician who told an assembly of CCP media at

a political campaign event that ”the South China Sea is

China’s own aair” and that Australia should ”respect

China’s decision” had to step down after it was revealed

that he had taken political donations from donors linked

to the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should require

the President to identify any foreign persons

responsible for actions to access, disrupt,

inﬂuence, or in any way alter information or

information systems related to U.S. political

parties or elections for federal oce, and

make any unclassiﬁed portion of the list

publicly available and published in the Federal

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7905, the Emergency Assistance for Safe

Elections Act, which would help states manage

elections during COVID-19; H.R. 4736, the Honest

Elections Act, which would reduce foreign

interference in U.S. elections by strengthening

the Foreign Agent Registration Act, prohibiting

the use of ballot harvesting in federal elections,

and prohibit states that allow non-citizens to

vote from receiving certain federal funds; H.R.

6882, the Election Fraud Prevention Act, which

would ban payments to states that allow ballot

harvesting by certain third parties; and H.R. 5707,

the Protect American Voters Act, which would

establish the Emerging Technology Committee

to guide the Election Assistance Commission

in adopting voluntary guidelines for use of

nonvoting election technology. Collectively,

these legislative proposals would help protect

the integrity of U.S. elections and safeguard the

U.S. electoral process.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

3442, the Defending Elections against Trolls from

Enemy Regimes (DETER) Act, which would make

aliens who engage in improper interference in a

U.S. election inadmissible for entry in the U.S. or

deportable if already present in the U.S.

Domestic Inﬂuence Campaigns

Key Finding: The CCP uses a broad variety of inﬂuence

mechanisms to advance its interests in the U.S., and

particularly in Washington, D.C. These include both overt

and covert eorts to corrupt U.S. interests, institutions,

and individuals through lobbying and funding for key

think tanks, events, and programming.

The CCP enlists individuals to advance its agenda through

a broad range of political, informational, and economic

measures to inﬂuence or undercut the interests of the

U.S. and its partners. The CCP’s goal is to shift public

perceptions and policies in a direction favorable to the

CCP while seeking to conﬂate criticism of the CCP with

criticism of all individuals of Chinese descent. Frequently,

these activities connect economic incentives with

political compliance. Individuals, entities, and countries

that adapt language and policies favorable to the CCP

can receive lucrative rewards. Those who challenge the

CCP orthodoxy are often publicly rebuked. After Houston

Rockets General Manager Daryl Morey tweeted an image

in support of demonstrations in Hong Kong, CCP state

media quickly suspended cooperation with the Rockets

and across the National Basketball Association (NBA),

high-proﬁle players, coaches, and owners soon distanced

themselves from Morey’s statement. The NBA ultimately

released a statement that included Chinese-language text

saying it was “extremely disappointed in the inappropriate

comment.”

179

U.S. state and local governments are also targets for

malign CCP political inﬂuence operations. The CCP has

used economic leverage, illegal political contributions, and

the development of relationships through intermediaries

and organizations to establish long-term inﬂuence at the

state and local level. These actions combined create

a coordinated eort to inﬂuence politicians and local

governments that may be agreeable to PRC investment

and projects and sympathetic to issues important to the

CCP, such as Taiwan. Earlier this year, the President of

the Wisconsin State Senate received emails from PRC

diplomatic sta with a request that the Wisconsin State

Senate pass a resolution supporting the PRC’s eorts

to combat COVID-19. The resolution, drafted by the

PRC consulate, was ﬁlled with falsehoods related to the

PRC’s handling of COVID-19, and instead prompted the

U.S. State Senator to introduce an alternative resolution

condemning a wide array of actions by the CCP.

180

The CCP hires former U.S. government ocials to lobby

on its behalf, including for companies like Huawei. DoD

identiﬁed Huawei as a CCP military company, along with

19 other PRC ﬁrms with ties to the CCP’s military.

181

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

A DoD spokesperson later explained that DOD “envision[s]

this list will be a useful tool for the U.S. government,

companies, investors, academic institutions, and like-

minded partners to conduct due diligence with regard

to partnerships with these entities, particularly as the list

grows.”

182

Additionally, the CCP often uses its large market size

to pressure individual U.S. companies to conform to its

Communist political values. For example, in October 2019,

Tiany & Co., a luxury jewelry retailer, deleted a tweeted

advertisement showing a Chinese model wearing a

Tiany ring on her right hand as it covered her right

eye. Many PRC social media accounts claimed the pose

to be associated with the Hong Kong pro-democracy

protesters. In January 2019, McDonald’s, a U.S. fast-food

restaurant, apologized after some PRC social media

users accused the company of supporting Taiwan’s

independence in an advertisement. Major U.S. airlines

have removed references to Taiwan as a separate

country from their public websites and applications at the

direction of the Civil Aviation Administration in China. The

U.S. movie industry has been pressured to appease CCP

ﬁlm regulations and PRC viewers – a trailer for a sequel

to the movie “Top Gun” removed images of the Japanese

and Taiwanese ﬂags.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

1811/S. 480, the Countering Chinese Government

and Communist Party’s Political Inﬂuence

Operations Act, a bipartisan measure that

requires DoS and DHS to develop a long-term

strategy to counter the CCP’s political inﬂuence

operations in the U.S. and partner nations.

Recommendation: Congress should evaluate

legislation to require individuals lobbying on

behalf of PRC companies (or their aliates/

subsidiaries) to register under the Foreign

Agents Registration Act in addition to the

Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). This could

address a loophole through which individuals

lobbying on behalf of CCP-directed entities like

Huawei have been able to register through the

LDA’s lower disclosure thresholds. PRC laws in

eect deputizes all PRC companies as part of

the national intelligence service, and those who

lobby on their behalf should not be able to claim

that they are representing purely commercial

interests rather than a foreign power.

Recommendation: Congress should support the

sharing of information and coordination of eorts

between federal, state, and local law enforcement

to counter these inﬂuence campaigns at the

state and local level. Counterterrorism ‘fusion

centers’ established after 9/11 could be used

as a model. Such eorts would facilitate

information of ongoing CCP inﬂuence eorts,

the development of training, guidelines and

resources for identifying inﬂuence operations

and establish points of contact for non-elected

entities such as local businesses to provide and

receive information on CCP inﬂuence eorts.

Key Finding: The UFWD operates in the U.S. to advance

CCP interests in American society, without a concerted

federal response, or even meaningful public awareness

of UFWD activities and aliate organizations.

The CCP’s UFWD oversees a vast tapestry of aliate

organizations in the U.S. and conducts a multitude of

activities designed to inﬂuence American society and

promote CCP interests.

183

From the Chinese People’s

Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries,

which pursues sister city relationships, to “Peaceful

Reuniﬁcation” councils which promote the PRC’s

annexation of Taiwan, to chambers of commerce, such

entities exist as a part of the U.S.’ open civil society in

a way that U.S. organizations never could under CCP

rule. These UFWD front groups operate without any

widespread understanding that they are directed by the

CCP.

The CCP’s UFWD also conducts inﬂuence operations

through funding inﬂuential American academic and policy

institutes to guide perspectives and dialogue favorable

towards China. For example, the China-United States

Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), which is registered under

the Foreign Agents Registration Act provided funding to

a prominent U.S. university in Washington, D.C. for a new

endowed professorship and research project.

184

185

The

CUSEF was established in 2008 by Dr. Tung Cheehwa

and has further cooperated with a number of Washington,

D.C. think tanks—including the Brookings Institution, the

Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center

for American Progress, the East-West Institute, the Carter

Center, and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. Dr.

Tung currently serves as a vice chairman for the Chinese

People’s Political Consultative Conference—which is

responsible for directing and overseeing the UFWD.

Additionally, the vast majority of Chinese-language

media in the U.S. is inﬂuenced or controlled by the CCP,

and the most popular Chinese-language app in the U.S.,

WeChat, is monitored and censored by the CCP. Recent

reporting

186

and criminal indictments

187

have revealed

the extent to which the CCP takes an active hand on

U.S. college campuses. The CCP has routinely activated

these networks to conduct political activity in the U.S.,

including to suppress Americans’ free speech, with

little to no response or consequence. In one particularly

galling example, in 2008, PRC Ministry of State Security

agents deployed to San Francisco to coordinate pro-CCP

street action and suppress pro-Tibet protests during the

Olympic Torch relay.

188

In September 2020, federal prosecutors charged a New

York City police ocer and U.S. Army reservist for acting

as an agent of the PRC, among other crimes.

189

According

to charging documents, this individual was found to be

covertly working for two ocials at the PRC’s New

York consulate, one of whom “is believed to have been

assigned to the ‘China Association for Preservation

and Development of Tibetan Culture,’ a division of the

[UFWD]... [The UFWD] is responsible for, among other

things, neutralizing sources of potential opposition to the

policies and authority of the PRC.”

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CHAPTER III: NATIONAL SECURITY

Recommendation: DHS and other federal entities, including the FBI, should ensure the interagency has

a complete picture of UFWD aliates operating within the U.S., and the Administration should educate the

American public on the goals and methods of CCP inﬂuence operations and the reality that no such organizations

– corporate, academic, or people-to-people – are free of Beijing’s control.

Recommendation: The Administration should designate UFWD organizations as foreign missions, where

applicable. DoS has previously used this authority under the Foreign Missions Act to address the malign

conduct of CCP propaganda agencies, as well as the Confucius Institute U.S. Center, the de facto headquarters

of the Confucius Institute network in the U.S., which is guided by the UFWD.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue outreach to local and municipal governments to counter

CCP inﬂuence in American society. Recent examples include Secretary Pompeo’s speeches before the National

Governor’s Association and the Wisconsin legislature, and the September 2019 letter from the Departments of

Commerce, Agriculture, and State to state and local governments supporting cooperation with Taiwan.

Recommendation: The Administration should require that any memorandum of understanding or contract

between a U.S. state and municipal government, company, institute of higher education and a CCP entity must

be transparent and public, and no exceptions to U.S. laws or best practices should be made to placate CCP

requests.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

CHAPTER IV:

TECHNOLOGY

Introduction

The world is facing a technological revolution and maintaining U.S. leadership in technology is essential for U.S. growth,

security and competitiveness in the 21st century. Advances in AI, wireless communications, quantum technology,

autonomous transportation, cybersecurity, biotechnology, manufacturing, and space exploration are quickly creating the

industries and jobs of the future. The nation that leads in these technologies is likely to shape the world order for the

next century.

The CCP has made it an explicit goal to surpass the U.S. in critical technologies. The Made in China 2025 (MIC) initiative

outlines its intent to become the global leader in ten priority technology areas, including IT, robotics, transportation

technology, biopharmaceuticals, and new materials. The industrial plan, which the CCP introduced in 2015, seeks to

advance the PRC position in the global manufacturing value chain by leading innovation in emerging technologies

and reducing reliance on foreign companies. The plan also seeks to boost the CCP’s technological prowess through

government-funded acquisition of IP, companies, and people. This technology transfer is obtained by both legal and

illegal means.

A 2017 study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce concluded: MIC 2025 aims to leverage the power of the state to

alter competitive dynamics in global markets in industries core to economic competitiveness. By targeting and

channeling capital to specific technologies and industries, MIC 2025 risks precipitating market inefficiencies

and overcapacity, globally.

191

By 2035, the CCP seeks to reach parity with the U.S., making its own major technological breakthroughs, leading in

advanced industries, and setting global technology standards. By 2049, to mark its 100th anniversary of Communist rule,

the CCP aims to surpass the U.S. to be the world’s top economy. This ambitious plan is a direct threat to U.S. economic

and national security.

As the CCP attempts to accelerate its recovery from the coronavirus it attempted to coverup, the COVID-19 pandemic has

made the U.S. reliance on technology even more apparent as many Americans work, learn, and receive health care from

their homes. The U.S.’ leadership in the future will be deﬁned by its leadership in the area of technology.

Eric Schmidt, the founder of Schmidt Futures and chairman of the National Security Commission on Artiﬁcial Intelligence and the Defense Innovation Board, warns:

Americans should be wary of living in a world shaped by China’s view of the

relationship between technology and authoritarian governance. Free societies must

prove the resilience of liberal democracy in the face of technological changes that

threaten it.”

The U.S. cannot aord to cede leadership in critical technologies and their development to the CCP. If the CCP surpasses

the U.S. in critical technologies like AI or quantum it will have signiﬁcant implications for U.S. national security, economic

competitiveness, and the American way of life.

Since the beginning of the last century, Americans have been pioneers in technology, and that spirit must be renewed.

In 1969, driven by curiosity, ambition, and an innate urge to explore, the U.S. landed on the Moon. Doing so at the height

of the Cold War helped establish U.S. technological supremacy and gave the U.S. a fundamental edge over the Soviet

Union.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

Michael Kratsios, the Administration’s Chief Technology

Ocer, identiﬁed core areas of industries of the future

to Congress earlier this year, “To this end, we identiﬁed

four key pillars that underpin the U.S. eorts across AI,

5G, QIS, biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing—

fundamental R&D, workforce development, light-touch

regulation, and international engagement.”

192

The U.S. must ensure continued leadership in federal

research investment, enhanced public-private

partnerships, and policies that promote private sector

innovation and reduce regulatory barriers to responsible

development and deployment in six emerging technology

areas: AI, 5G wireless communications, quantum

information science, autonomous vehicles, cybersecurity,

and biotechnology. To enable these technologies the

U.S. must prioritize streamlined permitting, international

cooperation, standards development, and privacy risk

management. Finally, space is still the next frontier of

technological development and achievement. The CCP’s

ambitions for space exploration and development require

a renewed commitment by the U.S. to return to the Moon

and continue its mission on to Mars.

Emerging Technologies

Key Finding: As the CCP pursues an aggressive plan to

become the world’s leader in AI by 2030, U.S. leadership

in the development and adoption of AI underpinned by

democratic U.S. values, is imperative to national and

economic security.

AI may be the most disruptive technology of the 21st

century and is rapidly advancing in capability. AI includes

technologies that allow computers and other machines

to learn from experience and complete tasks that have

traditionally required human intelligence or reasoning.

Due to the enormous economic and security implications

of AI, leading nations and companies are in a race to

develop and deploy this technology in nearly every

sector, from healthcare to ﬁnancial services to agriculture.

The National Security Commission on AI (NSCAI),

established by Congress in the FY2019 NDAA, wrote in

a 2019 interim report:

AI will shape the future of power.

The nation with the most resilient

and productive economic base

will be best positioned to seize

the mantle of world leadership.

That base increasingly depends

on the strength of the innovation

economy, which in turn will

depend on AI. AI will drive waves

of advancement in commerce,

transportation, health, education,

ﬁnancial markets, government,

and national defense.”

The U.S. remains the global leader in AI, but that lead

is shrinking. In July 2017, the State Council of the PRC

released the “New Generation Artiﬁcial Intelligence

Development Plan,” which outlines the CCP’s strategy to

build a domestic AI industry worth nearly $150 billion in

the next few years and to become the leading AI power

by 2030.

193

More information is needed about the exact

level of the CCP’s investment in AI.

On February 11, 2019, the Administration issued an

executive order to launch the American AI Initiative, which

directs federal agencies to develop AI R&D budgets to

support their core missions.

194

Federal agencies are also

directed to increase access to their resources to drive

AI research by identifying high-priority federal data and

models, improving public access to and quality of federal

AI data, and allocating high-performance and cloud

computing resources to AI-related applications and R&D.

In its FY2021 budget request, the Administration proposed

doubling non-defense spending on AI over the next two

years from $973 million to almost $2 billion.

195

Congress and the Administration are reviewing how to

accelerate investment in AI research and development,

develop and adapt a U.S. workforce for AI-enabled

industries, support public-private partnerships in AI,

and develop a regulatory framework. By fulﬁlling these

initiatives, the U.S. can lead the world in deploying

trustworthy AI underpinned by democratic values of

fairness, transparency, and protection of civil liberties.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

ﬁnal passage of the bipartisan National Artiﬁcial

Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020, as included in

sections 5001-5502 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021

NDAA. This legislation would create a national

initiative on AI to coordinate and accelerate

federal investments across federal research

agencies, direct the development of a voluntary

risk management framework for trustworthy AI

standards, facilitate public-private partnerships

on AI through the creation of a national network

of AI institutes, and support development of

K-12 curriculum in AI as well as fellowship and

traineeship opportunities to expand the AI

workforce.

Recommendation: Congress should support

the Administration’s FY2021 commitment to

accelerate funding for R&D of trustworthy AI

across the federal government, with the goal

of doubling funding over the next two years.

Federal investments across the civilian and

defense agencies will develop the AI standards

and solutions to compete and prepare an

American workforce for AI-enabled jobs.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

8132, the bipartisan American COMPETE Act,

which would facilitate a roadmap for commercial

adoption of AI and related technologies and

remove impediments for U.S. companies to

invest and innovate.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The Administration should ﬁnalize and adopt the OMB Memorandum on “Guidance

for Regulation of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Applications.”

196

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and

the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) should also adopt this guidance. The guidance

directs agencies, when considering regulations or policies related to AI applications, to promote

advancements in technology and innovation while protecting U.S. technology, economic and national

security, privacy, civil liberties, and other American values, including the principles of freedom, human

rights, the rule of law, and respect for IP.

Recommendation: Congress should pass sections 217, 222, 241-249, bipartisan provisions of H.R.

6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which are recommendations made by the NSCAI to ensure the necessary

talent, infrastructure, and authorities to accelerate the adoption of DoD AI.

Key Finding: The U.S. and the CCP are in a global race for deployment of 5G wireless technology. The CCP seeks

to increase its global power by building 5G infrastructure domestically and abroad to dominate standard-setting,

technological development, and the global supply chain. The U.S. must promote private and public cooperation

on rapid 5G deployment by private industry for consumer services and innovation, economic growth, and national

security.

5G will be a primary driver of U.S. prosperity and security in the 21st century. This new advanced communications

technology will provide consumers, businesses, and governments with faster network connections that will transform the

way we live, work, learn, and communicate. However, the development and deployment of 5G also brings new risks and

vulnerabilities. While U.S. 5G deployment is driven entirely by the private sector, the CCP’s 5G aspirations are driven

by the government, including through its BRI. The PRC telecommunications company Huawei is one of the global

leaders in 5G equipment deployment. The U.S. intelligence community has warned for over a decade of the threat posed

by PRC companies inﬁltrating U.S. networks, as Huawei has provided communications hardware to U.S. providers at a

low cost. The PRC’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 requires that all companies in the PRC comply with CCP demands

to turn over data.

In response to this growing threat, Congress and the Administration have taken bipartisan action against Huawei and other

suspect companies to secure U.S. networks and incentivize U.S. development and deployment of telecommunications

gear to decrease reliance on untrusted, foreign equipment. Congress passed laws to secure networks from bad

actors, including the bipartisan Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act (P. L. 116-124), to help secure the

U.S.’ communications supply chain by incentivizing smaller, rural providers to rip and replace suspect equipment from

companies like Huawei and ZTE.

197

The Administration is also taking prudent action again Huawei and its aliates in the CCP by restricting Huawei’s access

to U.S. technology and software.

198

The DoC’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 38 more Huawei aliates

to its Entity List in 2020, which will prevent Huawei from circumventing its blacklisted status. This action follows BIS’s

May 2020 eort to target Huawei’s ability to obtain U.S. semiconductors. Additionally, the Federal Communications

Commission (FCC) recently designated Huawei and ZTE as National Security Threats.

199

The Administration has succeeded in helping other key nations become better informed of the various risks. The United

Kingdom and France both have recently announced plans to phase out and ban Huawei from their networks. Securing

U.S. networks and ensuring our allies take similar action are crucial components to maintain U.S. leadership in

technology and protect the privacy of all Americans. Domestically, DoS has instituted the Clean Network program to

use internationally accepted standards to protect American assets—including citizens’ data and companies’ valuable

information—from bad actors like the CCP.

The U.S. must also support a strong U.S. telecommunications industry. FCC Chairman Ajit Pai has been executing a 5G

FAST Plan to free up spectrum for 5G, releasing signiﬁcant swaths of spectrum in the high-, mid-, and low-bands, for both

licensed and unlicensed services. In August 2020, the Administration announced an additional 100 MHz of mid-band

spectrum that can be used for commercial, domestic 5G networks.

200

This is possible through the collaborative work

between the DoC’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the FCC, DoD, and other federal

agencies. Spectrum is a valuable resource that will make nationwide 5G a reality, and the U.S. commercial sector partners

can ensure that the U.S. remains innovative in advanced wireless communications.

The U.S. has a competitive communications marketplace, due to eective incentives that increase competition among

private companies and ensure that all Americans are connected. Reducing red tape and making the U.S. a more attractive

place to build, create, and develop helps the U.S. maintain its leadership against the CCP. The cycle is never-ending;

there will always be new technologies, new generations of equipment, and new upgrades. By taking steps now to secure

networks, encourage private sector competition, and make necessary spectrum resources available, we are providing

the building blocks for the U.S. to continue to lead.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

Recommendation: The Administration, through

the NTIA, should continue to implement the

“National Strategy to Secure 5G” as directed

by the bipartisan Secure 5G and Beyond Act

of 2020 (P.L. 116-184). The strategy seeks to

facilitate the rollout of 5G domestically; assess

the cybersecurity risks and identify core security

principles of 5G capabilities and infrastructure,

address risks to U.S. economic and national

security during development and deployment

of 5G infrastructure worldwide; and promote

responsible global development and deployment

of secure and reliable 5G infrastructure.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

legislation to streamline ﬁxed and wireless

communications network permitting processes

at the federal, state, and local level to ensure

all Americans are connected. Reducing U.S.

regulatory barriers will speed up deployment

of broadband and 5G communications

infrastructure, and that will promote a market for

secure solutions not made in China. More than

two dozen bills have been introduced to address

such impediments:

• H.R. 292, the “Rural Broadband Permitting Eciency Act of 2019”

• H.R. 4741, the “Connecting Communities Post Disasters”

• H.R. 7355, the “Federal Broadband Deployment Tracking Act”

• H.R. 7367, the Facilitating DIGITAL Applications” Act

• H.R. 7377, the “Deploying Infrastructure with Greater Internet

Transactions And Legacy Applications” or “DIGITAL Applications”

• H.R. 7344, the “Federal Broadband Deployment in Unserved

Areas Act”

• H.R. 7421, the “Expediting Federal Broadband Deployment

Reviews Act”

• H.R. 7349, the “Enhancing Administrative Reviews for Broadband

Deployment Act”

• H.R. 7334, the “Broadband Deployment Streamlining Act”

• H.R. 7350, the “Standard Fees to Expedite Evaluation and

Streamlining” or “Standard FEES” Act

• H.R. 7373, the “Wildﬁre Wireless Resiliency Act”

• H.R. 7337, the “Proportional Reviews for Broadband Deployment

Act”

• H.R. 7353, the “Timely Replacement Under Secure and Trusted

for Early and Dependable Broadband Networks” or “TRUSTED

Broadband Networks” Act

• H.R. 7333, the “Coastal Broadband Deployment Act”

• H.R. 7378, the “Brownﬁelds Broadband Deployment Act”

• H.R. 7374, the “Reducing Antiquated Permitting for Infrastructure

Deployment” or “RAPID” Act

• H.R. 7335, the “Protecting Critical Infrastructure Act”

• H.R. 7369, the “Cable Transparency Act”

• H.R. 7364, the “Consumer Access to Broadband for Local

Economies and Competition” or “CABLE Competition” Act

• H.R. 7360, the “Wireless Resiliency and Flexible Investment Act”

• H.R. 7357, the “Wireless Broadband Competition and Ecient

Deployment Act”

• H.R. 6488, the “Streamlining Permitting to Enable Ecient

Deployment of Broadband Infrastructure” or “SPEED” Act

• H.R. 7363, the “Communities Overregulating Networks Need

Economic Competition Today” or “CONNECT’ Act

• H.R. 7364, the “Cable Access for Broadband and Local Economic

Leadership” or “CABLE Leadership” Act

• H.R. 7352, the “Barriers and Regulatory Obstacles Avoids

Deployment of Broadband Access and Needs Deregulatory

Leadership” or “BROADBAND Leadership” Act

• H.R. 7362, the “Winning the International Race for Economic

Leadership and Expanding Service to Support Leadership” or

“WIRELESS Leadership” Act

Recommendation: The NTIA should continue

working with all federal agencies that have

spectrum licenses on ways to increase

commercial access to spectrum. Private

companies invest billions of dollars to upgrade

and expand communications infrastructure,

and spectrum is a crucial resource that leads

to higher speeds and better connections.

Releasing a long-term spectrum strategy, as

directed by the Presidential Memorandum on

Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for

America’s Future, should provide a roadmap of

actions that can be taken by federal agencies to

increase access to valuable spectrum resources

through repurposing or sharing arrangements.

Recommendation: Congress should fund

H.R. 4998, the bipartisan Secure and Trusted

Communications Networks Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-

124), so the FCC can establish a reimbursement

program for companies to remove suspect

equipment from their communications networks

that pose a national security risk.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

6624, the bipartisan Utilizing Strategic Allied

(USA) Telecommunications Act of 2020, which

would promote and speed up the deployment

and use of secure Open Radio Access Networks

(O-RAN) 5G software and equipment. Growing

the domestic wireless supply chain is crucial to

secure U.S. networks.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R.6235, the NETWORKS Act, a bipartisan

measure to sanction PRC telecommunications

companies engaged in economic or industrial

espionage.

Recommendation: DoC should fully and strictly

implement all recent updates to the Export

Administration Regulation (EAR) — including the

Foreign Direct Product Rule, Military End-Use

End-User rule, Civilian Exemption, and License

Exemption for Additional Permissive Reexports

— to restrict the sale or diversion of sensitive

U.S. technologies, including those for 5G, to

companies on the Entity List, such as Huawei

and its aliates, as well as participants in the

CCP Military-Civil Fusion strategy.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The U.S. should fully implement the prohibition on using or procuring certain

telecommunications and video surveillance equipment from Huawei and ZTE as required by the bipartisan

FY2019 NDAA. (P.L. 115-232).

Key Finding: Quantum information science and technology is poised to redeﬁne the next generation of scientiﬁc and

technological breakthroughs. The U.S. must accelerate eorts to secure leadership in the quantum sector as the CCP

invests heavily in quantum technologies and threatens to shift the balance of global power through the next quantum

revolution.

Quantum is poised to redeﬁne the next generation of scientiﬁc breakthroughs. Quantum Information Science (QIS)

is based on exploiting subtle aspects of quantum physics, such as “quantum superposition” and “entanglement”

for valuable, real-world technologies. These technologies can handle computationally complex problems, provide

communication security and enhance navigation, imaging, and other sensing technologies in ways that are impossible

using conventional hardware.

Harnessing QIS for new technologies brings opportunities for innovation, as well as new industries and jobs, but there

are signiﬁcant implications for national security, particularly for cryptography. One key quantum algorithm could break

public-key cryptography, which secures transactions over the internet. While employing this algorithm is far beyond

the current level of technology, the need to protect sensitive data and provide a reliable infrastructure over the long-term

requires moving to “post-quantum” or “quantum-resistant” forms of cryptography.

The CCP named quantum informatics a key priority in its 13th Five-Year Plan and Made in China 2025 plan.

201

According

to a report by the Center for a New American Security, CCP defense professionals believe that “quantum hegemony”

may determine the future of international politics.

202

The CCP has touted its achievements in quantum, including the

ﬁrst quantum science satellite and a quantum network connecting Beijing and Shanghai. Although there is only limited

authoritative information available on total levels of the CCP’s funding on quantum, it appears that the recent and current

levels of funding amount to billions of dollars.

203

In 2018, the President signed into law the National Quantum Initiative (NQI) Act, which leverages the resources and

expertise of U.S. government, industry, and academia to create a uniﬁed national quantum strategy that ensures the U.S.

continues breakthroughs in QIS. The bill authorized $1.2 billion in federal R&D spending over ﬁve years. The Administration

also released the National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Science to guide federal QIS actions, including

the establishment of a Quantum Economic Development Consortium to build the QIS industrial ecosystem in the U.S.

204

The Administration has also proposed doubling QIS R&D funding by FY2022, with a request of $699 million in FY2021.

U.S. government and industry investments in QIS and quantum technologies have yielded signiﬁcant advances over

the last two years. In September 2019, scientists at Google and the University of California at Santa Barbara achieved a

milestone known as “quantum supremacy.” Their experimental quantum machine ran an algorithm much faster than the

world’s fastest supercomputer could simulate. In 2020, researchers at the University of Chicago developed a technique

that can help increase the stability of quantum systems by allowing quantum states to work 10,000 times longer than

before.

The nation that harnesses the power of quantum technology will have a signiﬁcant security and economic advantage.

The U.S. must continue to commit resources to spurring private sector innovation in QIS and quantum technologies and

support the development of quantum technologies for national security purposes.

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should continue to support full funding and

implementation of the NQI Act (P.L.115-368). The bipartisan legislation established a 10-year National

Quantum Initiative Program to accelerate progress in QIS and technology development through an

interagency coordination oce, the establishment of quantum research institutes by the Department

of Energy (DoE) and the National Science Foundation, the direction of research for the development

of quantum standards by the National Institute of Standards and Development, and the creation of the

Quantum Economic Development Consortium (Q-EDC) for industry and government collaboration on

quantum technology challenges. Congress should support the Administration’s FY2021 proposal to

double funding for NQI activities over the next two years.

Recommendation: Congress should support and fund the Quantum User Expansion for Science and

Technology (“QUEST”) Program, as proposed in H.R. 8303, the QUEST Act of 2020. This competitive,

merit-based initiative would encourage and support access to U.S. quantum computing resources for

research purposes, to secure a strong domestic quantum computing industry sector, and to develop

the next generation of quantum workforce.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6919, the Advancing Quantum Computing Act, to

further identify how quantum computing can beneﬁt U.S. commercial sectors, as well as identifyand

mitigaterisks.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

Recommendation: Congress should pass HR. 8279, the Quantum Network Infrastructure Act of 2020,

to establish and support a quantum network infrastructure research and development program at DoE.

This program will lay the groundwork for a quantum internet, which will rely on the laws of quantum

mechanics to control and transmit information more securely than ever before. Currently in its initial

stages of development, the quantum internet could become a secure communications network and

have a profound impact on areas critical to science, industry, and national security.

Recommendation: The Administration should assess and address the risk to National Security Systems

posed by quantum computing. As part of this process, the Secretary of Defense should complete

a comprehensive assessment of the current and potential threats and risks posed by quantum

computing to National Security Systems as directed in section 1614, a bipartisan provision of H.R.

6395 in the FY2021 NDAA.

Recommendation: DoD should establish additional Quantum Innovation centers within each service

— such as the center established at the Air Force Research Lab in Rome, New York — to identify

technical problems and research challenges that are likely to be addressable by quantum computers

within the next three to ﬁve years, to complement the eight civilian institutes and centers established

by DoE and NSF. DoD should also establish additional partnerships with academia and industry with

functional quantum computing capability to accelerate the national security application of quantum

computing advantages over traditional computing systems.

Key Finding: The U.S. must continue to lead in the development of autonomous vehicles (AV). The CCP is using

knowledge it is gaining by on-road testing in the U.S. to plan how to dominate the autonomous transportation sector

in the decades ahead. U.S. leadership in the growing AV ecosystem is critical to domestic job creation and retention

and the long-term health of our economy.

The CCP, through state-supported companies like Huawei, is positioning itself to be a world leader in AV technology.

Using a similar strategy as their desired telecommunication provider, the CCP is attempting to lay the groundwork for

controlling the market for AVs and the CCP’s interest and capability is only growing in this sector.

205

It would be a

catastrophic loss for the U.S.’ already challenged automotive sector to lose this market, particularly because U.S.

government inaction is the main hurdle to deployment.

U.S. AV companies are the most advanced in the world, but the U.S. must create a national strategy to unleash American

ingenuity to maintain its global dominance. Leadership in automotive technology has long been a pillar of U.S. economic

success, supporting 10 million jobs and contributing nearly 3.5 percent to U.S. national gross domestic product

(GDP). The future of the industry is deeply tied to the development of AVs, a potential $8 trillion global industry

opportunity.

206

Just as important, the COVID-19 crisis has signiﬁcantly highlighted an even greater need for AVs. AVs

can help seniors and those with disabilities become more self-sucient and deliver tests and medical supplies, all while

drastically improving roadway safety and congestion.

207

Meanwhile, PRC companies are taking advantage of the U.S. innovation system, conducting research and testing AVs

on U.S. soil. PRC AV companies are second only to the U.S. in testing AVs on California roads, one of the world’s

foremost testbeds.

208

These companies take what they learn here, and then manufacture and deploy them elsewhere.

Regulatory uncertainty and frivolous litigation handicaps U.S. automotive and technology companies from widely

deploying the technology in the U.S. Given that the CCP centrally plans its regulations and provides ﬁnancial support to

its own companies, the U.S. is in need of its own federal framework for AVs to maintain its global leadership and ensure

Americans enjoy the vast mobility and safety beneﬁts that come with this lifesaving and life-changing technology. As

we have already seen in the telecommunications sector, permitting the CCP to set the rules for standards, innovation,

manufacturing, and deployment compromise both the U.S. economy and security.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8350, the SELF-DRIVE Act, a measure to ensure the

U.S. leads on AVs. Although the U.S. is home to the world’s most advanced AV companies, the U.S.

continues to trail other countries because there is no national approach. A national strategy is needed

to provide certainty around federal and state roles, establish a clear path to deployment in the U.S.,

and create a level playing ﬁeld for innovators. If Congress fails to act, Americans will miss out on the

vast safety and mobility beneﬁts that come with AVs and the U.S. will cede leadership to the CCP –

who will dictate terms to the rest of the world on this transformational technology.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7972, the bipartisan Advanced Unmanned Delivery

Services Act, which would study the beneﬁts that autonomous delivery has for various segments and

sectors of U.S. society, including health care and food services, amongst others.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7214, the bipartisan Surface Transportation Research

and Development Act, which would support fundamental research for autonomous transportation

systems, including the creation of a testbed for developing and testing autonomous trucking, which

could improve U.S. goods movement for the food supply and other critical supplies.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Key Finding: The U.S. must continue to develop and

deploy enabling technologies for cybersecurity and

grow the cyber workforce to support those technologies

as the CCP presents a persistent cyber threat to the U.S.

Cybersecurity is one of the deﬁning national and

economic security challenges of the 21st century. The

federal government, critical infrastructure sectors, and

all Americans are increasingly dependent on cyberspace

while new technologies are increasing both the kinds of

sensitive information that can be stolen and the complexity

of the threat landscape. The security challenges for the

U.S. and the cyber threats presented by the CCP are well

covered previously in this report.

Congress should support the development and

deployment of enabling technologies for cybersecurity,

as well as developing the workforce to support these

technologies. Fundamental research is also needed

to address key questions relating to improving the

privacy, security, and vulnerability of software tools and

communication networks.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

key legislative recommendations made by

the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, such

as the development of an information and

communications technology industrial policy to

better safeguard critical supply chains against

CCP interference and to ensure the U.S.

government has the human capital it needs by

enhancing its ability to recruit, develop, and

retain its cyber workforce.

Recommendation: Congress should pass S.

2775, the Harvesting American Cybersecurity

Knowledge through Education (HACKED) Act,

a bipartisan provision in S. 4049 in the FY2021

NDAA, which would strengthen the U.S.’

cybersecurity workforce in both the public and

private sectors by bolstering existing science

education and cybersecurity programs within the

National Institute of Standards and Technology,

National Science Foundation, NASA, and

the Department of Transportation. The bill

would incentivize recruitment of cybersecurity

educators, align education and training with

the cybersecurity workforce needs of industry,

and design clear paths in the cybersecurity

workforce for cybersecurity professionals to

advance their careers.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

3255, the TOWER Infrastructure Deployment

Act, a bipartisan measure which would establish

a Telecommunications Workforce Development

Advisory Council to develop recommendations

on how to increase the workforce in the

communications industry, promote deployment

of communications infrastructure, encourage

participation in industry-led workforce

development programs, and improve workforce

development in the communications industry.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to promote the adoption of the NIST

cybersecurity framework for the protection

of public and private systems and support the

measurement science that informs standards

development to enable new cyber technologies

and the internet of things (IoT), as authorized by

the bipartisan Cybersecurity Enhancement Act

(P.L. 113-274) and subsequent amendments to

the law.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to work through the NTIA’s multi-

stakeholder process and CISA’s binding

operational directive process to support

collaboration between the private sector and

the government on information sharing related

to vulnerability disclosures and coordinating

response.

Recommendation: The Administration should

promote adoption of recommended actions in “A

Road Map Toward Resilience Against Botnets,”

released by DoC and DHS. This road map was

a result of recommendations put forth in the

original report, “Enhancing the Resilience of

the Internet and Communications Ecosystem

Against Botnets and Other Automated,

Distributed Threats.”

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Recommendation: Congress should pass

the H.R. 8132, the American COMPETE Act, a

bipartisan measure that includes provisions of

the SMART IoT Act that promotes an IoT strategy

at the federal level that streamlines development

and adoption of these technologies. The

provisions included can help counter the CCP as

it continues to make inroads in the IoT market.

This legislation also includes provisions on

promoting the use of blockchain technology by

the private sector to further advance the U.S.

economy and add another layer of security.

Key Finding: The CCP’s biotechnology industry has been

growing rapidly in the past decade as part of a CCP

strategy to challenge the U.S.’ global dominance in the

bioeconomy. The U.S. must lead the safe development

of new and emerging technologies in the biological

sciences to drive economic growth, improve public

health, protect the food supply, and prevent new

biological threats.

The biotechnology industry is a large and growing

sector of the U.S. economy, employing over 1.4 million

Americans across more than 85,000 companies. The

bioscience industry’s total economic impact on the U.S.

economy totaled $2 trillion in 2016.

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New gene editing

techniques like CRISPR and the advancement of rapid

genetic sequencing are driving innovations in agriculture,

medicine, energy, and manufacturing. Since we ﬁrst

began cultivating crops and breeding livestock, humans

have been trying to improve plant and animal genetics.

We are now developing the tools to do it with a precision,

speed, and scale our ancestors could not have imagined.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

The CCP considers biology and biotechnology as one

of its new domains of warfare.

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The CCP’s domination

in gene editing, genetic testing and data collection, and

monopoly on biopharmaceutical products could continue

to impact all sectors of the U.S. economy, including energy

production, food supply and agriculture, and healthcare,

and could increase the risk to military force protection and

mission.

The proliferation of biotechnology for military applications

could see the altering of genetic code to modify plants,

animals, and humans and could be used to enhance

performance of military personnel.

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For example, the

CCP’s use of DNA to enhance facial recognition and track

minority populations has national security consequences.

In 2019, DoD issued a memo to service members noting

that there are security risks, to include mass surveillance

and potential tracking, associated with using consumer

DNA kits. Additionally, the CCP is starting to sequence

non-human DNA resources like microbes in U.S. crops for

free to retain commercial rights and to have access to the

genetic code, which is very valuable.

The CCP’s research on biotechnology and acquisition of

large quantities of biodata could also give the CCP and

the PLA the ability to intersect AI and biotech, which could

have many military and civilian applications.

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The U.S. must not cede leadership in the bioeconomy to

the CCP and must establish a research and regulatory

framework that supports innovation and a marketplace for

new products, while setting the biological safety, ethics,

and privacy standards for the world to follow.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4373, the Engineering

Biology Research and Development Act of

2019 (introduced in the Senate as S. 3734, the

Bioeconomy Research and Development Act

of 2020), bipartisan legislation which would

support a coordinated federal research “National

Engineering Biology Initiative.” The legislation

would ensure continued U.S. leadership in the

development of new biotechnologies including

synthetic biology, biomanufacturing, and non-

human gene editing. The bill would establish a

framework for greater interagency coordination

and strategy for federal investments in

engineering biology while expanding public-

private partnerships and supporting education

and training for the next generation of

engineering biology researchers.

Recommendation: Congress and the

Administration should work together to

modernize the regulatory framework for

agriculture biotechnology products, including the

consideration of recommendations to be made

by the Task Force established in Executive Order

13874, “Modernizing the Regulatory Framework

for Agricultural Biotechnology Products.”

The Executive Order called for regulatory

streamlining in order to facilitate bringing

innovations of agricultural biotechnology to

the market eciently, consistently, and safely

under a predictable, consistent, transparent, and

science-based regulatory framework.

Key Finding: U.S. leadership in advanced manufacturing

across industrial sectors is imperative to put the U.S.

on the leading edge of new products, processes, and

services, as the CCP seeks to move up the value chain

away from its traditional reliance on mass production of

low-end goods to more high-tech manufacturing.

Advanced manufacturing technologies fundamentally

alter and transform manufacturing capabilities, methods,

and practices. These new manufacturing technologies

drive U.S. competitiveness by enabling improved

productivity and the development of superior products,

leading to the formation of entirely new industries.

Manufacturing accounts for about 12 percent of the

U.S.’s GDP and employs approximately 12 million U.S.

workers. Manufacturers also fund about two-thirds of

the nation’s industrial R&D, providing a foundation for

technological innovation and continued U.S. technological

leadership.

The Administration has recognized the growing concern

that U.S. manufacturing competitiveness might be

declining relative to the PRC and other countries. While

rapid innovation has long been a deﬁning attribute of the

U.S. industry, private investments in manufacturing-based

technologies have dramatically shrunk in recent years.

Manufacturing leadership in emerging markets, exports,

and trade not only requires investment in advanced

technologies, but the ability to eectively leverage new

technologies and platforms across industrial sectors. To

this end, in 2018 the Administration released a “Strategy

for American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing,”

214

which focuses on the development of new technology

and the training of the future workforce.

The federal government provides technical assistance

to U.S. manufacturers through two primary programs,

the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) and

Manufacturing USA institutes. The MEP program is a

public-private partnership with centers in all 50 states

and Puerto Rico dedicated to serving small and medium-

In 2019, a massive espionage campaign to steal

advanced biomedical research was exposed at MD

Anderson’s Cancer Center, a prominent and cutting

edge research facility in Houston, Texas. Multiple

scientists were caught sending research back to

the CCP’s government or plotting to do so. In an

e-mail back to China, one scientist wrote, “I should

be able to bring the whole set of primers to you, if

I can ﬁgure out how to get a dozen tubes of frozen

DNA onto an airplane.” This brazen act is just the

tip of the iceberg of the CCP’s widescale espionage

eorts in the United States, especially through

their Thousand Talents Program.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

sized manufacturers.

215

MEP centers work with manufacturers to develop new products and customers, expand and

diversify markets, adopt new technology, and enhance value within supply chains. Manufacturing USA is a network of

regional research institutes in the U.S. that focuses on developing manufacturing technologies through public-private

partnerships, including additive manufacturing, 3-D printing, and biopharmaceuticals.

216

As has been well covered in other sections of this report, the Made in China 2025 initiative seeks to transform the

PRC from a low-end manufacturer to a high-end producer of goods through a top-down government controlled

industrial policy. The U.S. can continue to lead in advanced manufacturing through policies that support R&D, programs

that develop the workforce for the manufacturing jobs of the future, promotion of free and fair trade, and the creation of

a regulatory and tax system that unleashes the private sector.

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should continue to support implementation

of the “Strategy for American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing,” which articulates a plan for

U.S. leadership in manufacturing through the development and transition of new manufacturing

technologies, education and reskilling of the manufacturing workforce, and expansion of the

capabilities of the domestic manufacturing supply chain.

217

Recommendation: The Administration should leverage the Manufacturing USA institutes and the

MEP program to assist small and medium manufactures with retooling and reskilling for supply chain

diversity and to promote geographic diversity of U.S. advanced manufacturing, as directed in the

bipartisan American Manufacturing Leadership Act (P.L. 116-92).

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8132, the American COMPETE Act, a bipartisan measure

that promotes strategies for the U.S. to lead in manufacturing goods that the U.S. will depend on in

the future. This measure includes provisions promoting advanced manufacturing techniques for IoT,

incentivizing states to adopt model codes for the manufacturing of IoT devices, advances 3D printing

capabilities for manufacturing, and requires a national strategy for encouraging more tech-focused

startups and small businesses in all parts of the U.S. The provisions included will assist businesses of

all sizes to compete in the global marketplace with a focus on innovation, investment and geographic

diversiﬁcation.

Key Finding: The U.S., in coordination with its allies, must bring like-minded nations into a multilateral consortium for

enabling the private sector to develop alternatives to PRC companies, like Huawei, and build a trusted allied network

for sharing critical R&D as well as IP.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

The CCP’s mishandling of the initial COVID-19 outbreak

and its lack of transparency, as well as its disinformation

campaigns against the U.S. and its allies and partners, is

drawing new attention to the risks associated with relying

on PRC-produced 5G infrastructure and critical supply

chains.

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proposed

consolidating a new D-10 group of leading democracies

(the current G-7 members, plus South Korea, India, and

Australia) for addressing both 5G mobile communications

and vulnerable supply chains.

218

Recommendation: The U.S. should work with

the United Kingdom and other nations to form

a new D-10 group of leading democracies

focused on developing and deploying 5G and

subsequent generations, addressing 5G mobile

communications and vulnerable supply chains,

and leveraging technical expertise of each

nation in emerging technologies for the beneﬁt

of democratic nations.

Key Finding: The Administration should work with its

allies and private industry to continue shaping the

standards and the future international governance of

emerging e-technologies, to counter the CCP’s eorts

to dominate and manipulate international standards

setting bodies.

An explicit goal of the Made in China 2025 initiative

is to dominate international standards development.

Standards enable everything from communication

technologies to GPS, and ensure the safety of devices

such as pacemakers, while promoting conﬁdence in the

performance of products. In 2016, a DoC study found that

92 percent of U.S. exports were aected by consensus

standards. The urgency of securing standards leadership

is heightened by the potential impact of key emerging

technologies like AI and 5G.

The CCP views standards setting as an opportunity to

promote PRC technologies and make them the global

standard. For example, the CCP has focused particular

attention on the International Telecommunication Union

(ITU) which is working to set global 5G standards, by

placing a PRC-national as the head of the organization.

While U.S. experts have historically been leaders in

international standards development, particularly for

emerging technologies, there is a concern the U.S. is

losing its edge. Strengthening the unique U.S. public-

private partnership approach to industry-led standards

development is critical to U.S. economic competitiveness.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

section 1705 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA,

a bipartisan provision which would direct the

National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST) to commission an independent study

on the impact of the policies of the PRC and

coordination among industrial entities within the

PRC on engagement in international standards

bodies for emerging technologies, and how

to improve U.S. government and industry

engagement in international standards.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4500, the Promoting

U.S. Wireless Leadership Act of 2019, a

bipartisan measure which would enhance

the representation of the U.S. in international

standards-setting bodies by both the private and

public sector and promote U.S. leadership in

communications policy internationally.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

ﬁnal passage of H.R. 3763, the Promoting U.S.

International Leadership in 5G Act of 2019, a

bipartisan measure which would increase U.S.

leadership and participation at international

standards-setting bodies, and engender

diplomatic engagement with allies and partners

to increase cooperation at these bodies, as well

as share information and methods to identify

risks.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal

passage of H.R. 5698, the Promoting Secure

5G Act, which would require the U.S. to support

IFI assistance for 5G wireless technologies

only if they provide appropriate security for

beneﬁciaries. This bill is designed to prevent

the PRC from using the IFIs for loans that

could facilitate procurement or infrastructure

development leading to unsafe 5G networks

abroad.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to promote robust participation by

U.S. industry in international standards bodies

and conferences. The Administration’s June

2020 rule clariﬁed that technology that would

not have required a license to be disclosed to

Huawei before the company’s placement on

the Entity List can be disclosed for the purpose

of standards development in a standards-

development body without the need for an

export license. Such guidance ensures that

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

appropriate actions against state-sponsored PRC companies do not prevent U.S. companies from contributing to

important standards-developing activities, despite Huawei’s pervasive participation in standards-development

organizations, and is important to ensuring U.S. engagement in setting international standards.

Space Exploration and Technologies

The U.S. has renewed its commitment to space exploration and is building a thriving commercial space industry. The

Administration set a bold goal to return Americans to the lunar surface by 2024, and then venture on to Mars. This is

not a symbolic eort. The Artemis mission to return to the Moon will keep the U.S. on the leading edge of technological

development, help us identify and manage lunar resources, and prevent the CCP from gaining leadership in space

exploration and utilization. Together with commercial and international partners, NASA will establish a sustainable

presence on the Moon to prepare for missions to Mars.

The successful May 2020 launch of the Crew Dragon Capsule on the Demo-2 mission to the International Space Station

(ISS) by NASA and SpaceX marked a new era in space exploration. The ﬁrst launch of American astronauts, on an

American rocket, on American soil in nearly a decade was not just successful, but inspiring. It demonstrated the success

that is possible with a continuity of commitment to U.S. space programs and an investment in public-private partnerships.

The U.S. has a ﬂourishing private space sector, and it is in U.S. commercial and national interests to foster this industry,

eliminate regulatory barriers to its growth, and make use of its innovations.

While the U.S. views space exploration as a way to expand human knowledge, create new technologies, and discover

new phenomena, the CCP seeks to establish leadership in space for the purpose of keeping the CCP in power and as a

show of economic and national security strength. Unlike the U.S., which has a civilian agency (NASA) overseeing space

exploration, the PLA manages the PRC’s space program. The CCP dedicates high-level attention and funding for space

while also aggressively attempting to acquire U.S. space startup companies and technology, both through legitimate

means and coercion and theft.

219

If the PRC succeeds in its eorts to launch its ﬁrst long-term space station module in 2022, it will have matched the U.S.’

nearly 40-year progression from ﬁrst human spaceﬂight to ﬁrst space station module in less than 20 years. The CCP

is vocal about plans to establish a human base on the Moon. The U.S. should be concerned about the technological

innovations and leadership role for the CCP that could come from missions crewed by PRC-nationals to the Moon.

While the National Security chapter of this report covers the importance of space as a warfare domain, space exploration

should continue to be for the beneﬁt of humanity.

In his 1958 message to Congress on the creation of a new civilian space agency, President Eisenhower wrote:

I recommended that we have a civilian agency because of the clear evidence that

space exploration holds promise of adding importantly to our knowledge of the earth,

the solar system and the universe, and because it is of great importance to have the

fullest cooperation of the scientiﬁc community at home and abroad in moving forward

in these ﬁelds. Moreover, a civilian setting for the administration of space science and

exploration will, in my judgment, emphasize the concern of our nation that outer space

be devoted to peaceful and scientiﬁc purposes.”

This is just as important today. The Moon, and all the cosmos, should be explored with the principles of freedom and

liberty.

Key Finding: As the CCP seeks to attract international partners to support its own space exploration goals and expand

its inﬂuence, the U.S. must maintain its presence in low-Earth orbit, return U.S. astronauts to the Moon, chart a future

path for human exploration of Mars, and maintain a steady commitment to space science missions. U.S. civilian space

exploration eorts impact and aid multiple national interests, including the economy, national security, scientiﬁc

advances, and diplomacy.

Recommendation: Congress should pass a reauthorization of NASA and fund annual appropriations

that supports the return of U.S. astronauts to the lunar surface and on to the surface of Mars, ensures

continuity of purpose for space exploration eorts, and fully supports the development of the Space

Launch System, Orion Spacecraft, Exploration Ground Systems, and Human Landing System. H.R.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

5666, the NASA Authorization Act of 2020, is bipartisan legislation that takes important ﬁrst steps

towards supporting these goals and should continue to be reﬁned through the legislative process.

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should work together to maintain presence in

low-Earth orbit for strategic purposes, including continued operations of the ISS and transition to

commercial platforms as soon as possible. The U.S. should preserve assured access to the ISS and

low-Earth orbit using commercial crew and cargo services.

Recommendation: The U.S. should seek international participation in space exploration through

bilateral agreements. The U.S. should embrace the Administration’s “Artemis Accords” for lunar

exploration and reinforce the ISS Intergovernmental Agreement for future low-Earth orbit activities to

make the U.S. a more attractive partnership option than the PRC.

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should support a balanced, robust, and stable

science enterprise that counters the CCP’s attempts to eclipse U.S. leadership in the ﬁelds of Earth

science, astronomy, astrophysics, heliophysics, planetary science, and life and physical sciences. This

includes the development of small, medium, and large missions, as well as the research and analysis

funding necessary to support the mission scientists, post-doctoral researchers, and other elements of

the academic pipeline.

Recommendation: The U.S. should carry out its space exploration goals by leveraging private sector

investments. Private infrastructure, both in space and on Earth, can support U.S. government space

activities at lower cost than if the government were the sole owner and operator. Regular ﬂight

opportunities and innovative contracting mechanisms can support the development of platforms and

other infrastructure to serve multiple purposes, thus sharing ﬁxed costs across a variety of government

and private customers.

Recommendation: Congress should review the Wolf Amendment to annual appropriations laws that

has been in place for nine years, which prohibits bilateral cooperation between NASA and the PRC

unless the government certiﬁes 30 days in advance that the interaction will not result in the transfer

of technology, data, or other information with national security or economic security implications to

the PRC or a PRC-owned company and will not involve knowing interactions with ocials who have

been determined by the U.S. to have direct involvement with violations of human rights. Congress

should evaluate, through considered analysis and debate, whether this limitation should be modiﬁed

or strengthened.

Key Finding: As the PRC seeks to foster a new domestic commercial space industry under the inﬂuence and control of

the CCP, the U.S. must maintain free-market principles and streamline regulations to provide a stable and attractive

environment for private investment and operations. The U.S. must also protect private sector interests against the

theft of IP, the exploitation of space science collaborations, and the manipulation of PRC investment to ensure the

viability of this nascent and promising domestic industry.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3610, the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise

Act, which would streamline existing regulations for the licensing of commercial remote sensing

systems and provide a licensing system for other commercial space activities not already regulated by

other agencies in order to strengthen compliance with the “authorization and continuing supervision”

requirements of the Outer Space Treaty.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6208, the Protecting American Space Assets Act,

which would direct the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to protect the U.S. aerospace

industry from CCP interference by strengthening U.S. military and commercial capabilities in space,

promoting freedom of navigation for space assets, and increasing protections for space manufacturing

programs and supply chains.

Recommendation: Congress should pass the Space Technology Advancement Report Act, included

in H.R. 6395 of the FY2021 NDAA. The provision would direct the National Space Council to develop

a strategy to ensure the U.S. remains the preeminent space power in the face of growing global

competition from the CCP.

Key Finding: The growth of orbital debris in Earth’s orbit from defunct satellites, spent rockets, and other human-made

debris threatens civilian, commercial, and military activity in outer space.

Recommendation: The U.S. should engage with the PRC and other space competitors on shared

goals of space sustainability and safety issues, through bilateral diplomatic dialogue as well as forums

for multilateral discussions on establishing norms, best practices, and transparency and conﬁdence

building mechanisms for managing space debris.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation that creates an American Space Situational

Awareness and Framework for Identity Management, similar to the framework proposed last Congress

in the bipartisan measure H.R. 6226, that would provide information to the private sector and

international partners to ensure safe operations in space without burdensome regulations that would

stiﬂe industry and push companies overseas.

Privacy Risk and Consumer Protection

Key Finding: The CCP does not share the same set of values, including a respect for the privacy of its own citizens,

as the U.S. and other nations. The CCP has a record of using ocial government resources and companies with

CCP aliations to compromise the data of people around the world. The U.S., not the CCP, should lead the world in

developing practices and technologies that impact consumer privacy and establish new norms for the protection of

data and digital commerce.

The CCP’s bungled response and subsequent cover up of COVID-19 allowed it to become a pandemic, and both

instances demonstrate the complete control they can exert over their own people and their media. At the same time,

the CCP uses the enormous amount of data collected on their citizens as the fuel for their own state-sponsored pipeline

of innovation. This is enabled by the PRC’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 that requires organizations and citizens to

support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work. The law compromises the privacy of the PRC’s own citizens

as well as people around the world as PRC companies are hard pressed to explain safeguards that govern data they

collect. In response, there has been increased scrutiny of PRC companies like ByteDance (owner of TikTok), and other

PRC companies with direct or indirect ties to the CCP. The U.S. needs its allies and partners in government and industry

around the world to join the growing eort to secure data from the CCP’s surveillance state and other malign entities.

Building a Clean fortress around citizens’ data will ensure security for all nations.”

220

At the same time, the U.S. has

struggled to establish its own uniform data protection framework, endangering its own global standing as other countries

or blocs establish their own frameworks that may protect parochial interests and serve as de facto standards for U.S.

companies operating abroad.

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation that: 1) establishes one national data protection

standard to ensure protections do not vary state to state; 2) increases transparency so consumers

and regulators know what information is being collected, how it is being collected, and who it is

being shared with; 3) increases FTC authority to suciently hold bad actors accountable; 4) provides

ﬂexibility to protect the U.S. innovation advantage and allow small businesses to compete with large

tech companies; and 5) enhances data security to require reasonable practices that comport with

companies’ size, nature and scope of activities, the sensitivity of information collected, the current

state of art in technological means for protecting such information, and the cost of implementing such

safeguards.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6969, the U.S. TELL Act, which would require companies

to disclose whether China has access to data transmissions, and H.R. 6942, the Internet Application

I.D. Act, that requires app-makers to disclose applications originating from the PRC. U.S. consumers

should have clear knowledge of where downloaded applications are sourced and where their data

may travel.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6929, the Advancing Facial Recognition Act, which

would help identify harms to individuals of facial recognition technology, while also promoting public-

private partnerships on its ethical use and identifying appropriate federal oversight over the technology.

This will assist in assessing risks and trends in the marketplace, with the U.S. driving design and use.

Recommendation: NIST should continue to develop and promote adoption of the NIST Privacy

Framework, a voluntary tool developed in collaboration with stakeholders intended to help

organizations identify and manage privacy risk to build innovative products and services while

protecting individuals’ privacy.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7005, the SHIELD Act, which would promote cross-

border data ﬂows with our allies. The Administration should enact H.R. 4779, the SAFEWEB, Act, a

bipartisan measure to extend FTC’s international cooperation eorts to counter spam, spyware, and

other malicious attempts on scams and fraud originating abroad. The U.S. should continue to support

the free ﬂow of internet and voice trac with countries that respect U.S. laws and interests.

CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGY

Key Finding: The Administration’s “Clean Network” initiative is further safeguarding the nation’s assets by shining

a light on threats to citizens’ privacy and companies’ most sensitive information that may be vulnerable to intrusion

by the CCP.By promoting internationally accepted digital trust standards, the program can continue to expand the

coalition of trusted partners, and in doing so adjust to the rapidly changing technology and economics of global

markets.

Recommendation:The Administration should complete implementation of the “Clean Path” initiative

contained in the FY2019 NDAA.This will ensure that voice and data trac entering and exiting U.S.

diplomatic facilities abroad are not traversing Huawei equipment.No untrusted vendors should have

access to DoS systems.

Recommendation:The Administration should direct the NTIA, as part of the “Clean Cable” initiative,

to strengthen interagency coordination of the Executive Branch review of international undersea

cable landings and applications for new licenses or transfers of licenses for authorization to provide

telecommunications or radio services.Without such coordination, Huawei Marine Systems and PRC

state-owned telecommunications companies may expand networks throughout the world to dominate

the market for submarine cables that carry voice and data trac and subvert infrastructure for

intelligence gathering by the CCP.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

CHAPTER V:

ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

Introduction

The CCP is solidifying and expanding its authoritarian power through commercial linkages with the international trading

system. In so doing, the CCP is distorting the rules of the international trading system for its own ends by, among other

things, using massive subsidies to favor its state-owned or controlled enterprises, stealing IP and requiring technology

transfer as a cost of doing business, and forcing open markets for PRC exports while protecting its market and industries

through localization requirements and other trade barriers.

The CCP’s economic system is threatening U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The proceeds of its economic

growth are ﬁnancing the buildup of the CCP’s military and the continuation of a surveillance state to oppress ethnic

and religious minorities. The acquisition and development of cutting-edge and foundational technologies by whatever

means necessary is existential to the CCP’s economic and political system. Consequently, American ingenuity and

research is under assault by CCP attempts to achieve economic and military superiority over the U.S.

Undergirding the CCP’s industrial policies and Military-Civil Fusion strategy is an ideology that demands preeminence.

In a seminal speech on ideology after being named the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping tasked the Party with

“building a socialism that is superior to capitalism” whose economic and technological prowess will give it “the

dominant position” in world aairs.

222

Months later, the CCP circulated an authoritative, internal memo on ideology –

Document Number 9 – denouncing core tenets of the international system, such as economic liberalism, privatization,

and the free ﬂow of information, as threats to the regime’s survival.

This ideological orthodoxy is shaping a legal framework in the PRC to compel all individuals and organizations to work with

and protect the CCP. The PRC’s National Security Law of 2015, for example, goes so far as to codify an unprecedented

deﬁnition of security that requires the absence of domestic and international threats. These principles form a strategic

logic for the CCP, a regime paranoid about the maintenance of its unchallenged power, that it cannot be safe in the

current international order.

Taken together, General Secretary Xi is mobilizing his 90-million-person party, 200-million-person military, and nearly

one-ﬁfth of the world’s economy to wage a global war of systems and ideas. The incompatibility of CCP and liberal,

democratic values results in a dangerous dynamic in which the CCP seeks the elimination or capitulation of values that

underpin democratic countries, such as the U.S. to achieve its own security.

This dynamic marks the emergence of a revisionist power that is trying to upend the existing liberal international order.

The CCP strategy—marked by the rampant theft of hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. IP, systemic distortion across a

broad spectrum of critical industries and technologies caused by hundreds of billions of dollars in industrial subsidies,

fusing of its military into its industrial and innovation base, and thousands of cases of economic espionage—amounts to

an urgent challenge for the U.S. that demands the appropriate use of existing authorities (see Appendix III).

Success for the U.S. and supporters of a liberal, rules-based economic system requires immediate and forceful action.

The U.S. and its allies must defend and bolster their economies, separately and collectively, as well as the rules that

undergird the international economic order. These nations must also recommit themselves to an economic system that

spurs innovation, free enterprise, and growth. They must ensure their diplomacy on trade as well as export control and

investment review harmonization, work in concert to forge closer bonds with their allies and partners in the competition

with the CCP and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy.

A fuller understanding of the extent of the U.S.-PRC commercial, technological, and ﬁnancial relationship and how it

aects long-term U.S. economic and national security is critical. Data and information from the private sector—including

supply chain dependencies, technology licensing, and capital ﬂows—are critical for policymakers to understand the

complexity of these challenging choices and to educate the public of their necessity.

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

Oensive Tools: Setting a Positive Agenda and

Advancing U.S. Trade and Commercial Interests

China’s growth over the years has

been remarkable, but in many ways

it is fueled by theft, coercion, and

exploitation of free market economies,

private companies, and colleges and

universities.”

- Sec. Esper, Munich Conference, 2/15/2020

Key Finding: The PRC’s trade and economic policies are

based on ﬂouting international norms and aggressively

seeking an advantage, particularly where there are

no rules. Its unfair trade practices pose particular

challenges because they systematically undermine fair

competition and create damaging global overcapacity

through grossly distorting subsidization, IP theft, forced

technology transfer, localization policies, and the use of

state-owned enterprises to outcompete U.S. companies

and their workers.

As the U.S. Trade Representative documented after

an extensive investigation, over the past decade the

PRC has reversed many of its economic reforms and

refused to comply with its WTO obligations, and that

trend is accelerating.

223

The PRC is aggressively using

all means at its disposal to compel the transfer of control

and technology to its state-owned and nominally private

enterprises as a requirement for market entry, block

or restrict the sale of foreign products and services in

the PRC, and provide preferential treatment to its own

industry players, particularly in the information and

communications technology (ICT) sector.

224

In concert

with the 13th Five-Year Plan, Internet Plus Action Plan,

and other state-led development plans, Made in China

2025 constitutes a broad strategy to use state resources

and state control to distort the global marketplace and

create comparative advantage for the PRC’s state-owned

and nominally private players in critical sectors of the

21st century economy on a global scale.

225

PRC theft of

U.S. IP is rampant, costing between $225 billion and

$600 billion annually.

226

The PRC’s onerous constraints

on foreign investment and severe limitations on access

to its market make it one of the world’s most restrictive

regimes, as measured by the OECD.

227

Even when its

measures blatantly violate its WTO obligations, the PRC’s

lack of transparency often makes it enormously dicult to

document and prove this is the case in a timely way.

At the same time, exports of U.S. goods, agriculture, and

services are important for U.S. macro- and microeconomic

growth, as well as U.S. job creation; the PRC is the U.S.’

third largest export market. Complete decoupling from

trade relationship with the PRC is not advisable because

other countries will simply take the U.S. place in the

market, leaving the PRC’s distortions intact. Instead,

the U.S. must be strategic and selective in its approach

and strike the right balance to do all it can to compel the

PRC to end its unfair trade practices and preserve U.S.

competitiveness, or at least insulate the U.S. from the

harmful eects of those practices.

The Phase One agreement with the PRC is an excellent

ﬁrst step in achieving that balance and tackling the PRC’s

extensive and embedded trade barriers, successfully

addressing key barriers created by the PRC’s lack

of respect for IP rights, discriminatory agriculture

standards, and certain foreign ownership restrictions. Full

enforcement of all aspects of this agreement, using the

unique and innovative consultation and dispute resolution

mechanism in the agreement, is imperative. In addition,

the PRC must agree to additional, enduring disciplines

to address remaining barriers and practices. The

Administration’s commitment to addressing remaining

distortions, such as subsidies, state-owned enterprises,

cloud computing, and data localization, in a Phase Two

negotiation is welcome.

Recommendation: Congress must work closely

with the Administration to aggressively use

the new and unprecedented consultation,

monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms in the

Phase One agreement to strictly enforce that

agreement, particularly relating to protecting

U.S. IP, removing agriculture barriers, disciplining

forced technology transfer, and ending

ownership and control requirements.

Recommendation: Congress should intensify its

engagement with the Administration to develop

a strategic plan for Phase Two negotiations with

the PRC based on a uniﬁed U.S. approach that

will convey the message that the cost will be high

if it refuses to engage in good faith Phase Two

negotiations. This strategic plan should address

the full range of remaining PRC trade barriers

that undermine American competition, including

the use of subsidies to grossly distort global

markets and create overcapacity; dominance of

state-owned enterprises to dictate the terms of

trade, data, and other localization requirements

that mandate use of PRC servers and products;

and remaining forced technology transfer and

joint venture requirements that seize the crown

jewels of American innovation as a cost of doing

business in the PRC.

Key Finding: The CCP’s survival depends on accelerating

and deepening the PRC’s economic integration with

the rest of the world. The PRC seeks to shift the global

center of economic and investment activity to Beijing by

dominating global markets through unfair advantage

and outright theft of technology and IP while protecting

its own market from competition. Working with allies to

address the PRC’s barriers and strengthening economic

ties and the economic rule of law with U.S. allies will

provide a crucial counterweight to the PRC.

The European Union (EU) and Japan, as well as many

other trading partners, have often been less willing than

the U.S. to confront the PRC directly, preferring to hide

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

behind the U.S. The Administration’s engagement with

the EU and Japan over the last two years has resulted

in progress with a trilateral eort to publicly identify and

address some of the PRC’s barriers and unfair practices,

but more eort and commitment by U.S. trading partners

is necessary and is in their interest.

In addition, establishing close economic ties with allies is

essential in addressing PRC barriers because shifting PRC

trade ﬂows from the U.S. to other democracies will harm

U.S. competitiveness without changing the PRC’s behavior.

Uniﬁed, bipartisan U.S. government engagement with

its allies, both at their embassies in the U.S. and in their

own respective capitals, as well as through international

institutions, is necessary to eectively counter the PRC.

The Administration has negotiated ambitious new trade

agreements based on U.S. law and standards as well as

new market access for U.S. exports, such as the U.S.-

Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the Phase One

agreement with Japan, and amendments to the Korea-

U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Expanding the U.S. network

of groundbreaking trade agreements and other trade

relationships will set high-standard rules in Asia and

around the globe, create more opportunities for U.S.

exporters to sell American-made products and services,

and provide a meaningful alternative to the PRC for

other countries. These agreements are negotiated and

implemented under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade

Priorities and Accountability Act (TPA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-

26), which sets out detailed negotiating objectives for the

Administration to follow as well as intensive consultation

requirements for the Administration to meet with both

Congress and the public.

The U.S. has high-quality free trade agreements (FTAs)

with 20 countries. They account for only 6 percent of the

world’s population,

228

but cover 46 percent of U.S. goods

exports.

229

Other economies like the EU are negotiating

many more trade agreements than the U.S., and the U.S.

will be at a disadvantage if it does not stay proactive in

negotiating new agreements.

Even if some countries are not ready to negotiate a

trade agreement, the U.S. has an arsenal of trade tools

created by Congress over the years to enhance economic

relationships, establish rules using U.S. standards, create

strong investment bonds that pay dividends through

increased trade, and open markets for U.S. goods and

services.

Recommendation: On a bipartisan basis,

Members of Congress should work with their

counterparts across the globe to continue to

build bilateral and plurilateral relationships to

address the challenges posed by the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should engage

in close consultations with the Administration

under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade

Priorities and Accountability Act (TPA) rules and

procedures to negotiate new trade agreements

and other arrangements to counter CCP

directed inﬂuence by strengthening economic

and geostrategic ties, establishing strong and

ambitious rules and standards globally based on

U.S. law, and creating new export opportunities

for U.S. manufacturers, farmers, and service

providers. Speciﬁc actions include:

• Continue ongoing trade agreement negotiations

with the UK for a comprehensive, high-standard

agreement;

• Commence Phase Two comprehensive trade

agreement negotiations with Japan;

• Continue ongoing trade agreement negotiations

with Kenya for a comprehensive, high-standard

agreement and send a strong signal to other sub-

Saharan African countries that the U.S. is eager

to deepen its trade relationship with all countries

that are ready to do so;

• Continue ongoing discussions with India to

address its trade barriers;

• Continue bilateral discussions with the EU when it

is ready;

• Identify additional partners for trade agreement

negotiations if they demonstrate a willingness

and ability to take on ambitious, enforceable, and

comprehensive obligations;

• Include a provision in all U.S. trade agreements

to require parties to our agreements to inform

us and consult with us if they are considering

negotiations with a non-market economy, as is

contained in USMCA; and

• Include ambitious provisions in U.S. trade

agreements with the aim of setting international

rules aimed at addressing the PRC’s barriers, such

as risk- and science-based standards, disciplines

on state-owned enterprises, IP protection, and

cross-border data ﬂows, as were included in

USMCA.

Recommendation: Congress should continue

its action and oversight, and the Administration

should continue its implementation, of other

statutory trade tools to strengthen economic

and geostrategic ties with developing countries

in Africa, Asia, and Latin America:

• Extend the bipartisan Generalized System of

Preferences, set to expire at the end of 2020,

to provide preferential access for developing

countries to the U.S. market if they comply with

strict eligibility criteria based on the economic rule

of law and non-discrimination against U.S. exports;

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

• Extend the bipartisan Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, set to expire September 30, 2020,

which provides preferential access to the Caribbean Basin and Haiti (based in part on H.R. 991,

Extension of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act); and

• Use the bipartisan Africa Growth & Opportunity Act to strengthen ties with sub-Saharan Africa.

Recommendation: The Administration should enhance our relationship with Taiwan by supporting the

full and timely implementation of the bipartisan Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement

Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-135).

Recommendation: The Administration should work to deepen trade ties with Taiwan and resolve

speciﬁc outstanding trade issues, taking the steps to launch trade agreement negotiations once those

issues are addressed.

Key Finding: The PRC has abused its membership in the WTO to its advantage, meeting obligations only on its own

terms, blocking consensus on new disciplines, claiming developing country status with entitlement to “special and

dierential treatment” even though it meets objective tests to be considered a developed country, and disregarding

transparency requirements to shroud its barriers.

The CCP has refused to internalize the norms and practices of competition-based trade and investment, instead

exploiting the beneﬁts of WTO membership to become the world’s largest exporter, while systematically protecting

its own markets from foreign competition.

230

The CCP has cynically used the beneﬁts of WTO membership, including

its guarantee of open, non-discriminatory access to the markets of other WTO Members, to exponentially increase its

exports while resisting liberalization of its trade regime by claiming to be a “developing” country entitled to “special and

dierential treatment”

231

and continuing to discriminate against U.S. and other non-PRC companies that attempt to export

to or invest in the PRC.

While the WTO has had tremendous value for the U.S., WTO rules, most of which were written in the mid-1990s, are not

equipped to handle the full range of economic problems associated with the PRC’s rise and the distortions created by

the CCP economic model.

232

Signiﬁcant reform is needed, and other WTO members can be important allies to push back

against CCP aggression.

Congress, which passed legislation in 1994 to implement U.S. participation in the WTO, has an important statutory

oversight role over the Administration’s participation in WTO activities, including negotiations and dispute settlement.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H. Res. 746, a bipartisan resolution supporting the WTO and

calling on other WTO members to join the U.S. in reforming the organization.

Recommendation: Congress should work through the WTO, together with the Administration and

allies, on developing reforms and new rules and disciplines to address the threats the CCP poses;

advance U.S. policy positions, rules and standards and build alliances with other member countries to

counter the CCP’s inﬂuence and best address the CCP’s economic aggression. In particular:

• Negotiate an ambitious agreement on e-commerce that prohibits localization barriers and allows

cross-border data ﬂows;

• Reform the WTO Appellate Body to prevent it from imputing new obligations to the U.S. that prevent

enforcing U.S. rights under WTO agreements with respect to state subsidies;

• Reform the WTO to require countries to meet their transparency and notiﬁcation obligations so that

we can use dispute settlement more eectively;

• Discipline the designation of “developing country” using objective standards so that special and

dierential treatment is reserved for truly developing countries and not the PRC and similarly

situated economies; and

• Negotiate new disciplines on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and IP.

Recommendation: Congress should work with the Administration to develop a U.S. government

strategy to select a new Director-General of the WTO this fall who understands the scope of the CCP

threat to the system and is equipped to challenge their eorts to undermine the system, using both

dispute settlement and negotiations.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Key Finding: The CCP is attempting to reshape international norms, standards, and trade networks through BRI. It

is leveraging these predatory loans and economic dependencies to give its companies an unfair advantage in third

countries, create leverage for future political concessions and military access to infrastructure, and co-opt countries

for their votes at international bodies.

BRI is giving rise to a world diametrically opposed to the existing one.

233

Through debt-trap diplomacy, no-bid contracts,

and opaque lending practices, the CCP is securing strategic land and resources around the world. The CCP now controls

strategic ports in Sri Lanka, Djibouti, and at both ends of the Panama Canal.

234

More concerning, the BRI is attempting to

set rule and technological standards to give PRC ﬁrms an advantage over competitors and increase the PRC’s leverage

over these countries’ domestic politics. The Digital Silk Road aims for key digital sectors like telecommunications, IoT

infrastructure, and smart city and other artiﬁcial intelligence surveillance technology to be built on PRC proprietary

technology from its national champions, including Huawei and ZTE. These countries will all be linked together by

Beijing’s Beidou navigational system, its version of “GPS,” which will serve as the “digital glue for roads, railways, ports,

and industrial parks.”

235

Congress has taken important steps to counter the CCP’s ambitions and better support U.S. businesses competing for

contracts across the globe. This includes the enactment of the bipartisan, Championing American Business through

Diplomacy Act (P.L. 116-94), which mandates a more focused approach from DoS and DoC overseas and signiﬁcant

reforms in the Export-Import Bank’s (Ex-Im) reauthorization. Specially, Congress created the Program on China and

Transformational Exports (“the Program”), which Ex-Im Chairman Kimberly Reed has described as “one of the most

signiﬁcant initiatives in Ex-Im’s 86-year history.”

236

Under the program, Ex-Im is to devote no less than 20 percent of its

$135 billion in ﬁnancing authority to neutralize PRC export credit and advance America’s competitive edge in technologies

such as 5G and semiconductors.

The Program will help enable Ex-Im to challenge the CCP using competitive ﬁnancing terms and maintain pressure on the

PRC government through aggressive ﬁnancing of U.S. exports so that the CCP is incentivized to comply with multilateral

credit standards.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure eective implementation and resourcing of the Ex-Im

Bank’s new bipartisan Program on China and Transformational Exports (P.L. 116-94). As Ex-Im’s new

initiative develops, Congress should pass H.R. 8163, the Countering China Through American Export

Competitiveness Act, in order to raise the minimum level of Program resources from 20 percent to

33 percent of the Bank’s authority. Congress should also bolster the Program’s eectiveness through

appropriate funding increases for administrative costs.

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

Recommendation: As Ex-Im seeks to counteract

the CCP’s malign designs, it should not

ﬁnance the PRC in any way. In previous years,

PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have

beneﬁtted from billions of dollars in Ex-Im loan

guarantees backed by the U.S. taxpayer, even

as Beijing sits on more than $3 trillion in foreign

exchange reserves and seeks to use its SOEs

for strategic ends inconsistent with our national

interest. For these reasons, in 2019’s bipartisan

reauthorization of Ex-Im, the House established

a national interest review for all large Ex-Im

Bank transactions involving PRC government-

controlled entities. It is critical for Ex-Im to deny

this support: the Bank should refuse to put

taxpayers on the hook as long as SOEs continue

to implement the priorities of the CCP.

Recommendation: The Administration should

direct the DFC and related agencies, such as

the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the

U.S. Export Import Bank, and USAID, to partner

together to establish deal team coordination

centers and one-stop-shops in critical regions,

such as South America, Southeast Asia, and

Africa, and work actively with DoS personnel

to better identify strategic projects. A more

coordinated eort is needed to best challenge

the CCP’s BRI. Face-to-face interagency

coordination in one oce would enhance

the agencies’ ability to monitor and evaluate

current projects, grow the pipeline of potential

future projects, scale up investments in these

key regions, and work more closely with host

governments and U.S. companies on the front

lines of foreign markets.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7570, a bipartisan measure which provides a

budget treatment for equity investments made

by the DFC that does not require dollar-for-

dollar funding or expose U.S. taxpayers to any

signiﬁcant new risks. This will ensure taxpayer

dollars can be better stretched to counter the

BRI.

Recommendation: The DFC, working with

the Ex-Im Bank, should sign a Memorandum

of Understanding with the Oce of the

Director of National Intelligence to receive

and analyze classiﬁed economic data related

to corporations and countries in order to best

direct investments.

Recommendation: The Administration should

fully implement the bipartisan Championing

American Business through Diplomacy

Act (P.L.116-94), which promotes American

economic interests abroad and counters the

CCP’s predatory BRI in developing nations.

The law requires the DoS to report on strategic

investment by foreign governments abroad,

designate a point of contact for U.S. businesses

at each mission, update training on U.S. business

promotion for chiefs of mission and Foreign

Service Ocers, and coordinate with DoC to

promote tools available to U.S. businesses

seeking foreign market penetration. It also

explicitly places the duty of foreign business

promotion on each chief of mission.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue its multilateral eorts to provide a

credible alternative to the BRI. DoS’ infrastructure-

oriented Blue Dot Network, and its Economic

Prosperity Network for broader economic ties,

are key initiatives to promote high ﬁnancial

transparency and accountability standards and

to draw a contrast to CCP corruption.

Recommendation: The Administration should

coordinate its diplomacy on trade as well

as export control and investment review

harmonization to forge closer bonds with U.S.

allies and partners in its competition with the

CCP and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy to

extract assets and technology for military and

commercial preeminence.

Key Finding: The CCP is acting against the fundamental

goals of IFIs through its disregard for the rule of law,

human rights, and international norms. These behaviors,

combined with Beijing’s establishment of alternative

lending institutions, undermine a rules-based ﬁnancial

system and disadvantage countries that need special

ﬁnancial support.

The PRC has risen to become the third largest shareholder

in both the IMF and World Bank, yet its governance is at

odds with the core principles of these institutions.

Beijing’s history of questionable economic data,

secretive lending practices, and persistent state

intervention in its ﬁnancial system are inconsistent with

IMF members’ obligations and put the Fund’s ability to

monitor the global economy at risk. Of particular concern

is the PRC’s emergence as the world’s largest ocial

creditor, since the opacity of much of its lending poses a

threat to ﬁnancial stability and the IFIs’ ability to respond.

Researchers have estimated that up to $200 billion in

PRC ocial credit to developing countries has gone

unreported, jeopardizing the ability of the IFIs and private

creditors alike to assess risk.

237

In addition, despite being an upper middle-income

country, the PRC has continued to receive World Bank

assistance even though it exceeds the Bank’s threshold

for lending, beneﬁtting from more than $9 billion in

commitments from 2015 to 2019.

238

These resources

would be better deployed to combat poverty elsewhere,

and the fungibility of money raises particular concerns

for Bank projects at a time when Beijing has forced more

than a million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities into

internment camps and is creating a dystopian surveillance

state in Xinjiang and across the PRC, actions which make

a mockery of the World Bank’s mission to “reduce poverty

and build shared prosperity.”

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

As the largest or second-largest shareholder of each international ﬁnancial institution, U.S. leadership is critical to ensure

that the IFIs pursue poverty alleviation, good governance, and ﬁnancial stability for the global good. The CCP’s exploitative

development model and creation of rival institutions underscores how Beijing is not committed to these priorities. U.S.

stewardship of the IFIs, in cooperation with like-minded member countries, should rejuvenate these institutions as an

alternative to the CCP’s self-interested approach to foreign assistance and trade.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1779 of H.R. 6395, the FY2021 NDAA, which includes

the provisions of H.R. 5932, the Ensuring Chinese Debt Transparency Act, a bipartisan measure which

would establish as policy the use of the voice and vote of the U.S. at IFIs to secure greater transparency

for PRC loans to IFI beneﬁciaries, consistent with the standards of the Paris Club. The bill would also

require the Treasury Secretary to report on eorts and recommendations on heightening transparency

for credit that may be channeled through the PRC’s SOEs or other government-controlled entities.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 5846, the Neutralizing Unfair Chinese Subsidies Act,

which would require the Treasury Secretary to submit to Congress a strategy and timeline to ensure,

in cooperation with U.S. allies, the PRC’s compliance with the ﬁnancial terms and conditions of the

OECD Arrangement on Ocial Supported Export Subsidies. This bill emphasizes the importance of

U.S. leadership in mobilizing international support behind a transparent, rules-based ﬁnancial order,

highlighting how the Arrangement and other agreements can serve as a framework for the U.S. and its

partners to come together against the CCP’s cynicism.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6086, the IMF Reform and Integrity Act, which would

prevent any shareholding increase at the IMF for a country, such as the PRC, that does not meet basic

obligations codiﬁed in the organization’s Articles of Agreement. The legislation would also require

the U.S. to oppose an increase for the PRC if the CCP has not demonstrated a commitment to the

rules and principles of the Paris Club. H.R. 6086 would bolster U.S. leadership in the Fund, including

by holding the CCP accountable to the Fund’s basic principles and securing a rules-based ﬁnancial

system. Congress should insist on progress toward these goals through oversight of DoT’s advocacy

on the IMF’s board of directors and pursue similar aims at other IFIs through future legislation that

authorizes and appropriates new funding.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1843 of H.R. 6395, the FY2021 NDAA, which

includes provisions of H.R. 5051, the Accountability for World Bank Loans to China Act, a bipartisan

measure which would establish as policy the use of the voice and vote of the U.S. at the World Bank

to graduate the PRC from assistance, and require an action plan to achieve this graduation within two

years. The bill would also require the Treasury Secretary to report to Congress on debt management

assistance provided by the U.S. to BRI borrowing countries and other U.S. eorts at international

ﬁnancial institutions to promote PRC debt transparency.

Key Finding: The CCP’s aggressive eorts to develop, expand, and dominate long-term nuclear energy relationships

with other nations is a geostrategic and economic threat to the U.S. Without a robust and comprehensive approach to

nuclear energy, the U.S. risks ceding global competitiveness to the PRC’s state-owned enterprises that will undermine

its national security interests and decrease its own technological and industrial capabilities in the long term while

resulting in an increase to proliferation and safety risks.

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

U.S. global leadership on nuclear energy is losing

ground on several fronts: decades of domestic policy

choices have eroded the nation’s nuclear industrial

base, domestic energy competition and policies have

led to the premature shuttering of high-performing

generating stations, and competition from Russian and

PRC state-owned enterprises has put U.S. companies at a

disadvantage when engaging with other nations to supply

services and build new reactors in those nations. For the

past 20 years, two of every three new reactors that have

been built around the world have been built by Russia or

the PRC—including in critical emerging economies.

The PRC, using its predatory economics, is currently

building or planning to build 20 reactors across multiple

countries and is projected to surpass the U.S. in nuclear

power generation in ten years. Meanwhile, as a recent

analysis released by DoE observed, “the U.S. is entirely

absent from the global new build nuclear reactor market

with no foreign orders.”

The U.S. is ceding the strategic energy and diplomatic

partnerships forged through nuclear commerce to the

PRC. The net eect of this dynamic, if it is not reversed,

will undermine 70 years of U.S. nuclear energy strategy,

which recognized that U.S. promotion and engagement

on peaceful uses of nuclear energy would serve not only

the welfare of nations but the strategic security interests

of the U.S.

The current Administration recognizes the importance of

civilian nuclear relationships and their role in its strategic

competition with the CCP, as indicated in its “Restoring

America’s Competitive Nuclear Energy Advantage: A

Strategy to Assure U.S. National Security,” but more

must be done to restore civilian nuclear policy to its

rightful place in U.S. security and energy policy decision-

making.

239



Recommendation: Congress should elevate

nuclear energy, and related engineering,

technological, and industrial capacity, as a

national security imperative, with the requisite

attention of the White House in coordination

with the DoS, DoE, DoC, and DoD.The President

should do this through Presidential memorandum,

which would lead to appropriately valuing and

accounting for nuclear energy’s national security

attributes that transcend conventional domestic

energy supply issues.

Recommendation: Congress should strengthen

the U.S.’ competitive position in global

nuclear markets through the expanded export

of nuclear technology, which will require

strengthening ﬁnancing mechanisms and

developing collaborative relationships with

U.S. allies to support private industry exports

of nuclear technology to compete with PRC

state-owned enterprises. The Administration’s

recommendation to designate a senior

Administration position dedicated to leading

nuclear export coordination among relevant

agencies should be implemented by the

President or Congress.

240

Enhancing, supporting,

and developing the U.S. domestic civilian

nuclear energy industry and its supply chain

and increasing U.S. governmental engagement

on international nuclear safety, safeguards, and

licensing will support restored U.S. leadership.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7405, the Strengthening American Nuclear

Competitiveness Act, which would improve

nuclear competitiveness and commerce by

identifying regulatory, commercial, and liability

barriers to domestic and foreign competition

and by updating Atomic Energy Act procedures

to expedite DoE decisions and approvals for

certain nuclear technology exports.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7406, the Nuclear Licensing Eciency Act,

which would remove regulatory barriers to the

commercial licensing and deployment of nuclear

technologies, including advanced nuclear

technologies, which is necessary to restore a

robust, globally competitive domestic industry.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7814, the Nuclear Prosperity and Security Act,

which would direct the Secretary of Energy

to create a uranium reserve to build domestic

fuel supply chain and ensure the U.S. maintains

a domestic supply in the event of market

disruption.

Key Finding: The CCP is looking for alternatives to a

U.S.-driven Liquiﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) market.The U.S.

should continue to lead in the investment and innovation

in this sector and drive the international market for this

resource.

U.S. innovation and technological developments have

allowed the U.S. to become the world’s number one

producer of oil and gas, and to reap signiﬁcant economic

beneﬁts. The shale revolution has created hundreds of

thousands of jobs, and billions of dollars of development.

In the last decade, U.S. energy imports have plummeted,

dramatically improving the U.S.’ energy security. Today,

as an emerging energy superpower, the U.S. stands as

a beacon of hope for its allies who are forced to rely on

the Middle East and Russia for their energy supplies. For

60 years, the U.S. has been a natural gas importer—now

it has more than it can use and continues to be growing

exporter. This is good for the U.S.’ economy, national

security, and allies around the world.

Until the shale revolution, U.S. supplies were dwindling,

and the U.S. was importing natural gas. As you would

expect, U.S. laws reﬂected that reality. However, the U.S.

is in a completely dierent situation today as for the ﬁrst

time ever, the U.S. is a net exporter of natural gas. Now, in

order to capitalize on this incredible opportunity, the U.S.

needs to update its laws to remove unnecessary barriers

to innovation and growth.

As dozens of studies have shown, including those

sponsored by DoE, LNG exports provide wide-ranging

net beneﬁts to consumers and the economy. Removing

unnecessary restrictions on these exports would help

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

create more open, transparent, and competitive markets

for natural gas, which would, in turn, encourage more

production in the U.S., create thousands of jobs, and spur

further economic development that would beneﬁt the

nation as a whole. Critically, LNG exports also strengthen

U.S. energy diplomacy to confront and respond to nation

states, especially the PRC, that use energy as a weapon.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R. 7404, the Unlocking our Domestic LNG

Potential Act of 2020, which would remove

regulatory barriers to exporting and importing

natural gas while maintaining Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Pipeline

and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

regulations for LNG facilities. These changes will

help ensure U.S. global energy leadership and

competitiveness, in part because LNG exports

will provide considerable security and economic

beneﬁts for the U.S. and U.S. partners in Asia and

elsewhere.

Key Finding: The U.S. must maintain its energy

independence and security as a net exporter of oil

and gas for national security and economic prosperity,

particularly in terms of pushing back on the CCP’s BRI.

The U.S. must also ensure supply chains associated

with domestic oil and gas companies are secure and

protected.

Today, the U.S. is the world’s number one producer of

petroleum and natural gas. Its markets are more open,

transparent, and competitive than ever before.The U.S.

has cut its imports by about seventy-ﬁve percent since

they peaked in 2005.

The U.S. achieved this by repealing Carter-era supply

and price controls to encourage a free market for energy

commodities. The U.S. has taken steps to improve its

regulatory policies, though there is more that can be

done. Piece-by-piece, the U.S. has removed restrictions

on energy trade to allow U.S. energy to compete in the

global marketplace.Most recently, the U.S. repealed a 40-

year ban on crude oil exports.Now, just two years later,

the U.S. is exporting more than one-and-a-half million

barrels per day of crude oil to countries around the world.

The shale revolution, now ten years in the making, has had

an enormously positive impact on the U.S. economy.It also

has had a big impact on the U.S. power sector, and with

the shift to abundant and cheap natural gas, the country

has seen a huge reduction in its carbon emissions.In fact,

the U.S. is leading the world in reducing carbon emissions,

with 2019 international reporting showing “the largest

absolute decline among all countries since 2000.”

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Since

peaking in 2005, U.S. carbon emissions have declined

steadily, and this trend looks likely to continue.

The U.S. is seeing these beneﬁts today—and as the U.S.

emerges as a world leading LNG exporter—our trading

partners will share in this good fortune.Stronger oil and

gas industries domestically and the energy policies to

match translate into additional opportunities to help U.S.

allies abroad who are in need of reliable and aordable

supplies of energy.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7429, the Promoting Cross-border Energy

Infrastructure Act, which would remove

regulatory barriers to permitting cross-border

pipelines and electricity transmission, which

would strengthen North American energy

security, a prerequisite for competing with PRC

energy interests in the Western Hemisphere.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

3983, the Promoting Interagency Coordination

for Review of Natural Gas Pipelines Act, which

would streamline the natural gas pipeline

permitting process at FERC, enabling a more

ecient supply of U.S. energy production to

domestic and global markets.

Key Finding: It is critical that the U.S. continue to

enhance the security of its energy grid, particularly its

bulk-power system (BPS). The U.S. should ensure that

BPS equipment from foreign adversaries that pose

security risks is not acquired, transferred or installed

here in the U.S.

Over the past decade, as the U.S. has monitored the

increased security threats its adversaries pose to the U.S.’

electricity system, we have worked to ensure DoE has

the authorities and tools necessary to detect and address

threats to critical electric infrastructure, which is essential

for the health and safety of all Americans. In May 2020,

the President signed Executive Order 13920, “Securing

the United States Bulk-Power System.”

The BPS is vital to the reliable, secure delivery of

electricity, supporting every aspect of our daily lives, work,

and health, as well as the operations of various critical

infrastructure, emergency services, and national defense.

Current procurement practices by both the federal and

private sectors may be exploited by our near-peer foreign

adversaries, namely Russia and the PRC, with malicious

intent. As such, Executive Order 13920 declared that

threats by foreign adversaries, including the PRC, to the

BPS constitute a national emergency.

242

The Bulk-Power System Executive Order directs the

Secretary of Energy to take additional steps to enhance

the security of the U.S.’ electric grid.Among other things, it

prohibits federal agencies and U.S. persons from acquiring,

transferring, or installing BPS equipment in which foreign

adversaries have any interest and where the transaction

poses an unacceptable risk to national security or the

security and safety of American citizens. Additionally,

it requires DoE to develop recommendations for the

electric industry to isolate, manage, or replace equipment

identiﬁed as posing a national security risk to the bulk

power system. The Executive Order also creates a

task force, led by the Secretary of Energy, to develop

energy infrastructure procurement policies to ensure

national security considerations are fully integrated

into government energy security and cybersecurity

policymaking.

Recommendation: Congress should strengthen

DoE’s existing authorities over the BPS and

Critical Defense Electric Infrastructure. Given

the critical role of electrical power across lifeline

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

sectors, the PRC could seek to disrupt the

reliable supply and delivery of electrical power

to protect public health, safety, and the common

defense.

Defensive Tools: Protecting U.S. Industries and

Technology from Malign Inﬂuence

Key Finding: Existing multilateral export control regimes,

such as the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional

arms and dual-use goods and technologies, are too

cumbersome to keep pace with rapidly evolving

technological innovations. The CCP is exploiting

weaknesses in the international system, including

inconsistent licensing policies among Wassenaar

members, to gain access to cutting-edge technology

that strengthens its military and surveillance state to

the detriment of U.S. national security and foreign policy

interests.

Protecting critical technologies is vital to U.S. national

security and economic competitiveness. However, in

cutting-edge areas, like semiconductors, aerospace and

aviation, quantum computing, and artiﬁcial intelligence, the

U.S. adversaries are systematically diverting technology

and evading export control laws to achieve military and

economic superiority. These diverted technologies can

be used in ways that threaten U.S. national security

and foreign policy interests, including by supporting

adversarial countries’ weapons systems, hollowing out

the U.S. industrial base, and facilitating massive human

rights abuses.

Unfortunately, existing multilateral export control regimes,

such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, are ill-equipped to

prevent critical technologies from being acquired by arms

embargoed countries, such as the PRC. With more than

40 members, including Russia, that make decisions based

on consensus and have national discretion on licensing

restrictions of controlled items, Wassenaar is slow-moving

and its licensing standards are inconsistent. As a result,

the U.S. may apply a rigid control on a technology, only

to have other Wassenaar members fail to constrain their

exporters in any meaningful way.

243

Recommendation: Congress should pass HR

8329, To eliminate or substantially reduce the

global availability of critical technologies to

United States arms embargoed countries, and

for other purposes, to direct the Administration

to develop a strategy for export control

diplomacy to focus on swift, agile agreements

with key partners and allies who possess

critical technologies, including semiconductor

manufacturing equipment, that enhances the

eectiveness of export controls and maintains

U.S. leadership in innovation.

Key Finding: Because technology is central to achieving

the CCP’s goal of global preeminence, it will stop at

nothing to gain access to it. Policies such as Military-Civil

Fusion, Internet Sovereignty, and Made in China 2025

amount to an unprecedented attack on the global trade

of technology and the U.S. export control regime.

Industrial policies, including Made in China 2025, aim

to hollow out the technological and manufacturing

capabilities of the PRC’s main trading partners with

a concentrated focus on those that have leading

capabilities such as the U.S. Through its Military-Civil

Fusion strategy, the CCP is intertwining its military into

its industrial and innovation base to extract technology

obtained through commercial and civil licensing,

partnerships, and trade interaction to achieve military

superiority over its adversaries. Moreover, proliferating

policies on cyber and national security give PRC ocials

– whose agencies typically have a dual enforcement and

industrial policy mission – expansive authority to gain

in-person and remote access to corporate information

technology systems. Consequently, even companies in

the PRC acting in good faith have no credible ability to

safeguard licensed technology, wreaking havoc on any

end-use and end-user agreement.

Policy updates to DoC rules on military end-use and

end-user and civilian exemption, as well as the Foreign

Direct Product Rule (FDPR) in the Export Administration

Regulations (EAR) are necessary responses to PRC

policies that intentionally attempt to evade or violate the

Export Control Reform Act and the EAR. These rules give

the U.S. government greater visibility into how dual-use

technology is being sought by an opaque and amorphous

PRC industrial complex that integrates the party, state,

private sector, academia, and military to achieve global

preeminence.

Recommendation: DoC must fully implement

key aspects of the Export Control Reform

Act of 2018 (ECRA), speciﬁcally the Emerging

and Foundational technology control list.

The absence of this control list impedes not

only implementation of ECRA but also aects

the authority of the Committee on Foreign

Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) to review PRC

and other foreign investments in critical and

emerging technology below a traditional

threshold of foreign control.

244

If DoC‘s Bureau

of Industry and Security is unable to make

substantial and measurable progress in fulﬁlling

this requirement, Congress should consider

whether a dierent bureau or department can

better fulﬁll this statutory obligation.

Recommendation: The Administration should

designate all entities on the June 2020 DoD

list of PRC entities that are operating in the U.S.

and are tied to the CCP military to the DoC Entity

List, under a licensing policy of a presumption of

denial. DoD and DoC should create a mechanism

to ensure all future iterations of this DoD list and

other lists that identify known military-linked

entities are designated on the DoC Entity List.

Recommendation: The Administration should

update its policy on end-use and end-user

agreements in the PRC to recognize that the

recipient of any technology will have no ability to

refuse diversion to the PRC’s military industrial

complex no matter what it has promised its

business partner. In other words, the U.S.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

government should presume that any dual-use

item that is exported to the PRC can and will be

diverted to the PLA.

Recommendation: The Administration should

aggressively expand end-use and end-user

controls on PRC entities involved in or supporting

the Social Credit system and other mass

surveillance systems. The Administration should

also reevaluate current technology controls and

licensing policies on products and services that

could be used for surveillance and are destined

to the PRC to ensure U.S.-origin technology is

not facilitating human rights and civil liberties

abuses.

Key Finding: The PRC’s investment regime – one of the

most restrictive in the G-20 – blocks investment across

large swaths of its economy, including key industries.

This asymmetry in investment access creates an uneven

playing ﬁeld that disadvantages U.S. companies.

The PRC’s Foreign Investment National Negative List

expressly prohibits or restricts investment access

in at least 40 industries, including cloud computing,

telecommunications, and internet-related services. In

addition, other regulatory tools – including licensing and

approval regimes, antitrust, procurement, and standard-

setting – often forestall or deny access, even in nominally

open sectors. Consequently, U.S. companies are denied

meaningful investment access to the PRC economy.

PRC companies, on the other hand, enjoy relatively few,

if any, restrictions on investment in the U.S. For instance,

Alibaba independently operates at least two cloud

computing centers in the U.S. By comparison, U.S. cloud

computing providers, such as Amazon Web Services and

Microsoft, cannot independently obtain requisite licenses

in the PRC, and are essentially required to transfer all

ownership and operations to a PRC company, forcing the

transfer of valuable IP as the cost of accessing the PRC

market. These asymmetries in investment access persist

despite years of bilateral and multilateral engagement to

create investment regimes with reciprocal access.

Recommendation: The Administration, in

coordination with U.S. trading partners, should

enforce reciprocal treatment of PRC investment

into the U.S. as a means to restore balance and

open up the PRC economy to investment, if the

PRC continues to restrict meaningful investment

access to its market, including through joint

venture requirements, discriminatory licensing,

antitrust, standards setting, and procurement

practices.

Key Finding: Investment and acquisition of U.S. and

international companies is part of a multi-decade CCP

strategy to control the commanding heights of critical

technologies by making inroads with companies that

possess emerging and foundational technologies and

know-how in vital sectors, including life sciences and

information technology.

Through CFIUS, the U.S. reviews and, if necessary, may

recommend that the President prohibit investments

by foreign persons that threaten our national security.

CFIUS has enjoyed strong bipartisan support precisely

for its narrow focus on resolving national security risks

while otherwise maintaining America’s open investment

climate. This climate contributes to national security by

spurring innovation, generating jobs, and sustaining

economic growth.

In response to an increase in PRC acquisitions of U.S.

businesses, Congress modernized CFIUS in 2018 through

the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization

Act (FIRRMA). While CFIUS could previously review

investments conferring control of a U.S. business to a

foreign person, FIRRMA expanded this jurisdiction to

include certain non-controlling investments involving

critical technologies, critical infrastructure, sensitive

personal data, and real estate near national security-

related sites. FIRRMA also brought with it a permanent

reauthorization of export controls, which, in cooperation

with U.S. partners, aims to protect the release of

technologies essential for national security.

As of 2019, the PRC is the largest source of covered

transactions for CFIUS, and PRC deals continue to run

afoul of national security reviews. As recently as March

of this year, the President prohibited the acquisition of

StayNTouch, Inc. by a PRC ﬁrm following CFIUS’ review.

CFIUS also reviewed the national security implications

of PRC ownership of TikTok, the popular video-sharing

app, which led to an Executive Order on August 14,

2020 requiring divestment of TikTok by its PRC parent

company, ByteDance Ltd.

While the U.S. has taken important steps to defend against

malign investment, PRC acquisitions of critical assets in

other advanced economies remains worrying. In order

to confront Beijing’s ambitions, a coordinated strategy

on investment screening by the U.S. and its partners is

essential.

Recommendation: Congress should fully fund

DoT’s CFIUS operations to enable outreach to

U.S. allies and partners for the development

of targeted investment screening regimes

that protect against CCP’s inﬂuence over

critical technologies, critical infrastructure, and

sensitive personal data, while also safeguarding

an open investment climate conducive to global

growth and the ﬂow of capital. This is particularly

important as the CCP’s corrosive BRI is making

inroads across the world.

245

Recommendation: Congress should ensure

that DoD and other CFIUS member agencies

are executing section 1721(b) of FIRRMA by fully

assessing their resource needs and procedures

to eectively address investment risks,

pursuant to the requirements of FIRRMA and

recommendations by GAO.

246

Recommendation: The Administration and

Congress should regularly assess whether

CFIUS is eectively addressing ever-changing

and persistent CCP eorts to acquire U.S.

technology through foreign investment, while

CHAPTER V: ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

ensuring that robust export controls complement

CFIUS’s eorts and prevent the acquisition or

use of critical technology and IP to end-users of

concern.

Recommendation: The Administration should

institute a CFIUS “blacklist” in its regulations to

implement Section 721(a)(4)(E) of the Defense

Production Act, which would focus on the PRC

and other countries of concern that require

heightened scrutiny for investments.

Key Finding: PRC ocials, as well as their companies

and supporters, are taking actions that threaten U.S.

national security and foreign policy interests, including

the facilitation of U.S. sanctions evasion.

DoJ and the UN have both described in detail how the PRC

banking sector has, for years, facilitated the propping up

of the regime in North Korea with ﬁnancing that runs afoul

of U.S. sanctions. However, the U.S. has not suciently

targeted these PRC institutions for their malign activity.

These ﬁnancial institutions need access to the dollar

to remain fully operational in international markets and

the U.S. should use that leverage to minimize sanctions

evasion activities and bring about behavioral change in

Pyongyang.

While the case for imposing additional sanctions on the

PRC is overwhelming, it is also essential to link those

sanctions to clear objectives with respect to the CCP’s

behavior. Congress has become increasingly vocal on

the need to hold sanctions accountable for achieving

policy goals, particularly since these tools may lead to

foreign countries diverting transactions away from the

U.S. dollar. The dollar’s centrality in the global ﬁnancial

system beneﬁts the U.S., but for that very reason, the CCP

has sought to increase international use of its currency in

order to free itself from exposure to the dollar and U.S.

sanctions. Responding to CCP directed eorts requires

thoughtful and strategic use of sanctions, rigorous

oversight from Congress to ensure results, and continued

innovation in ﬁnancial technologies to appropriately

facilitate payments and trade connected to the U.S. dollar.

Recommendation: Congress should require

the DoT, as it has teams dedicated to the North

Korea and Iran threats respectively, to establish

a dedicated team focused on the PRC. The

team should include personnel with expertise in

policy, enforcement and compliance, licensing,

and regulations, and have a sucient number

of Mandarin speakers to implement existing

authorized ﬁnancial sanctions regimes against

the CCP threat.

Recommendation: The Administration should

carry out enforcement actions and sanction PRC

banks responsible for North Korea sanctions

evasion, including through more rigorous

implementation of the bipartisan Otto Warmbier

North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement

Act (P.L. 116-92).

Key Finding: As a result of the U.S.’ openness to business

and entrepreneurship, PRC companies have access to

U.S. capital and investment markets. All these companies

are connected to the CCP in some manner and many are

complicit in human rights abuses. One of the CCP’s aims

is to hollow out U.S. manufacturing.

Our federal workforce, investors, and capital markets

have become increasingly exposed to companies that

are based in or have signiﬁcant operations in the PRC.

The inability to monitor compliance or enforce certain

regulatory standards for these issuers is concerning.

To that end, the U.S. should ensure that PRC-based

companies adhere to its regulatory standards.

At the core of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s

(SEC’s) eorts to protect investors, preserve market

integrity, and facilitate capital formation is the U.S.’

principles-based disclosure framework. This framework,

together with oversight and enforcement, allows the

SEC to perform its mission. There are certain obstacles

related to our inability to ensure key elements of the U.S.

regulatory framework are adhered to in the PRC.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Public Company

Accounting and Oversight Board’s (PCAOB’s) rules impose

requirements on PCAOB-registered ﬁrms that perform

audit work for public companies, including providing

complete and timely access for PCAOB inspections. The

PCAOB works with audit regulators in other jurisdictions

on speciﬁc legal requirements of individual jurisdiction,

while continuing to adhere to their statutory mandate.

However, the PCAOB is unable to conduct inspections of

the audits of public companies with PRC-based auditors

– which includes most public companies with signiﬁcant

PRC-based operations.

According to the SEC and the PCAOB, as of December

2018, there were 224 U.S.-listed companies where the

PCAOB faced obstacles in inspecting the company’s

principal auditor’s work.

247

On June 4, 2020, the President issued a Presidential

Memoranda on Protecting U.S. Investors from Signiﬁcant

Risks from Chinese Companies to direct the Presidential

Working Group (PWG) on Financial Markets to suggest

actions the Executive Branch could take to protect U.S.

investors from the failure of the PRC government to

allow PCAOB-registered audit ﬁrms to comply with U.S.

securities laws.

248

The PWG on Financial Markets Report

included a number of recommendations to address: (1)

PCAOB’s inability to inspect the audit work and practices

of PCAOB-registered auditing ﬁrms in the PRC, (2) a

lack of high-quality issuer and fund disclosure around

the risks of investing in companies that are based in or

have signiﬁcant operations in the PRC, (3) due diligence

standards of index providers regarding the implications of

dierent standards when considering issuers to include

in an index, and (4) ﬁduciary obligations of investment

advisers that are recommending investments in emerging

markets.

249

The SEC is preparing proposals in response

to the PWG on Financial Markets recommendations for

consideration by the Commission.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation to address concerns that the SEC and the PCAOB are

unable to inspect audit work and practices of PCAOB-registered auditing ﬁrms in the PRC, such as H.R. 7000,

the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act. H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA included substantially similar

provisions, and Congress should maintain those provisions in NDAA. In addition, Congress should support the

SEC as it promulgates rules relating to the PCAOB’s inability to inspect the audit work and practices of PCAOB-

registered auditing ﬁrms in the PRC.

Recommendation: Congress should support SEC reforms to improve disclosures relating to emerging market

investment risk, including the risks of investing in the PRC, and other PWG recommendations. Where appropriate,

Congress should supplement the SEC’s forthcoming reforms with legislation.

Recommendation: Congress should consider additional legislation regarding disclosures relating to PRC-

related investment risk, such as H.R. 8197, the Transparency in Chinese Government Investment Act, which

would require the SEC to assess whether it is appropriate for PRC issuers to disclose information regarding

certain support provided to, or received by, the government of the PRC, as well as senior positions held at the

issuer by members of the PRC government or the CCP.

Recommendation: Congress should consider legislative proposals regarding the risks of investing in PRC

companies in retirement accounts. H.R. 6614, the Taxpayers and Savers Protection Act, a bipartisan measure

would prevent the federal Thrift Savings Plan from investing in any security that is listed on exchanges located

in jurisdictions where the PCAOB is unable to inspect registered accounting ﬁrms – which would include

companies listed on PRC exchanges. Congress should ensure that retirement account investments are fair to all

investors and provide appropriate investor protections without unduly restricting investment opportunities.

Recommendation: Congress should consider legislative proposals to examine capital ﬂows to PRC entities that

threaten U.S. national security. For instance, H.R. 8407, the Protecting National Security in Financial Investments Act,

which would require the SEC to assess whether it is appropriate to require the disclosure of information related to

investments in entities on the Bureau of Industry and Security of the DoC Entity List. Additionally, this bill requires

the creation of a DoS list of Entities of the PRC that Threaten United States National Security List. Under current law,

all companies and individuals designated on the Entity List are threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy

interests and are subject to certain licensing requirements—typically under a presumption of denial—for technology

items. It is critical that Congress and the Administration address capital ﬂows to entities that threaten U.S. national

security and foreign policy goals.

CHAPTER VI: COMPETITIVENESS

CHAPTER VI:

COMPETITIVENESS

Introduction

For more than a century, the U.S. has led the world in

innovation and economic competitiveness. American

ingenuity has produced breakthrough technologies that

improve our quality of life, produce high-paying jobs for

U.S. workers, and give the U.S. a strategic advantage over

global competitors.

But today U.S. leadership in innovation is under threat.

The CCP aims to replace the U.S. as the economic,

military, and political leader of the world by 2049. As part

of that plan, the CCP has increasingly tried to copy the

U.S. innovation playbook.

249

To achieve its goal, the CCP

is pursuing an agenda to overtake the U.S. in innovation

through massive subsidies, state-directed industrial policy,

and theft of U.S. knowledge and research. Since WWII,

the U.S. partnership between government, universities,

and industry for driving innovation has been the most

successful model in the world. This system must be

preserved and renewed. The U.S. needs a proactive,

oensive agenda to increase its competitiveness and

secure its leadership on the world stage.

“We assess that China’s intelligence services will exploit

the openness of American society, especially academia

and the scientiﬁc community, using a variety of means.

For 2019 and beyond, the innovations that drive

military and economic competitiveness will increasingly

originate outside the U.S., as the overall U.S. lead in

science and technology (S&T) shrinks; the capability

gap between commercial and military technologies

evaporates; and foreign actors increase their eorts

to acquire top talent, companies, data, and intellectual

property via licit and illicit means…Chinese President

Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, view

strong indigenous science and technology capabilities as

key to their country’s sovereignty, economic outlook, and

national power.”

– Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats

250

The U.S. maintains an innovation edge over the PRC and

other international competitors, but there are three areas

that the Administration and Congress should focus on to

ensure future U.S. competitiveness: supporting macro-

level policies and investments that drive innovation,

developing an American workforce to compete, and

protecting the integrity of U.S. research and innovation.

Supporting U.S. Innovation through Macro-Level

Competitiveness Measures

The U.S. must drive innovation through macro-level

policies that promote pro-growth tax rates, incentivize

private sector investment in R&D, invest in federal basic

research, reform regulations, and ensure patent rights.

Key Finding: The CCP is attempting to use massive

subsidies and state-directed industrial plans to

overtake U.S. leadership in innovation and advanced

manufacturing, seeking to undermine the U.S. ability to

attract domestic manufacturing and spur cutting-edge

innovation.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) reduced the U.S.

corporate tax rate to a globally competitive level (21

percent). This change triggered a global response, with

six other countries subsequently lowering their corporate

tax rates. In the coming years, other countries will likely

seek to attract business investment by undercutting the

U.S. rate.

251

TCJA spurred long-term U.S. investments in

machinery and equipment by allowing businesses to fully

deduct the cost of those investments in the tax year in

which they occur, but this provision is set to begin phasing

out in 2023.

Recommendation: Congress and the

Administration should keep tax rates globally

competitive and remain vigilant if the PRC or

other foreign competitors seek to undercut U.S.

rates.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7749, the Bringing Back American Jobs Through

Intellectual Property Repatriation Act, which

would support innovation and high-paying jobs

in the U.S. by allowing U.S. companies to bring

back to the U.S. IP that is held oshore without

immediate U.S. tax consequences.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

6802, the Accelerate Long-term Investment

Growth Now Act, which would incentivize

long-term investments by making permanent

the opportunity for businesses to fully deduct

investments in business machinery and

equipment in the tax year in which they occur.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Key Finding: The PRC has likely surpassed the U.S. for

the ﬁrst time in aggregate spending on R&D. To remain

competitive, the U.S. must prioritize federal investment in

basic research and incentivize private sector investment

in R&D in the U.S. through a whole-of-government eort.

The National Science Board estimates that the PRC

surpassed the U.S. in total R&D spending for the ﬁrst

time in 2019, making it the global leader in funding

R&D.

252

While U.S. spending on R&D grew modestly

between 2000 and 2017, driven mainly by the business

sector, the U.S. global share of R&D has declined from 37

percent to 25 percent as other nations accelerate their

investments.

In the PRC, the government is the primary driver of R&D

spending. The PRC increased public R&D spending by 56

percent between 2011 and 2016, while U.S. government

investment declined 12 percent. The federal government

plays an important role in funding basic research that

industry does not have a strong incentive to invest in,

as well as areas of critical importance to national and

economic security. In 2017, the U.S. invested $92 billion in

basic research, while the PRC came in a distant second,

investing $27 billion. The majority of the PRC’s R&D

expenditures have been in experimental development.

253

U.S. public and private investment in basic research

remains a strategic advantage and is a primary driver of

U.S. innovation.

In the U.S., the business sector is now the largest funder

of research. Industry’s commitment to R&D is a strength

of the U.S. innovation ecosystem. Robust R&D tax credits

are highly eective in spurring private sector innovation.

However, the PRC and other countries oer much more

generous R&D tax credits than the U.S. does.

254

In particular, while U.S. law currently allows businesses to

fully deduct R&D costs in the year in which they occur, this

provision is set to expire after 2021.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

and support funding for H.R. 5685, the

Securing American Leadership in Science and

Technology Act, a bipartisan measure that

establishes a national science and technology

(S&T) strategy and quadrennial review process

to establish a whole-of-government S&T plan

to guide priorities; authorizes a doubling of

basic research funding over the next ten years

at DoE, the National Science Foundation, NIST,

and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration; invests in U.S. research facilities;

prioritizes Science, Technology, Engineering,

and Mathematics (STEM) education programs

that will grow the U.S. workforce; and reforms

government regulations to improve technology

transfer and promote better collaboration

between the federal government and private

industry.

Recommendation: The Administration and

Congress should work together to prioritize

federal funding for basic research and accelerate

investments in research for advancing the

industries of the future. Congress should also

evaluate new mechanisms for funding the

transition of federally funded basic research

to private sector commercialization in key

technology areas.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7766, which would improve tax incentives to

conduct R&D in the U.S. by doubling the current

R&D tax credit and increasing the small business

portion allowed against payroll taxes to help

maintain U.S. leadership on innovation.

Recommendation: Congress should pass

H.R. 4549, the American Innovation and

Competitiveness Act, a bipartisan measure

which would eliminate the R&D amortization

provision that begins in 2022, so that businesses

may deduct R&D costs immediately instead of

slowly over a ﬁve-year period.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to expand public-private partnerships

between the federal government, universities,

national laboratories, and industry to leverage

resources and accelerate the movement of early

stage research to commercialization.

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to pursue bilateral agreements for

international cooperation on science and

technology projects and research with allies and

likeminded nations, to advance the progress of

science and U.S. competitiveness.

CHAPTER VI: COMPETITIVENESS

Recommendation: The Administration should leverage existing programs to improve regional

innovation across all geographic areas of the U.S. such as the Regional Innovation Strategies program

at DoC and the Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR), to ensure that the

U.S. capitalizes on all S&T talent from across the nation and that all communities have the opportunities

to develop and beneﬁt from the industries of the future.

Key Finding: Federal regulations must be updated to maximize return on investment from taxpayer funded research.

Current laws and regulations are outdated and lack clarity, creating barriers for U.S. entrepreneurs moving research

from lab to market, while the CCP remains singularly focused on achieving a technological advantage over the U.S.

The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was landmark legislation for U.S. innovation, enabling universities to retain titles to inventions

and take the lead in patenting and licensing groundbreaking discoveries, which spurred inventions out of the lab and into

commercialization by the private sector. While that system must be preserved, federal technology transfer laws, such as

Stevenson-Wydler and the Federal Technology Transfer Act, were largely written prior to the internet and the emergence

of the digital economy.

NIST and the White House Oce of Science and Technology Policy undertook a more than year-long eort consulting

with several hundred experts and organizations representing thousands of companies, universities, and institutions, to

address how to update federal laws and regulations to maximize innovation from taxpayer funded research. The result

was a green paper, “Return on Investment Initiative for Unleashing American Innovation.”

255

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should address all 15 key ﬁndings in the green

paper released by NIST, “Return on Investment Initiative for Unleashing American Innovation,”

including streamlining federal regulations to enhance technology transfer from lab to market, creating

greater ﬂexibility for public-private partnerships, and making it easier for joint public-private funding

opportunities for research.

256

H.R. 5685, the Securing American Leadership in Science and Technology

Act, which is previously mentioned, proposes modiﬁcations to the Stevenson-Wydler Technology

Innovation Act to address several of these ﬁndings that require statutory changes.

Key Finding: The CCP has taken steps over the past decade to rapidly modernize and strengthen its patent system

to better compete with the U.S. The CCP has realized that a robust patent system creates powerful incentives for

innovation, technological development, and economic growth. Continuing to improve the U.S. patent system is vital

to maintaining our technological leadership and the competitiveness of the U.S. innovation economy. Therefore, it is

critical to ensure that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce (USPTO) is operating eectively and has the resources

necessary to accomplish its mission.

The U.S. patent system has helped foster U.S. leadership in technology for over a century, and the CCP seeks to replicate

that success in the PRC. For example, more international patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

have come from the U.S. than any other nation each year since the PCT entered into force in 1978, until the PRC overtook

the U.S. for the ﬁrst time in 2019.

257

This recent lead in the annual rate of new patent application ﬁlings does not yet

indicate that the PRC’s patent system has surpassed the U.S. patent system, particularly given the PRC patent system

was moribund for decades. When considered with other available information on the impact of the CCP’s technology

policies, however, it appears it is quickly catching up to the U.S.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to prioritize reducing the time required

for the USPTO to complete examination of patent

applications; average pendency in 2018 was

23.8 months, which was longer than that of the

PRC patent oce (Chinese National Intellectual

Property Administration (CNIPA) as well as the

patent oces of Japan and South Korea.

258

259

Recommendation: The Administration should

continue to prioritize modernizing and upgrading

the IT systems of the USPTO to facilitate the

work of patent examiners. Congress and the

Administration should work together to ensure

that the USPTO, which is fully fee-funded, has

full access to its fee collections for its operations,

including its IT modernization eorts, and

that fees are not diverted and remain entirely

dedicated to the USPTO.

Recommendation: Congress and the

Administration should monitor whether CNIPA

or other elements of the PRC government

provide any unfair advantages or preference to

PRC patent applicants over foreign applicants,

including U.S. applicants, in violation of

international agreements.

Developing an American Workforce to Compete

The U.S. needs ﬂexible STEM-capable workers at every

education level to spur innovation and meet the demands

of U.S. companies and the industries of the future. A

competitive U.S. workforce also requires an education

system responsive to the needs of workers pursuing

upskilling opportunities throughout their life. Middle-skill

jobs, or positions that require education beyond high

school but not a baccalaureate degree, will be the plurality

of job openings (48 percent) through 2024.

260

Advances

in technology and automation will require workers to learn

new skills and adapt to dierent occupations. A report by

the McKinsey Global Institute estimates that 166 million

U.S. workers, or up to 32 percent of the workforce, may

need to switch occupational categories between 2016

and 2030.

261

The eects of the COVID-19 pandemic

increase the urgency of those projections.

The U.S. needs to improve federal investments in

education to meet the demands of the 21st century and

provide opportunities to all Americans. Federal subsidies

of the education and workforce systems need to be

reformed to encourage lifelong learning and keep skills

education accessible and aordable. The U.S. also needs

to continue to attract the best and brightest STEM talent

from around the world, or risk falling behind in the global

race for talent and losing its competitive advantage in

innovation.

Key Finding: The U.S. must harness its domestic talent

by creating a STEM-capable, skilled workforce to remain

competitive in the global economy, foster innovation,

and provide a foundation for shared prosperity. Because

the CCP is ensuring a whole-of-society approach to gain

an economic edge, the U.S. must produce a strong,

adaptable domestic workforce capable of sustaining its

pro-growth innovative and technological advantage.

STEM employment in the U.S. – made up of occupations

like software developers, computer system analysts,

chemists, mathematicians, economists, psychologists,

and engineers – has grown more rapidly than the

workforce overall and now represents ﬁve percent of all

U.S. jobs. According to the most recent estimates, the

U.S. awarded nearly 800,000 science and engineering

bachelor’s degrees in 2016. The PRC produced 1.7 million

equivalent degrees. PRC students earning U.S. science

and engineering doctoral degrees has increased by more

than seven times in the last 20 years. The number of such

degrees in the PRC has doubled over the past 10 years,

with engineering accounting for nearly 70 percent of

those degree awards.

While annual U.S. federal expenditures on STEM initiatives

exceed $3 billion across over 160 dierent programs, the

number of U.S. students prepared for STEM degrees,

pursuing STEM degrees, and staying in STEM careers

continues to lag. College costs are also rising faster than

inﬂation and have for decades, thereby increasing the

risk associated with taking on debt and trying to earn a

degree. Even after successfully completing a degree

program many students ﬁnd themselves underemployed.

A 2018 GAO report found that federal STEM education

eorts were not meeting goals set by Congress. GAO found

duplication of eort and that the interagency Committee

on STEM Education had not fully met its responsibilities

to assess the federal STEM education portfolio, including

reviewing programs’ performance assessments. It also

found that there was a need to encourage the use of

evidenced-based practices across the portfolio.

The Administration has made signiﬁcant progress in

addressing these deﬁciencies. In 2018, the Administration

released a ﬁve-year STEM Strategic Plan. The plan

strengthens the federal commitment to equity and

diversity, to evidence-based practice, and to engagement

with the national STEM community through a nationwide

collaboration with learners, families, educators,

communities, and employers. However, Congress and

the Administration still have work to do to implement this

strategic vision.

A postsecondary education system that does not

prepare students for careers has real consequences for

employers and society. Just 13 percent of the country

believes college graduates are well prepared for success

in the workplace.

262

This is especially concerning as the

PRC now produces twice as many college graduates

per year as the U.S., and a substantial portion of those

graduates are a result of the CCP’s push to develop

a technical workforce to drive innovation.

263

The U.S.’

educational system cannot aord to lag behind. Experts

project changes in educational settings will be necessary

to help people stay employable in the workforce of the

future. The National Academies of Sciences declared

that the “education system will need to adapt to prepare

individuals for the changing labor market,”

264

and it is

clear that U.S. workers have internalized this insight. A

CHAPTER VI: COMPETITIVENESS

2016 Pew Research Center survey found that 87 percent of workers believe it will be important or essential for them

to get additional education and develop new job skills throughout their work life in order to keep up with changes in

the workplace.

265

Instead of going to college, getting an associate or baccalaureate degree, and not pursuing further

education, many Americans now understand they must adopt a mindset of lifelong learning in order to get a job and stay

employed.

Many employers recognize there is a disconnect between educational programs and in-demand skills, and they are

making investments to beneﬁt their employees and the national economy. Walmart, FedEx, Starbucks, and Disney all

oer free tuition to their lower-wage employees.

266

Countless other high-proﬁle employers oer some form of tuition

reimbursement beneﬁt program to dedicated employees including Amazon, Best Buy, Chick-ﬁl-A, Deloitte, Home Depot,

McDonalds, Oracle, Target, and Verizon.

267

According to the Society for Human Resource Management’s 2019 Employee

Beneﬁts Survey, more than half of U.S. employers provide education assistance to their workers.

268

Companies are doing more than simply paying for continuing education. Employers are also working to make sure the

education provided is a valuable pathway to a sustainable career. IBM’s Pathways in Technology Early College High Schools

provide their public-school students with skills education. The Business Roundtable’s Workforce Partnership Initiative

is working with colleges and universities to increase STEM skills, ﬁll high-demand jobs, and assist underrepresented

populations in STEM ﬁelds.

269

The Manufacturing Institute and the National Association of Manufacturers are leading the

Creators Wanted campaign to reduce the skills gap in the U.S.

270

Other eorts, like the Kentucky Federation of Advanced

Manufacturing Education program, implement earn-and-learn programs to create a pipeline of highly skilled workers.

271

The private sector recognizes a college degree is not a perfect proxy for occupational competence. Not all family-

sustaining jobs require a postsecondary degree. Congress should encourage the transition to skills-based hiring, which

prominent entities like the federal government, Apple, and Alphabet are embracing.

Private sector investment and instruction plays a crucial role in building a strong domestic workforce, but federal laws

governing higher education and workforce development programs must catch up to these innovations if the nation

wants to maintain its competitive edge over the PRC.

Recommendation: Congress should evaluate, consolidate, coordinate, and fund federal STEM eorts

to empower local entities and families, particularly at the elementary through secondary school levels,

with the tools they need to meet the STEM educational needs of their communities and the industries

of the future.

Recommendation: Congress should update the COMPETES Act of 2010, directing the National

Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC) Committee on STEM Education (CoSTEM) to address the

fractured STEM ﬁnancing mechanism with a uniﬁed approach that develops strategic partnerships

with states and employers, engages students across dierent platforms, and uses common metrics to

measure progress and inform the public on STEM.

Recommendation: Congress should reform the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to create the

framework necessary to transition from a degree-based economy to a skills-based workforce, which

will feature earn-and-learn programs and a lifelong learning ﬂexibility. Reforming the HEA by allowing

for growth in dual enrollment, shorter-term program Pell Grant eligibility and stackable credentials

and apprenticeships will make college more aordable and less risky for students and help future

generations ﬁll high-skill, in-demand jobs.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7321 the Elevating America’s Workforce Act, a bipartisan

measure that would amend the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act to include personal

reemployment accounts instead of pushing workers through the unemployment insurance system.

Congress should update the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act to support incumbent and

unemployed worker upskilling eorts. Congress must increase funding ﬂexibility by including larger

set-asides for incumbent worker training and by increasing reimbursement for on-the-job education.

More funds can be directed through the governor’s reserve to improve local employment needs.

These policies will help the American workforce compete with the PRC over the next decade in a

post-pandemic economy.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4372, the MSI STEM Achievement

Act; H.R. 4979, The Rural STEM Education Act; and H.R. 2528, The STEM Opportunities Act, all

bipartisan measures that increase diversity, equity, and inclusion in STEM and promote access for all

Americans with access to high-quality STEM education.

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to expand the U.S.’

successful STEM talent programs, including growing the National Science Foundation’s Graduate

Research Fellowships program to 2,500 students a year and increasing the number of qualiﬁed K-12

STEM educators by doubling the number of Noyce Teachers Scholarships over 10 years, as proposed

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

in previously recommended H.R. 5685, the

bipartisan Securing American Leadership in

Science and Technology Act.

Key Finding: The U.S. must compete in the global race

for talent by working to attract and retain the best and

brightest minds to contribute to the U.S. economy and

drive U.S. productivity.

The U.S. has long relied on attracting foreign talent to

ﬁll STEM jobs, where the demand is greater than the

domestic supply of highly skilled workers. As of 2017,

over 40 percent of the U.S. doctoral-level workforce was

foreign-born. In computer sciences, mathematics, and

engineering, nearly 60 percent of PhD holders in the

U.S. workforce are foreign-born. At the same time, the

U.S. share of international students has declined slightly,

as have “stay rates” for foreign students after receiving

their degree.

The U.S. was long the top destination for the best and

brightest students in the world, but more countries than

ever are now competing for this talent. The CCP has a

two-pronged approach for attracting STEM talent: a United

Front eort to return PRC-born students and workers

abroad back to the PRC through incentives and coercion

and attracting non-PRC STEM students and researchers

through immigration reforms and incentives. The PRC

announced in 2017 that it was expanding its foreign

talents work visa beyond “urgently needed talents” to

include “scientists, entrepreneurs, and leading experts

in science and technology industries.” These reforms

were followed in 2018 by the liberalization of permanent

residency requirements.

272

However, the PRC has not yet

supplanted the U.S. as the primary destination of choice

for STEM talent.

The U.S. cannot aord to take for granted that it will

remain the destination of choice for STEM students. While

developing a domestic STEM workforce should remain a

priority, in the near and medium term the U.S. will remain

reliant on foreign talent.

Recommendation: The United States remains

the most sought after destination for high skilled

foreign-born workers from around the world.

The global race for talent is in full swing and the

U.S. cannot aord to lose its competitive edge.

The U.S. immigration system is a generous

one that must be updated to meet the needs

of the modern economy. This means making a

shift towards a more “merit-based” immigration

system that remains mindful not to harm the

employment prospects of qualiﬁed American

workers, particularly as the economy reopens in

the aftermath of COVID-19.

Protecting the Integrity of American Research and

Innovation

The foundation of U.S. competitiveness is the integrity

of the innovation system. The core principles and values

of science are openness and transparency, accountability

and honesty, impartiality and objectivity, respect, freedom

of inquiry, reciprocity, and merit-based competition. While

international collaboration and foreign contributions are

critical to the success of U.S. competitiveness, the U.S.

must take steps to protect the integrity of its research.

The full scope of the CCP’s inﬂuence and presence in the

U.S. is not entirely known by the public, but in remarks

before the Hudson Institute in July 2020, FBI Director

Christopher Wray disclosed that the FBI is opening

a new PRC-related counterintelligence case about

every 10 hours and that of the nearly 5,000 active FBI

counterintelligence cases currently underway across

the country, almost half are related to PRC.

273

[T]he use of nontraditional collectors,

especially in the academic setting, whether

it’s professors, scientists, students, we see in

almost every field office that the FBI has around

the country. It’s not just in major cities. It’s in

small ones as well. It’s across basically every

discipline. I think the level of naiveté on the

part of the academic sector about this creates

its own issues. They’re exploiting the very open

research and development environment that we

have, which we all revere, but they’re taking

advantage of it.”

– FBI Director Christopher Wray

274

Key Finding: The CCP seeks to exploit the openness of

the U.S. academic and research system to accelerate its

technological capabilities at the U.S. taxpayer’s expense.

The U.S. must strengthen transparency, disclosure, and

accountability of foreign funding and conﬂicts of interest

to protect the integrity of the research enterprise and

ensure academic freedom.

Transparency and more disclosure are needed to properly

assess the risks of foreign relationships and partnerships

CHAPTER VI: COMPETITIVENESS

to the U.S. research enterprise. A study commissioned by the National Science Foundation and carried out by JASON, the

independent science advisory group, found the actions of the PRC government and its institutions are not in accord with

U.S. values of science. The study states, “JASON reviewed classiﬁed and open-source evidence suggesting that there

are problems with respect to research transparency, lack of reciprocity in collaborations and consortia, and reporting of

commitments and potential conﬂicts of interest, related to these actions.”

275

Of particular concern are PRC military-aliated researchers studying and working in the U.S. who are not disclosing

that relationship. Although these researchers represent a small fraction of the approximately 370,000 PRC citizens who

study in the U.S. as part of international academic exchanges, recent actions by the PRC in the face of an order by the

DoS to close the consulate in Houston suggests there are signiﬁcantly more PRC military-aliated researchers than

previously reported who have evaded government detection.

276

On May 6, 2019, the White House Oce of Science and Technology Policy established the Joint Committee on the

Research Environment (JCORE) through the National Science Technology Council, with a Subcommittee on Research

Security. At the direction of Congress in the bipartisan Securing American Science and Technology Act (P.L. 116-92), the

Subcommittee is developing recommendations for appropriate and eective risk management; developing consistent,

coordinated, and eective outreach to and engagement with academic and research institutions; coordinating guidance

for federal agencies; and issuing recommendations for academic and research institutions. The Subcommittee is also

working with the Science and Security Roundtable, established by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,

and Medicine at the direction of the FY2019 NDAA. The Roundtable was established as an ongoing forum for academia,

federal research agencies, law enforcement, and the national security agencies to collaborate and share information.

Recommendation: The Administration should issue uniform and coordinated requirements for

researchers and universities across all federal agencies to protect federally funded R&D from foreign

interference, through the process established in the bipartisan Securing American Science and

Technology Act (P.L 116-92). These guidelines should include rules for disclosures of foreign sources

of funding, conﬂict of interest, and clariﬁcation of penalties for noncompliance.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 229 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which

would require all federally funded researchers to disclose foreign sources of funding and enhances

enforcement of disclosure requirements.

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to provide sucient

resources to federal research agencies and the Oces of Inspectors General to investigate cases of

foreign espionage and research misconduct in federally funded research projects.

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to work with allied nations like the United

Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Canada, and other key allies like the EU, to share best practices for

deterring CCP inﬂuence in academia and the research enterprise that are contrary to the values and

norms of the democratic international scientiﬁc community.

Key Finding: Foreign direct investment and inﬂuence in the U.S. higher education system is on the rise. Many

U.S. institutes of higher education (IHE) receive large sums of so-called “anonymous” donations from U.S. foreign

adversaries, including the PRC. Since July 2019, the Department of Education (DoEd) has uncovered over $6.5 billion

of previously unreported foreign donations to IHEs which have anonymized identities of donors, including at least

$1.14 billion in funds from foreign countries such as the PRC. It is concerning that IHEs have an apparently large

dependency on foreign funding from adversarial states, which pose signiﬁcant concerns to academic freedom and

U.S. national security. Speciﬁcally, the PRC has spent approximately $1.17 billion in gifts and contracts to IHEs between

2014 and 2019.

The Administration has sought to improve transparency and reduce reliance on foreign investment by actively enforcing

Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, which requires colleges and universities to disclose contracts with, and

gifts from, any foreign source of over $250,000 to the DoEd.

277

The DoEd has recently found multiple university contracts

with CCP-subsidized ﬁrms, to include at least one institution with several contracts with the CCP.

278

Recommendation: Congress should amend Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require

colleges and universities to report annually all foreign donations received from foreign adversarial

sources, including the PRC. Donations received from entities from adversarial nations should have the

donor’s name, employer, and reason for the donation publicly disclosed on a federal website. DoEd

must work with federal agencies to vet potential security threats. All IHEs should also be required to

report on how they used the gift.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.7842, the Intelligence on Nefarious Foreign Leaders

Using Education Networks for Corrupt Enrichment (INFLUENCE) Act, which would amend the Higher

Education Act of 1965 to lower the reporting threshold triggering universities responsibility to report

to DoEd any foreign gift to $50,000, require schools to report to DoEd on the nature of any contracts

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

with foreign nationals on sensitive

projects, and establish interagency

coordination on the enforcement of

any violations exposing U.S. national

security projects.

Key Finding: The CCP has a coordinated global

campaign to recruit overseas S&T experts through talent

programs like “Thousand Talents” and other eorts, to

obtain knowledge and IP through coercive or fraudulent

means.

The CCP operates more than 200 foreign talent

recruitment plans, such as the “Thousand Talents”

program, as part of a strategy to obtain expertise,

knowledge, and IP from abroad. Many countries,

including the U.S., use legitimate talent programs to

develop early-career STEM researchers. The CCP’s talent

programs are not legitimate programs for developing

STEM talent, but rather require participants to operate

in secrecy and in some cases contractually obligate

participants to illegally transfer information and property.

The threat of the “Thousand Talents” program was well

documented in a 2019 sta report by the bipartisan

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate

Homeland Security and Governmental Aairs Committee,

“Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent

Recruitment Plans.”

279

Recommendation: The Administration should

restrict all federal employees and federal

contractors from participating in foreign talent

programs, similar to the restriction implemented

by DoE, which deﬁnes a talent recruitment

program as “any foreign-state-sponsored

attempt to acquire U.S. scientiﬁc-funded research

or technology through foreign government-

run or funded recruitment programs that target

scientists, engineers, academics, researchers,

and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or

educated in the U.S.”

Key Finding: The CCP has targeted U.S. research

through cyber intrusions and cyber-theft, including

COVID-19 related research. The U.S. must ensure strong

cyber protections and penalties for cyber theft of U.S. IP

and research.

Cyber intrusions and cyber-theft are another tool the CCP

uses to obtain U.S. research, personal information, and IP

by illicit means.

In May 2020, the FBI and DHS issued an alert regarding

the PRC targeting of organizations conducting COVID-19

research. The warning stated,

The FBI is investigating the targeting and compromise

of U.S. organizations conducting COVID-19-related

research by PRC aliated cyber actors and non-

traditional collectors. These actors have been observed

attempting to identify and illicitly obtain valuable IP and

public health data related to vaccines, treatments, and

testing from networks and personnel aliated with

COVID-19-related research. The potential theft of this

information jeopardizes the delivery of secure, eective,

and ecient treatment options.

280

As has been previously mentioned in this report, in July

2020, the DoJ indicted two hackers, both nationals and

residents of the PRC, with hacking into the computer

systems of hundreds of victim companies, including those

developing COVID-19 vaccines, testing technology, and

treatments. According to the indictment, the defendants

in some instances acted for their own personal ﬁnancial

gain, and in others for the beneﬁt of the PRC Ministry

of State Security or other PRC government agencies.

The hackers stole terabytes of data which comprised a

sophisticated and proliﬁc threat to U.S. networks.

281

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R.

7708, the Defend COVID Research from Hackers

Act, which would authorize the President to

impose sanctions on any foreign person that

engages in cyber-related activity that threatens

the U.S.’ national security or economic health,

including hacking researchers who are

developing a vaccine to COVID-19, and gives the

President certain power to block the property of

such foreign actors and ban them from traveling

to the U.S.

Case Study: In January 2020, Dr. Charles Lieber,

chair of Harvard’s Department of Chemistry

and Chemical Biology, was indicted for making

false statements to federal authorities about

his Thousand Talents participation. The U.S.

has alleged that Lieber concealed from both

Harvard and the NIH his position as a scientist

at a Chinese university, and the fact that the

Chinese government was paying him, through

the Wuhan University of Technology (WUT).

Under the terms of Lieber’s three-year Thousand

Talents contract, WUT paid Lieber $50,000 USD

per month, living expenses of up to 1,000,000

Chinese Yuan (approximately $158,000 USD

at the time) and awarded him more than $1.5

million to establish a research lab at WUT. In

return, Lieber was obligated to work for WUT

“not less than nine months a year” by “declaring

international cooperation projects, cultivating

young teachers and Ph.D. students, organizing

international conference[s], applying for patents

and publishing articles in the name of” WUT. At

the same time Lieber was receiving federal grants

from NIH and DOD. It is also alleged that in 2018

and 2019, Lieber lied to federal authorities about

his involvement in the Thousand Talents Plan and

his aliation with WUT.

CHAPTER VI: COMPETITIVENESS

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7998, the NIST COVID-19 Cyber-Security Act, which

would require the Director of NIST to issue resources and guidance to universities and research

institutions to protect research, including COVID-19 research, based on the NIST Cybersecurity

Framework.

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1256 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would

require the President to produce a whole-of-government strategy to impose costs on, and achieve

deterrence toward, the CCP for cyber-enabled corporate espionage and personal data theft.

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3611, the Securing American Research from Cyber Theft

Act, which would create a pilot project for a nationwide network of secure computing enclaves for

sensitive federally funded research in universities.

Key Finding: The CCP seeks to inﬂuence universities and intellectual freedom through programs such as Confucius

Institutes, Chinese Students and Scholars Associations, and other campus entities. The CCP has used these institutes

to promote an idyllic image while actively working to steal U.S. research and innovation and coerce colleges and

universities.

The CCP funds Confucius Institutes and other cultural and language programs abroad as part of an eorts to inﬂuence

public opinion, recruit “inﬂuence agents” on U.S. campuses, and engage in cyber espionage and IP theft. A sta report by

the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aairs Committee,

“China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System,” details these eorts.

282

According to the report, the CCP has spent

over $158 million in the U.S. on this eort. At the height of the program, there were approximately 100 U.S. educational

institutions with Confucius Institutes and 519 Confucius Classrooms based in primary and secondary schools in the U.S.

As the purpose of these institutes has become better understood, many universities have begun to divest themselves

from the institutes. Today it is believed there are 75 Confucius Institutes operating in the U.S., 65 of which are active on

U.S. university campuses, with the rest functioning as standalone organizations.

On August 13, 2020, DoS designated the Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS), which serves as the Washington D.C.

based, de facto headquarters of the Confucius Institute network, as a foreign mission of the PRC. The designation will

require the CIUS to regularly provide information to DoS about PRC citizen personnel, recruiting, funding, and operations

in the U.S.

283

The Administration should maintain DoS designation of the CIUS as a foreign mission of the PRC. The U.S.

must continue to root out these eorts on American campuses, which are a threat to the democratic principle of freedom

of thought.

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 7601/S. 939 the Concerns Over

Nations Funding University Campus Institutes in the United States Act, (CONFUCIUS Act), a bipartisan

proposal to address concerns about the CCP’s inﬂuence on college campuses. The bill limits the

inﬂuence of Confucius Institutes by barring certain DoEd funds from going to the university until its

contract or agreement with the Confucius Institute protects the academic freedom of the college,

prohibits the application of foreign law on the institution’s campuses, and grants full managerial

authority of the Confucius Institute to the university including teaching plans, research grants, and

employment decisions.

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF

RECOMMENDATIONS AND

FURTHER INVESTIGATION

I: Ideological Competition

Recommendation: The Administration should clearly and publicly state an intention to break the CCP’s totalitarianism.

America’s goal must not be indeﬁnite coexistence with a hostile Communist state, but rather, the end of the Party’s

monopoly on power. p. 9

Recommendation: The Administration should revise and reissue the 2020 “U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s

Republic of China” to incorporate the principle above. p. 9

Recommendation: The Administration should continue directly attacking the legitimacy of socialism with Chinese

Characteristics. p. 9

Recommendation: The Administration should continue reasserting that democratic freedoms are the right of every

human being. p. 10

Recommendation: Congress should continue developing comprehensive, omnibus legislation for competition with the

CCP which recognizes that the CCP is a threat across the full range of U.S. interests. p. 10

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its use of diplomatic authorities to pressure the CCP for its

restrictions on U.S. diplomats, properly identify CCP propagandists operating in the U.S., and highlight the CCP’s malign

ideology. p. 10

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should prioritize competition with the CCP as a deciding factor

for federal resource decisions, including for foreign assistance and foreign service personnel allocations for the Indo-

Paciﬁc. p. 11

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7937, the Countering CCP Malign Inﬂuence Act. p. 11

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8058, the Chinese Research Funds Accounting Act. p. 11

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of Titles V, VI and VII of the bipartisan Eliot L. Engel

Department of State Authorization Act of 2020, which is included in H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 National Defense

Authorization Act (NDAA). p. 11

Recommendation: Congress should create a new sanctions mechanism speciﬁcally tailored for the UFWD, which can

be used to apply visa and asset blocking sanctions on UFWD ocials and aliates who are responsible for CCP malign

inﬂuence operations which threaten U.S. national security. p. 11

Recommendation: The Administration should prioritize counter-United Front programming through the Indo-Paciﬁc

Transparency Initiative. The Administration should develop and fund speciﬁc counter-UFWD programs under the

Initiative, and DoS should update and reissue its factsheet on the Initiative to publicize these eorts. p. 11

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should prioritize legal assistance for foreign inﬂuence

transparency, foreign agent registration, and political donations using the Transparency Initiative and other existing

foreign assistance programming. p. 12

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should commission and fund country-speciﬁc, open-source, and

unclassiﬁed studies of CCP malign inﬂuence, including United Front work. p. 12

Recommendation: The Administration should explore options for making the U.S.-funded International Law

Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok a regional hub for law enforcement cooperation and training regarding CCP

United Front activity. p. 12

The Task Force makes 82 key ﬁndings and 430 associated recommendations to support a comprehensive U.S.

approach to countering the threat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Below is an abbreviated summary with

references to the appropriate sections where complete descriptions of each recommendation can be found.

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: DoS should use existing diplomatic and foreign assistance resources to counter the UFWD.

Congress should conduct oversight of these eorts and if necessary, legislate further reporting requirements to drive

Administration action. p. 12

Recommendation: The Administration should continue and expand enforcement actions in line with its “Xinjiang

Supply Chain Business Advisory.” The Administration should regularly update the Business Advisory and issue further

such advisories when appropriate. p. 12

Recommendation: The Administration should reexamine all export licenses issued pursuant to DoS’ International

Trac in Arms Regulations and DoC’s Export Administration Regulations to entities in Hong Kong prior to July 2020.

p. 13

Recommendation: The Administration should fully implement recent bipartisan sanctions laws to respond to CCP

human rights violations, including the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (P.L. 115-330), the Hong Kong Human Rights and

Democracy Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-76), the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145), and the Hong Kong

Autonomy Act (P.L. 116-149). p. 13

Recommendation: The U.S. should evaluate whether to modify, strengthen, or make permanent a limitation in the

current appropriations law that prohibits certain types of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC without a

government certiﬁcation. p. 13

Recommendation: Congress should secure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 6210, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. p. 13

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4331, the Tibetan Policy and Support Act. p. 13

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7805, the Stop Predatory Organ Tracking Act. Congress should

require an interagency assessment of forced organ harvesting speciﬁc to the PRC, and if necessary, single out and

sanction the ocials who run the PRC’s organ transplant system. p. 13

Recommendation: The Administration should levy Global Magnitsky sanctions on ocials from the United Front’s

Religious Work Bureau, as appropriate, to apply consequences for the oppression of Christianity. p. 13

Recommendation: DoS should consider issuing a determination that the CCP’s crimes against Uyghurs amount to

genocide. p. 13

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation calling on companies to disclose to American audiences that

entertainment productions, such as ﬁlms or sporting events, that are distributed or intended to be distributed in the

PRC, have had their content approved by CCP censors. p. 13

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 5725, the Hong Kong Be Water Act. p. 13

Recommendation: Congress should support the Administration in its pledge to “reallocate admissions within the

refugee ceiling set by the annual Presidential Determination to residents of Hong Kong based on humanitarian

concerns, to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law…” as stated in The President’s Executive Order on

Hong Kong Normalization, issued on July 14, 2020. p. 14

Recommendation: Congress should pass Section 1284 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, a bipartisan provision

reﬂecting the text of H.R. 7307, the Foreign Advanced Technology Surveillance Accountability Act. p. 14

Recommendation: Congress should pass the following pieces of bipartisan legislation: H.R. 3843, the CROOK Act; H.R.

3441, the Kleptocrat Exposure Act; H.R. 4140, the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act; H.R. 4361, the Justice for Victims of

Kleptocracy Act; and H.R. 2167, Protecting United States Businesses Abroad Act. p. 14

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 2514, the bipartisan Coordinating Oversight, Upgrading and Innovating

Technology, and Examiner Reform Act. p. 14

Recommendation: The Administration should establish a program to highlight the CCP’s environmental hypocrisy,

along with the millions of dollars the U.S. continues to spend each year to promote environmental conservation globally

through U.S. foreign assistance programming. p. 15

Recommendation: The Administration should issue a plan to respond to the CCP’s perpetuation of global climate

change as the world’s largest carbon emitter by a massive margin. p. 15

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its eorts to counter and expose CCP attempts to perpetuate

and whitewash its environmental malfeasance through the UN system and International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

p. 15

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 4636, the bipartisan Partnering and Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash

for International Cleaner Seas Act. p. 15

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 5859, the bipartisan Trillion Trees Act. p. 15

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7939, the United Nations Transparency and Accountability Act (UNTAA).

p. 16

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to place more American personnel in the

UN system. The Administration should ensure that the presence of U.S. personnel is appropriately prioritized and

coordinated, while Congress should ensure that these eorts are appropriately funded. p. 16

Recommendation: Congress should authorize the Administration’s recently created position of Special Envoy for UN

Integrity. p. 16

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7733, the Li Wenliang Global Public Health Accountability Act. p. 17

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7938, the USIA for Strategic Competition Act. p. 17

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should continue fully funding DoS’ Global Engagement Center

(GEC) and ensuring the GEC is not budgetarily reliant on the Department of Defense (DoD). p. 17

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6621, the bipartisan Open Technology Fund Authorization Act. The

Administration should fully fund the Open Technology Fund in accordance with the most recent Congressionally

approved spend plan, and sources of funding for the development and innovation of such tools should be expanded to

include foreign governments, foundations, and the private sector. p. 17

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation calling on social media companies to disclose when CCP and

other state propaganda is disseminated on social media platforms. p. 17

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation calling on U.S. media organizations to disclose when they receive

payments for advertisements from companies or news outlets with strong ties to adversarial governments, such as the

CCP. p. 17

Recommendation: The Administration should increase existing foreign assistance programming to expand investment

mechanisms for investigative, unbiased media in capital-poor countries where the CCP saturates the media landscape.

p. 17

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6570, the Online Consumer Protection Act. p. 18

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its eorts to issue multilateral or coordinated statements with

likeminded allies on malign CCP activities. p. 18

Recommendation: The Administration should issue further deﬁnitive statements on CCP activities which are illegal

under international law. p. 18

Recommendation: The Administration should allow Taiwan to change the name of its diplomatic oce to the “Taiwan

Representative Oce” or a similar title. p. 18

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 2002, the bipartisan Taiwan Assurance Act. p. 19

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 353/S. 249, a bipartisan bill which would direct the

Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the WHO. p. 19

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6287, the bipartisan Taiwan Symbols of Sovereignty (SOS) Act. p. 19

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7414, the bipartisan Taiwan Fellowship Act. p. 19

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6974, the Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act of 2020. p. 19

Recommendation: Congress should pass Section 1851 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, a bipartisan provision

reﬂecting the text of H.R. 6014, the Employment Fairness for Taiwan Act of 2020. p. 19

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

II: Supply Chain Security

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 845 of H.R. 6395 in the House passed FY2021 NDAA, which would

limit funds until DoD develops a national security strategy for the defense industrial base in order to assess gaps and

vulnerabilities to the national technology and industrial base. p. 21

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1254 of H.R. 6395 in the House passed FY2021 NDAA, which would

extend the requirement for public reporting of CCP military companies operating in the U.S. p. 21

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1255 of H.R. 6395 in the House passed FY2021 NDAA, which would

direct a federally funded R&D center to conduct a study on the defense industrial base of the CCP. p. 21

Recommendation: Congress should encourage companies that make up the defense industrial base, as part of the

terms of their contract with DoD, to participate in a threat intelligence sharing program that would be housed at DoD

component level. p. 21

Recommendation: Congress should support DoD’s Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certiﬁcation program to seek and

identify cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities within the information systems of defense industrial base companies.

p. 21

Recommendation: Congress should consider legislative proposals to eectively cut o material support for CCP

military industrial base companies. For instance, H.R. 7064, the Stop Funding the People’s Liberation Army Act, would

require divestment from certain companies with ties to the CCP military. p. 21

Recommendation: The U.S. should pass section 824 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would mandate

a preference for sourcing rare strategic and critical materials, including rare earth materials, from the National

Technology and Industrial Base. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 823 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would expand the

prohibition on acquiring certain sensitive materials from the PRC. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 826 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would mandate where

printed circuit boards can be manufactured and assembled. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 835 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would expand the

prohibition on government procurement or use of any commercial o-the-shelf drone or certain unmanned aircraft

systems from foreign entities subject to inﬂuence or control by the PRC. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass sections 829 and 830 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which address

aluminum production in the U.S. as a critical national security issue. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration must remove regulatory barriers to domestic mining. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7061, the American Critical Mineral Exploration and Innovation Act.

p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8198, the National Security Through America’s Resources and Permitting

Reform Act of 2020. p. 23

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to prioritize initiatives that strengthen cooperation with allied

countries in the mining and energy sector with a speciﬁc focus on mining sector governance, strengthening private

investment, and securing supply chains. p. 23

Recommendation: Congress should pass certain advanced semiconductor manufacturing incentives found in the

provisions of the bipartisan H.R. 7178, the CHIPS for America Act, including relevant sections included in the House and

Senate passed FY2021 NDAA. p. 24

Recommendation: Congress should design and pass tax incentives to encourage more domestic production of

advanced semiconductors. p. 24

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should seek to make substantial direct and indirect investment

in semiconductor and electronic component assembly in the U.S. sucient to meet the needs of defense and critical

infrastructure systems. p. 24

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: The Administration should establish a threat-speciﬁc supply chain strategy and expand partnerships

with allies, like-minded nations, and the private sector to shift supply chains to aordable and more secure locations.

p. 24

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should make securing the supply chains of the most strategic

products for national security and health requirements a top priority in bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral trade and

economic discussions with allies and other trusted trading partners. p. 24

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 712, a bipartisan provision of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which

would require the next National Security Strategy to include the provision of drugs, biologics, vaccines, and critical

medical equipment. It would also require a classiﬁed report on the vulnerabilities to the medical supply chain of the

U.S. from foreign countries like the PRC. p. 26

Recommendation: Congress should pass Section 1808(f) of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, a bipartisan provision

reﬂecting the text of H.R. 6399, the Securing America’s Vaccines for Emergencies (SAVE) Act. p. 26

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 750L, a bipartisan provision of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which

would require DoD to submit a classiﬁed report to Congress on DoD’s Joint Development Formulary (JDF), which

would include a core list of pharmaceutical items that are required for contingency operations, identify barriers that

may limit DoD from procuring necessary items, and identify international military partners who can help manufacture

them. p. 26

Recommendation: The Administration should quickly implement section 3112 of the CARES Act. Additionally, the

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine should act swiftly to begin the study required under

section 3101 of the CARES Act. p. 26

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6670, the Prescription for American Drug Independence Act. p. 26

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation to require the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and

Medicine to conduct a study on why pharmaceutical manufacturing has moved o-shore, what products (such as APIs)

were or were not historically manufactured in the U.S., and what market incentives would need to change to increase

domestic drug manufacturing. p. 26

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 4866, the bipartisan National Centers of Excellence in Continuous

Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Act. p. 27

Recommendation: The Administration should promote the use of the Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development

and Manufacturing (CIADMs) Program. p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6531, the bipartisan Medical Supplies for Pandemics Act. p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation to continue to promote policies intended to prevent and mitigate

drug shortages, such as legislation that would allow the government to enter contracts with pharmaceutical distributors

in which the distributors would secure, manage, and replenish a supply of drugs that are at high-risk of shortage. p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass provisions of H.R. 6930, the bipartisan Manufacturing API, Drugs, and

Excipients (MADE) in America Act. p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7767, the Domestic Medical and Drug Manufacturing Tax Credit Act.

p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7555, the More Cures Act, and H.R. 7556, the Start-ups for Cures Act.

p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7537, the Infectious Disease Therapies Research and Innovation Act of

2020. p. 27

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7505, the American Innovation Act of 2020. p. 27

III: National Security

Recommendation: The U.S. must close capability gaps with the PLA in certain areas and maintain its competitive

advantage in others by making steady investments in the capabilities required for a joint campaign and joint

warﬁghting operations along with their supporting infrastructure. p. 30

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: The U.S. must prioritize sustainment activities, including training, maintenance, mechanical

upgrades, and procurement. Both the House-passed and Senate-passed FY2021 NDAAs include many of these

activities and enhancements, and Congress should ensure its ﬁnal passage. p. 30

Recommendation: Congress should cease all limitations on DoD’s ability to develop and ﬁeld conventional ground-

launched cruise and ballistic missiles and should support Administration eorts to work with Indo-Paciﬁc allies

to regionally base U.S. intermediate-range missiles. Congress should fully fund the Long-Range Precision Fires

requirement described by Indo-Paciﬁc Command (INDOPACOM). p. 30

Recommendation: Nuclear modernization must be fully funded to ensure the nuclear triad and other capabilities are

eective, safe, and credible. p. 31

Recommendation: The U.S. should continue pressing to bring the PRC into arms control negotiations. p. 31

Recommendation: The U.S. must prioritize the development of emerging technologies while also increasing its ability

to defend against them, which includes substantial investments to maintain anti-access/area denial capabilities and

investment in AI, lethal autonomous weapons, long-range strike weapons, directed energy weapons, biotechnology,

and quantum technology. p. 31

Recommendation: Congress should evaluate whether DoD has the appropriate authorities and ﬂexibility to make

changes to its budget and fund experimentation of emerging technologies for DoD use. p. 31

Recommendation: Congress must pass a stable, strategy-based defense budget that is on time to allow the military to

make deliberate funding choices and plan programmatically. p. 32

Recommendation: Congress should require DoD to provide a classiﬁed budget exhibit that demonstrates how the

defense budget is aligned with and supports the NDS, with emphasis on competing with and deterring the PRC.

Congress should also require the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent assessment along with an outside

assessment to examine whether there is proper alignment and delegated decision-making authority within DoD’s

current processes and organizational structure. p. 32

Recommendation: Congress should exercise greater oversight of DoD’s investments to ensure capabilities align

with operational challenges. The Joint Force must develop joint, modernized operating concepts to overcome

the challenges posed by the CCP. Logistics should be a core element of military strategy and operational concept

development. p. 32

Recommendation: Congress should require DoD to report on operational concepts that address scenarios involving

highly escalatory approaches from the PLA against a defense partner like Taiwan or against a treaty ally like Japan and

to describe how it plans to perform multiple missions in dierent theaters on a near-simultaneous basis, any gaps and

vulnerabilities within that plan, and resources or authorities required for mitigation. p. 32

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Sta should provide to Congress a detailed and

consolidated plan to integrate joint training range exercises and the speciﬁc infrastructure and logistic priorities for the

Indo-Paciﬁc region as required in section 1704 of H.R. 6395 in the bipartisan FY2021 NDAA. p. 33

Recommendation: Congress should pass the “Indo-Paciﬁc Deterrence Initiative” as proposed in H.R. 6613 and

the contents for the initiative, which are included in the FY2021 House and Senate NDAA and both authorize and

appropriate funds to support this Initiative. p. 35

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to publicly identify the CCP’s actions in Indo-Paciﬁc waters as

unlawful and should continue to promote frequent and sustained U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the region.

Congress should arm that it is the policy of the U.S. to support lawful commercial interests and activities in the South

China Sea and East China Sea, and support in international fora the legitimate cases and grievances brought against

the PRC by regional states and stakeholders. p. 35

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3508, the bipartisan South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act

of 2019. p. 35

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7423, the Taiwan Defense Act. p. 35

Recommendation: Congress should continue to encourage and approve arms sales to Taiwan. Congress should

support S. 878, the “Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019,” and language included in the House and Senate FY2021 NDAA

that supports Taiwan’s continued pursuit of asymmetric capabilities and concepts, as well as regular U.S. sales and

transfers of defense articles to Taiwan, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities. p. 35

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should ensure DoD and the inter-agency takes steps to expand defense and security

cooperation with Taiwan. H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, requires DoD to brief Congress on its policies with respect

to commencing bilateral military exercises with Taiwan, including naval and air exercises that seek to enhance cross-

strait deterrence, utilizing ship visits, and any other matters that would deepen and expand defense cooperation with

Taiwan. p. 35

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its eorts to clarify and reassert the U.S.’ longstanding security

commitments to Taiwan. p. 35

Recommendation: Congress should require DoD to biannually update the report mandated in the FY2018 NDAA to

assess the foreign and non-military activities of the PRC that could aect regional and global U.S. national security and

defense interests. p. 36

Recommendation: Congress should encourage the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and other parliamentary assemblies

around the world to collaborate and examine how CCP investments in critical infrastructure, information, and

technology could impact their defense and national security, allied and partner military operations and capabilities, and

secure communications. p. 36

Recommendation: The Administration should build a coalition of partners and allies around the world to share

knowledge on key strategic locations where the CCP is seeking to secure military footholds, and direct the Secretary

of Defense and Secretary of State to work with this coalition to provide alternative options to host nations that may be

considering CCP military infrastructure projects such as naval ports and airﬁelds that may be sovereign debt traps.

p. 36

Recommendation: The U.S. must continue to uphold its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Paciﬁc through close

dialogue and military cooperation in order to ensure eective deterrence. p. 36

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration must ensure commitments with the Freely Associated States are

extended beyond 2023. The U.S. should also seek new opportunities for security agreements with non-traditional

partners to allow for a more distributed footprint. p. 36

Recommendation: Congress should fully fund eorts in the House-passed and Senate-passed NDAAs to build

partnership capacity through security cooperation programs and the Indo-Paciﬁc Maritime Security Initiative. p. 36

Recommendation: The U.S. should improve predictability of arms sales with allies and partners and expand military

training with allied and partner nations. Congress should continue to support professional military education for

foreign partners carried out by DoD, including an increase in funding for the Department of State International Military

Education and Training (IMET) program. p. 37

Recommendation: The U.S. should expand forward presence and improve interoperability with allies and partner

nations through the use of joint training and exercises. p. 37

Recommendation: Congress should pass sections 1610, 1604, and 1605 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA to support

development of capabilities to respond to CCP activities in space that are rapid, scalable and require an operational

plan for unpredictability. Congress should give DoD acquisition authorities similar to the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA) to incubate space technology across the domestic and international landscape. p. 37

Recommendation: DoD must normalize space warfare as a key joint competency and develop operational intelligence

to support space operations. Congress should provide DoD with appropriate and rapid acquisition authorities for

space, encourage DoD to develop budget structures that accurately capture space investments in a transparent

manner, pass section 1603 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, and require DoD to develop Foundational Military

Intelligence for space. The U.S. should develop policies to determine DoD’s role in defending all U.S. space capabilities

during peace and all phases of conﬂict. p. 38

Recommendation: Congress should direct DoD to perform a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) structure assessment and

deﬁne authorities for cyber operations. p. 38

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1621 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would direct DoD to

create a Major Force Program category for the training, manning, and equipping of U.S. Cyber Command. p. 38

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1628 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require DoD to

assess the need for, and requirements of, a military cyber reserve. p. 38

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1629 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require DoD to

conduct an annual cybersecurity vulnerability assessment of all segments of the nuclear command and control system.

p. 39

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1630 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require DoD to

annually present a plan to assess major weapons system cyber vulnerabilities. p. 39

Recommendation:Congress should require DHS and the FBI, in coordination with other appropriate federal

departments and agencies, to conduct a study mapping CCP investment and contracts with critical infrastructure

sectors in the U.S. DHS and FBI should partner with the private sector to build a thorough understanding of CCP’s

connections to critical infrastructure while protecting U.S. security. p. 39

Recommendation: The National Telecommunications and Information Administration, in coordination with CISA and the

NSA, should undertake a comprehensive review of core internet vulnerabilities to begin the remediation and removal

of technologies and entities compromised by CCP security services. p. 39

Recommendation: Congress should codify the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission reﬂected

in H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA to strengthen the federal government’s ability to secure critical infrastructure and

respond to 21st century threats. p. 39

Recommendation: Congress should direct CISA, in coordination with the National Telecommunications and Information

Administration, to report to Congress on any additional resources, facilities, and authorities required to threat hunt

across the .gov domain. p. 40

Recommendation: Congress should establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics within DoC. p. 40

Recommendation: Congress should codify into law the concept of “systemically important critical infrastructure.”

Congress should direct DHS, in coordination with other appropriate federal agencies and departments, to develop a

process to identify key systems and assets underpinning critical functions. p. 40

Recommendation: The Administration should develop and maintain, in consultation with the private sector, a continuity

of the economy plan, to ensure the continuous operation of critical functions of the economy in the event of a

signiﬁcant cyber disruption. p. 40

Recommendation: Congress should codify a “Cyber State of Distress” in the event of a signiﬁcant cyber incident

or series of incidents to enable the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate asset preparation, response, and

recovery operations. p. 40

Recommendation: Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to protect U.S. critical infrastructure

by authorizing CISA to notify U.S. private and public sector entities put at risk by cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the

networks and systems that control critical assets. p. 40

Recommendation: Congress should ensure that the DoJ’s China Initiative has the necessary resources and tools to

confront the CCP’s malign behaviors. p. 41

Recommendation: The FBI should develop more tailored or sector-speciﬁc unclassiﬁed training and other education

resources to enable more eective security measures against CCP-directed espionage, establish a secure online

portal to enable dissemination of training materials, and provide local ﬁeld oces additional funding and personnel to

conduct the necessary outreach to improve awareness of CCP threats. Congress should examine measures to codify a

Higher Education Initiative in the FBI’s Oce of Private Sector. p. 41

Recommendation:Congress should pass legislation that provides additional support for Mandarin language and other

majorChinesedialects atDoJ, including mid-career courses to maintain or enhancelanguage proﬁciency,sothatit can

better investigate and prosecute cases implicating the CCP. p. 41

Recommendation: Congress should support the study of the CCP throughout academia, including by improving the

teaching of China’s history and culture to counteract CCP propaganda. Some National Resource Centers authorized

in the Higher Education Act should shift their focus onto Chinese history, language and culture to strengthen our

understanding of China and counteract CCP machinations. p. 41

Recommendation: The Administration should ensure that the federal government’s PRC-focused open source

publications are best addressing their customers’ needs regarding this growing multifaceted threat. p. 42

Recommendation: Congress should authorize military counterintelligence organizations within the services and

DoD counterintelligence entities to support the FBI in investigations of CCP espionage against DoD and the Defense

Industrial Base. p. 42

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) should establish small counterintelligence cells

composed of IC professionals at federal agencies and elements targeted by the CCP. p. 42

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: DNI and DoD should examine the CCP’s intent and the threat to U.S. research and produce

an annual report on sensitive research targeted by the CCP. This classiﬁed document should be disseminated

appropriately to inform FBI and whole of government eorts to protect U.S. innovations. p. 42

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3997, Safe Career Transitions for Intelligence and National Security

Professionals. p. 42

Recommendation: The Administration should seek greater collaboration with Five Eyes allies in sharing and releasing

information of CCP sponsored counterintelligence activities and coordinate with other partners to ensure that their own

critical infrastructure and technology remains free from CCP inﬂuence. p. 42

Recommendation:Congress should build the federal government’s capacity to quickly identify and, when appropriate,

disrupt eorts by the CCP to exploit legitimate mobile applications and internet platforms for malign activities against

not only government employees and ocials, but also the American public. p. 42

Recommendation:Congress should pass H.R. 6896/S. 3455, the bipartisan No Tik Tok on Government Devices Act.

p. 42

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1256 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA that requires the President to

produce a whole-of-government strategy to impose costs on and deter CCP cyber-enabled corporate espionage and

personal data theft. p. 44

Recommendation: The Administration should strictly enforce its October 2019 export licensing requirements on PRC-

surveillance ﬁrms. The Administration should also encourage other allies and partners to take similar actions. p. 44

Recommendation: Congress should require federal law enforcement entities to share information with state and local

law enforcement agencies regarding security concerns surrounding drones with a nexus to the CCP. Congress should

further encourage states and local governments to consider banning or limiting the use of drones produced by, funded

by, or linked to the CCP. p. 44

Recommendation: The Administration should rigorously enforce all of the IP provisions of the Phase 1 trade agreement

with the PRC. p. 45

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to vigorously investigate and identify PRC entities and

individuals engaged in IP theft and industrial espionage. The Administration should expand the use of strong

penalties for IP theft and industrial espionage, and work more closely with U.S. businesses to improve the detection

of IP theft and obtain more information about the scope and nature of such activities. Congress should reinforce the

Administration’s authority in these areas and/or supplement existing resources, if necessary. p. 45

Recommendation: The Administration should exercise the powers outlined in Executive Order 13694 “Blocking the

Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Signiﬁcant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities.” p. 45

Recommendation: Congress should require the Administration to provide an annual report to Congress identifying

PRC businesses and organizations that have engaged in pervasive or repeated acts of IP theft or industrial espionage

against the U.S. For each entity identiﬁed in the report, Congress and the Administration should work together to

ensure that proportionately severe sanctions are imposed and other appropriate actions are taken. p. 45

Recommendation: Congress should increase funding and support for federal departments and agencies to step up

investigations, criminal prosecutions, and other actions against PRC entities/individuals for violations of relevant U.S.

laws regarding IP theft. Congress and the Administration should also pursue trade policies that deter and protect

against IP theft, and provide more protection for U.S. companies operating abroad. p. 45

Recommendation: Congress should continue to support measures and programs that provide U.S. companies with

tools to protect their technology and IP from CCP activities. Congress should amend the Defend Trade Secrets Act

(DTSA) to clarify that its reach encompasses individuals and conduct outside of the U.S. when an appropriate nexus

with the U.S. is found. Congress should also amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to prevent PRC companies

working with the CCP from abusing its provisions to avoid accountability in U.S. courts for IP infringement and theft.

p. 45

Recommendation: Congress should ensure that relevant laws provide all necessary authority to empower

the Administration to eectively address the CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber activities and combat the

CCP’s continued use of cyber-attacks against U.S. businesses to steal their IP and technology. Congress and the

Administration should work together to ensure sucient resources and incentives are made available to both

government and private entities for the development and deployment of improved defenses to cyber-attacks. p. 45

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: The Administration should promote greater cooperation and coordination among federal

departments and agencies to detect and prevent acts of IP theft and industrial espionage. p. 45

Recommendation: Congress should strengthen the ability of relevant agencies and departments of the U.S.

government to detect and prevent the importation of counterfeit or infringing goods from the PRC. p. 46

Recommendation: The Administration should coordinate with the governments of other nations to enhance anti-

counterfeiting eorts and protection of IP rights, and hold the CCP accountable for facilitating counterfeiting activities

and failing to take reasonable measures to prevent them. The Administration should also continue to maintain pressure

on the CCP to take meaningful steps to curb the activity of PRC entities producing or tracking in counterfeit goods.

p. 46

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6196, the bipartisan Trademark Modernization Act, and work with

the Administration to provide resources and any additional authority necessary to the USPTO to address the CCP’s

campaign against the U.S. trademark system. The Administration should ensure that the next potential phase of trade

negotiations with the PRC government includes an agreement by the PRC to end its practice of providing incentives for

PRC entities and individuals to fraudulently obtain U.S. trademark registrations. p. 46

Recommendation: The Administration should act to limit the CCP’s inﬂuence over international IP policy at WIPO and

ensure U.S. interests are protected. p. 46

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation building on reforms to the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program

implemented by the Administration in its November 2019 regulation. p. 47

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7224, the End Communist Chinese Citizenship Act. p. 47

Recommendation: The Administration must continue to encourage diplomatic and law enforcement cooperation

with the PRC to hold illicit fentanyl and other drug trackers accountable for circumventing important U.S. and PRC

regulations and enforcement protocols. p. 48

Recommendation: Congress must ensure eective implementation by the USPS and DHS of the bipartisan Synthetics

Tracking and Overdose Prevention Act (P. L. 115-271). p. 48

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 6284 of S. 4049 in the FY2021 NDAA, Blocking Deadly Fentanyl

Imports, a bipartisan measure which would expand reporting requirements related to foreign nations that produce illicit

fentanyl. p. 48

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 4963/S. 2764, the bipartisan Stop the Importation and Manufacturing of

Synthetic Analogues Act. p. 48

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 2935/S. 3148, the Stopping Overdoses of Fentanyl Analogues Act.

p. 48

Recommendation: Congress should ensure that DHS and DoS have the authorities necessary to improve visa security

programs and processes, and to prevent entry of foreign nationals with known ties to CCP defense and intelligence

services traveling to the U.S. from the PRC to engage in sensitive technology research. p. 48

Recommendation: Congress should require institutions of higher education to disclose appropriate information on

individuals participating in research on sensitive technologies after entering the U.S. to identify individuals who may

have circumvented initial visa security screening. p. 48

Recommendation: DHS and DoJ must use additional investigative tools and coordination with companies and research

institutions to identify individuals located within the U.S. who are national security threats with known ties to CCP

defense and intelligence services and who are engaged in sensitive technology research and technology transfer.

p. 49

Recommendation: Congress should limit all federal funds to institutions of higher education with Confucius Institutes

unless such institutions impose policies to protect academic freedom, prohibit the application of any foreign law on

campus, and grant full managerial authority of the Confucius Institute to the institution. p. 49

Recommendation: Congress should address the CCP’s use of various nontraditional intelligence collection platforms in

the U.S. to collect information on research. p. 49

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 228 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require DoD to

maintain a public list of “foreign talent programs” that provide a threat to national security interests. p. 49

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Recommendation: Congress should supporta regulationtoprevent certainstudent visa holdersfrombeing initially

admitted to the United States for the duration of their schooling – no matter how long that schooling lasts. The

regulation would requiresuch student visa holders to apply for extensions of their admission every two or four years.

p. 49

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 229 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require any

individual applying for federal research grants or funds to disclose all sources of foreign funding. p. 49

Recommendation: Congress should require the President to identify any foreign persons responsible for actions to

access, disrupt, inﬂuence, or in any way alter information or information systems related to U.S. political parties or

elections for federal oce and make any unclassiﬁed portion of the list publicly available and published in the Federal

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7905, the Emergency Assistance for Safe Elections Act; H.R. 4736, the

Honest Elections Act; H.R. 6882, the Election Fraud Prevention Act; and H.R. 5707, the Protect American Voters Act.

p. 50

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3442, the Defending Elections against Trolls from Enemy Regimes

(DETER) Act. p. 50

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 1811/S. 480, the bipartisan Countering Chinese Government and

Communist Party’s Political Inﬂuence Operations Act. p. 51

Recommendation: Congress should evaluate legislation to require individuals lobbying on behalf of PRC companies

(or their aliates/subsidiaries) to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, in addition to the Lobbying

Disclosure Act (LDA). p. 51

Recommendation: Congress should support the sharing of information and coordination of eorts between federal,

state and local law enforcement to counter CCP inﬂuence campaigns at the state and local level. p. 51

Recommendation: DHS and other federal entities should ensure the interagency has a complete picture of UFWD

aliates operating within the U.S., and the Administration should educate the American public on the goals and

methods of CCP inﬂuence operations and the reality that no such aliated organization is free of Beijing’s control.

p. 52

Recommendation: The Administration should designate UFWD organizations as foreign missions, where applicable.

p. 52

Recommendation: The Administration should continue outreach to local and municipal governments to counter CCP

inﬂuence in American society. p. 52

Recommendation: The Administration should require that any memorandum of understanding or contract between a

U.S. state and municipal government, company, institute of higher education and a CCP entity must be transparent and

public, and no exceptions to U.S. laws or best practices should be made to placate CCP requests. p. 52

IV: Technology

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of the bipartisan National Artiﬁcial Intelligence Initiative Act

of 2020, as included in sections 5001-5502 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA. p. 54

Recommendation: Congress should support the Administration’s FY2021 commitment to accelerate funding for R&D of

trustworthy AI across the federal government. p. 54

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8132, the bipartisan American COMPETE Act, which would facilitate

a roadmap for commercial adoption of AI and related technologies and remove impediments for U.S. companies to

invest and innovate. p. 54

Recommendation: The Administration should ﬁnalize and adopt the OMB Memorandum on “Guidance for Regulation

of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Applications.” The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Consumer Product Safety

Commission (CPSC) should also adopt this guidance. p. 55

Recommendation: Congress should pass sections 217, 222, 241-249, bipartisan provisions of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021

NDAA, which are recommendations made by the NSCAI to ensure the necessary talent, infrastructure, and authorities

to accelerate the adoption of DoD AI. p. 55

100

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: The Administration, through the NTIA, should continue to implement the “National Strategy to

Secure 5G” as directed by the bipartisan Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-184). p. 56

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation to streamline ﬁxed and wireless communications network

permitting processes at the federal, state, and local level to ensure all Americans are connected. Reducing U.S.

regulatory barriers will promote a market for secure solutions not made in China. p. 56

Recommendation: The NTIA should continue working with all federal agencies that have spectrum licenses on ways to

increase commercial access to spectrum. p. 56

Recommendation: Congress should fund H.R. 4998, the bipartisan Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act

of 2020 (P.L. 116-124). p. 56

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6624, the bipartisan Utilizing Strategic Allied (USA) Telecommunications

Act of 2020. p. 56

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6235, the bipartisan NETWORKS Act. p. 56

Recommendation: DoC should fully and strictly implement all recent updates to the Export Administration Regulation

(EAR) to restrict the sale or diversion of sensitive U.S. technologies to companies on the Entity List as well as

participants in the CCP Military-Civil Fusion strategy. p. 56

Recommendation: The U.S. should fully implement the prohibition on using or procuring certain telecommunications

and video surveillance equipment from Huawei and ZTE as required by the bipartisan FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232).

p. 57

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should continue to support full funding and implementation of the

NQI Act (P.L.115-368). Congress should support the Administration’s FY21 NQI funding proposal. p. 57

Recommendation: Congress should support and fund the Quantum User Expansion for Science and Technology

(“QUEST”) Program, as proposed in H.R. 8303, the QUEST Act of 2020. p. 57

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6919, the Advancing Quantum Computing Act. p. 57

Recommendation: Congress should pass HR. 8279, the Quantum Network Infrastructure Act of 2020. p. 58

Recommendation: The Administration should assess and address the risk to National Security Systems posed by

quantum computing. p. 58

Recommendation: DoD should establish additional Quantum Innovation centers within each service to identify

technical problems and research challenges that are likely to be addressable by quantum computers within the next

three to ﬁve years. DoD should also establish additional partnerships with academia and industry with functional

quantum computing capability. p. 58

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8350, the SELF-DRIVE Act, to ensure the U.S. leads on AVs. p. 58

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7972, the bipartisan Advanced Unmanned Delivery Services Act. p. 58

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7214, the bipartisan Surface Transportation Research and Development

Act. p. 58

Recommendation: Congress should pass key legislative recommendations made by the Cyberspace Solarium

Commission to safeguard critical supply chains against CCP interference and enhance the U.S. Government’s ability to

recruit, develop, and retain its cyber workforce. p. 59

Recommendation: Congress should pass S. 2775, the Harvesting American Cybersecurity Knowledge through

Education (HACKED) Act. p. 59

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3255, the TOWER Infrastructure Deployment Act. p. 59

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to promote the adoption of the NIST cybersecurity framework

for the protection of public and private systems and support the measurement science that informs standards

development to enable new cyber technologies and the internet of things (IoT). p. 59

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to work through the NTIA’s multi-stakeholder process and

CISA’s binding operational directive process to support collaboration between the private sector and the government

on information sharing related to vulnerability disclosures and coordinating response. p. 59

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

101

Recommendation: The Administration should promote adoption of recommended actions in “A Road Map Toward

Resilience Against Botnets”, released by DoC and DHS. p. 59

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8132, the American COMPETE Act, a bipartisan measure that includes

provisions of the SMART IoT Act that promotes an IoT strategy at the federal level that streamlines development and

adoption of these technologies. p. 59

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4373, the bipartisan Engineering Biology Research

and Development Act of 2019. p. 60

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to modernize the regulatory framework for

agriculture biotechnology products. p. 60

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should continue to support implementation of the “Strategy for

American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing.” p. 61

Recommendation: The Administration should leverage the Manufacturing USA institutes and the MEP program as

directed in the bipartisan American Manufacturing Leadership Act (P.L. 116-92). p. 61

Recommendation: Congress should pass provisions of H.R. 8132, the American COMPETE Act, that promote advanced

manufacturing techniques for IoT, incentivize states to adopt model codes for the manufacturing of IoT devices,

advance 3D printing capabilities for manufacturing, and require a national strategy for encouraging more tech-focused

startups and small businesses in all parts of the U.S. p. 61

Recommendation: The U.S. should work with the United Kingdom and other nations to form a new D-10 group of

leading democracies focused on developing and deploying 5G and subsequent generations, addressing 5G mobile

communications and vulnerable supply chains, and leveraging technical expertise of each nation in emerging

technologies for the beneﬁt of democratic nations. p. 62

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1705 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, a bipartisan provision which

directs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to commission an independent study on the impact of

the policies of the PRC in international standards bodies and how to improve U.S. engagement. p. 62

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4500, the bipartisan Promoting U.S. Wireless

Leadership Act of 2019. p. 62

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 3763, the bipartisan Promoting U.S. International

Leadership in 5G Act of 2019. p. 62

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 5698, the Promoting Secure 5G Act. p. 62

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to promote robust participation by U.S. industry in international

standards bodies and conferences. p. 62

Recommendation: Congress should pass a reauthorization of NASA and fund annual appropriations. p. 63

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should work together to maintain presence in low-Earth orbit

for strategic purposes, including continued operations of the ISS and transition to commercial platforms as soon as

possible. p. 64

Recommendation: The U.S. should seek international participation in space exploration through bilateral agreements.

p. 64

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should support a balanced, robust, and stable science enterprise

that counters the CCP’s attempts to eclipse U.S. leadership in the ﬁelds of Earth science, astronomy, astrophysics,

heliophysics, planetary science, and life and physical sciences. p. 64

Recommendation: The U.S. should carry out its space exploration goals by leveraging private sector investments.

p. 64

Recommendation: Congress should review the Wolf Amendment to annual appropriations laws that has been in place

for nine years, which prohibits bilateral cooperation between NASA and the PRC unless the government makes certain

certiﬁcations 30 days in advance. p. 64

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3610, the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act. p. 64

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6208, the Protecting American Space Assets Act. p. 64

102

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: Congress should pass the Space Technology Advancement Report Act, included in H.R. 6395 in the

FY2021 NDAA. p. 64

Recommendation: The U.S. should engage with the PRC and other space competitors on shared goals of space

sustainability and safety issues, through bilateral diplomatic dialogue as well as forums for multilateral discussions.

p. 64

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation that creates an American Space Situational Awareness and

Framework for Identity Management. p. 65

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation that establishes national standards for data protection, increases

transparency for data collection, increases FTC authority to suciently hold bad actors accountable, provides ﬂexibility

to protect the U.S. innovation advantage, and enhances data security. p. 65

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6969, the U.S. TELL Act; and H.R. 6942, the Internet Application I.D. Act.

p. 65

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6929, the Advancing Facial Recognition Act. p. 65

Recommendation: NIST should continue to develop and promote adoption of the NIST Privacy Framework. p. 65

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7005, the SHIELD Act. The Administration should enact H.R. 4779, the

bipartisan SAFEWEB Act. p. 65

Recommendation: The Administration should complete implementation of the “Clean Path” initiative contained in the

2019 NDAA. p. 66

Recommendation:The Administration should direct the NTIA, as part of the “Clean Cable” initiative, to strengthen

interagency coordination of the Executive Branch review of international undersea cable landings and applications for

new licenses or transfers of licenses for authorization to provide telecommunications or radio services. p. 66

V: Economics and Energy

Recommendation: Congress must work closely with the Administration to aggressively use the new and

unprecedented consultation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms in the Phase One agreement to strictly enforce

that agreement. p. 68

Recommendation: Congress should intensify its engagement with the Administration to develop a strategic plan for

Phase Two negotiations with the PRC based on a uniﬁed U.S. approach. p. 68

Recommendation: On a bipartisan basis, Members of Congress should work with their counterparts across the globe

to continue to build bilateral and plurilateral relationships to address the challenges posed by the CCP. p. 69

Recommendation: Congress should engage in close consultations with the Administration under the Bipartisan

Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act (TPA) rules and procedures to negotiate new trade agreements

and other arrangements to counter CCP directed inﬂuence. p. 69

Recommendation: Congress should continue its action and oversight, and the Administration should continue its

implementation, of other statutory trade tools to strengthen economic and geostrategic ties with developing countries

in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. p. 69

Recommendation: The Administration should enhance our relationship with Taiwan by supporting the full and timely

implementation of the bipartisan Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019

(P.L. 116-135). p. 70

Recommendation: The Administration should work to deepen trade ties with Taiwan and resolve outstanding trade

issues, taking the steps to launch trade agreement negotiations once those issues are addressed. p. 70

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.Res. 746, a bipartisan resolution supporting the WTO and calling on other

WTO members to join the U.S. in reforming the organization. p. 70

Recommendation: Congress should work through the WTO, together with the Administration and allies, on developing

reforms and new rules and disciplines to address the threats the CCP poses. p. 70

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

103

Recommendation: Congress should work with the Administration to develop a U.S. government strategy to select a

new Director-General of the WTO this fall who understands the scope of the CCP threat to the system. p. 70

Recommendation: Congress should ensure eective implementation and resourcing of the Ex-Im Bank’s new

bipartisan Program on China and Transformational Exports (P.L. 116-94). Congress should pass H.R. 8163, the

Countering China Through American Export Competitiveness Act. p. 71

Recommendation: As Ex-Im seeks to counteract the CCP’s malign designs, it should not ﬁnance the PRC in any way. It

is critical for Ex-Im to deny support to PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs). p. 72

Recommendation: The Administration should direct the DFC and related agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge

Corporation, the U.S. Export Import Bank, and USAID, to partner together to better identify strategic projects in critical

regions. p. 72

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7570, a bipartisan measure which provides a budget treatment for

equity investments made by the DFC that does not require dollar-for-dollar funding or expose U.S. taxpayers to any

signiﬁcant new risks. p. 72

Recommendation: The DFC, working with the Ex-Im Bank, should sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the

Oce of the Director of National Intelligence to receive and analyze classiﬁed economic data related to corporations

and countries in order to best direct investments. p. 72

Recommendation: The Administration should fully implement the bipartisan Championing American Business through

Diplomacy Act (PL 116 -94), which promotes American economic interests abroad and counters the CCP’s predatory BRI

in developing nations. p. 72

Recommendation: The Administration should continue its multilateral eorts to provide a credible alternative to the

BRI. p. 72

Recommendation: The Administration should coordinate its diplomacy on trade as well as export control and

investment review harmonization to forge closer bonds with U.S. allies and partners. p. 72

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1779 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which includes provisions of

H.R. 5932, the bipartisan Ensuring Chinese Debt Transparency Act. p. 73

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 5846, the Neutralizing Unfair Chinese Subsidies Act. p. 73

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6086, the IMF Reform and Integrity Act. p. 73

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1843 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which includes provisions of

H.R. 5051, the bipartisan Accountability for World Bank Loans to China Act. p. 73

Recommendation: Congress should elevate nuclear energy, and related engineering, technological, and industrial

capacity, as a national security imperative, with the requisite attention of the White House in coordination with the DoS,

DoE, DoC, and DoD. The President should do this through Presidential memorandum. p. 74

Recommendation: Congress should strengthen the U.S.’ competitive position in global nuclear markets through the

expanded export of nuclear technology. p. 74

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7405, the Strengthening American Nuclear Competitiveness Act. p. 74

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7406, the Nuclear Licensing Eciency Act. p. 74

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7814, the Nuclear Prosperity and Security Act. p. 74

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7404, the Unlocking our Domestic LNG Potential Act of 2020. p. 75

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7429, the Promoting Cross-border Energy Infrastructure Act. p. 75

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3983, the Promoting Interagency Coordination for Review of Natural

Gas Pipelines Act. p. 75

Recommendation: Congress should strengthen DoE’s existing authorities over the BPS and Critical Defense Electric

Infrastructure. p. 75

104

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 8329, which would direct the Administration to develop a strategy

for export control diplomacy to focus on swift, agile agreements with key partners and allies who possess critical

technologies, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment, that enhances the eectiveness of export controls

and maintains U.S. leadership in innovation. p. 76

Recommendation: DoC must fully implement key aspects of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), speciﬁcally

the Emerging and Foundational technology control list. p. 76

Recommendation: The Administration should designate all entities on the June 2020 DoD list of PRC entities that are

operating in the U.S. and are tied to the CCP military to the DoC Entity List, under a licensing policy of a presumption of

denial. p. 76

Recommendation: The Administration should update its policy on end-use and end-user agreements in the PRC to

recognize that the recipient of any technology will have no ability to refuse diversion to the PRC’s military industrial

complex. p. 76

Recommendation: The Administration should aggressively expand end-use and end-user controls on PRC entities

involved in or supporting the Social Credit system and other mass surveillance systems. p. 77

Recommendation: The Administration, in coordination with U.S. trading partners, should enforce reciprocal treatment

of PRC investment into the U.S. as a means to restore balance and open up the PRC economy to investment, if the PRC

continues to restrict meaningful investment access to its market. p. 77

Recommendation: Congress should fully fund DoT’s CFIUS operations to enable outreach to U.S. allies and partners

for the development of targeted investment screening regimes. p. 77

Recommendation: Congress should ensure that DoD and other CFIUS member agencies are executing section 1721(b)

of FIRRMA by fully assessing their resource needs and procedures to eectively address investment risks, pursuant to

the requirements of FIRRMA and recommendations by GAO. p. 77

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should regularly assess whether CFIUS is eectively addressing

everchanging and persistent CCP eorts to acquire U.S. technology through foreign investment, while ensuring that

robust export controls complement CFIUS’s eorts and prevent the acquisition or use of critical technology and IP to

end-users of concern. p. 77

Recommendation: The Administration should institute a CFIUS “blacklist” in its regulations to implement Section

721(a)(4)(E) of the Defense Production Act, which would focus on the PRC and other countries of concern that require

heightened scrutiny for investments. p. 78

Recommendation: Congress should require DoT, as it has teams dedicated to the North Korea and Iran threats

respectively, to establish a dedicated team focused on the PRC. p. 78

Recommendation: The Administration should carry out enforcement actions and sanction PRC banks responsible for

North Korea sanctions evasion, including through more rigorous implementation of the bipartisan Otto Warmbier North

Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act (P.L. 116-92). p. 78

Recommendation: Congress should pass legislation to address concerns that the SEC and the PCAOB are unable

to inspect audit work and practices of PCAOB-registered auditing ﬁrms in the PRC, such as H.R. 7000, the Holding

Foreign Companies Accountable Act. p. 79

Recommendation: Congress should support SEC reforms to improve disclosures relating to emerging market

investment risk, including the risks of investing in the PRC, and other PWG recommendations. p. 79

Recommendation: Congress should consider additional legislation regarding disclosures relating to PRC-related

investment risk, such as H.R. 8197, the Transparency in Chinese Government Investment Act. p. 79

Recommendation: Congress should consider legislative proposals regarding the risks of investing in PRC companies

in retirement accounts, such as H.R. 6614, the bipartisan Taxpayers and Savers Protection Act. p. 79

Recommendation: Congress should consider legislative proposals to examine capital ﬂows to PRC entities that

threaten U.S. national security. For instance, H.R. 8407, the Protecting National Security in Financial InvestmentsAct

would require the SEC to assess whether it is appropriate to require the disclosure of information related to

investments in entities on the Bureau of Industry and Security of the DoC Entity List. p. 79

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

105

VI: Competitiveness

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should keep tax rates globally competitive and remain vigilant if

the PRC or other foreign competitors seek to undercut U.S. rates. p. 80

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7749, the Bringing Back American Jobs Through Intellectual Property

Repatriation Act. p. 80

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 6802, the Accelerate Long-term Investment Growth Now (ALIGN) Act.

p. 80

Recommendation: Congress should pass and support funding for H.R. 5685, the bipartisan Securing American

Leadership in Science and Technology Act. p. 81

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should work together to prioritize federal funding for basic

research and accelerate investments in research for advancing the industries of the future. Congress should

also evaluate new mechanisms for funding the transition of federally funded basic research to private sector

commercialization in key technology areas. p. 81

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7766, which improves tax incentives to conduct R&D in the U.S. p. 81

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 4549, the bipartisan American Innovation and Competitiveness Act.

p. 81

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to expand public-private partnerships between the federal

government, universities, national laboratories, and industry to leverage resources and accelerate the movement of

early-stage research to commercialization. p. 81

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to pursue bilateral agreements for international cooperation on

science and technology projects and research with allies and likeminded nations. p. 81

Recommendation: The Administration should leverage existing programs to improve regional innovation across all

geographic areas of the U.S. p. 82

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress should address all 15 key ﬁndings in the green paper released by

NIST, “Return on Investment Initiative for Unleashing American Innovation.” p. 82

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to prioritize reducing the time required for the USPTO to

complete examination of patent applications. p. 83

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to prioritize modernizing and upgrading the IT systems of the

USPTO to facilitate the work of patent examiners. Congress and the Administration should work together to ensure that

the USPTO has full access to its fee collections for its operations and that fees remain entirely dedicated to the USPTO.

p. 83

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should monitor whether CNIPA or other elements of the PRC

government provide any unfair advantages or preference to PRC patent applicants over foreign applicants in violation

of international agreements. p. 83

Recommendation: Congress should evaluate, consolidate, coordinate and fund federal STEM eorts to empower

local entities and families with the tools they need to meet the STEM educational needs of their communities and the

industries of the future. p. 84

Recommendation: Congress should update the COMPETES Act of 2010, directing the National Science and

Technology Council’s (NSTC) Committee on STEM Education (CoSTEM) to address the fractured STEM ﬁnancing

mechanism with a uniﬁed approach. p. 84

Recommendation: Congress should reform the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to create the framework necessary

to transition from a degree-based economy to a skills-based workforce. p. 84

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7321, the Elevating America’s Workforce Act, a bipartisan measure that

would amend the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act to include personal reemployment accounts instead of

pushing workers through the unemployment insurance system. p. 84

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 4372, the bipartisan MSI STEM Achievement Act; H.R.

4979, the bipartisan Rural STEM Education Act; and H.R. 2528, the bipartisan STEM Opportunities Act. p. 84

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APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to expand the U.S.’ successful STEM talent

programs. p. 84

Recommendation: The U.S. immigration system is a generous one that must be updated to meet the needs of the

modern economy. This means making a shift towards a more “merit-based” immigration system that remains mindful

not to harm the employment prospects of qualiﬁed American workers,particularly as the economy reopens in the

aftermath of COVID-19. p. 85 

Recommendation: The Administration should issue uniform and coordinated requirements for researchers and

universities across all federal agencies to protect federally funded R&D from foreign interference, through the process

established in the bipartisan Securing American Science and Technology Act (P.L 116-92). p. 86

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 229 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require

all federally funded researchers to disclose foreign sources of funding and enhances enforcement of disclosure

requirements. p. 86

Recommendation: Congress and the Administration should work together to provide sucient resources to federal

research agencies and the Oces of Inspectors General to investigate cases of foreign espionage and research

misconduct in federally funded research projects. p. 86

Recommendation: The Administration should continue to work with key allies to share best practices for deterring

CCP inﬂuence in academia and the research enterprise that are contrary to the values and norms of the democratic

international scientiﬁc community. p. 86

Recommendation: Congress should amend Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require colleges and

universities to report annually all foreign donations received from foreign adversarial sources, including the PRC. p. 86

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7842, the Intelligence on Nefarious Foreign Leaders Using Education

Networks for Corrupt Enrichment (INFLUENCE) Act. p. 86

Recommendation: The Administration should restrict all federal employees and federal contractors from participating

in foreign talent programs. p. 87

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7708, the Defend COVID Research from Hackers Act. p. 87

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 7998, the NIST COVID-19 Cyber-Security Act. p. 88

Recommendation: Congress should pass section 1256 of H.R. 6395 in the FY2021 NDAA, which would require the

President to produce a whole-of-government strategy to impose costs on the CCP for cyber-enabled corporate

espionage and personal data theft. p. 88

Recommendation: Congress should pass H.R. 3611, the Securing American Research from Cyber Theft Act. p. 88

Recommendation: Congress should ensure ﬁnal passage of H.R. 7601/S. 939, the bipartisan Concerns Over Nations

Funding University Campus Institutes in the United States Act (CONFUCIUS Act). p. 88

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

107

CONCEPTS FOR

FURTHER INVESTIGATION

• H.R. 2161– Pell Flexibility Act of 2019, which would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to establish a Job

Training Federal Pell Grants demonstration program

• H.R. 3422-Competency-Based Education Act of 2019, which would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to

clarify competency-based education

• H.R. 6978– Endless Frontier Act, which would redesignate the National Science Foundation as the National Science

and Technology Foundation and establishes a Directorate for Technology within the foundation.

• Congress should continue evaluating how U.S. capital ﬂows into speciﬁc countries and entities of concern may

be adversely aecting U.S. national and/or supply chain security in critical sectors and explore whether additional

authorities are needed to mitigate any potential risks or threats.

• Congress and the Administration should conduct an exhaustive review to more fully understand the CCP’s Military-

Civil Fusion (MCF). The CCP’s intertwining of its military and civilian economy results in nearly every U.S. interaction

with the PRC—including trade, research, and investment—has the potential to beneﬁt their military capabilities.

Protecting U.S. national and economic security from MCF will likely require signiﬁcant reform to how U.S. government

agencies and private industry assess and insulate themselves from CCP eorts to extract technology, capital, and

know-how. Once we have a better understanding, we can more eectively coordinate with our allies to address this

threat.

• Congress and the Administration should conduct a full review of today’s national security education and foreign

language programs to evaluate their ecacy and consider reforms as appropriate. Such programs include the

Fulbright and Critical Language Scholarship programs administered by the Department of State, and the Boren and

Language Flagship programs administered by the Department of Defense. The limited data available reﬂects that for

at least some of these programs, less than one ﬁfth of participants move on to federal employment.

• The Administration should evaluate whether the CCP should be designated a transnational organized crime threat,

and what beneﬁts such a designation might contribute to U.S. competition with the CCP. Pursuant to Executive Order

13773, the administration has previously used this label to sharpen and organize law enforcement eorts for speciﬁc

groups.

• Congress and the Administration should continue to evaluate whether it would beneﬁt U.S. foreign policy to establish

further Fulbright Universities. Fulbright University Vietnam is a pioneering bilateral public-private partnership that

has beneﬁtted U.S.-Vietnam relations and serves as a platform for U.S. engagement.

• Congress and the Administration should explore options for increasing support for independent and investigative

journalism and broadcasting as the CCP aggressively seeks to expand its control over media globally. Such options

could include reauthorizing, reforming, and expanding the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) into a

grantmaking organization akin to the International Republican Institute or the National Democratic Institute.

• Congress and the Administration should work together to achieve a complete understanding the CCP’s, and its

proxies’, presence and activities in the United States, consistent with U.S. principles and Constitutional protections. At

present, the U.S. government has no mechanism to generate a holistic understanding of CCP members, immigration

status, holdings, aliate groups, and activities in the U.S.

108

APPENDIX II: SUMMARY OF COVID-19 ORIGINS REPORT

APPENDIX II:

SUMMARY OF COVID-19

ORIGINS REPORT

Background

During the 2003 SARS pandemic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used its stranglehold on journalists and

dissidents in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to hide information and obfuscate the source of the outbreak. CCP

leaders failed to inform the World Health Organization (WHO) about the virus for four months. In the wake of this

malfeasance, the world demanded reforms to the International Health Regulations (IHR) that govern how countries are

required to handle public health emergencies. Today, it has become clear that the CCP failed to heed these lessons.

The ongoing pandemic is a tragic second chapter to their mishandling of the 2003 SARS outbreak.

It is beyond doubt that the CCP actively engaged in a cover-up designed to obfuscate data, hide relevant public health

information, and suppress doctors and journalists who attempted to warn the world. They deliberately, and repeatedly,

disregarded their obligations under the 2005 IHR. Senior CCP leaders, including CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping,

knew a pandemic was ongoing weeks before it was announced. By responding in a transparent and responsible manner,

the CCP could have supported the global public health response and shared information with the world about how to

handle the virus. It is likely the ongoing pandemic could have been prevented had they done so, saving hundreds of

thousands of lives and the world from an economic meltdown. As more countries have begun to question the CCP’s

ocial accounting of the early stages of the pandemic and call for an international investigation, the PRC has used

economic manipulation and trade coercion to demand silence.

During the early stages of the outbreak, PRC companies abroad, at the direction of the CCP, procured millions of

protective masks, medical gowns, and gloves on the international market and shipped hundreds of tons of medical

equipment from abroad back to the PRC. Within its borders, the CCP nationalized the supply chains and manufacturing

capacity of foreign companies like General Motors and 3M to produce medical supplies while denying export licenses

for their products. As countries began to call for an international investigation into the PRC’s cover-up, the CCP waged a

campaign of economic coercion designed to silence their critics.

New primary documents related to the CCP’s cover-up have also been identiﬁed, including a discipline notice for a nurse

in Taizhou who was punished for discussing the COVID-19 outbreak in her city with classmates and family via WeChat.

Combined with other documents detailing the harassment of doctors, a snapshot emerges of the widespread nature of

the CCP’s crackdown on medical professionals.

WHO Director-General Tedros has responded to the CCP’s cover-up by praising the CCP for their “transparency,” despite

internal documents showing WHO frustration with the CCP’s failure to share critical data and information about the virus.

The WHO has repeatedly parroted CCP talking points while ignoring conﬂicting information from reputable sources.

Director-General Tedros’ full-throated defense of the CCP’s early response and embrace of their revisionist history, as

well as the impact of his actions on the global response, remains incredibly concerning.

After multiple letters of inquiry from Ranking Member McCaul, and repeated requests via phone and email by Committee

Minority sta, new information has been provided by the WHO related to the declaration of the PHEIC and the WHO-

China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019. These responses, which provide a level of detail that has not been

publicly reported elsewhere, are included in their entirety in the report and Appendix. However, there are a multitude of

outstanding questions that require a serious examination of the WHO’s handling of COVID-19. However, it remains clear

the WHO has failed to fulﬁll certain duties required by the IHR.

Nine months into the pandemic, new information continues to emerge from the PRC and elsewhere showing the scale

of CCP eorts to cover up the outbreak and punish countries seeking accountability. After discovering new evidence

and receiving additional information from the WHO, this report is an eort to put that information into context, deﬁne

what questions regarding the virus and the response are still outstanding, and provide recommendations on how to

improve the global response moving forward. A previous, interim version of this report focused on the early phases

of the pandemic, prior to the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on January 30, 2020.

After the publication of that report, both the WHO and CCP modiﬁed their public statements regarding COVID-19, with

the WHO issuing a new, “updated” timeline and the CCP temporarily retracting their claim that they notiﬁed the WHO on

December 31, 2019.

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CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

In the intervening months, and under the direction of Ranking Member McCaul, the House Foreign Aairs Committee

Minority sta continued its investigation into the origins of the virus and the handling of the pandemic by the PRC and the

WHO. The report’s timeline was also extended through March 11th, highlighting key events that occurred prior to Director-

General Tedros’ delayed pandemic declaration. Throughout this investigation, it has become clear that the scale of the

CCP cover-up and WHO’s mishandling of the pandemic are only partially understood.

Similarity to CCP Actions during the 2003 SARS Pandemic

Given CCP malfeasance during the 2003 SARS pandemic was the basis for the 2005 reforms to the IHR, it is prudent

to examine their failures in handling SARS and how they compare with the mishandling of COVID-19. During the early

stages of the SARS outbreak, the PRC banned the Chinese press from reporting on the outbreak. The CCP knew about

the outbreak for four months prior to notifying the WHO. Even after informing the WHO the virus originating within its

borders the CCP continued to provide inaccurate information about the number of SARS cases within the PRC. Similarly,

in December 2019 the CCP failed to report the early positive SARS tests or the identiﬁcation of a novel coronavirus

outbreak to the WHO.

Similar to the early days of COVID-19, requests for access to the epicenter of the SARS outbreak were denied by the CCP.

Even after the WHO was admitted, the cover-up continued; CCP ocials went so far as to put SARS patients in hospital

rooms and in ambulances driving around the city to hide them from the WHO. As mentioned in the full report, in early

2003 the CCP failed to warn the public about the outbreak prior to the massive travel season surrounding the Spring

Festival. In a repetition of past mistakes, the CCP again failed to warn their citizens or the world about the severity of the

outbreak prior to the commencement of the 2020 Spring Festival.

In mid-February 2020, the CCP announced the ﬁring of the Communist Party secretaries for Hubei province and Wuhan

and punishments for hundreds of lower level government ocials. The announcement was well received on Chinese

social media, with one commenter supporting “the wise adjustment of the party central committee.” During the SARS

pandemic, the CCP employed similar tactics, ﬁring the PRC’s health minister and the mayor of Beijing. These high-proﬁle

government ocials were scapegoated in order to recover public support and protect the top leaders of the CCP, who

in both instances have remained in power.

It is evident that there are clear correlations between the CCP’s behavior during the 2003 SARS pandemic and the

ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic. To date we have identiﬁed nine behaviors that the CCP engaged in during both their

failed handling of SARS and their cover-up regarding COVID-19:

CCP Actions SARS COVID-19

Waited to inform the WHO? ✓ ✓

Subsequently hid information from the WHO? ✓ ✓

Hid their knowledge of the severity of the outbreak? ✓ ✓

Disrupted press from reporting? ✓ ✓

Response kept secret until after the Spring Festival travel season

began?

✓ ✓

Limited access of outside experts to epicenter of the outbreak? ✓ ✓

Claimed the virus was under control? ✓ ✓

Underreported number of cases? ✓ ✓

Firing of select CCP ocials as scapegoats? ✓ ✓

The startling similarity in the CCP’s mishandling of the two outbreaks only adds to the evidence that the spread and

impact of COVID-19 could have been prevented. The PRC had faced a similar crisis before, sought to hide it, and the

world suered for their mistake. When faced with a second, incredibly similar scenario, CCP ocials doubled down on

their past mistakes and COVID-19 became the second, more deadly and damaging chapter of a story that began in 2002.

Recommendations

The United States must take action within the international community to support accountability, transparency, and

reforms to the systems and processes that enabled the CCP’s cover-up and the WHO’s failures. To this end, we provide

four recommendations: new leadership at the WHO, Taiwan’s re-admittance to the WHO as an observer, United States

engagement in an international investigation with likeminded WHO Member States regarding the early stages of

COVID-19, and concrete reforms to the International Health Regulations.

110

APPENDIX II: SUMMARY OF COVID-19 ORIGINS REPORT

New Leadership at WHO

It is clear Director-General Tedros seriously erred in his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Coupled with a concerning

history of covering up outbreaks of cholera in his home country of Ethiopia and repeated delays in declaring a PHEIC in

response to the Kivu Ebola epidemic, we believe there is an established pattern of poor decision-making and political

deference that has weakened the ability of the WHO to fulﬁll its mandate. We do not expect, nor require, the head of the

WHO to be perfect. However, Director-General Tedros has repeatedly defended his decisions, responded to Taiwan’s

criticism by accusing their government of supporting racists, and praised the CCP’s deplorable actions in response to

the outbreak.

Defenders of Director-General Tedros argue that it would have been counterproductive to push back against the CCP.

They argue that “diplomatic ﬂattery is the price of ensuring Chinese cooperation.” Others say that the Director-General

“cannot aord to antagonize the notoriously touchy Chinese government.” These statements rest on the claim that if

Director-General Tedros had been more aggressive in questioning the claims coming from the CCP, then the CCP would

have shared less information or delayed WHO access to the country.

However, such defenses ring hollow when the world has seen the impact of an independent Director-General of the

WHO. In April 2003, two months after the CCP ﬁnally reported the outbreak of SARS to the WHO, and in the midst of

the WHO response, then-Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland publicly commented on the CCP’s mishandling of the

outbreak. Director-General Brundlant criticized the failure of the CCP to report the outbreak and their lack of coordination

with the international community. Under her leadership the WHO declared a travel guidance for the ﬁrst time in 55 years

in order to stem the spread of SARS. Almost prophetically, Director-General Brundlant stated:

When I say that it would have been better, it means that I’m saying as the director general of the World Health Organisation:

next time something strange and new comes anywhere in the world let us come in as quickly as possible.

Tragically, the CCP failed to heed her guidance. Director-General Brundlant’s handling of the 2003 SARS pandemic is a

case study for the importance of a Director-General who speaks truth to power and publicly challenges Member States

when they fail to uphold their obligations to the international community. Instead, Director-General Tedros has chosen to

defend and heap praise on a Member State who has continuously fed the WHO lies and misinformation. We now know

Director-General Tedros and other senior leaders within the WHO knew that the PRC was withholding information and

failing to abide by the IHR despite the deference of the WHO. They knew their policy of appeasement was failing yet

chose to double down on it.

As such, we have lost faith in the ability of Director-General Tedros to lead the WHO. Having presided over two ﬂawed

PHEIC responses and prevented Taiwan from engaging with the WHO, it is clear that Director-General Tedros prioritizes

matters other than the on-the-ground impact of COVID-19. The WHO’s constitution requires it to provide “appropriate

technical assistance,” not political coverage for mistakes and cover-ups carried out by Member States. As Director-

General, the responsibility of declaring a PHEIC, and indeed, the impact of choosing not to declare one, rests on his

shoulders. In order to restore the faith of WHO Member States and return the WHO to its mandate of providing accurate,

technical advice, Director-General Tedros should accept responsibility for his detrimental impact on the COVID-19

response and resign. The health of the world cannot aord incompetence and poor management.

Re-admittance of Taiwan to the WHO under Observer Status

In the early 1970s, by a vote of the World Health Assembly, Taiwan was removed from the World Health Organization

and replaced with the PRC. After years of Taiwan petitioning to be readmitted to the WHO, the PRC and WHO signed

the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the WHO Secretariat and the PRC. While the text remains secret, it

is understood that the agreement severely limits contact between the WHO and Taiwan. Taiwan’s interactions with the

WHO were so restricted that representatives from Taiwan were only allowed to attend 21 of the approximately 1,000

WHO technical meetings held between 2005 and 2008.

In 2009, after years of diplomatic negotiation, the Department of Health in Taiwan received an invitation from then WHO

Director-General Margaret Chan to attend a meeting of the WHA under the name “Chinese Taipei.” The invitation, granted

under the authority of the Director-General of the WHO, was extended each year until 2016. After Taiwan democratically

elected President Tsai Ing-wen, seen as more critical of the PRC than her predecessor, the invitations stopped. Director-

General Tedros, after being elected in May 2017, was quick to reassure the CCP that he would support their position. On

May 26th, three days after he was elected, Director-General Tedros spoke to Xinhua, a PRC state-run press agency, and

pledged to “abide by the one-China principle.” The “one-China principle” is the CCP’s own view that it holds sovereignty

over Taiwan, which is not UN policy, the consensus view of UN member states, nor the policy of the United States. 

The importance of Taiwan’s inclusion at the WHO is an issue that has longstanding bipartisan support in Congress.

During the 116th Congress, both chambers have passed several pieces of legislation supporting Taiwan’s engagement

with the WHO. The House of Representatives passed H.R.353, a bill supporting Taiwan’s participation in the WHO,

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CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

unanimously. The Senate followed suit, unanimously approving S.249, a similar bill. A third piece of legislation, S. 1678,

was signed into law by President Trump earlier this year, establishing as the policy of the United States support for the

inclusion of Taiwan as an observer within appropriate international organizations.

Despite Taiwan’s early identiﬁcation of the outbreak, warning of human-to-human transmission, and success in battling

COVID-19, Director-General Tedros has remained committed to the CCP’s position and continues to refuse to invite

Taiwan to participate in the WHA. Had Taiwan been a member of the WHA, or allowed to attend under Observer Status,

it is highly likely their warnings regarding human-to-human transmission would have been transmitted to other countries

instead of censored by the WHO. As was the case under the previous Director-General, it is completely within Director-

General Tedros’ power to invite Taiwan to participate in the WHA. He has simply chosen to allow the PRC to make

this decision for him, yielding his authority in deference to the CCP. As such, we call upon the Director-General who

replaces Director-General Tedros to invite Taiwan to participate in the WHO, in order to ensure that future warnings about

potential health emergencies do not go unheeded.

International Investigation

The United States should engage with likeminded WHO Member States and Taiwan on an international investigation of

the CCP’s cover-up of the early stages of the pandemic and the WHO’s failure to fulﬁll its obligations under the IHR. Such

an investigation should seek to establish an even more deﬁnitive account of the origins of SARS-CoV-2, its appearance

in humans, eorts by the CCP to conceal relevant scientiﬁc and health information about the outbreak, the eect of the

CCP’s cover-up on the actions of the WHO, the impact of the WHO’s parroting of CCP propaganda, and the inﬂuence of

the CCP’s cover-up on the global response.

Fortunately, we are not alone in this proposal. The Governments of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and Taiwan,

in addition to the European Commission, have publicly expressed their support for an independent investigation of the

pandemic. On May 19, the World Health Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution cosponsored by more than 130

countries calling for an independent and comprehensive evaluation of the WHO’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The resolution, despite not mentioning the PRC’s cover-up or failure to abide by the IHR, is a positive step towards

developing a comprehensive understanding of the pandemic. However, while this investigation is important, it does not

address the issue of true accountability regarding the PRC’s clear violations of international law.

On July 6th, the United States submitted formal notice of its intent to withdraw from the WHO, eective July 6, 2021.

We share the frustrations of President Trump, Secretary of State Pompeo, and National Security Adviser O’Brien with

the WHO’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. NSA O’Brien has publicly stated that the Administration would

consider remaining a part of the WHO if the organization instituted the necessary reforms to ensure its independence.

We agree it is vital for the WHO to restore its independent nature as a body that provides technical advice free from

political considerations. The on-going pandemic has revealed deep ﬂaws within WHO processes that can only be

addressed by serious, and extensive, reforms. While the WHO failed to abide by the IHR, uphold its mandate, and fulﬁl its

obligations to Member States, we do not believe the withdrawal of the United States or the establishment of a competing

international organization is the best path forward. As such, we call on the WHO to ﬁx the deﬁciencies outlined by the

Administration, adopt the recommendations of this report through internal action where possible, and make preparations

for improvements and reforms that need to be ratiﬁed by the World Health Assembly at its next meeting or emergency

session. By remaining part of a WHO that is ready for change, the United States can be drive forward the necessary

reforms of the International Health Regulations and the WHO.

IHR Reforms

In the wake of the 2003 SARS pandemic, the United States was involved in eorts to reform the International Health

Regulations. Negotiations amongst WHO Member States resulted in the 2005 IHR, which entered into eect in 2007.

While the 2005 IHR included several important reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed additional ﬂaws and the

need to reﬁne previous reforms. We recommend the President and Secretary of State use the voice, vote, and inﬂuence

of the United States to seek additional IHR reforms, including around the information Member States are required to

provide, the WHO’s obligations to investigate unocial reports concerning health events and notify Member States, and

the process for declaring a PHEIC.

Article 6 of the IHR requires Member States to provide certain relevant public health information to the WHO, including

“laboratory results,” among other things. The PRC failed to transmit the SARS-CoV-2 genetic sequencing data to the

WHO for 10 days, and to date has not provided viral isolates or other biological samples to the WHO. Article 6 should be

amended to include, by reference, genetic sequencing data and biological samples in the list of public health information

Member States are required to provide to the WHO. This will ensure that Member States cannot exploit loopholes they

perceive to hide or suppress vital public health information.

Under Article 9 of the IHR, the WHO has a “mandate” to investigate and seek veriﬁcation of unocial reports concerning

112

APPENDIX II: SUMMARY OF COVID-19 ORIGINS REPORT

health events with “potential international implication.” In several instances discussed in this report, it appears that the

WHO failed to do so. The United States Government should consider how to improve and clarify the WHO’s responsibilities

to investigate reports from non-Member States under Article 9. One possible option would be requiring the WHO to

disclose the results of their investigations once complete. Alternatively, the IHR could be modiﬁed to empower Member

States to refer third party or unocial reports of activity within a dierent Member State to the WHO for investigation.

Article 11 of the IHR regulates how the WHO provides information to Member States. While the IHR mandates Member

States provide certain information with 24- or 48-hours, Article 10 only requires the WHO to provide information “as soon

as possible.” After the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission notiﬁed the WHO of the outbreak, it took the WHO four

days to publicly report the notiﬁcation on social media and ﬁve days to issue a technical publication to the scientiﬁc and

public health communities. The IHR should be modiﬁed to require the WHO to inform Member States of all reports and

notiﬁcations received from a Member State within 48 hours.

Finally, Article 12 concerns the determination of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. While Section

4 of the Article provides a list of items for the Director-General to consider, there is no requirement that the Director-

General heed the advice of the Emergency Committee or provide justiﬁcation of his decision to declare, or not declare,

a PHEIC. We believe that the breakdown of the PHEIC process during the Kivu Ebola epidemic and the current COVID-19

pandemic illustrates the need to reform and formalize this process. PHEIC decisions should be made based on scientiﬁc

information and global health best practices, not any other considerations. To this end, we recommend reforms around

the structure and authority of the Emergency Committee, as well as the processes in Article 12, that would achieve this

goal.

Conclusion

There remain many unanswered questions as to the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the cause of the COVID-19 global

pandemic. Director-General Tedros’ full-throated defense of the CCP’s response and embrace of their revisionist history

remains incredibly concerning. Reﬂecting on what we have uncovered so far, the failures of the CCP to protect their

citizens and fulﬁll their obligations under international law have resulted in disappeared journalists, a world seized by a

public health emergency, a shattered world economy, and hundreds of thousands of dead.

Senior CCP leaders, including CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, knew a pandemic was ongoing weeks before it was

announced. Instead of warning the world, the CCP chose to nationalize foreign supply chains and secretively buy up

medical supplies in foreign countries to ship to the PRC. When countries complained, or advocated for an investigation

into the CCP cover-up, the PRC threatened bans on exports or instituted massive taris to punish those countries. The

CCP continues to seek to bully not only the WHO, but other countries around the world who want to understand the core

failures that lead to COVID-19 becoming a global pandemic.

Research shows the CCP could have reduced the number of cases in China by up to 95% had it fulﬁlled its obligations

under international law and responded to the outbreak in a manner consistent with best practices. It is highly likely the

ongoing pandemic could have been prevented. The WHO, despite internal discussions about the lack of transparency

and cooperation from the CCP, continues to praise General Secretary Xi and the PRC for its handling of the virus. As such,

it is incumbent upon the United States and likeminded WHO Member States to ensure the accountability and reforms

at the WHO necessary to prevent the CCP’s malfeasance from giving rise to a third pandemic during the 21st century.

113

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Timeline of Key Events in the Chinese Communist Party’s Cover-up

December 2019 – January 2020: CCP leaders know about coronavirus but take aggressive steps to hide it from the

public, including detaining doctors who warned about the virus and censoring media on the virus.

Dec. 30, 2019: Doctors in Wuhan report positive tests for “SARS Coronavirus” to Wuhan health ocials. Under WHO

regulations, China is required to report these results within 24 hours. China fails to inform the WHO about the outbreak.

Dec. 31, 2019: WHO ocials in Geneva become aware of media reports regarding an outbreak in Wuhan and direct the

WHO China Country Oce to investigate. Taiwan informs WHO about human-to-human transmission, but data is not

published on WHO’s data exchange platform.

Jan. 1, 2020: Hubei Provincial Health Commission ocial orders gene sequencing companies and labs who had already

determined the novel virus was similar to SARS to stop testing and to destroy existing samples.

Jan. 2, 2020: The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) completes gene sequencing of the virus, but the CCP does not share

the sequence or inform the WHO.

Jan. 3, 2020: China’s National Health Commission ordered institutions not to publish any information related to the

“unknown disease” and ordered labs to transfer samples to CCP controlled national institutions or destroy them.

Mid-Late January: Despite knowing about the virus, CCP allowed massive travel within China and abroad during the

Spring Festival (3 billion estimated trips over 40 days), and Wuhan held a celebratory potluck with more than 40,000

families eating from 14,000 dishes.

Jan. 11-12, 2020: After a researcher in Shanghai leaks the gene sequence online, the CCP transmits the WIV’s gene

sequencing information to the WHO that was completed 10 days earlier. The Shanghai lab where the researcher works

is ordered to close.

Jan. 14, 2020: Wuhan health authorities claim no human-to-human transmission from coronavirus. This assessment

was tweeted by WHO the same day. According to classiﬁed documents obtained by the Associated Press, Xi Jinping is

warned by top Chinese health ocial that a pandemic is occurring.

Jan. 22, 2020: WHO mission to China admits some evidence of human-to-human transmission.

Jan. 23, 2020: After the Emergency Committee is divided on whether to declare a Public Health Emergency of

International Concern (PHEIC), Director-General Tedros decides not to. This delay contributed to a regional epidemic

turning into a global pandemic.

Jan. 23, 2020: The CCP institutes a city-wide lockdown of Wuhan. However, before the lockdown goes into eect, an

estimated 5 million people leave the city.

Jan. 29, 2020: Tedros praises the CCP’s response to the virus, saying their transparency was “very impressive, and

beyond words” and that the CCP was “actually setting a new standard for outbreak response.”

Jan. 30, 2020: One week after declining to do so, Tedros declares a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

Feb. 1, 2020: First death outside of the PRC occurs, in the Philippines.

Feb. 7, 2020: Dr. Li, who ﬁrst shared the positive SARS test results with his classmates via WeChat, dies from COVID-19.

Feb. 9, 2020: The death toll for COVID-19 surpasses that of SARS.

Feb. 15, 2020: First death from COVID-19 outside of Asia occurs, in France.

Feb. 16, 2020: WHO and PRC ocials begin a nine-day “WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019” and

travel to China to examine the outbreak and origin of COVID-19. Many team members, including at least one American,

were not allowed to visit Wuhan on the trip.

Feb. 25, 2020: For the ﬁrst time, more new cases are reported outside of PRC than within.

Feb. 26, 2020: The WHO-China Joint Mission issues its ﬁndings, praising the PRC for its handling of the outbreak.

Feb. 29, 2020: The ﬁrst reported COVID-19 death in the United States occurs.

March 11, 2020: The WHO ocially declares the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic after 114 countries had already reported

118,000 cases including more than 1,000 in the United States.

114

APPENDIX III: ACTIONS THE

ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN

AND UNUSED AUTHORITIES

The executive branch has existing authority to sanction individuals and entities from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

for a variety of reasons, including protecting U.S. national security and economic interests and defending human rights. This

Administration has used many of these tools on PRC individuals and entities, including blocking certain PRC entities access

to U.S. technology through export controls and raising import duties on PRC goods through trade authorities.

The Global Magnitsky Act (Glomag)

Authority: Allows the State and Treasury Departments to restrict the travel and freeze the assets of individuals who have

violated human rights.

Application: This Administration has placed Glomag sanctions on numerous PRC persons.

The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA)

Authority: The HKHRDA requires the Secretary of States to certify whether Hong Kong remains suciently autonomous to

justify separate treatment under U.S. law, submit a sanctions report to Congress listing persons responsible for human rights

violations in Hong Kong, and apply asset blocking and visa sanctions to such persons. Based on the Secretary’s certiﬁcation,

the President can then terminate various aspects of Hong Kong’s separate treatment under the Hong Kong Policy Act.

Application: The Secretary has decertiﬁed Hong Kong’s autonomy in the ﬁrst report due under the HKHRDA, but has not

submitted the sanctions report to Congress, which is now overdue. The Administration has levied sanctions on Hong Kong

and PRC ocials under the HKHRDA. The President has terminated numerous elements of Hong Kong’s separate treatment

pursuant to the Act in Executive Order 13936.

The Hong Kong Autonomy Act

Authority: The Autonomy Act requires the President to submit a report identifying foreign persons who have materially

contributed to undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy, as well as the foreign ﬁnancial institutions who knowingly do business

with such persons. The bill imposes mandatory sanctions on such persons and ﬁnancial institutions.

Application: The Administration has sanctioned individuals under the authority of the Autonomy Act, but has not submitted

the required sanctions report or sanctioned ﬁnancial institutions.

The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (UHRPA)

Authority: UHRPA requires the President to issue asset blocking and visa sanctions against persons responsible for human

rights violations against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, members of other Muslim minority groups, or other persons in

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, by December 17, 2020.

Application: This authority has not been implemented.

Entity List and Denied Persons List

Authority: The Commerce Department Entity List contains a list of names of certain foreign persons—including businesses,

research institutions, and individuals—that are subject to license requirements for the export of speciﬁc items. The

Commerce Department Denied Persons List is a list of foreign people and companies whose export privileges have been

denied.

Application: Several PRC entities, including Huawei and companies linked to repression in Xinjiang, are on the Entity List.

The Trump Administration had put ZTE on the Denied Persons List but later removed it following a settlement with the

company.

Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act

Authority: Makes ineligible for a visa or other entry, an alien whose entry to the United States or proposed activities while in

the country, would have serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.

Application: The Administration used this authority to impose visa restrictions on the PRC government and Communist Party

ocials it believes are responsible for the detention and abuse of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang province.

Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule

Authority: A foreign-produced item may be considered a “direct product” of the United States and subject to the U.S. Export

Administration Regulations if the foreign-produced item is based on certain U.S. technology. 

Application: The Administration amended this rule to narrowly and strategically target Huawei’s acquisition of

semiconductors that are the “direct product” of certain U.S. software and technology.

115

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

Specially Designated Nationals (SDN)

Authority: Inclusion on the Treasury Department’s SDN list generally prohibits U.S. banks from maintaining accounts for listed

persons and U.S. persons could face civil or criminal penalties for doing business with them.

Application: The Trump Administration has placed or maintained more than 175 PRC persons on the SDN list.

Foreign Mission Act

Authority: Entities that are designated as a foreign mission must adhere to certain administrative requirements that also

apply to foreign embassies and consulates in the United States, including notifying the Oce of Foreign Missions at the

State Department about the number of personnel and current property holdings in the United States.

Application: The State Department has used this authority to designate several PRC entities operating in the United States,

including the Confucius Institute U.S. Center and at least nine CCP propaganda outlets.

Executive Order 13694: Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities

Authority: Gives broad authority to the president to block the property of companies involved in or beneﬁtting from the theft

of trade secrets through cyber-enabled means.

Application: Two PRC persons have been sanctioned for activities relating to North Korea.

Executive Order 13873: Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain

Authority: Authorizes the Commerce Secretary to regulate the acquisition and use of information and communications

technology and services (e.g. any hardware, software, or service) from a “foreign adversary”—likely to include the PRC.

Application: The ﬁnal rule has not been released yet.

The Anti-Boycott Act

Authority: Encourages and in some cases requires U.S. ﬁrms to refuse to participate in foreign boycotts that the United

States does not sanction.

Application: This Act has not been applied in response to actions by the PRC government.

Trade Authorities

Authorities: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 337 of the Tari Act of 1930 as well as countervailing duties

and anti-dumping allow taris and import bans to be used as remedies for a variety of violations, including IP theft and

subsidies.

Application: All four trade tools have been used with respect to the PRC.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)

Authority: Broad powers to deal with any “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the United States.

Application: The last two Administrations have used authorities under IEEPA as the legal basis to issue various executive

orders, such as EO 13694 (cyber-enabled activities) and EO 13873 (securing the supply chains).

International Investment Survey Act of 1976

Authority: The Act allows the President to request mandatory surveys of companies under speciﬁc deadlines with the ability

to invoke civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.

Application: It does not appear this authority has been invoked for the PRC but could be used to gather information on

several areas of potential congressional concern, including the status of medical supply production, distribution, and export

policy situation facing U.S. companies overseas.

Kingpin Act

Authority: The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”) provides sanctions authorities to deny

signiﬁcant foreign narcotics trackers, their related businesses, and their operatives access to the U.S. ﬁnancial system and

all trade and transactions involving U.S. companies and individuals.

Application: The Administration has used the Kingpin Act to sanction PRC drug trackers, including for illegal production

and tracking of fentanyl.

116

APPENDIX IV:

TASK FORCE ACTIVITY

This list includes formal activities conducted by Members and/or sta of the China Task Force; however, the listing does

not include all meetings and other consultations conducted during the course of the Task Force’s review.

Task Force Activity Summary

Full Task Force Brieﬁngs (16)

Member Level Pillar Brieﬁngs (40)

Sta Level Brieﬁngs (11)

Total Brieﬁngs (67)

Total Ocials/Experts who Briefed the Task Force (131)

Full Task Force Brieﬁngs (16)

David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary and Dr. M. Miles Yu,

Oce of the Secretary, Department of State (May 2020)

Robert O’Brien, National Security Advisor and Matt

Pottinger, Deputy National Security Advisor, National

Security Agency (May 2020)

Dr. Eric Schmidt, Chair, US DOD Defense Innovation

Advisory Board (June 2020)

Adam Boehler, CEO, US International Development Finance

Corporation (June 2020)

FBI and ODNI Ocials (June 2020)

Larry Kudlow, Director, U.S. National Economic Council

(June 2020)

Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative

(June 2020)

Secretary Michael Pompeo, Department of State (July

2020)

Ely Ratner and Richard Fontaine, Center for a New

American Security (CNAS) (July 2020)

Secretary Mark Esper, Department of Defense (July 2020)

Michele Flournoy, Former Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy (August 2020)

Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s Representative to the U.S.

(August 2020)

Jeh Johnson, Former Secretary of Homeland Security

(August 2020)

Kelly Craft, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

(September 2020)

Deputy Secretary Stephen Biegun, Under Secretary Keith

Krach, Assistant Secretary David Stilwell, Special Envoy

Lea Gabrielle, and Director of Policy Planning, Dr. Peter

Berkowitz, Department of State (September 2020)

Ambassador Rosemary Banks of New Zealand and

Ambassador Arthur Sinodinos of Australia (September 2020)

Member Level Brieﬁngs (40)

Academic and Research Security: Thousand Talents

Program (June 2020)

Briefer: Dr. Michael Lauer, Deputy Director for Extramural

Research, National Institute of Health (NIH)

Introduction to Economic Statecraft and China’s Use of

International Financial Institutions (June 2020)

Briefers: Meg Lundsager, International Monetary Fund and

Clay Lowery, Institute of International Finance

The Reagan Administration’s Ideological Warfare Strategy

Against the Soviet Union and Drawing Lessons for US

policy Today (June 2020)

Briefers: Roger Zakheim, Washington Director of the

Reagan Institute and Will Inboden Ph.D, Executive Director

of Clements Center for National Security, Lyndon B. John

School of Public Aairs, UT Austin

U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’s

Recommendations: Competitiveness and Research

Security (June 2020)

Briefers: Commissioners Robin Cleveland, Jim Talent and

analyst Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic

Future Defense Warfare and Cyber Kill Chain Issues (June

2020); Briefer: Chris Brose, Anduril Industries

Promoting U.S. Energy Resiliency (June 2020)

Briefers: Maria Korsnick, Nuclear Institute, and Rich Powell,

Clearpath

Role of Ideology in Xi’s China (June 2020)

Briefers: Professor Aaron Friedberg, Princeton University;

Daniel Tobin, National Intelligence University and Peter

Mattis, Deputy Sta Director of the Congressional-Executive

Commission on China

Threats To, Vulnerabilities of, and Opportunities for the

U.S. Supply Chain (June 2020)

Briefer: Samantha Ravich, Foundation for Defense of

Democracies (FDD)

Overview of the White House Technology Oce (June

2020) Briefer: Michael Kratsios, Chief Technology Ocer

CCP’s Facilitation of Global Corruption (June 2020)

Briefers: Paul Massaro, US Helsinki Commission; Nate

Sibley, Hudson Institute’s Kleptocracy Initiative; Elaine

Dezenski, Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center

on Economic and Financial Power; David Shullman,

International Republican Institute

117

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

CCP’s United Front Work Department, Its Global Activities,

and CCP Interference and Subversion Around the World

(June 2020); Briefers: Anne-Marie Brady, University of

Cantebury; Alex Joske, Australia Strategic Policy Institute;

John Garnaut, JG Global

The Challenges Posed by China in the Transition to 5G

(June 2020)

Briefers: Rob Atkinson, Stephen Ezell, and Doug Brake,

Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF)

PLA Conventional and Nuclear Threats (June 2020)

Briefers: Tom Mahnken, President and Toshi Yoshihara,

Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments (CSBA)

White House Oce of Science and Technology Policy

(OSTP) Activities on China and U.S. Competitiveness

(June 2020)

Briefer: Dr. Kelvin Droegemeier, Director, OSTP

Administration Space Policy as Related to Global

Competition and China (June 2020)

Briefer: Dr. Scott Pace, Executive Secretary, White House

National Space Council

Overview of On-going Eorts to stop Chinese Exploitation

of Highly Sensitive Technologies in the U.S. (June 2020)

Briefers: Department of Homeland Security Ocials

CCP’s Eorts to Inﬁltrate and Inﬂuence the UN system

and International Organizations Writ Large (July 2020)

Briefer: Mark Lambert, Special Envoy for UN Integrity,

Department of State

China’s Threats on Biotech and Biosecurity (July 2020)

Briefers: Alexander Titus, former Assistant Director for

Biotechnology, Department of Defense Oce of the Under

Secretary for Research and Engineering and Jason Kelly,

CEO of Gingko Bioworks

Role of the Export-Import Bank and How the Bank Can Be

Used as a Tool to Counter China (July 2020)

Briefer: Kim Reed, Chairman, EX-IM Bank

Space and Intelligence (July 2020)

Briefers: Kevin Pollpeter, CNA expert on space; Kari

Bingen, Former Principle Deputy of the Undersecretary of

Defense for Intelligence and Security; and Chirag Parikh,

Microsoft Azure space lead and Former Director of the

Oce of Source Strategies at the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency

U.S. Export Control Policy with the PRC (July 2020)

Briefers: Cordell Hull, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce

for Industry and Security and Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford,

Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and

Nonproliferation

Information Statecraft: Responding to CCP Disinformation

and Upgrading U.S. Counter Messaging (July 2020)

Briefers: Laura Rosenberger, Alliance for Securing

Democracy, and Zack Cooper, German Marshall Fund

University Leadership Perspectives and Actions on

Academic Research Security (July 2020)

Briefers: Dr. David Norton, VP of Research, University

of Florida; Dr. Morley Stone, VP of Research, Ohio State

University; Dr. Michael McQuade, VP of Research, Carnegie

Mellon University Mr. Kevin Gamache, Chief Research

Security Ocer, Texas A&M; Mr. Toby Smith, VP for Policy,

Association of American Universities

China’s Territorial Aggression in the Indo-Paciﬁc Region,

China’s Increasing Global Security Footprint, and U.S.

Responses (July 2020)

Briefers: Randy Schriver, Former Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Indo-Paciﬁc Security Aairs and Dan

Blumenthal, Director for Asian Studies of the American

Enterprise Institute

Role of Trade Policy in Countering China and

Strengthening Alliances in Asia (July 2020)

Briefers: Wendy Cutler, Vice President and Managing

Director, Asia Society Policy Institute; Former Acting Deputy

USTR and negotiator for TPP; and John Murphy, Senior

Vice President for International Policy, U.S. Chamber of

Commerce

CCP’s Human Rights and Religious Freedom Abuses

(July 2020); Briefer: Samuel Brownback, U.S. Ambassador

at Large for International Religious Freedom, Department of

State

The Race to 5G, Spectrum Distribution and Critical

Technologies Impacted by 5G Deployment (July 2020)

Briefers: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and CTIA Executives

How to Better Defend the US in Cyberspace (July 2020)

Briefers: RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, Executive

Director, Cyberspace Solarium Commission and Jamil

Jaer, Founder & Executive Director, National Security

Institute, George Mason University

The Justice Department’s China Initiative (July 2020)

Briefers: Department of Justice Ocials

STEM Education to Enable U.S. Competitiveness and

COVID Response and Recovery (July 2020)

Briefer: James Brown, Director, STEM Education Coalition

China’s Unrestricted Warfare (July 2020)

Briefer: General Robert Spalding (USAF, Ret.), Hudson

Institute

Overview of U.S. Energy Competitiveness (July 2020)

Briefers: Department of Energy Ocials

Role of Allies and Partners in the US-China Competition

(July 2020); Briefers: Tom Tugendhat, United Kingdom MP

and Andrew Hastie, Australia MP

China and U.S. Capital Markets (July 2020)

Briefer: Jay Clayton, Chairman, Security and Exchange

Commission

U.S. Competitiveness, Workforce, and Supply Chains

(July 2020); Briefers: President and CEO, Joshua Bolten,

VP of Trade and International Policy, Paul Delaney, and

VP of Technology and Innovation, Denise Zheng, Business

Roundtable

National Security Impacts of China’s Cyber Operations on

Civilian Government Networks and Critical Infrastructure

(July 2020); Briefer: Christopher Krebs, Director, DHS’

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Tax and Trade Policies to Make the U.S. More Competitive

with China (August 2020)

Briefer: Doug Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action

Forum

118

Cyber, Critical Infrastructure, IP Theft and Supply Chain

Challenges (August 2020) ; Briefers: Frank J. Cilluo,

Director of Auburn University’s McCrary Institute for Cyber

and Critical Infrastructure Security and Nicholas Eftimiades,

Professor at Penn State University, Homeland Security

Program

Pharmaceutical Supply Chain and Proposed Policies

Regarding Supply Chain (August 2020)

Briefers: Senior VP of Policy, Anne Pritchett; VP of Law,

Kelly Goldberg, and Deputy VP of Law, Neil Pratt, PhRMA

U.S. Corporate Perspectives on Challenging the Belt and

Road Initiative (August 2020)

Briefer: Stu Jones, President, Regions and Corporate

Relations, Bechtel

Sta Level Brieﬁngs (11)

US Trade Policy with China (May 2020)

Briefer: Jamieson Greer, Former Chief of Sta to USTR

Lighthizer

Chinese Inﬂuence Operations in the U.S. and Globally

(June 2020)

Briefers: Larry Diamond and Glenn Tiert, Hoover Institute

Google’s Quantum Computing Moonshot (June 2020)

Briefers: Eric Ostby, Miles Taylor and Andrew Ladner,

Google

Foreign Assistance Tools and the Role of EX-IM Bank,

Trade Development Agency (TDA), and Development

Finance Corporation (DFC) to Respond to Our Great

Power Competition with China (June 2020)

Briefer: Daniel Runde, Senior Vice President & Chair in

Global Analysis, Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS)

Drug Manufacturing and Supply Chains (June 2020)

Briefers: Leon Wyszkowski and Tim Fenton, Thermo Fisher

Scientiﬁc

Challenges with and Solutions for U.S. Export Control

Policy with the PRC (June 2020)

Briefers: Georgetown’s Center for Emerging Technology

and the Congressional Research Service

Strengthening U.S. Competitiveness in 5G (June 2020)

Briefer: Klon Kitchen, Heritage Foundation

Artiﬁcial Intelligence (July 2020)

Briefer: Charlie Burgoyne, Valkyrie

Evolving and Emerging Threats to Critical Industries

(July 2020); Briefers: David Hanke, Arent-Fox and David

Stapleton, Defense Counterintelligence and Security

Agency (DCSA)

Trade, Tax, and Workforce Development Policies to Gain a

Competitive Advantage Over China (August 2020)

Briefers: Carolyn Lee, Executive Director, The

Manufacturing Institute and Chris Netram, Vice President of

Tax and Domestic Economic Policy

U.S. Leadership in International Standards Development

(August 2020); Briefers: Adam Sedgewick and Lisa

Carnaham, National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST)

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

119

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES

1 Stilwell, David R. “U.S.-China Bilateral Relations: The Lessons of History.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 Dec. 2019.

Speech. https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-bilateral-relations-the-lessons-of-history/

2 The People’s Republic of China, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. “Decision of the Central Committee

of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning Upholding and Improving the Socialist System with

Chinese Characteristics and Promoting the Modernization of the National Governance System and Governance.” Adopted at the

Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 31 Oct. 2019. https://web.archive.org/

web/20191105223124/http:/www.xinhuanet.com/2019-11/05/c_1125195786.htm

3 Deng Xiaoping. “Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Second Session of the Council of Sino-Japense Non-Governmental

Persons, 30 June 1984. Speech. http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/China/Deng/Building.htm

4 “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation.” ChinaFile, 8 Nov. 2013, https://www.chinaﬁle.com/document-9-chinaﬁle-translation.

5 Buckley, Chris. “Xi Touts Communist Party as Defender of Confucius’s Virtues.” Sinosphere, The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2014,

https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/xi-touts-communist-party-as-defender-of-confuciuss-virtues/?_php=true&_

type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1

6 Xi Jinping. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success

of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 Oct. 2017.

Speech. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf

7 O’Brien, Robert C. “The Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Global Ambitions.” Phoenix, Arizona, 26 June 2020. Speech.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/chinese-communist-partys-ideology-global-ambitions/

8 Xi Jinping. “The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is the most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Central Economic Work Conference, 10 Dec. 2013. Speech. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-07/15/c_1126234524.htm

9 Zoellick, Robert B. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. New York

City, 21 Sept. 2005. Speech. https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm

10 Wibawa, Tasha. “Chinese National Security and the ‘Three Warfares’: How Beijing Decides Who or What to Target.” ABC News, 25

Feb. 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-26/chinas-three-warfares-how-does-beijing-decide-who-or-what-to/10825448

11 “The Chinese Communist Party’s Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang.” U.S. Department of State,

https://www.state.gov/ccpabuses

12 Xu, Vicky Xiuzhong, et al. “Uyghurs for Sale.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 Mar. 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/

uyghurs-sale

13 “PRESS RELEASE: 180+ Orgs Demand Apparel Brands End Complicity in Uyghur Forced Labour.” Uyghur Human Rights Project, 23

July 2020, https://uhrp.org/press-release/press-release-180-orgs-demand-apparel-brands-end-complicity-uyghur-forced-labour.html

14 Bandurski, David. “Tech Shame in the ‘New Era.’” China Media Project, 11 Apr. 2018, https://chinamediaproject.org/2018/04/11/tech-

shame-in-the-new-era/

15 Ibid.

16 Feldstein, Steven. “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 Sept. 2019, https://

carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847

17 Rogin, Josh. “China’s Camps Now Have Survivors, and Their Ordeals Aren’t Over.” The Washington Post, 23 Jan. 2020, https://www.

washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/chinas-camps-now-have-survivors-and-their-ordeals-arent-over/2020/01/23/400886d8-

3e24-11ea-8872-5df698785a4e_story.html

18 Harwell, Drew and Tony Romm, “TikTok’s Beijing roots fuel censorship suspicion as it builds a high U.S. audience.” The Washington

Post, 15 Sept. 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/15/tiktoks-beijing-roots-fuel-censorship-suspicion-it-builds-

huge-us-audience/

19 Xinhuanet, 4 Mar. 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-03/04/c_1125660473.htm

20 Perlez, Jane, et al. “China’s Technology Ambitions Could Upset the Global Trade Order.” The New York Times, 7 Nov. 2017, https://

www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/business/made-in-china-technology-trade.html

21 “Confucius Institute U.S. Center Designation as a Foreign Mission,” State Department, Fact Sheet, 13 Aug. 2020, https://www.state.

gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/

22 Lloyd-Damnjanovic, Anastasya. “A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Inﬂuence and Interference Activities in American Higher

Education.” Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/media/documents/publication/prc_political_inﬂuence_full_

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23 O’Brien.

24 “Researchers Charged with Visa Fraud After Lying About Their Work for China’s People’s Liberation Army.” U.S. Department of

Justice, 23 July 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researchers-charged-visa-fraud-after-lying-about-their-work-china-s-people-s-

120

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liberation-army

25 Devlin, Kat, et al. “Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, Americans’ Views of China Increasingly Negative.” Global Attitudes Project, Pew

Research Center, 21 Apr. 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-

coronavirus-outbreak/

26 “The Origins of The Covid-19 Global Pandemic, Including the Roles of The Chinese Communist Party and The World Health

Organization.” Minority Sta Report, House Foreign Aairs Committee. 21 Sept. 2020, https://gop-foreignaairs.house.gov/wp-content/

uploads/2020/09/Final-Minority-Report-on-the-Origins-of-the-COVID-19-Global-Pandemic-Including-the-Roles-of-the-CCP-and-WHO-

9.20.20-Coverpage.pdf

27 Mann, James. The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China. Penguin Books, 2007.

28 Redden, Elizabeth. “New Restrictions for Chinese Students With Military University Ties.” Inside Higher Ed, 29 May 2020, https://

www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/29/us-plans-cancel-visas-students-ties-universities-connected-chinese-military

29 “KLA-Tencor Corp (KLAC) Q3 2020 Earnings Call Transcript.” The Motley Fool, 5 May 2020, https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-

transcripts/2020/05/05/kla-tencor-corp-klac-q3-2020-earnings-call-transcr.aspx

30 John Lee’s “Decoupling the US Economy from China after COVID-19” ﬁnds that about 80 percent of private sector R&D money

spent in China in 2015 was by non-Chinese multinationals. See: Lee, John. “Decoupling the US Economy from China after COVID-19.”

Hudson Institute, May 2020, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Lee_Decoupling%20the%20US%20Economy%20from%20

China%20after%20COVID-19%20v2.pdf

31 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success

of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

32 Ward, Jonathan D. T. China’s Vision of Victory. Atlas, 2019. Pg. 212.

33 “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation.” ChinaFile, 8 Nov. 2013, https://www.chinaﬁle.com/document-9-chinaﬁle-translation.

34 McKenzie-Murray, Martin. “Inside China’s ‘United Front.’” The Saturday Paper, Edition No. 194, 3-9 Mar. 2018. https://www.

thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/politics/2018/03/03/inside-chinas-united-front/15199956005888.

35 Allison, Graham.Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?Houghton Miin Harcourt, 2017. pg. 119-120.

36 Ramzy, Austin, and Chris Buckley. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.”

The New York Times, 16 Nov. 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

37 Bowe, Alexander. “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the U.S.” Sta Research Report, U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission. August 2018. pg. 3.

38 Ibid.

39 McKenzie, Nick, et al. “Beijing’s Secret Plot to Inﬁltrate UN Used Australian Insider.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 Nov. 2018,

https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/beijing-s-secret-plot-to-inﬁltrate-un-used-australian-insider-20181031-p50d2e.html.

40 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany, et al. “China Wants a New World Order. At the U.N., NGOs Secretly Paid Cash to Promote Beijing’s

Vision.” Yahoo! News, 11 Nov. 2018, https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-wants-new-world-order-u-n-china-linked-ngos-secretly-paid-

cash-promote-beijings-vision-145746181.html?soc_src=hl-viewer.

41 Abi-habib, Maria. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times, 25 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.

com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html

42 Clark, William P. “Memorandum for the Vice President, et al., NSDD 75 on ‘U.S. Relations with the USSR.’” 17 Jan. 1983, https://fas.

org/irp/odocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf

43 A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic Security

and Review Commission. 116th Cong. 6 (2020) (testimony of Daniel Tobin) https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/testimonies/SFR%20

for%20USCC%20TobinD%2020200313.pdf

44 “US Shutdown Reveals Flawed Democracy.” Global Times, 9 Jan. 2020, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1135224.shtml

45 Li Laifang “Enlightened Chinese Democracy Puts the West in the Shade.” China Daily, 17 Oct. 2017,. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/17/content_33364425.htm

46 Ibid.

47 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success

of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

48 “US Shutdown Reveals Flawed Democracy.” Global Times, 9 Jan. 2020, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1135224.shtml

49 Berwick, Angus. “A New Venezuelan ID, Created with China’s ZTE, Tracks Citizen Behavior.” Reuters, 14 Nov. 2018, https://www.

reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-zte/

50 “Risch, Gardner, Romney, Young Introduce Landmark Legislation to Compete with China.” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, 22 July 2020, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/risch-gardner-romney-young-introduce-landmark-

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51 Shepardson, David. “Exclusive: White House Asks U.S. Agencies to Detail All China-Related Funding.” Reuters, 15 Sept. 2020,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-budget-exclusive/exclusive-white-house-asks-u-s-agencies-to-detail-all-china-related-

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funding-idUSKBN25V1DO

52 “Issuance of Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory,” State Department, Fact Sheet, 1 July 2020, https://www.state.gov/issuance-

of-xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/

53 Joske, Alex. “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Aairs

Work.” China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 9 May 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-

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54 Zenz, Adrian. Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang.

The Jamestown Foundation, 2020. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-

UPDATED-July-21.pdf?x11160

55 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump]. Executive Order 13936:The President’s Executive Order on

Hong Kong Normalization. Sec. 3(k).14 Jul. 2020. Federal Register, vol. 85, no. 138, 17 July 2020, pg. 43413-43417, https://www.govinfo.

gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-07-17/pdf/2020-15646.pdf

56 United States, Congress, House, Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act. Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr7415/BILLS-

116hr7415ih.pdf. 116th Congress, 2nd Session, H.R.7415

57 “Here Are the Proposed Coal Power Plants China Is Bankrolling around the World.” Quartz,https://qz.com/1760615/china-quits-coal-

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58 Sun, Yun. “The Intricacy of China’s Arctic Policy.” Stimson Center, 27 Aug. 2018, https://www.stimson.org/2018/intricacy-chinas-

arctic-policy/

59 “China.” IUU Fishing Index, http://iuuﬁshingindex.net/proﬁle/china

60 Urbina, Ian. “The Deadly Secret of China’s Illegal Fishing Armada: It’s Killing Impoverished North Korean Squid Fishermen.” NBC

News, 22 July 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/china-illegal-ﬁshing-ﬂeet/

61 “Is China’s Fishing Fleet a Growing Security Threat?” Voice of America, 13 Aug. 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-paciﬁc/

chinas-ﬁshing-ﬂeet-growing-security-threat

62 Schaefer, Brett D. “How the U.S. Should Address Rising Chinese Inﬂuence at the United Nations.” The Heritage Foundation, 20

Aug. 2019, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/how-the-us-should-address-rising-chinese-inﬂuence-the-united-nations

63 Sirohi, Seema. “China’s Footprint Is Growing within the United Nations.” Observer Research Foundation, 6 Apr. 2020, https://www.

orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-footprint-is-growing-within-the-united-nations-64177/

64 Xi Jinping. “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinse Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reuniﬁcation.” Meeting

Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, 2 Jan. 2019. Speech. http://www.gwytb.gov.

cn/m/news/201904/t20190412_12155846.htm

65 United States, Department of Defense. Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply

Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulﬁllment of Executive

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66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Friedberg, Aaron. “The United States Needs to Reshape Global Supply Chains.” Foreign Policy, 8 May 2020, https://foreignpolicy.

com/2020/05/08/united-states-reshape-global-supply-chains-china-reglobalization/

69 Ryall, Julian. “Japan Moves to Secure Rare Earths to Reduce Dependence on China.” South China Morning Post, 17 Aug. 2020,

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3097672/japan-moves-secure-rare-earths-reduce-dependence-china

70 Section 2500 of Title 10, U.S. Code, deﬁnes the terms “national technology and industrial base” as the persons and organizations

that are engaged in research, development, production, integration, services, or information technology activities conducted within

the U.S., the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, and Canada.

71 Kharpal, Arjun. “China Unveils Policies to Boost Chipmakers as Tensions with U.S. Rise. Analysts Say They May Not Help.” CNBC, 10

Aug. 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/11/china-policies-to-boost-chipmakers-as-tensions-with-us-rise.html

72 Tan, Huileng. “China May Punish Australia with Trade Curbs - but It Can’t Stop Buying Iron Ore from Down Under.” CNBC, 11 June

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73 John Murphy, brieﬁng to the China Task Force, 20 July 2020.

74 Wendy Cutler, brieﬁng to the China Task Force, 20 July 2020.

75 Douglas Holtz-Eakin, brieﬁng to the China Task Force, 6 Aug. 2020.

76 United States, Congress. 2019 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Nov. 2019. https://

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77 Ibid.

78 Safeguarding Pharmaceutical Supply Chains in a Global Economy: Hearing before the House Committee on Energy and

Commerce. 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Janet Woodcock) https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/safeguarding-

122

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES

pharmaceutical-supply-chains-in-a-global-economy/

79 Ibid.

80 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

Report to Congress, 1 Sept. 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-

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81 Ibid.

82 United States, Congress, House, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s

Republic of China. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China. Government Printing

Oce, 1999. https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/legacy/AppImages/overv.pdf

83 Barr, William P. “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum.”

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policy-gerald-r-ford-presidential.

84 Oce of the Director of National Intelligence. “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the

American Public.” 7 Aug. 2020, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-director-

william-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public.

85 United States, Defense Intelligence Agency. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019. https://www.dia.

mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

86 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

Report to Congress, 1 Sept. 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-

REPORT-FINAL.PDF.

87 “An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard.” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-

scorecard.html.

88 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

Report to Congress, 1 Sept. 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-

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89 United States, White House, Oce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens

the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the U.S. and the World, June 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/

uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf

90 Walters, Riley. “Why China’s Intellectual Property Theft Is a Concern for National Security.” The Heritage Foundation, 4 Apr. 2019,

https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/why-chinas-intellectual-property-theft-concern-national-security

91 Ibid.

92 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

Report to Congress, 1 Sept. 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-

REPORT-FINAL.PDF

93 Ibid.

94 “The Chinese Communist Party’s Military-Civil Fusion Policy.” State Department, Fact Sheet. https://www.state.gov/military-civil-

fusion/.

95 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

Report to Congress, 1 Sept. 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-

REPORT-FINAL.PDF

96 “Mattis Urges Congress to Provide Budget Predictability for DoD.” U.S. Department of Defense, 6 Feb. 2018, https://www.defense.

gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1433784/mattis-urges-congress-to-provide-budget-predictability-for-dod/.

97 United States, Defense Intelligence Agency. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019. https://www.dia.mil/

Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

98 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

Report to Congress, 1 Sept. 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-

REPORT-FINAL.PDF

99 United States, Department of Defense. Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply

Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulﬁllment of Executive

Order 13806, Sept. 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-

MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF

100 United States, Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States. Providing for the Common Defense:

The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, 2018. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/

ﬁles/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf

101 Davidson, Philip S. “Transforming the Joint Force: A Warﬁghting Concept for Great Power Competition.” West 2020, San Diego,

California, 3 Mar. 2020. Speech. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/2101115/transforming-the-joint-force-a-

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

123

warﬁghting-concept-for-great-power-competition/.

102 Joint operating concepts “constitute an essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and budgetary priorities

needed to advance them,” as noted by the National Defense Strategy Commission.

103 Lague, David. “America’s Latest Salvo against China’s Growing Might: Cold War Bombers.” Reuters, 1 Sept. 2020, https://www.

reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-china-bombers/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=twitter.

104 United States, Congressional Research Service. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and

Issues for Congress (R42784). Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, 28 Aug. 2020. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf

105 Swanson, Ana. “U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea.” The New York Times, 26 Aug. 2020,

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/business/economy/trump-sanctions-south-china-sea.html

106 United States, Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual

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107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 United States, Oce of Personnel Management. Cybersecurity Incidents. https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-

incidents/

110 Martinez, Luis, et al. “Major U.S. Weapons Compromised By Chinese Hackers, Report Warns.” ABC News, 28 May 2013, https://

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111 Nakashima, Ellen and Paul Sonne, “China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine

warfare,” Washington Post, 8 June 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-a-navy-contractor-

and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data-on-submarine-warfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html.

112 United States, Government Accountability Oce. Weapons Systems Cybersecurity: DoD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of

Vulnerabilities, October 2018. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-128.

113 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Committee: Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Daniel R. Coats) https://www.dni.gov/ﬁles/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf

114 Volz, Dustin, et al. “U.S. Charges China Intelligence Ocers Over Hacking Companies and Agencies.” The Wall Street

Journal, 20 Dec. 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-unseal-criminal-charges-against-chinese-intelligence-ocers-

11545316450?mod=article_inline&mod=article_inline&mod=article_inline

115 Wray, Christopher. “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the CCP to the Economic and National Security of the U.S.”

Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. 7 July 2020. https://www.i.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-

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116 Barr, William P. “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum.”

Grand Rapids, Michigan, 16 July 2020. https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-china-

policy-gerald-r-ford-presidential.

117 “Chinese Citizen Convicted of Economic Espionage, Theft of Trade Secrets, and Conspiracy.” U.S. Department of Justice, 26 June

2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-citizen-convicted-economic-espionage-theft-trade-secrets-and-conspiracy.

118 United States District Court, Southern District of California. U.S. v. Zhang Zhang-Gui et. al. 25 Oct. 2018, https://www.justice.gov/

opa/press-release/ﬁle/1106491/download.

119 United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington. U.S. v. Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi. 7 July 2020, https://www.justice.gov/

opa/press-release/ﬁle/1295981/download.

120 Leonardi, Anthony. “US Orders China to Close Houston Consulate.” Washington Examiner, 22 July 2020, https://www.

washingtonexaminer.com/news/us-orders-china-to-close-houston-consulate.

121 Pompeo, Michael R. “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With Lou Dobbs of Lou Dobbs Tonight.” 1 Sept. 2020, Interview. https://www.

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-lou-dobbs-of-lou-dobbs-tonight-3/.

122 United States, Department of State. Brieﬁng With Senior U.S. Government Ocials On the Closure of the Chinese Consulate in

Houston, Texas, 24 July 2020. https://www.state.gov/brieﬁng-with-senior-u-s-government-ocials-on-the-closure-of-the-chinese-

consulate-in-houston-texas/.

123 An intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the U.S.

124 Wray, Christopher. “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the CCP to the Economic and National Security of the U.S.”

Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. 7 July 2020. https://www.i.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-

and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.

125 Strobel, Warren, and Jonathan Landay. “Exclusive: U.S. Accuses China of `Super Aggressive` Spy Campaign on LinkedIn.” Reuters,

31 Aug. 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-linkedin-china-espionage-exclusive/exclusive-us-accuses-china-of-super-aggressive-

spy-campaign-on-linkedin-idUSKCN1LG15Y.

126 O’Brien, Robert C. “The Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Global Ambitions.” Phoenix, Arizona, 26 June 2020. Speech.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/chinese-communist-partys-ideology-global-ambitions/

124

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. U.S. v. Wu Zhiyong, Wang Qian, Xu Ke, and Liu Lei. 28

Jan. 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/ﬁle/1246891/download.

130 Ibid.

131 United States, Department of Justice, Chinese Military Personnel Charged with Computer Fraud, Economic Espionage and Wire

Fraud for Hacking into Credit Reporting Agency Equifax. 10 Feb. 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-military-personnel-

charged-computer-fraud-economic-espionage-and-wire-fraud-hacking.

132 United States, Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Adds 28 Chinese Organizations to its Entity List. 7 Oct.

2019, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/10/us-department-commerce-adds-28-chinese-organizations-its-entity-

list.

133 Swanson, Ana, and Paul Mozur. “U.S. Blacklists 28 Chinese Entities Over Abuses in Xinjiang.” The New York Times, 7 Oct. 2019,

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/us-to-blacklist-28-chinese-entities-over-abuses-in-xinjiang.html.

134 China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against the U.S.: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses: Hearing before the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary. 115th Cong. 1-6 (2018) (testimony of John C. Demers) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-

12-18%20Demers%20Testimony.pdf

135 United States, Executive Oce of the President, Oce of the United States Trade Representative. “Findings of the Investigation

Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the

Trade Act of 1974.” 22 March 2018, pg. 10-17, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF

136 Id., 19-61.

137 Id., 19-47.

138 Id., 48-61.

139 Id., 62-152.

140 Id., 127.

141 Id., 128.

142 Id., 128-129.

143 Id., 100-147.

144 United States, Department of Justice. “Electrical Engineer Convicted of Conspiring to Illegally Export to China Semiconductor

Chips with Missile Guidance Applications.” 2 Jul. 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/electrical-engineer-convicted-conspiring-

illegally-export-china-semiconductor-chips-missile..

145 Ibid.

146 United States, Department of Justice, Electrical Engineer Convicted of Conspiring to Illegally Export to China Semiconductor

Chips with Missile Guidance Applications. 2 July 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/electrical-engineer-convicted-conspiring-

illegally-export-china-semiconductor-chips-missile.

147 Ibid.

148 USTR 2018 China Report 153-176; Demers 2018 Testimony 4

149 United States, Federal Bureau of Investigations, China: The Risk to Corporate America. 2019, pg. 7, https://www.i.gov/ﬁle-

repository/china-risk-to-corporate-america-2019.pdf/view

150 USTR 2018 China Report 157-170

151 Dangerous Partners: Big Tech and Beijing: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime

and Terrorism. 116th Cong. 2-3 (2020) (testimony of Adam S. Hickey). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hickey%20

Testimony.pdf

152 USTR 2018 China Report 157-163; FBI 2019 China Risks 7.

153 Ibid.

154 FBI 2019 China Risks 8-9.

155 See Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Hytera Commc’ns Corp., No. 1:17-cv-01973 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2020) (holding that the extraterritoriality

provisions of the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1837, apply to the DTSA despite the lack of such a provision in the DTSA).

156 United States, Department of Homeland Security, Customs & Border Protection, Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Statistics:

Fiscal Year 2019, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/assets/documents/2020-May/FY%202019%20IPR%20Seizure%20

Powerpoint%20FINAL%20PBRB%20APPROVED_0.pdf.

157 United States, The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property. Update to the IP Commission Report – The Theft of

American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and U.S. Policy. 2017, pg. 8-10. http://www.ipcommission.org/report/

IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf

158 Gershman, Jacob. “Flood of Trademark Applications FromChinaAlarms U.S. Ocials.” The Wall Street Journal, 5 May 2018,

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

125

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ﬂood-of-trademark-applications-fromchinaalarms-u-s-ocials-1525521600.

159 Ibid.

160 Allocation of Immigration Visas, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(A) (2006).

161 Ng, Winnie. “An Analysis of the Current EB-5 Market in China.” EB5 Investors, 21 June 2018,

https://www.eb5investors.com/magazine/article/an-analysis-of-current-eb-5-market-in-china.

162 Ibid.

163 United States, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment. Dec. 2019,

https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2020-01/2019-NDTA-ﬁnal-01-14-2020_Low_Web-DIR-007-20_2019.pdf.

164 United States, Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse. Overdose Death Rates. https://www.

drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates.

165 United States, Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Drug and Opioid-Involved

Overdose Deaths—U.S., 2017-2018, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6911a4.htm.

166 Ibid.

167 United States, Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. What is Fentanyl? https://

www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html.

168 United States, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment. Dec. 2019,

https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2020-01/2019-NDTA-ﬁnal-01-14-2020_Low_Web-DIR-007-20_2019.pdf.

169 United States, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. Fentanyl Flow to the U.S. Jan. 2020, https://www.dea.

gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2020-03/DEA_GOV_DIR-008-20%20Fentanyl%20Flow%20in%20the%20United%20States_0.pdf.

170 United States, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security & Government Aairs, Portman, Carper Letter Outlines Failure of Federal

Agencies to Comply With the STOP Act . 4 Apr. 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/portman-

carper-letter-outlines-failure-of-federal-agencies-to-comply-with-the-stop-act

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Dou, Eva. “China Closes Loophole in Fentanyl Rules.” The Wall Street Journal, 1 Apr. 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-

closes-loophole-in-fentanyl-rules-11554112953.

174 United States, National Counterintelligence and Security Center. Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace. 2018, https://www.

dni.gov/ﬁles/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf.

175 United States, Congress. 2019 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Nov. 2019.

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2019-11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf

176 Girard, Bonnie. “The Real Danger of China’s National Intelligence Law.” The Diplomat, 23 Feb. 2019, https://thediplomat.

com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/.

177 Oce of the Director of National Intelligence. “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the

American Public.” 7 Aug. 2020, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-director-

william-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public.

178 “China’s Inﬂuence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance.” Edited by Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, Hoover

Institution, 29 Nov. 2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-inﬂuence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance.

179 Deb, Sopan, and Marc Stein. “N.B.A. Executive’s Hong Kong Tweet Starts Firestorm in China.” The New York Times, 6 Oct. 2019,

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180 Conklin, Melanie. “Chinese Government Asks Wisconsin Senate for a Commendation.” Wisconsin Examiner, 10 Apr. 2020, https://

wisconsinexaminer.com/2020/04/10/chinese-government-asks-wisconsin-senate-for-a-commendation/.

181 Ibid.

182 Capaccio, Anthony, and Jenny Leonard. “Pentagon Names 20 Chinese Firms It Says Are Military-Controlled.” Bloomberg, 24 June

2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-24/pentagon-names-20-chinese-ﬁrms-it-says-are-military-controlled.

183 “China’s Inﬂuence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance.” Edited by Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, Hoover

Institution, 29 Nov. 2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-inﬂuence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance.

184 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “This Beijing-Linked Billionaire Is Funding Policy Research at Washington’s Most Inﬂuential

Institutions.” Foreign Policy, 28 Nov. 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/28/this-beijing-linked-billionaire-is-funding-policy-research-

atwashingtons-most-inﬂuential-institutions-china-dc/

185 Bowe.

186 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “China’s Long Arm Reaches Into American Campuses.” Foreign Policy, 7 Mar. 2018, https://

foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-

communist-party/

187 Dorfman, Zach. “How Silicon Valley Became a Den of Spies.” Politico Magazine, 27 July 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/

126

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES

story/2018/07/27/silicon-valley-spies-china-russia-219071

188 Ibid.

189 Paul, Deanna. “U.S. Charges New York Police Ocer With Acting as Agent for China.” The Wall Street Journal, 21 Sept. 2020,

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190 United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. U.S. v. Baimadajie Angwang. 19 Sept. 2020, https://www.justice.gov/

usao-edny/press-release/ﬁle/1318501/download

191 “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2017. https://www.uschamber.

com/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁnal_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf

192 Industries of the Future: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 116th Cong. (2020)

(testimony of Michael Kratsois). https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/ﬁles/B7184908-E657-441C-967A-871D8A80B0F0

193 “China’s New Generation of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Development Plan.” Foundation for Law & International Aairs, 30 July 2017,

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194 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump]. Executive Order 13859:Maintaining American Leadership

in Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 11 Feb. 2019. Federal Register, vol. 84, no. 31, 14 Feb. 2019, pg. 3967-3972, https://www.whitehouse.gov/

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195 United States, The White House. President Trump’s FY2021 Budget Commit to Double Investments in Key Industries of the Future.

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industries-future/

196 United States, Oce of Management and Budget. Request for Comments on a Draft Memorandum to the Heads of Executive

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to-the-heads-of-executive-departments-and-agencies.

197 United States, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce. “Bipartisan E&C Bill to Protect Americans from Suspect Foreign

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198 United States, Department of Commerce. “Commerce Department Further Restricts Huawei Access to U.S. Technology and

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department-further-restricts-huawei-access-us-technology-and

199 United States, Federal Communications Commission. “FCC Designates Huawei and Zte As National Security Threats: Money in

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200 “Pentagon, White House Earmark Mid-Band Spectrum Segment for 5G.” Janes, 12 Aug. 2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-

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201 The People’s Republic of China, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. “The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and

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202 Kania, Elsa B., and John Costello. “Quantum Hegemony? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership.”

Center for a New American Security, 12 Sept. 2018, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf

203 Ibid.

204 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump], National Science & Technology Council. “National Strategic

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205 Yu, Cheng. “Self-Driving Vehicles Set to Become Common.” China Daily, 8 Apr. 2020, http://global.chinadaily.com.

cn/a/202004/08/WS5e8d24a9a310aeaeeed50a6a.html

206 Wayland, Michael. “GM’s Cruise Values Autonomous Vehicle Industry at $8 Trillion.” CNBC, 5 Feb. 2020, https://www.cnbc.

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207 Krycka, Amber. “Autonomous Vehicles Transport COVID-19 Tests to Mayo Clinic.” WJAX, 2 Apr. 2020, https://www.actionnewsjax.

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208 “China Logs Second-Most Miles in California Self-Driving Tests.” Nikkei Asian Review, 8 Mar. 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/

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209 United States, Department of Commerce. “A Road Map Toward Resilience Against Botnets.” 29 Nov. 2018, https://www.

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210 TEConomy/BIO Report, “Investment, Innovation and Job Creation in a Growing U.S. Bioscience Industry.” 2018, https://www.bio.

org/sites/default/ﬁles/TEConomy_BIO_2018_Report.pdf

211 Kania, Elsa B., and Wilson VornDick. “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of Warfare’.”

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212 United States, Government Accountability Oce. “Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the U.S. as Identiﬁed by Federal

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

127

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213 Kania.

214 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump], National Science & Technology Council. Strategy for

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215 United States, National Institute of Standards and Technology. “Manufacturing Extension Partnership.” https://www.nist.gov/mep

216 Manufacturing USA, https://www.manufacturingusa.com/

217 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump], National Science & Technology Council. Strategy for

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218 Brattberg, Erik, and Den Judah. “Forget the G-7, Build the D-10.” Foreign Policy, 10 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.

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219 United States, Congress. 2019 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Nov. 2019.

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220 United States, Department of State. “Announcing the Expansion of the Clean Network to Safeguard America’s Assets.” 5 Aug.

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221 Greer, Tanner. “Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s Guiding Ideology.” Palladium Magazine, 31 May 2020, https://palladiummag.

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222 United States, Oce of the United States Trade Representative. “2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.” Feb.

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223 “Preventing Deglobalization: An Economic and Security Argument for Free Trade and Investment in ICT.” U.S. Chamber of

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224 “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2017. https://www.uschamber.

com/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁnal_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf

225 United States, The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property. Update to the IP Commission Report – The Theft

of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and U.S. Policy. 2017, pg. 8-10. http://www.ipcommission.org/report/

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226 “FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index Database.” OECD,http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.

227 United Nations. World Population Prospects (2019), https://population.un.org/wpp/

228 United States, Census Bureau. U.S. Trade in Goods by Country. 2019, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html

229 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump]. “The U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of

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230 United States, Oce of the United States Trade Representative. “2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.” Feb.

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231 Wu, Mark. “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance.”Harvard International Law Journal57 (2016): pg. 261-324.

https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/HLI210_crop.pdf

232 Nadège Rolland, “China’s Vision for a New World Order,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2020, https://www.nbr.

org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf

233 https://gop-foreignaairs.house.gov/chinas-malign-global-inﬂuence-regional-snapshots/

234 “Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads,” The National Bureau of Asian

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235 United States, Export-Import Bank of the United States. “Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition.” Jun.

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236 Horn, Sebastian, et al. “How Much Money Does the World Owe China?” Harvard Business Review, 26 Feb. 2020, https://hbr.

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237 World Bank. “Annual Report 2019: Lending Data.” 2019, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/724041569960954210/WBAR19-

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238 United States, Department of Energy. “Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Energy Advantage: A Strategy to Assure

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239 Ibid.

240 International Atomic Energy Agency. “Global Energy &CO2 Status Report.” Mar. 2019, https://www.iea.org/geco/emissions/

128

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES

241 Tanner Greer, “Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s Guiding Ideology,” May 31, 2019 https://palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-

in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/

242 Lewis, James Andrew. “Emerging Technologies and Managing the Risk of Tech Transfer to China,” Center for Strategic

and International Studies, Sept. 2019, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190904_Lewis_

ChinaTechTransfer_WEB_v2_1.pdf

243 United States, Congressional Research Service. U.S. Export Control Reforms and China: Issues for Congress

(IF11627). Prepared by Ian F. Fergusson and Karen M. Sutter, 21 Aug. 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11627.pdf

244 United States, House, Committee of Foreign Aairs Republicans. “China Regional Snapshot: Exposing the CCP’s Global Malign

Inﬂuence.” 9 Sept. 2020, https://gop-foreignaairs.house.gov/chinas-malign-global-inﬂuence-regional-snapshots/

245 United States, Government Accountability Oce. “Report to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: Action Needed to Address Evolving National Security Concerns Facing the

Department of Defense.” July 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693010.pdf.

246 United States, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. “Statement on the Vital Role of Audit Quality and Other Information

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access-audit-and-other. The Statement noted that there were another 207 U.S.-listed companies where the PCAOB can inspect

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247 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump]. Presidential Memorandum on Protecting U.S. Investors from

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248 United States, Executive Oce of the President [Donald J. Trump], The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. “Report

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249 Atkinson, Robert D., and Caleb Foote. “Is China Catching Up to the United States in Innovation?” Information Technology &

Innovation Foundation, Apr. 2019, http://www2.itif.org/2019-china-catching-up-innovation.pdf

250 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Committee: Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Daniel R. Coats) https://www.dni.gov/ﬁles/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf

251 Douglas Holtz-Eakin, China Task Force Member Brieﬁng, August 6, 2020.

252 Losing Ground: U.S. Competitiveness in Critical Technologies: Hearing before the House Committee on Science, Space, and

Technology. 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Diane Souvaine) https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.

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253 Boroush, Mark. “Science & Engineering Indicators.” National Science Foundation, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20203

254 Douglas Holtz-Eakin, China Task Force Member Brieﬁng, August 6, 2020.

255 “NIST Releases Findings on Increasing the Innovation Impacts of Federally Funded R&D.” National Institute of Standards and

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256 Ibid.

257 World Intellectual Property Organization. “China Becomes Top Filer of International Patents in 2019 Amid Robust Growth for

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258 IP5. “Statistics Report 67-68.” tbl. 4.3 (2018), https://www.ﬁveipoces.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2018edition/

259 United States, U.S. Patent & Trademark Oce. “Patents Data, at a Glance.” Jul. 2020, https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/patents.

260 “United States’ Forgotten Middle,” National Skills Coalition, 2017, https://www.nationalskillscoalition.org/resources/

publications/2017-middle-skills-fact-sheets/ﬁle/United-States-MiddleSkills.pdf

261 https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/future%20of%20organizations/what%20the%20future%20

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262 Busteed, Brandon. “America’s ‘No Conﬁdence’ Vote on College Grads’ Work Readiness.” Gallup, 24 Apr. 2015, http://news.gallup.

com/opinion/gallup/182867/america-no-conﬁdence-vote-college-grads-work-readiness.aspx

263 Stapleton, Katherine. “China Now Produces Twice as Many Graduates a Year as the US.” World Economic Forum, 13 Apr. 2017,

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/higher-education-in-china-has-boomed-in-the-last-decade

264 United States, The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Committee on Information Technology,

Automation, and the U.S. Workforce. “Information Technology

And the U.S. Workforce: Where Are We And Where Do We Go From Here?” 2017, https://www.nap.edu/read/24649/chapter/1

265 The State of American Jobs.” Pew Research Center, 6 Oct. 2016. https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/10/06/the-state-of-

american-jobs/

CHINA TASK FORCE REPORT

129

266 Blumenstyk, Goldie. “Big Companies Are Investing in Free College. Will Their Commitments Last?” The Chronicle of Higher

Education, 28 Aug. 2018, https://www.chronicle.com/article/big-companies-are-investing-in-free-college-will-their-commitments-last/

267 Kuchar, Kristen. “These Companies Will Help You Pay for College.” Saving For College, 16 Apr. 2020, https://www.

savingforcollege.com/article/these-companies-will-help-you-pay-for-college

268 “Executive Summary: SHRM Employee Beneﬁts 2019,” The Society for Human Resource Management, 2019, https://www.shrm.

org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/SHRM%20Employee%20Beneﬁts%202019%20Executive%20

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269 “BRT Launches CEO-Led and Community Partnerships to Strengthen U.S. Workforce.” Business Roundtable, https://www.

businessroundtable.org/archive/media/news-releases/brt-launches-ceo-led-and-community-partnerships-strengthen-u.s.-workforce

270 Harris, Laurie Beth. “Creators Wanted Campaign Helps Solve the Workforce Crisis.” National Association of Manufacturers, 4 Dec.

2019, https://www.nam.org/creators-wanted-campaign-helps-solve-the-workforce-crisis-6432/?stream=workforce

271 “About,” KYFAME, https://kyfame.com/about/

272 Zwetsloot, Remco. “China’s Approach To Tech Talent Competition: Policies, Results, And The Developing Global Response,”

Brookings Institute, Apr. 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_china_talent_policy_

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273 Wray, Christopher. “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the CCP to the Economic and National Security of

the U.S.” Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. 7 July 2020. https://www.i.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-

government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.

274 Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2018) (testimony of Christopher

Wray) https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-0

275 “Fundamental Research Security.” JASON, Dec. 2019, https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/jasonsecurity/JSR-19-2IFundame

ntalResearchSecurity_12062019FINAL.pdf

276 O’Keee, Kate, and Aruna Viswanatha. “Chinese Diplomats Helped Military Scholars Visiting the U.S. Evade FBI Scrutiny, U.S.

Says.” The Wall Street Journal, 25 Aug. 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-diplomats-helped-visiting-military-scholars-in-the-

u-s-evade-i-scrutiny-u-s-says-11598379136

277 Disclosures of Foreign Gifts, 20 U.S.C. §1011f (1998).

278 United States, Department of Education, “Secretary DeVos Unveils Enhanced Online Portal for Higher Education Institutions to

Report Foreign Gifts and Contracts.” 22 Jun. 2020, https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USED/bulletins/2920323.

279 “Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans.” Sta Report, Senate Committee on Homeland

Security & Government Aairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 18 Nov. 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/

doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Sta%20Report%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf

280 United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. “Public Service

Announcement: People’s Republic of China (PRC) Targeting of COVID-19 Research Organizations.” 13 May 2020, https://www.cisa.gov/

sites/default/ﬁles/publications/Joint_FBI-CISA_PSA_PRC_Targeting_of_COVID-19_Research_Organizations_S508C.pdf?source=email

281 United States, Department of Justice. “Two Chinese Hackers Working with the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global

Computer Intrusion Campaign Targeting Intellectual Property and Conﬁdential Business Information, Including COVID-19 Research.” 21

Jul. 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion

282 “China’s Impact of the U.S. Education System.” Sta Report, Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government Aairs,

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 22 Feb. 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20

China’s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf

283 “Confucius Institute U.S. Center Designation as a Foreign Mission,” State Department, Fact Sheet, 13 Aug. 2020, https://www.

state.gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/

284 Rosenthal, Elisabeth, and Lawrence K. Altman. “China Raises Tally of Cases and Deaths in Mystery Illness.” The New York Times,

27 Mar. 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/03/27/world/china-raises-tally-of-cases-and-deaths-in-mystery-illness.html.

285 Rosenthal.

286 Epstein, Gady A. “Chinese Admit to SARS Mistakes.” Baltimoresun.com, Baltimore Sun, 1 Apr. 2003, www.baltimoresun.com/bal-

te.sars21apr21-story.html.

287 Woo.

288 Ibid.

289 “Coronavirus: WHO Chief and Taiwan in Row over ‘Racist’ Comments.” BBC News, 9 Apr. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-

asia-52230833.

290 Borger, Julian. “Caught in a Superpower Struggle: the inside Story of the WHO’s Response to Coronavirus.” The Guardian, 18

Apr. 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/18/caught-in-a-superpower-struggle-the-inside-story-of-the-whos-response-to-

coronavirus.

291 Griths, James. “WHO’s Relationship with China under Scrutiny Due to Coronavirus Crisis.” CNN, 17 Feb. 2020, www.cnn.

com/2020/02/14/asia/coronavirus-who-china-intl-hnk/index.html.

130

APPENDIX V: ENDNOTES

292 “Health | China under Fire for Virus Spread.” BBC News, 6 Apr. 2003, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2922993.stm

293 Collins, Michael. “The WHO and China: Dereliction of Duty.” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Feb. 2020, www.cfr.org/blog/who-

and-china-dereliction-duty.

294 “Health | China under Fire for Virus Spread.” BBC News, 6 Apr. 2003, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2922993.stm

295 “Constitution.” World Health Organization, www.who.int/about/who-we-are/constitution.

296 Glazier, E., et al. “The Limits of Global Health Diplomacy: Taiwan’s Observer Status at the World Health Assembly.” Globalization

and Health, BioMed Central, 1 Oct. 2014, https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-014-0071-y.

297 Ibid.

298 Ching, Nike. “USSupportsTaiwan’s World Health AssemblyObserverStatus.” Voice of America, 30 Mar. 2020, www.voanews.

com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/us-supports-taiwans-world-health-assembly-observer-status.

299 “WHO’s Newly Elected Chief Rearms One-China Principle.” Xinhua, 26 May 2017, www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-

05/26/c_136318462.htm.

300 “Historic Health Assembly Ends with Global Commitment to COVID-19 Response.” World Health Organization, 19 May 2020, www.

who.int/news-room/detail/19-05-2020-historic-health-assembly-ends-with-global-commitment-to-covid-19-response.

301 Semones, Evan. “Trump’s National Security Adviser Attacks World Health Organization.” POLITICO, 31 May 2020, www.politico.

com/news/2020/05/31/trump-obrien-world-health-organization-corrupt-292059.

302 2005 IHR.

303 “Frequently Asked Questions about the International Health Regulations (2005).”World Health Organization, 18 Aug. 2009, www.

who.int/ihr/about/faq/en/.

304 Ibid.

305 2005 IHR.