Family Law Case Summaries April 2022 through September 2022

CASE LAW UPDATE

2023 FLORIDA BAR

FAMILY LAW SECTION

REVIEW COURSE

Family Law Case Summaries

April 2022 through September 2022

Presentation by:

Thomas J. Sasser, Esq.

tomsasser@sasserlaw.com

Materials by:

Thomas J. Sasser, Esq.

Cash A. Eaton, Esq.

William K. Norvell, Esq.

Alexander M. Bottone, Esq.

Carolyn D. Ware, Esq.

Jourdan L. Porter, JD

Sasser, Cestero & Roy, P.A.

1800 Australian Avenue South, Suite 203

West Palm Beach, FL 33409

BIOGRAPHY

THOMAS J. SASSER

Thomas J. Sasser is the managing partner of the law firm of Sasser, Cestero & Sasser,

P.A., which is located in West Palm Beach, Florida. He is Board Certified in Marital

and Family Law. Mr. Sasser is a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial

Lawyers (“AAML”) and the International Academy of Family Lawyers (“IAFL”).

He is a Diplomate of the American College of Family Law Trial Lawyers. He

received his J.D. in 1995 from The University of Florida and his B.A. in 1992 from

The College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. He is a past Chair of

the Family Law Section of The Florida Bar. In addition, he is a four-time past chair

of the Florida Bar Marital and Family Law Board Certification Review Course. He

is a past President of the Florida Chapter of the AAML and serves as a national Vice

President of the AAML. He also is currently President of the IAFL and has served

on the Board of the United States Chapter of the IAFL. He served as the chair of the

Palm Beach County Bar Association Family Law Practice Committee from 2003 -

2008. Mr. Sasser is the author of numerous articles for the Family Law Section

Commentator and The Florida Bar Journal. He often lectures for the Palm Beach

County Bar Association, The Florida Bar Family Law Section, the AAML and the

IAFL. He currently presents the Annual Caselaw Update on Florida Family Law

during both The Florida Bar Family Law Section Review Course and the AAML

Florida Chapter Institute.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2022 Family Law Case Summaries

Parenting ......................................................................................................................................... 4

Equitable Distribution..................................................................................................................... 7

Alimony ........................................................................................................................................ 11

Child Support................................................................................................................................ 14

Everything Else............................................................................................................................. 17

a. Agreements ........................................................................................................... 17

b. Appeals ................................................................................................................. 18

c. Attorney Misconduct ............................................................................................ 19

d. Contempt............................................................................................................... 19

e. Discovery .............................................................................................................. 20

f. Disqualification..................................................................................................... 22

g. Domestic Violence/Injunctive Relief.................................................................... 24

h. Evidence................................................................................................................ 27

i. Fees and Costs....................................................................................................... 28

j. Findings................................................................................................................. 33

k. Jurisdiction and Venue.......................................................................................... 35

l. Paternity ................................................................................................................ 37

m. Procedure .............................................................................................................. 38

Table of Authority......................................................................................................................... 44

Family Law Case Summaries

April 2022 through September 2022

Parenting

Sadlak v. Trujillo, 336 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

A trial court commits error by failing to attach a parenting plan to the final judgment.

Ceballos v. Barreto, 337 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is a violation of due process to modify timesharing at a hearing on a motion for contempt

and enforcement arising from a party unilaterally enrolling the child in school.

Payne v. Koch, 336 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

A court departs from the essential requirement of law by granting relief not requested by

the pleadings and without notice to the parties. – The trial court ordered the parties to place the

child in behavioral therapy even though this relief was not requested by either party and no

advanced notice was given to either party that the court might consider this relief.

Levy v. Donnenfeld, 338 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

An award of disproportionate timesharing and sole decision-making authority on medical

needs is affirmed as the trial court alone determines credibility. The issues were tried by

consent and there was competent substantial evidence to support the judgment.

Oddo v. Oddo, 340 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

It is error and a violation of a parent’s right to due process to order a modification of

timesharing without giving the parent notice or an opportunity to be heard.

It is error and a violation of a parent’s right to due process to order a mental evaluation

without notice to said parent that their mental health is at issue.

Hernandez v. Mendoza, 346 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A parenting plan must include that either party may consent to mental health treatment

pursuant to § 61.13(2)(b)3.a., Fla. Stat.

Hassenplug v. Hassenplug, 346 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

A designation of residence for school designation must be based upon the best interest of the

child. – In a dissolution of marriage, the Mother proposed to continue homeschooling the parties’

autistic child through at least the next school year before enrolling the child in a private school that

could accommodate the child’s needs. Evidence was presented demonstrating the child’s success

in the homeschool environment. The trial court, recognizing the parties’ communication problems

and to ensure they had an equal role in the child’s education, designated the Father’s residence for

public school designation effective immediately. The trial court was recognized for their effort to

“broker peace and foster communication” between the parents in making this determination,

however, this was done without consideration of the evidence to the contrary and the child’s best

interest. This was error because there were no findings that the change in schooling by way of

determining residence for school designation was in the child’s best interest.

E.M. v. E.G., 343 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is an abuse of discretion to order supervised timesharing for a parent without making

factual findings as to the necessity for supervised timesharing. – In this case, the Court adopted

a Magistrate’s recommendation that modified the parties’ parenting plan by giving Father sole

parental responsibility, awarding Father majority timesharing, and directing Mother to have

supervised timesharing. A trial court has the discretion to limit or restrict a parent’s visitation

where it is necessary to protect the welfare of the child. Gavronsky v. Gavronsky, 403 So. 2d 627,

627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, the Magistrate made no factual findings as to the necessity

for supervised visitation, and there is no evidence in the record to support the need for this

restriction.

Hiatt v. Mathieu, 2022 WL 3640297 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is an abuse of discretion to order both parties to pay equally for multiple international

trips to transport a child to the foreign country where Father resides without considering the

financial ability of the parties. Remand for reconsideration of entire time-sharing plan given

that travel costs are unaffordable. – The Court failed to consider the limited financial resources

of the parents, considering the Father was out of work necessitating an imputation of income for

child support purposes. It is an abuse of discretion to impose such enormous financial costs on the

parties, particularly the Mother, for the travel expenses of international travel without a

consideration of how the parents could possibly pay for such travel.

It is reversible error for the trial court to fail to attach child support guidelines worksheet to

the final judgment.

Provisions of final judgment barring mother’s sister from providing unsupervised childcare

and awarding alternating income tax dependency deduction to be deleted, as these provisions

were either unsupported by evidence or not requested by parent. – The provision in the final

order that stated the Mother's sister “shall not be permitted to provide unsupervised childcare” was

not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Therefore, it was reversed by the Appellate

Court.

Miedes v. Ideses, 346 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

No error in granting petition for modification of parenting plan and child support where

order contained explicit findings of fact supported by competent, substantial evidence, and

properly analyzed factors of § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat.

Rosaly v. Konecny, 346 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Statute governing injunction for protection against stalking does not provide a trial court

authority to make a custody determination in final judgment.

White v. Lee-Yuk, 2022 WL 4360606 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

The trial court’s denial of a mother’s petition for temporary relocation with the minor child

was affirmed. – In a factually unique case that dealt with a tri-custodial parenting arrangement,

the Appellant, Joheli Cruz White, was the natural Mother of the minor child, and she sought to

relocate with the minor child. The minor child was born of an intact same sex marriage. Ms. White

conceived a child with the Appellee, Kevin Lee-Yuk, who sought to establish paternity and

objected to Ms. White’s relocation. Ms. White argued that Mr. Lee-Yuk did not have standing to

object to the relocation because he had not adjudicated his parental rights. The Appellate Court

determined that Mr. Lee-Yuk, as the putative father, did have standing to object to the relocation

based on the language of the relocation statute, which provides standing to, “every other person

entitled to access to or time-sharing with the child.” Moreover, the Appellate Court held that the

trial court’s denial of the Mother’s petition for temporary relocation was supported by competent,

substantial evidence. Therefore, the denial of the petition for temporary relocation was affirmed.

The trial court erred when it ruled that the Appellant’s petition was facially deficient for

failing to attach a written job offer. – The Appellate Court held that the trial court did err, as a

matter of law, by dismissing the petition for failing to attach a written job offer. The relocation

statute only requires attaching a written job offer when one exists. The Appellant’s job offer was

not made in writing. Therefore, she could not attach the job offer to the petition, and it was not

facially deficient pursuant to § 61.13001, Fla. Stat.

Logreira v. Logreira, 2022 WL 4360595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

The trial court erred by failing to engage in any analysis of what was in the minor children’s

best interests when it ordered the parties’ children to participate in a family reunification

program. - After a nine (9) day bench trial, the Court modified the parties’ parenting plan and

ordered the children into Family Bridges, a family reunification program based outside of the state

of Florida. The Appellate Court recognized that there was no direct testimony of record that

participation in the Family Bridges program would promote the welfare and best interests of the

children. Therefore, the trial court erred by ordering the parties and the minor children to

participate in this program, when there was no evidence to support that it was in the minor

children’s best interests.

Spann v. Payne, 346 So. 3d 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

In a concurring opinion by Judge Robert E. Long, Jr., he wrote to reiterate that

§61.13(4)(c)(6), Fla. Stat., which governs make-up timesharing, does not require that the trial

court order that every day missed be awarded in make-up. – Instead, the statute requires that

“a sufficient amount of extra timesharing” be awarded “in a manner consistent with the best

interests of the child.”

Equitable Distribution

Padmore v. Padmore, 335 So. 3d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to include in equitable distribution a tax refund for a tax year that is fully

completed after the date of filing of the action for dissolution of marriage. – The action for

dissolution of marriage was filed in 2017 and the tax refund wrongfully equitably distributed by

the trial court was for tax year 2018, a full tax year after the filing date. Author’s Note - Be careful

with this opinion as the holding may not apply where there is income included on a post-filing tax

return generated from marital assets like a business that is not entirely attributable to reasonable

compensation of a spouse working in the business. Income generated by a marital asset is arguably

also a marital asset even if generated after the filing date.

Rea-Manna v. Manna, 336 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It is error to include in equitable distribution an asset that is not available to the party to

whom it is awarded. – The Husband, a federal employee stationed outside the United States, had

accrued 440 hours of annual leave. However, due to a provision in the United States Code, the

Husband was entitled to accumulate no more than 360 hours. Thus, it was error for the Court to

make an equitable distribution based upon the value of 440 hours, $29,871, rather than the value

of 360 hours.

Briggs v. Briggs, 336 So. 3d 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It is error to include in equitable distribution sums which have been diminished or depleted

during the proceedings for purposes reasonably related to the marriage. A court may only

include dissipated assets in the equitable distribution scheme if the court makes specific

factual findings that the dissipation resulted from intentional misconduct. – In the case before

the Court, the parties split $234,000 at the time of the filing of the dissolution of marriage. During

the pendency of the case, the Husband continued to give his paycheck to the Wife for household

expenses for her and the children. He used his half of the funds, which were split, to pay his living

expenses as well as attorney’s fees. There were no findings that the Husband had engaged in

misconduct. The court improperly included the full $117,000 in the Husband’s column for

purposes of equitable distribution even though a substantial amount of those funds had been

expended.

Twigg v. Twigg, 346 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to include in equitable distribution an automobile which was acquired by the

Husband prior to the marriage and which was not enhanced during the marriage with

marital effort or assets. – Following a line of cases regarding the equitable distribution of

automobiles acquired prior to a marriage, the Appellate Court held that it was error for the trial

court to include the $2,500 Buick in the scheme of equitable distribution when that vehicle had not

been enhanced with marital effort or marital funds. The most interesting part of this case might be

the decision of a party to appeal an issue related to the equitable distribution of a $2,500 automobile

(a $1,250 issue, arguably a $1,500 issue resulting from the court mistakenly using a stipulated

value of $3,000 rather than $2,500 for the care). Some people really do love their cars.

Olguin v. Olguin, 339 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to order equitable distribution of marital assets if the equitable distribution

worksheet filed with the final judgment is incomplete. – The Former Husband presented an

argument to the court on appeal concerning the failure of the parties to complete the equitable

distribution worksheet. The Appellate Court found that many lines were not filled out and a page

was duplicated. Therefore, the Court directed the trial court to attach a complete worksheet to the

final judgment upon remand.

Smith v. Smith, 338 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It is error to order equitable distribution of marital assets without factual findings based on

competent, substantial evidence. - A court must consider and make specific written findings of

fact as to all ten factors under § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. and to all four factors under § 61.075(3), Fla.

Stat., when awarding equitable distribution. The judgement lacked any findings concerning the

§61.075(1), Fla. Stat. and § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. factors, and included only cursory and conclusory

factual determinations.

Petrinic v. Petrinic, 346 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Remand for entry of order correcting scrivener’s error regarding IRA accounts and

equalizing payment amount in equitable distribution chart.

Arzillo v. Arzillo, 343 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to distribute a depleted account as an asset without a finding of misconduct. The

Husband’s dissipation of his retirement account to pay his attorneys’ fees did not constitute

misconduct.

Collier v. Collier, 343 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

Funds transferred from a revocable trust during the course of the parties’ marriage to an

irrevocable trust out of reach of the parties does not affect the status of same as “marital”

for purposes of equitable distribution. – The Court properly applied § 61.075(1)(i), Fla. Stat. to

justify the deviation from a straight equal equitable distribution of marital assets because Former

Wife transferred funds from a revocable trust and other personal accounts to a irrevocable trust

after the divorce proceedings commenced which effectively turned the marital funds over to a third

party and put them out of reach of both the spouses, but particularly beyond the control of the

Former Husband.

McGowan v. McGowan, 344 So. 3d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It was error to classify Former Wife’s bank account and stock as a marital asset where the

Court acknowledged that bank account contained funds from nonmarital inheritance which

had not been commingled with marital funds, and stock had been acquired in Former Wife’s

previous divorce with no efforts expended during the marriage to increase stock’s value.

It is error to classify several retirement and investment accounts as exclusively marital assets

where accounts included both marital and nonmarital portions. – In instances where the

parties each enter a marriage with significant nonmarital assets consisting of retirement and

investment funds, although the assets acquired before the marriage are generally nonmarital, the

enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting from the efforts of either

party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or

other forms of marital assets, or both, is considered a marital asset. § 61.075(6)(a)1.b, Fla. Stat.

It is a misclassification of certain real property as exclusively nonmarital where Former

Husband had used marital funds to pay mortgage on the property.

It is error to have not considered the passive appreciation accrued during the marriage and

the increased equity from the Former Husband’s use of marital funds to pay down the

mortgage. – As outlined in Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867, 870 (Fla. 2010) and Somasca v. Somasca,

171 So. 3d 780, 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), a court should consider the passive appreciation of

nonmarital real property accrued during the marriage and a share of the increased equity as a result

from the use of marital funds to pay down the mortgage on that property.

It is error to classify a car loan as a nonmarital liability where the car was purchased during

the marriage with marital funds and titled in both parties’ names.

It is error to classify certain credit card debts as nonmarital liabilities where the accounts

were opened during the marriage and all expenses using same occurred during the marriage.

It is error when during the valuation of parties’ assets, the court used different valuation

dates for similar assets and used several valuations in distribution scheme which did not

match the court’s specific findings of value. – The date for determining the value of marital

assets and liabilities is the date or dates as the judge determines is “just and equitable under the

circumstances.” In addition, § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. states that different assets may be valued as of

different dates, per the judge's discretion and as circumstances require. However, it is an abuse of

discretion when a court uses different valuation dates for “similarly situated assets” resulting in

values favoring one party over the other without explanation or record evidence to justify the

different treatment. See Tritschler v. Tritschler, 273 So. 3d 1161, 1165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) and

Struble v. Struble, 787 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

It was error to make an unequal distribution of assets and liabilities in favor of Former

Husband. Although the Court had authority to unequally distribute the parties’ assets and

liabilities, the Court had to first properly classify and value those assets and liabilities. –

While a court may have the authority to unequally distribute the parties’ assets and liabilities, it

must first properly classify and value those assets and liabilities. Unless the assets and liabilities

were properly classified and valued, the court would have no way of knowing whether its

distribution was equal or unequal.

Martin v. Martin, 344 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It was error to require Former Husband to pay a specified amount per month as a portion

of his “military retirement” referenced in final judgment where Former Husband receives

military disability, not military retirement. – In the instant case, the parties’ marital settlement

agreement contained the following provision: “The wife shall receive as part of Equitable

Distribution a portion of the Husband's Military Retirement in the event the Husband retires from

the military. The wife shall receive $255.82 per month which is .39 (93 months/240 months) of

her portion ($655.95) of his retirement earned during the marriage, beginning upon the first month

that the Husband is entitled to receive his military retirement pay.” The Former Wife brought a

post-judgment action for contempt and civil enforcement asserting the Former Husband had

willfully failed to pay her portion of his military retirement. In response, he asserted the benefits

he received were “non-taxable disability benefits” not subject to equitable distribution. As the

Former Husband did not reach twenty years of service to qualify for military retirement benefits,

his non-taxable disability benefits were not divisible property. Further, in Howell v. Howell, 197

L. Ed. 2d 781 (2017), the United States Supreme Court reversed a lower court order that ordered

the former husband to indemnify the former wife after he waived a share of his retirement benefits

to receive non-taxable disability benefits. The Court held federal law preempted states from

treating waived military retirement in the form of disability benefits as divisible community

property attempts to reimburse or indemnify the former wife to restore the amount previously

awarded as community property are also preempted by federal law. As a result, under Howell, a

court cannot order the Former Husband to indemnify the Former Wife from other assets; and the

trial court in this instance erred in enforcing a provision that contemplated an award “in the event

the Husband retires from the military” with twenty years of service, which never occurred. See 10

U.S.C.A. 1201; § 61.075(6)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 61.076, Fla. Stat.

Military disability payments are exempted from definition of “disposable retired pay”

subject to equitable distribution. – See 10 U.S.C.A. 1408(4)(A) for the Federal Code’s definition

of “disposable retired pay.”

Alimony

Rea-Manna v. Manna, 336 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It is error to award durational alimony with a specific termination date following a long-

term marriage in the absence of specific findings of fact as to how the court arrived at that

termination date and what change would occur by the termination date as to the recipient’s

need and the payor’s ability to pay. – There is a very clear and strong presumption that

permanent alimony should be awarded following a long-term marriage. In order to overcome that

presumption, a court must make specific findings that the recipient has no ongoing need for support

on a permanent basis. In summary, the recipient must be able to attain a level of self-support to

commensurate the marital standard of living by the time that the durational alimony award expires.

Shaw v. Shaw, 337 So. 3d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A court cannot order undifferentiated alimony and child support. The amounts must be

calculated separately. – In a case involving temporary support, the Court ordered a lump sum

amount for combined alimony and child support. Such an award prevents appropriate appellate

review and is prohibited.

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 330 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)

It is error for a trial court to sua sponte impute income to a party when the other party did

not request an imputation of income and where the issue was not otherwise noticed before

the court. – The Wife in this case had not been employed for twenty five years. Nonetheless, the

trial court sua sponte imputed minimum wage to her without any request for imputation by the

Husband.

Rodolph v. Rodolph, 344 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to treat discretionary withdrawals from a retirement account as income for

purposes of determining ability to pay alimony. In contrast, mandatory or minimum

withdrawals from a retirement account are treated as income for purposes of determining

alimony awards. – The Court improperly treated the Former Husband’s monthly discretionary

withdraws of $3,500 from his retirement account as income for the purposes of determining his

ability to pay in connection with the requested modification of alimony.

Kirby v. Kirby, 345 So. 3d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

A trial court cannot rely upon gross income when determining alimony awards. It must rely

upon net income. – The Court made several findings regarding the gross income of the parties but

failed to specifically state the net income for the Husband which it was using for the purposes of

evaluating alimony claims.

An award of alimony which results in a party paying 60% of his net monthly income is

erroneous.

Moquin v. Bergeron, 338 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Trial court did not err in awarding the Former Wife a lump sum alimony because the

judgment was supported by competent, substantial evidence - § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. states that

in determining whether to award alimony or maintenance, the court shall first make a specific

factual determination as to whether either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and

whether either party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance. Subsequently, the court must

then examine all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to the ten factors identified

in § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. The judgment awarding the Former Wife a lump sum alimony was

supported by competent, substantial evidence after going through the § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. factors

finding that if the Former Husband was awarded the two marital properties, then the Former Wife

had a need for alimony and the Former Husband had an ability to pay. The Appellate Court

awarded the Former Husband the properties and instructed the trial court to address whether

awarding the Former Wife some form(s) of alimony would be appropriate.

Olguin v. Olguin, 339 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to award durational alimony without making factual findings to allow for

meaningful review of the amount of alimony awarded. - A court must consider and make

findings as to all ten factors under § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. when awarding alimony. Further,

§61.08(2), Fla. Stat. requires the trial court to “make a specific factual determination as to whether

either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability

to pay alimony or maintenance.” The judgement lacked the factual findings concerning the Wife’s

income and expenses, and the Husband’s ability to pay based off his insufficient financial affidavit.

Adams v. Adams, 340 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to base an alimony award on gross income, instead of net income.

It is error to order permanent alimony without establishing the specific amount of need. –

The court determined Wife had an ongoing need for permanent alimony and awarded her $3500

per month in permanent alimony and $1000 per month for her health insurance, however the

reference to her limited financial resources without a finding of the specific need was reversible

error.

It is error to consider undistributed ‘pass-through’ income retained by a corporation as

income for the purposes of Chapter 61. – The trial court differentiated between undistributed

‘pass through’ and previously distributed income from the same corporations.

It is error to use the value of a non-marital business interest that is not supported by

competent, substantial evidence in determining the parties non martial assets in determining

an alimony award.

Rodolph v. Rodolph, 344 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to deny a petition for modification without specific factual findings regarding a

party’s current expenses and needs. – Though the Court found that Former Wife’s “needs were

not being met”, the failure to make specific factual findings prevented meaningful appellate

review.

It is error to consider discretionary withdrawals from a retirement account as “income” for

purposes of a party’s “ability to pay” alimony.

Inman v. Inman, 345 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Calculation of Former Husband’s income based on a reduction in his potential future salary

was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. – In the instant case, the Former

Husband reported his yearly income as $93,000.00 in 2019 and $107,762.00 in 2020, yet the Court

improperly computed his yearly income at $78,000.00 for alimony purposes because his health

issues “might” interfere with his future ability to earn income. However, as discussed in McLean

v. McLean, 652 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), a reduction in income for a potential future

decrease is improper. As such, the Court’s reduced calculation was in error as the potential for

reduced working hours due to “impending health problems” does not support a finding of reduced

income for alimony purposes.

Reduced working hours due to impending health problems does not support a finding of

reduced income for alimony purposes. – While a reduced future workload and the resulting

diminished future income may be grounds for a petition to modify alimony and obtain a reduction

in the amount to be paid, it cannot support calculations regarding current alimony payments.

It is error to reduce amount of alimony based on amount Former Wife would receive in

equitable distribution. – In the instant case, the Court erred when it ordered Former Husband to

pay Former Wife $100.00 per month in alimony by using the $900.00 per month Former Wife

would receive in equitable distribution to meet her $1,000.00 monthly need. As stated in Van

Maerssen v. Gerdts, 295 So. 3d 819, 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), “A court should not require a

former spouse in need of alimony to deplete or invade capital assets to maintain his or her standard

of living.”

It is error to require a former spouse in need of alimony to deplete or invade capital assets

to maintain his or her standard of living.

Kraus v. Kraus, 344 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

No error in granting Former Husband’s petition to modify alimony based on Former Wife’s

discharge of a marital debt that she assumed pursuant to settlement agreement. –

§61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. gives an ex-spouse the right to file a petition for an increase in alimony

where “the circumstances or the financial ability of either party has changed.” In the instant case,

the Former Husband as the alimony recipient, alleged that the Former Wife’s post-judgment

discharge of a marital debt she assumed pursuant to the marital settlement agreement both

increased her ability to pay alimony, by reducing her own debt, and financially injured the Former

Husband by leaving him open to subsequent tax issues. Pursuant to the opinion entered in Bedell

v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1991), this alleged change in the Former Wife's ability to

pay was sufficient to petition for a modification of alimony.

O'Brien v. O'Brien, 2022 WL 4002177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

The trial court erred when it ordered the Former Husband’s alimony obligation to be

suspended based on his monthly gross income, instead of his monthly net income.

Carlson v. Frengut, 2022 WL 4230393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The trial court erred by failing to enter an Income Withholding Order (IWO) as mandated

by Section 61.1301(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

Child Support

Dorvilien v. Verty, 335 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to fail to attach child support guidelines worksheet to final judgment providing

for child support. – Even if the court makes appropriate findings on the record and properly

considers the parties’ incomes, a final order which fails to attach a child support guidelines

worksheet is subject to reversal.

Minor errors in the calculation of child support which do not significantly exceed the

guidelines do not require reversal on appeal.

Shaw v. Shaw, 337 So. 3d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A court cannot order undifferentiated alimony and child support. The amounts must be

calculated separately. – In a case involving temporary support, the court ordered a lump sum

amount for combined alimony and child support. Such an award prevents appropriate appellate

review and is prohibited.

Oyebanji v. Collier, 336 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 1

DCA 2022)

In order to impute income for child support purposes, a court must make specific findings

of fact concerning the job market, the party’s most recent employment history, occupational

qualifications, and prevailing earnings level in the local community. – This case involved

peculiar facts. The child support payor admitted that he voluntarily left his job for a lower paying

but more stable job after child support was originally determined. Apparently, the payors voluntary

underemployment was not raised as a defense to the modification. The voluntary nature of the

underemployment was not contested, only the failure to make the required finding necessary to

impute income. There is a strong dissenting opinion from Judge Tanenbaum which suggests that

no findings are required because the trial court should never entertain the modification premised

upon the voluntary underemployment.

Sadlak v. Trujillo, 336 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Absent special circumstances, income may not be imputed to a party at a level which is higher

than that party has ever historically earned.

In order to impute income, a court must make specific findings of fact concerning the job

market, the party’s most recent employment history, occupational qualifications, and

prevailing earnings level in the local community, if such information is available.

The trial court must make findings as to the net incomes of the parties.

A trial court commits error by failing to attach a child support guidelines worksheet to the

final judgment.

Olguin v. Olguin, 339 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

Alimony awards must be considered in determining the parties’ incomes for calculation of

child support. – It is clear under § 61.30(2)(a)(9), Fla. Stat. that the Court must add to a party’s

income any alimony and under § 61.30(3)(g), Fla. Stat. the trial court must subtract any alimony

paid. The judgment lacked a reliable determination of child support since the Wife’s income lacked

the factual findings necessary to support the number on her financial affidavit.

McDaniel v. McDaniel, 340 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to consider “reimbursed expenses” or “in-kind payments” to the extent that they

do not reduce living expenses in calculating child support.

Remand for entry of order correcting error in calculating in net income. – The Court erred by

calculating Husband’s income by dividing the Husband’s net pay for the month of January 2020

by twenty-six (26) days, instead of thirty one (31) days, to derive a daily income figure.

It is error to impute income without specific findings as to the current employment market

and jobs available in the community. - Building on Gillespie v. Holdsworth, 333 So. 3d 278

(Fla. 2d DCA 2022), the trial court erred by imputing to the Husband, a teacher, a full-time

teacher’s income without any findings as to the current employment market in his community or

if there were any jobs available to him.

Tinoco v. Lugo, 342 So. 3d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to fail to make findings of fact regarding the parties’ incomes when determining

child support; specifically, net incomes and not just their gross incomes. – See J.A.D. v.

K.M.A., 264 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); M.M. v. J.H., 251 So. 3d 970, 972 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2018).

It is error to fail to include a child support guidelines worksheet to an order. – Absent the

guidelines worksheet or a meaningful substitute, the order on appeal “fails to show how the trial

court arrived at the monthly support obligation.” Citing Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. R.S.M. v. B.J.M.,

127 So. 3d 859, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception which guides the trial court’s application

of discretion when modification of alimony or child support is granted.

Setoffs against support obligations are permitted in those limited circumstances where the

requesting party can show compelling equitable criteria and considerations justifying such

a setoff. – Here, the Court failed to specify any compelling equitable criterial and considerations

justifying a complete setoff of child support arrearages owed that resulted in years of zero ongoing

support for a child living with the less financially capable parent. There is no precedent approving

a complete offset of child support arrearages resulting in years of zero ongoing support for a minor

child living with the less financially capable parent.

Other than stating that the unspecified amount of the arrearage was “fairly staggering,” the Court

simply said its ruling was “[b]ased on the updated financial affidavits provided by both parties, as

well as the stipulated Parenting Plan that gave the father the majority of overnights.” Further, the

Court (a) made no findings about Former Husband’s financial circumstances, other than accepting

his stated gross income and rejecting Former Wife’s argument that he was underemployed and (b)

made no findings at all about the needs of the child or whether those needs would be met without

any monthly support from Former Wife for years.

Brown v. Norwood, 343 So. 3d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

Mathematical errors in calculating Former Husband’s net income that appear on the face of

judgment are to be corrected on remand and amount of the child support arrearage to be

adjusted accordingly.

Former Husband’s obligation to pay ongoing child support for now-adult child stricken. –

In the instant case, by the time the Court entered the Second Amended Judgment, the parties’ child

had reached the age of majority and, therefore, the Court erred in ordering ongoing child support.

See Carlton v. Carlton, 816 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (recognizing that absent finding

of physical or mental deficiencies, there is no legal duty to pay child support beyond age of

eighteen).

Court cannot review sufficiency of evidence regarding Former Husband’s claims as to the

Court’s decision to give only partial credit to his claimed business expenses in absence of

transcript of hearing.

Shenoi v. Shenoi, 345 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

A portion of the final judgment was overturned because there was not a sufficient basis for

the Appellate Court to determine whether the retroactive child support awarded included

appropriate amounts already paid for the benefit of the child.

Everything Else

Agreements

Wallace v. Torres-Rodriguez, 341 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

A spouse does not have the right to transfer tenancy by entirety assets to a third party

without the knowledge and consent of the other spouse. – A Husband and Wife created an

Irrevocable Trust Agreement. The Agreement stated that if one spouse were to die, the survivor

would transfer to the trustee the marital assets owned as tenants by entirety or as joint tenants with

right of survivorship. Prior to the Wife’s death, the Husband transferred $2 million worth of marital

assets to his paramour. The trustee filed suit against the paramour. The Appellate Court held that

the trial court correctly relied on Sitomer v. Orlan, 660 So. 2d 111, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995),

which held that “neither spouse may sever or forfeit any part of the [marital] estate without the

assent of the other, so as to defeat the right of the survivor.” The Appellate Court affirmed the trial

court’s decision to impose a constructive trust as a remedy to recover tenancy by the entireties

assets wrongfully transferred by the Husband during his marriage without the consent of the Wife.

Antunes v. Oliveira, 341 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

The trial court erred in concluding that a monetary sanction was an unenforceable penalty

clause. – The parties’ marital settlement agreement contained a provision that, when one parent

fails to timely notify the other parent of international travel, the offending parent is required to pay

the non-offending parent $10,000. The fact that the monetary penalty provision had already been

adopted and incorporated by the Court in the final judgment rendered it unassailable as between

the parties, and the party subject to the penalty was prohibited from challenging its enforcement.

A trial court may set aside an agreement on child support, custody, and visitation if it is not

the best interest of the children. – A provision prohibiting further international travel with the

minor child with a parent who fails to timely notify the other parent of international travel was

deemed unenforceable.

Bates v. Bates, 345 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)

This opinion was originally issued on February 3, 2021, wherein the Appellate Court held

that sufficient coercive circumstances surrounded the execution of prenuptial agreement

that indicated the Wife did not execute the agreement of her own free will. However, the

Husband filed a motion for rehearing in the Appellate Court, which was denied.

Appeals

Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

In the absence of providing a transcript of the underlying proceedings, an appellant can

obtain relief only if he or she can show that an error of law has been committed on the face

of the order.

An argument that an order is erroneous on its face is waived if not raised in the initial brief.

Dike v. Dike, 336 So. 3d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

A non-final order which rescinds prior orders relating to child custody due to a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act is not subject to appeal.

Fine v. Fine, 338 So. 3d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Appellate courts have the power to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court; however, the

trial court must abide by the rules and procedures the appellate court sets out for said

relinquishment.

Hernandez v. Mendoza, 346 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The failure to provide a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court prevents meaningful

appellate review of the calculation of overnights. – Without a transcript, the Appellate Court

was unable to determine how overnights were calculated, therefore, the Court must presume

correctness of the calculations.

Birnbaum v. Mortman, 3412 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The failure to provide a transcript prevents the review of a nonfinal order on temporary

relief.

Travis v. Travis, 346 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

The trial court exceeded its limited jurisdiction when entering QDROs after Former

Husband filed his notice of appeal. – The trial court erred by entering QDROs after Former

Husband filed his notice of appeal without language stating that the QDROs were temporary and would

only affect the parties until this Court decided the appeal.

Shavers v. Shavers, 2022 WL 3868022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

An appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside a signed mediation memorandum in

a pending dissolution was dismissed as it was a nonfinal, nonappealable order.

Edwards v. Alphonse, 345 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The appellate court was unable to determine whether sufficient evidence supported the trial

court’s factual findings because the Appellant failed to provide a transcript of the

proceedings.

Johansson v. Johansson, 2022 WL 4360609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

When on appeal, requests for attorneys’ fees and costs must be made in a separate motion

pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b).

Attorney Misconduct

Julio v. State, 342 So. 3d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

Repeated and continued failure of attorneys to comply with appellate court directives could

require the investigation and/or initiation of proceeding(s) by The Florida Bar. – Attorney

for Appellant failed to remit filing fee with appeal. The Appellate Court issued an order requiring

the Appellant to submit the fee or risk dismissal of appeal and sanctions. The attorney for the

Appellant did not respond. Over the course of the next five months, the Appellate Court issued

additional orders directing the Appellant’s attorney to respond or risk sanctions. Finally, the

Appellant’s attorney refused to appear at an oral argument session regarding the matter and, after

being contacted by the deputy clerk and advised that she should file a pleading explaining the

reason for her failure to appear, Appellant’s attorney filed a notice of unavailability. The appellate

court then referred the matter to the Florida Bar for investigation and initiation of such proceedings

as may be appropriate.

Contempt

Orth v. Orth, 338 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

When enforcing the terms of a marital settlement agreement a court may not change the

terms of the agreement to fashion an equitable result. The court must grant relief only in

conformity with the agreement and cannot attempt to ameliorate a hardship to the promisor.

– In a very long and factually detailed opinion, the Appellate

Court examined the lower court’s attempt to enforce an ambiguously broad marital settlement

agreement in a manner that was fair and equitable. The trial court does not have that level of

discretion and must enforce the agreement as written. This is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

Lavrik v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 338 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A trial court is required to make findings as to the ability to pay a purge established as a part

of contempt proceedings. – The Department of Revenue confessed error and acknowledged that

the trial court failed to make the required finding regarding present ability to pay when establishing

a purge in connection with a contempt hearing.

O'Brien v. O'Brien, 2022 WL 4002177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

A trial court can utilize its discretion to not hold a party in civil contempt for their failure to

pay alimony. However, the trial court must enforce any alimony amounts that a party fails

to pay, and the party seeking to enforce the unpaid alimony obligation is entitled to pre-

judgment interest. – Former Husband filed a petition to modify his alimony obligation. Prior to

filing his petition, he failed to pay his monthly alimony obligation in February and March of 2016.

Accordingly, the Former Wife filed a motion for contempt and enforcement. After an evidentiary

hearing, the trial court temporarily suspended the Former Husband’s alimony obligation and

denied the Former Wife’s motion. The Appellate Court held that it was within the trial court’s

discretion to not hold the Former Husband in contempt, but the Trial Court erred when suspending

Former Husband’s alimony obligation because it had to enforce the amounts owed and award pre-

judgment interest.

Discovery

Karisma Hotels & Resorts Corporation Ltd. v. Hoffman, 346 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2022)

A corporate officer seeking a protective order preventing the officer from being subject to a

deposition must explain that the officer “lacks unique, personal knowledge of the issues being

litigated” in their affidavit. – See In re Amend. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.280, 324 So. 3d 459,

461 (Fla. 2021).

Beacon Park Phase II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Eagle Vista Equities,

LLC, 346 So. 3d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

The entirety of an opposing attorney’s billing records are not privileged.

In re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Florida Family Law

Rules of Procedure, and Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms,

2022 WL 2721400 (Fla. 2022)

Effective October 1, 2022 at 12:01 a.m.

Modifies 12.310(b) to require that the party taking a deposition through the use of

communication technology provide the subpoenaed documents no later than 5 days prior to

the deposition, and also to require certain language in the notice of an audiovisually recorded

deposition.

Modifies 12.310(c) to require, if requested by a party, that the testimony of a deponent at an

audiovisually recorded deposition must be transcribed at the initial cost of the requesting

party and that prompt notice of the request must be given to all other parties. Further, a

party who intends to use an audio or audiovisual recording of testimony at a hearing or trial

must have the testimony transcribed and must file a copy of the transcript with the court.

Modifies 12.407(a) prohibiting the presence of children at hearings to include remote

hearings held via communication technology, and requiring that the parties, counsel, and the

court ensure that children are not present or nearby during any remote proceedings.

Modifies 12.410(e) to require a party intending to audiovisually record a deposition to

include in the subpoena: the name and address of the operator of the audiovisual recording

equipment, the fact that the deposition is to be taken using communication technology, the

specific form of communication technology to be used, and instructions for access to the

communication technology.

Modifies 12.430(d) to address juror participation through audio-visual communication

technology. Previous 12.430(d) [Waiver] is now 12.430(e).

Modifies 12.440(b) to require that a notice for trial, if applicable, indicate that the court has

authorized the participation of prospective jurors or empaneled jurors through audio-video

communication technology under rule 12.430(d).

Removes 12.451 entirely.

Modifies 12.740(b) to expressly state that every effort must be made to expedite mediation of

family issues and adds that such referral may provide that same be conducted remotely via

audio or audio-video communication technology. Absent direction in the order of referral,

mediation must be conducted in person, unless the parties stipulate or the court, on its own

motion or on a motion by a party, otherwise orders that the proceeding be conducted by

communication technology or by a combination of communication technology and in-person

participation.

Modifies 12.740(d) to allow a party’s appearance “via communication technology” if

permitted by court order or written stipulation of the parties.

Modifies 12.740(f) to allow signatures on agreements reached at mediation to be original,

electronic, or facsimile, and allows same to be in counterparts.

12.980(a) – Instructions for Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(a)

Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence (10/22)

12.980(f) – Instructions for Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(f),

Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence (10/22)

12.980(n) – Instructions for Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(n)

Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Dating Violence (10/22)

12.980(q) – Instructions for Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(q)

Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Sexual Violence (10/22)

12.980(t) – Instructions for Florida Supreme Court

Disqualification

Chmilarski v. Empire Fire, 340 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

The trial court erred by prejudging entitlement to attorney’s fees. – The parties filed cross

motions for summary judgment seeking recission. At the hearing, the judge noted the anticipation

of receiving motions for attorney’s fees. The Petitioner indicated that they had pled for fees and

intended to file a subsequent motion, though neither party had filed motions for attorney’s fees at

that time. The trial court found that “for purposes of any subsequent attorney's fees claim that

neither party has significantly prevailed on the issues raised in the course of this case and the Court

further notes that, should either party move for attorney's fees”. The Petitioner filed a motion for

disqualification based upon the court’s prejudgment of issues. The trial court denied the motion as

legally insufficient. The Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of prohibition. The appellate court

granted the petition.

Menada, Inc. v. Arevalo, 341 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

In cases addressing motions for disqualification alleging ex parte communications with a

judge, the issue is not whether the ex parte communication actually prejudices one party at

the expense of the other; instead, the issue is whether the impartiality of the trial judge is

beyond question. – The judge assigned to the civil division and heard a wrongful death suit was

subsequently assigned, as part of the normal rotation of judges, to the family division. A new judge

was rotated into the civil division and now presided over the wrongful death suit. The Respondent

contacted the prior-presiding judge’s judicial assistant (JA) and requested the prior-presiding judge

continue presiding over the case and requested that the JA schedule a motion for clarification that

the Respondent filed. The Petitioner received notice of this communication when then prior-

presiding judge’s JA reached out to schedule a hearing and advised that she had been notified that

the parties had requested to stay with the prior-presiding judge. Petitioner had not made this request

or been included in this communication. Petitioner sought to disqualify the prior-presiding judge

based upon Respondent’s improper ex-parte communication with the JA. The prior-presiding

judge denied the motion for disqualification and heard the pending motion for clarification. The

Respondent filed a second motion to disqualify alleging that the prior-presiding judge improperly

commented on the merits of the first disqualification motion at the hearing on the motion for

clarification. The second disqualification motion was denied. The Petitioner then sought a writ of

prohibition on both orders denying the disqualification. On appeal, the court treated the petition

for writ of prohibition regarding the first motion for disqualification as a petition for writ of

certiorari and granted the relief, quashing the order. The order denying the second motion was also

quashed based upon the court’s lack of jurisdiction.

A.L.P. v. State, 343 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

To be legally sufficient, a motion to disqualify must establish a well-grounded fear on the

part of the movant that he/she will not receive a fair hearing, and such fear must be objective

rather than subjective. – The motion to disqualify alleged that the trial judge made specific

comments, before evidence was ever introduced in the case, that would put a reasonably prudent

person in well-founded fear of not receiving a fair or impartial hearing. While a trial judge may

form mental impressions and opinions during the course of a hearing, he or she may not, as it

appears the presiding judge did here, prejudge the case.

Cini v. Cabezas, 343 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Motion for disqualification alleging that opposing counsel’s law firm co-hosted a judicial

fundraising for the judge during a contested, ongoing re-election campaign, coupled with

proof of adverse rulings, was legally insufficient to warrant disqualification. – In MacKenzie

v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1333 (Fla. 1990), the Florida Supreme Court

considered whether disqualification was required where an attorney appearing before the judge

made a $500 contribution to the political campaign of the judge's husband. Observing “the

interplay of our state constitution, code of judicial conduct, and campaign statutes,” the Court

answered the question in the negative as Florida's statutory limitation on campaign contributions,

along with the required disclosure of the names of campaign contributors and contribution

amounts, promotes transparency and reduces the appearance of impropriety, which render a

permissible contribution to a judicial campaign insufficient to warrant disqualification. What

amounts to a “permissible contribution” appears to be based on the “timing, nature, and extent of

participation in a judge's campaign,” and adopting this approach, ordinarily, limited involvement

in a judicial re-election campaign does not constitute grounds for disqualification. Rivera v.

Bosque, 188 So. 3d 889, 890 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). As it would be “highly anomalous” to allow a

lawyer's nominal participation in a re-election effort to “create a disqualifying interest, an

appearance of impropriety or a violation of due process sufficient to require the justice's recusal

from all cases in which that attorney might be involved,” since “not surprisingly, ‘lawyers, along

with litigants, are the ‘primary’ contributors to judicial elections.’” Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics

and Campaign Contributions: The Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 Geo. J. Legal

Ethics 225, 241 n.66 (2011).

Davis v. State, 347 So. 3d 315 (Fla. 2022)

When ruling on a motion to disqualify judge, a trial court should only determine the legal

sufficiency of the motion and should not pass on the truth of the facts. – In a criminal case, the

Florida Supreme Court reviewed an opinion from the Second District, which found that the motion

to disqualify a trial court judge was legally sufficient. At the trial court level, the Defendant moved

to disqualify the judge assigned by the case. The case was originally scheduled before Judge

Donald Jacobsen. However, Judge Jacobsen announced that he expected to leave the capital felony

division. His replacement would be Judge Jalal Harb. The Defendant moved to keep Judge

Jacobsen, based on Judge Jacobsen’s knowledge of the case and that Judge Harb had been at the

State Attorney’s Office, while this case was pending. Judge Jacobsen presided at a hearing on these

matters. Judge Harb attended as an observer. The motion was denied. When Judge Harb took over

the case, the Defendant moved to disqualify Judge Harb. Judge Harb denied the motion as legally

insufficient. After the Defendant was convicted, he appealed. The Second District explained, the

State's eagerness, taken together with the allegations of Judge Harb's employment at the State

Attorney's office, were sufficient to give the Defendant a reasonable fear that he would not receive

a fair trial. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Second District’s determination that the

Defendant’s motion was legally sufficient.

Domestic Violence/Injunctive Relief

Klement v. Kofsman, 337 So. 3d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to grant a stalking injunction when a previous petition for a stalking injunction

has been denied after a hearing and was based upon the same incidents between the parties.

– The party seeking the injunction initially sought an injunction that was denied after a hearing by

one judge. Three months later, the party filed a second petition based upon the same incidents as

the first injunction. It was heard by a different judge. Two additional incidents were included in

the second petition, but no evidence was presented on those new allegations. The only evidence

presented related to those same incidents were addressed at the hearing that denied the first request

for an injunction. The injunction was erroneously entered as res judicata bars the Court from

granting relief based upon claims previously raised in a prior action.

Brooks v. Basdeo, 336 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

A court violates the due process rights of a party in an action for an injunction for protection

against domestic violence when it allows testimony concerning unpled alleged incidents of

domestic violence. § 741.30, Fla. Stat. requires the petitioner to include in his or her sworn

pleadings the specific facts and circumstances upon which the relief is sought.

Thomas v. Thomas, 335 So. 3d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

A temporary injunction cannot be entered without requiring the moving party to post a

bond. – In a dispute over real estate, the trial court erroneously granted an injunction without

requiring the post of a bond.

Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A stalking injunction must be based upon two separate instances of stalking. The two

instances cannot be a part of one continuous course of conduct. Stalking must cause

substantial emotional distress. Mere irritation, exasperation, aggravation, and frustration

does not constitute substantial emotional distress. – In a factually detailed opinion, the court

examined a stalking injunction that was granted based upon claims of stalking that apparently were

not in the petition for injunction and which were detailed in a subsequently filed affidavit. The trial

court indicated that it would take judicial notice of the affidavit. The Appellate Court reversed as

the trial court treated four encounters at a restaurant as four separate incidents of stalking. The

Appellate Court viewed these incidents as one course of conduct which would not cause substantial

emotional distress in a reasonable person. The Appellate Court also rejected the arguments by the

appellee that the injunction could be based upon the affidavit. The Appellate Court held that the

Court could not take judicial notice of the affidavit even though no objection was raised by the

other party as the admission of the affidavit into evidence. The Appellate Court held that a court

can take judicial notice only of matters which are common and general knowledge, and the trial

court cannot use judicial notice to dispense with proof of essential facts that are not judicially

cognizable. There is a strong and well written dissent by Judge Artau.

Lentino v. McKinney, 339 So. 3d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

Injunctions for protection against dating violence cannot be entered based on incidents

where the petitioner has been the victim of dating violence in the past. – The petitioner must

show that he or she has reasonable cause to believe that he or she is in imminent danger of

becoming the victim of an act of dating violence in the future.

Werner v. Werner, 339 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to grant an injunction for protection against domestic violence where the facts

established are insufficient as a matter of law to establish an objectively reasonable fear of

imminent danger. – The Petitioner testified that the Respondent had kicked down a door, punched

a hole in a bathroom door, and that he owned guns. On cross examination, the Petitioner testified

that the Respondent had never physically harmed her or threatened to do so. The Petitioner’s

testimony and evidence presented did not support a conclusion that Petitioner had an objectively

reasonable fear that she was in danger of imminent violence.

Baruti v. Vingle, 343 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

In order to grant a petition for an injunction for protection against stalking, there must be

sufficient evidence supporting two incidents of harassment.

Simply feeling “uncomfortable” does not constitute substantial emotional distress. – See

Klenk v. Ransom, 270 So. 3d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“It is not enough to be ‘weirded

out’ or ‘uncomfortable’.”).

SPC Fortebello, LLC v. Catuogno, 343 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

Reversal of temporary injunction was required where it did not include specific findings of

each of the four required elements necessary for issuance of injunction. – An injunction is

required to “specify the reasons for entry.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c). To satisfy this requirement, a

trial court must find that the parties seeking a temporary injunction have established four elements:

(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) the unavailability of an adequate legal remedy; (3) a

substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits; and (4) considerations of the public interest

support the entry of the injunction. In the instant case, the trial court made numerous factual

findings but failed to relate those factual findings to the four elements required for a temporary

injunction.

A court’s conclusory statement that required elements have been established is insufficient.

Further, to the extent written recitation imposed a legal obligation on party, order failed to

recite factual or legal basis sufficient to support that obligation.

Green v. Bordiuk, 344 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to deny motion to dissolve domestic violence injunction entered originally against

appellant six years prior where record showed that circumstances underlying injunction no

longer existed and that continuing the injunction no longer served a valid purpose. – As

previously outlined in Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), a party

moving to dissolve the injunction must show “changed circumstances” and in order to establish a

change in circumstances, the movant must “demonstrate that the scenario underlying the injunction

no longer exists so that continuation of the injunction would serve no valid purpose.” Then the

Court considers whether the injunction continues to serve a valid purpose based on whether the

victim “reasonably maintains” a continuing fear of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In

the instant case, this was the victim’s sixth attempt to lift the injunction, wherein she explained she

no longer feared becoming a victim of domestic violence and had not feared violence from the

other party for years, prompting the need to lift same.

Rosaly v. Konecny, 346 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Sufficient evidence was presented for the trial court to enter a final injunction for protection

against stalking. - The evidence at the hearing was that the Respondent was in the practice of

driving by appellee's residence multiple times a day. During one of these drive-bys, the Respondent

leaned out of the car window with an object in his hand and told the Petitioner, “You're dead you

piece of shit. Wait until I get done with you.” Additionally, the Respondent would operate a drone

over the Petitioner’s residence on at least three occasions. The record revealed no legitimate

purpose for this course of conduct. Moreover, given the potential for invasion of privacy, the

Appellate Court concluded that use of a drone is conduct that could contribute to substantial

emotional distress. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to meet all of the necessary elements.

Stevens v. Hudson, 345 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

The trial court’s entry of injunction for protection against domestic violence was overturned

because the Wife failed to establish that she was victim of domestic violence or had

reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic

violence. - The Wife sought to obtain an injunction for protection against domestic violence. At

the hearing, she described just one incident close in time to her petition. She alleged that during a

heated discussion between the parties, the Husband told her to “take about five steps right now.”

When she asked why, he turned and glared at her. The Appellate Court determined that this was

not sufficient to show that she had an objectively reasonable fear of “imminent” violence.

Therefore, the injunction was overturned.

Evidence

Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A trial court cannot take judicial notice of an affidavit in order to dispense with proof of

essential facts that are not judicially cognizable. – The Appellate Court held that the Trial Court

could not take judicial notice of the affidavit even though no objection was raised by the other

party as the admission of the affidavit into evidence. The Appellate Court held that a court can

take judicial notice only of matters which are common and general knowledge, and the trial court

cannot use judicial notice to dispense with proof of essential facts that are not judicially cognizable.

There is a strong and well written dissent by Judge Artau, who asserts that the failure of the

opposing party to object to the admission of the affidavit into evidence means that the issue is not

preserved for appeal. The dissent goes on to make a detailed analysis of the tipsy coachman rule.

William Hamilton Arthur Architect, Inc. v. Schneider, 342 So. 3d 757 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2022)

Trial Court erred by requiring the production of communication between attorney and client

under the crime fraud exception, § 90.502(4)(a), Fla. Stat.

Trial Court erred by failing to consider (1) a less intrusive method of obtaining requested

information and (2) not protecting against disclosure of confidential and privileged

information by granting unfettered access to a party’s personal electronic device.

Devalon v. Sutton, 344 So. 3d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It was not harmless error when the trial court failed to include a police report that contained

important evidence as to the Petitioner’s credibility. – The Respondent’s statement to police

was inconsistent with her testimony at the final hearing, and same was undeniably material because

it could have affected the Court’s determination of her credibility and ultimate entry of injunction

favoring her.

Kraus v. Kraus, 344 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Court was permitted to consider evidence of Former Husband’s financial hardship based on

his medical condition and loss of income. Although issue of Former Husband’s financial

hardship was not included in the pleadings, the issue was tried by consent where Former

Wife not only failed to object to introduction of testimony at hearing, but specifically engaged

in questioning regarding Former Husband’s medical condition and income. – “Under Florida

law, a trial court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine matters which are not the subject of

appropriate pleadings and notice.” Todaro v. Todaro, 704 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

However, “when an issue is tried by implied consent, due process concerns are alleviated.” Nisr v.

Barakat, 88 So. 3d 212, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). “Implied consent arises when arguments and

evidence are presented on the issue without objection by the opposing party.” C.J. v. Dep't of

Children & Family Servs., 9 So. 3d 750, 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). During the hearing on the

Former Husband’s petition for modification, the Former Husband presented evidence of his

financial hardship due to his medical condition and loss of income. Regardless of their exclusion

in his pleadings, as a result of the Former Wife not only failing to object to the introduction of this

testimony in the hearing, and specifically engaging in the questioning regarding the Former

Husband's heart condition and his loss of income, these issues met the standard to have been tried

by consent. It is not error for the court to consider the evidence in the final order and not a violation

of the Former Wife's right to fair notice.

In re: Amendments To Florida Evidence Code, 347 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 2022)

The Florida Legislature amended the Florida Evidence Code to include § 90.2035, Fla. Stat.

(Judicial notice of information taken from web mapping services, global satellite imaging

sites, or Internet mapping tools). – The Florida Supreme Court agreed and adopted this amended

portion of the Florida Evidence Code. Under this new § 90.2035, Fla. Stat. whenever a party

intends to offer into evidence information obtained from web mapping services, global satellite

imaging sites, or Internet mapping tools, the party must file with the court a notice of intent that

includes copies of any image, map, location, distance, or calculation the party intends to introduce.

An opposing party may object to the court taking judicial notice of the information and entering it

into evidence, but there is a rebuttable presumption that such information should be judicially

noticed. The presumption can be overcome if the Court finds that the information does not fairly

and accurately portray what it is being offered to prove.

Fees and Costs

Jimenez v. Aviles, Heuston and Heuston Legal, PLLC, 337 So. 3d 474 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2022)

Safe harbor notice under § 57.105(4), Fla. Stat. is not strictly limited as to a specific filing.

The withdrawal of a specific motion or pleading does not neutralize the effectiveness of a safe

harbor notice if the specific allegation or claim is reasserted in a new pleading. The wording

of the statute allows a party to challenge not only a specific motion or pleading, but also

claims, defenses, contentions, allegations, and denials. The withdrawal of a specific motion

or pleading will not negate the safe harbor notice or shelter the subsequent filing from a fee

claim. – Practice Tip – When you serve a safe harbor notice do not focus only on the pleading.

Rather, focus more broadly on contesting claims, defenses, contentions, allegations, and denials.

This will make your notice effective as to subsequent pleadings or motions which attempt to do the

same thing as the initial changed pleading or motion.

Rivera Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rosello, 336 So. 3d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is reversible error to grant sanctions pursuant to a motion for sanctions that is not properly

served in accordance with the safe harbor provisions of § 57.105, Fla. Stat.

A motion under § 57.105 which was properly served must be filed before the case is dismissed

in order to be considered by the court.

Interesting contrast with Jimenez v. Aviles, Heuston and Heuston Legal, PLLC., 337 So. 3d 474

(Fla. 5th DCA 2022).

Hasson v. Hasson, 339 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Trial court erred in ordering the Former Husband to pay $40,000 in temporary attorney’s

fees and $40,000 in temporary forensic accounting fees within 10 days. - § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat.

requires a court to consider “the financial resources of both parties” when ordering fees. The

Appellate Court reversed and remanded the judgment because the order was not supported by

competent and substantial evidence. The Former Wife did not establish a need for fees and did not

provide a financial affidavit. Further, the evidence was insufficient to show that the Former

Husband had the ability to pay significant fees in a short period of time.

Cummings v. Cummings, 342 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

A court order determining only entitlement to attorney’s fees without a determination as to

the amount of those fees is not ripe for appellate review.

Valente v. Raissi, 343 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

Because no amount of fees had been ascertained or awarded, the appellate court was without

jurisdiction to provide appellate relief. An order determining an entitlement to attorneys’

fees and costs without setting the amount is a nonfinal, non-appealable order.

Saad v. Abud, 341 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Nothing in the text of § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. provides for an award for costs.

Your Support Solution, P.A. v. Ovalles, 343 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

The plain language of Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.5(f)(3)(A) does not prohibit

a contingency fee to recover post-judgment child support arrearages. – The Contingency Fee

Agreement in this case is enforceable because Your Support Solution, P.A. was hired to recover

past-due amounts of child support nearly two (2) years after the final judgment established the

amount of support.

The comment to Rule 4-1.5 explains that “[t]his provision does not preclude a contract for a

contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment

balances due under support, alimony, or other financial orders because such contracts do

not implicate the same policy concerns.”

Erskine v. Erskine, 344 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It is within the trial court’s power to award temporary attorney’s fees and costs, in an

original action, to defend against an appeal. Such an award does not exceed the trial court’s

jurisdiction under § 61.16, Fla. Stat.

Merriman v. Adler, 338 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

Attorney’s fees may not be awarded without factual findings regarding the reasonable

hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended in counsel’s representation of a

party. – The Former Wife appealed an order arguing that the Trial Court did not have requisite

findings to support the amount of attorney’s fees awarded. The Appellate Court reversed and

remanded the award since the Trial Court’s findings of entitlement to fees were precluded by the

lack of transcript of the fee hearing, as well as the lack of findings in the order to support the

amount of fees awarded.

Moquin v. Bergeron, 338 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

An award of attorney's fees requires competent and substantial evidence. - Under § 61.16,

Fla. Stat., any determination regarding an appropriate award of attorney’s fees in proceedings for

dissolution of marriage, support, or child custody requires competent, substantial evidence. A trial

court may order a party to pay reasonable attorney’s fees after considering both parties’ financial

resources. The Appellate Court awarded the Former Husband the proceeds of two marital

residences as his separate property and instructed the Trial Court to address whether awarding the

Former Wife attorney’s fees on remand is appropriate.

Nizahon v. Bach, 339 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A trial court may allow an award of attorney’s fees to be paid over time; however, an order

that imposes a payment plan must set forth some factual basis for imposing the specific

payment plan selected. – The Trial Court erred in awarding attorney’s fees because the Trial

Court's order requires the Former Husband to pay the attorney's fees award in monthly installments

for eight months yet does not include any factual basis for the installment period or the installment

amount.

Frownfelter v. Frownfelter, 338 So. 3d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

An order that determines entitlement to attorney’s fees but not the amount is unripe for

appellate review.

Adams v. Adams, 340 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to rely on findings of need and ability under alimony factors in awarding attorney’s

fees. – The Trial Court erred when it failed to make any specific findings regarding Former Wife’s

need for or Former Husband’s ability to pay attorney’s fees. This constitutes reversible error.

Rodolph v. Rodolph, 344 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to award attorney’s fees from an order that grants entitlement only and reserves

on the amount. – The trial court found that the Former Wife had incurred $23,600 of attorney’s

fees. The Final Judgment entered is seemingly contradictory as it ordered Former Husband to pay

$23,600 while also granting Former Wife’s request only as to entitlement and reserving on amount.

The fee award is only proper if the trial court has made sufficient findings as to the need and

ability to pay and determined the reasonableness of the fees, including the reasonableness of

the time and hourly rate. – It was insufficient to award fees based solely upon the Former

Husband’s relative and overall superior financial circumstances.

Goulding v. Goulding, 341 So. 3d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

A trial court must determine both entitlement to fees and costs and the amount owed, without

which it is a nonfinal, nonappealable order.

Cadavid v. Saporta, 344 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is an abuse of discretion to impose sanctions against Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel

under section 57.105(8) where the record did not contain, or the trial court did not rely on,

“clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner knowingly made a false statement or

allegation in the petition . . . with regard to a material matter.” – In Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d

451, 452 (Fla. 2018), the Florida Supreme Court held that it is permissible to award fees under

section 57.105 in actions for injunctions for protection against repeat, dating, or sexual violence.

Following the issuance of Lopez, the legislature amended section 57.105, to add subsection (8),

which states as follows: “(8) Attorney fees may not be awarded under this section in proceedings

for an injunction for protection pursuant to s. 741.30, s. 784.046, or s. 784.0485, unless the court

finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner knowingly made a false statement or

allegation in the petition or that the respondent knowingly made a false statement or allegation in

an asserted defense, with regard to a material matter as defined in s. 837.011(3).” The legislature

has expressly limited the circumstances in which attorney's fees can be awarded in cases involving

an injunction for protection against domestic violence, requiring a higher standard and level of

proof, rather than just satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. A more stringent, clear

and convincing evidence standard must be met.

Petitioner’s failure to prove her case by preponderance of the evidence did not satisfy level

of proof necessary to support award of fees under § 57.105(8), Fla. Stat. – In the instant case,

the award of attorney's fees was not permitted under the plain language of the statute because the

record did not contain “clear and convincing evidence” that the former girlfriend knowingly made

a false statement or allegation in her petition with regard to a material matter. Instead, the trial

court determined only that the former girlfriend was not paralyzed by fear. While this finding may

support the denial of an injunction for protection under a preponderance of the evidence standard,

it is insufficient to meet the heavy burden of supporting an award of attorney's fees.

Mitchell v. Flatt, 344 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

Although the Trial Court properly found that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees and

costs under Fla. R. Civ. P. Rule 1.380(d), based upon defendant’s failure to attend scheduled

deposition, it was error to determine amount of attorney’s fees without considering expert

testimony as to reasonableness.

Award of attorney’s fees reversed without remand for further hearing where Plaintiff’s

counsel was aware of obligation to present expert testimony to establish that requested fee

was reasonable and made a conscious decision to forego any continuance and proceed

without the necessary evidence.

Shir Law Group, P.A. v. Carnevale, 345 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

A court’s failure to allow notice and hearing prior to entering sanction order against

dependents on its own initiative violated the defendants’ due process rights. – While a trial

court possesses the inherent authority to impose attorneys’ fees against an attorney for bad faith

conduct. The inherent authority of the trial court, like the power of contempt, carries with it the

obligation of restrained use and due process. Accordingly, the trial court must make express

findings of bad faith and provide the attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard and present

evidence prior to entering the sanction and imposing the attorneys’ fees. A trial court's failure to

allow notice and a hearing prior to entering a sanction order is violative of a defendants’ due

process rights.

Collins Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Riveiro, 348 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

No abuse of discretion in awarding the prevailing party attorney’s fees to the unit owner

after unit owner voluntarily dismissed his action against the association where the trial court

found that the unit owner dismissed his action not because he was destined to lose on the

merits, but rather because the association’s subsequent actions gave the unit owner the relief

he sought and rendered the action moot.

Fetchick v. Fetchick, 346 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

It is error to refuse to establish a fee award without corroborating expert testimony after

determining an entitlement to fees incurred in bringing a successful contempt action. § 61.16,

Fla. Stat. expressly states that such evidence is not required.

It is error to dismiss a subsequent motion to determine amount of attorney’s fees based on

lack of jurisdiction. Trial court was not required to reserve jurisdiction to set amount of

award in contempt order because, specific to award of attorney’s fees, the contempt order

was a non-final order which was merely prefatory to another order establishing fees that

former wife owed. – In the instant case, the Court ruled that Father was entitled to fees based on

the contempt of the Mother and invited him to file another motion to determine the amount. Thus,

specific to the award of attorney's fees, as outlined in Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla.

4th DCA 1994), the contempt order was a non-final order and merely prefatory to another order

establishing the fees Mother owed. As such, the Trial Court did not need to reserve jurisdiction to

set the amount of the award.

Rich v. Rich, 346 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

The Trial Court’s denial of the Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs was overturned,

as the Trial Court failed to consider the parties’ relative financial positions and the conduct

of the parties during the proceedings.

Singer v. Singer, 347 So. 3d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

When the parties stipulated that the Court would reserve the issue of attorney's fees for a

subsequent hearing, that agreement was binding upon the Court. Therefore, the trial court

erred when it subsequently ruled on the issue contrary to the stipulation.

Johansson v. Johansson, 2022 WL 4360609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The Appellate Court denied both parties’ respective requests for attorneys’ fees and costs

because both of their requests were made in their respective briefs, not in a separate motion

as required by Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b).

Findings

Oyebanji v. Collier, 336 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

In order to impute income for child support purposes, a court must make specific findings

of fact concerning the job market, the party’s most recent employment history, occupational

qualifications, and prevailing earnings level in the local community.

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 330 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)

Specific findings of fact regarding the reasonableness of the hourly rate of the attorney and

the number of hours expended are not per se required in connection with a temporary fee

award.

Rodolph v. Rodolph, 344 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

A trial court must make a finding that a party has met or failed to meet his or her burden

regarding the proof of a substantial change in circumstances in an action for modification of

alimony. – While the Trial Court found that the retirement of the Former Husband was ”justified”,

it made no specific finding of fact concerning whether the retirement was a substantial change in

circumstances.

In awarding fees and costs, a trial court must make findings regarding need and ability to

pay. Further, a trial court must make findings of fact regarding the reasonableness of the

attorney’s fees and the reasonable number of hours and hourly rate for the party’s counsel.

Kirby v. Kirby, 345 So. 3d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

The trial court must make findings of fact regarding the net incomes of the parties when

evaluating a claim for alimony.

A trial court must make findings as to ability to pay when awarding alimony.

Merriman v. Adler, 338 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

The trial court committed reversible error by failing to include factual findings to support

the amount of attorney’s fees awarded. – The Appellate Court reversed the award of attorney's

fees and remanded the case to the Trial Court to make and set forth specific findings regarding the

reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended in counsel's representation

of the Former Husband.

Olguin v. Olguin, 339 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

The trial court’s final judgment was deficient because it failed to include sufficient factual

findings explaining how it calculated the Former Wife’s net monthly income and failed to

include sufficient factual findings explaining how to Former Husband had the ability to pay

the alimony ordered by the court. – Both parties’ financial affidavits included overstated

monthly expenses. The trial court did not express the factual findings as to the calculation of the

Former Wife’s income or how her expenses were overstated. Further, the Trial Court found that

the Former Husband had the ability to pay the Former Wife’s needs based on his financial affidavit,

but the findings were insufficient for the Appellate Court to conduct a meaningful review. The

Trial Court committed reversible error due to providing no competent, substantial evidence as to

the Former Wife’s need for alimony and the Former Husband’s ability to pay.

Smith v. Smith, 338 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

The lack of findings supported by competent, substantial evidence when determining

equitable distribution preclude a meaningful review of the distribution ordered by the trial

court. – The Appellate Court found that remand was necessary for the trial court to reevaluate its

award of alimony and the equitable distribution of marital assets by making the necessary findings

of fact tailored to the statutory factors set out in § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat., § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat., and

§ 61.075(3), Fla. Stat.

Adams v. Adams, 340 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to rely on findings of need and ability under alimony factors in awarding attorney’s

fees.

Rodolph v. Rodolph, 344 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to deny a petition for modification of alimony without specific factual findings

regarding a party’s current expenses and needs.

It is error to award attorney’s fees from an order that grants entitlement only and reserves

on the amount.

A fee award is only proper if the trial court has made sufficient findings as to the need and

ability to pay and determined the reasonableness of the fees, including the reasonableness of

the time and hourly rate.

Arzillo v. Arzillo, 343 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

It is error to impute income without specific findings as to the current employment market

and jobs available in the community.

Hassenplug v. Hassenplug, 346 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

The trial court must make findings based upon the child’s best interest in determining

residence for school designation.

Jurisdiction and Venue

Webking v. Webking, 340 So. 3d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

The trial court was without jurisdiction when it entered an order in violation of a stay

imposed by the Appellate Court.

Travis v. Travis, 346 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

A court may clarify what is implicit in a final judgment and enforce the judgment. But after

a final judgment is rendered, a trial court lacks jurisdiction under § 61, Fla. Stat. to

determine property rights, unless the final judgment reserves jurisdiction for a specific

purpose regarding identified property. – See Semko v. Semko, 537 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA

1988); Flanders v. Flanders, 516 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). The trial court clarified

the final judgment when entering the QDRO on a program listed in the final judgment, though the

full name of the retirement program was not used. The clarification therefore did not distribute a

new benefit in either the QDRO or the accompanying Addendum.

The trial court exceeded its limited jurisdiction when entering QDROs after Former

Husband filed his notice of appeal.

Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

A trial court is not required to remain within the “four corners” of a motion to dimiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction. – The onus was on the opposing party to allege sufficient

jurisdictional ultimate facts in her initial pleadings. In this case, the Former Wife did not offer any

evidence to refute Former Husband’s sworn statements contained within Former Husband’s

motion to dismiss.

Malek v. Malek, 2022 WL 2821933 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

A trial court does not have jurisdiction to order the transfer of corporate property or assets

without joinder of the corporation. – See Austin v. Austin, 120 So. 3d 669, 674 (Fla. 1st DCA

2013); Ehman v. Ehman, 156 So. 3d 7, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Feldman v. Feldman, 390 So.2d

1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

Holt v. Holt, 343 So. 3d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

A trial court retains jurisdiction over both the entitlement to and amount of attorneys’ fees

until the matter of fees has been finalized.

Mandelko v. Lopresti, 345 So. 3d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

It is error to deny, for lack of jurisdiction, a motion to set aside, clarify, and/or enforce final

judgment of dissolution of marriage on the grounds that the motion was not filed within one

year of final judgment. Motion was essentially a motion to enforce a provision of the final

judgment incorporating pension benefits and, accordingly, the one-year time limitation of

Fla. R. Civ. P. Rule 1.540(b)(1) or Fla. R. Civ. P. Rule 12.540(b)(1) did not apply.

Chatani v. Blaze, 346 So. 3d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

No error in dismissing petition to establish paternity for lack of jurisdiction. Competent,

substantial evidence supported trial court’s finding that Mother intended to permanently

reside in Michigan. Trial court correctly determined that child’s home state was Michigan.

Where the Mother and minor child were in Michigan for the entire seven months preceding

the date of the petition, there was no date the minor child resided in Florida within the six

months preceding the filing of the petition from which the trial court could look back to

determine if Florida was the minor child’s home state. – A court may look backwards from a

date the child lived in Florida, which may have occurred as much as six months prior to the

commencement of the custody proceeding, and determine whether, at that time, the minor child

had lived in Florida for six consecutive months. In the instant case, however, for the entire seven

months preceding the date Father filed his amended petition, there was no date which the minor

child resided in Florida.

Mother’s allegedly unjustifiable conduct of continually informing Father she would

eventually return to Florida when in actuality she intended to remain permanently in

Michigan does not vest a Florida court with jurisdiction. Unjustifiable conduct does not

confer jurisdiction, but simply operates as a basis for a court to decline jurisdiction if a party

engages in it. – § 61.521(1), Fla. Stat. states, “if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this

part because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the

court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction.” This provision essentially provides that when a

party has engaged in unjustifiable conduct to establish jurisdiction under the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, a Florida court shall decline, not accept, that

jurisdiction. As previously outlined in Benson v. Evans, 901 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), this

provision does not serve as an independent basis to vest or invoke jurisdiction, but instead allows

a basis for a court to decline jurisdiction gained as a result of the unjustifiable conduct.

Fetchick v. Fetchick, 346 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

It is irrelevant that a modified final judgment contained no reservation of jurisdiction

because the contempt proceeding was separate and distinct from the modification

proceeding. – “When a trial court renders a final judgment in an action, its jurisdiction over that

action is terminated, except that it retains continuing jurisdiction to enforce its judgment.” Kozel

v. Kozel, 302 So. 3d 939, 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). Thus, a trial court retains continuing

jurisdiction to enforce that judgment, including by findings of contempt and establishing the

associated fees owed.

Paternity

Nelson v. Mirra, 335 So. 3d 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

An acknowledgement of paternity does not establish rights of timesharing for a father. In

the absence of a court order, the mother of a child born out-of-wedlock has “primary

residential care and custody of a minor child.” – The Fifth District re-iterated the existing case

law interpreting § 744.301(1), Fla. Stat. holding that paternity status alone does not establish

custody rights. A court order is required.

Dep't of Revenue by Zelaya v. Trochez, 343 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

It is a departure from essential requirement of law resulting in material injury irremediable

on appeal when Court ordered Mother and her minor child to submit to genetic testing

pursuant to presumed Father’s request. – No party to any family law proceeding is entitled to

an order requiring another party to submit to genetic testing unless the proceedings place paternity

“in controversy” and “good cause” exists for the testing. A trial court is further charged with

determining that the testing would be in the “child's best interest.”

Certiorari relief is proper because presumed father’s petition was insufficient to place

paternity in controversy or establish good cause for compelled genetic testing.

Under applicable statutory scheme, presumed father was required, at a minimum, to raise

allegations of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact, or communicate his intent to disestablish

paternity; because he did neither, the challenged order runs afoul of essential requitements

of law.

Procedure

Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe, 336 So. 3d 698 (Fla. 2022)

The parties to an arbitration agreement can empower the arbitrator to determine questions

of arbitrability. More specifically, the parties can, by referring to the AAA Rules, expressly

delegate to an arbitrator issues concerning arbitrability. – In an interesting opinion based

heavily on U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Court authority, the Florida Supreme Court resolved

a dispute between the Second, Third, and Fifth Districts (quashing the decision of the Second

District and approving of decisions by the Third and Fifth Districts).

Florida Water and Mold Restoration, LLC v. American Integrity Insurance

Company of Florida, 335 So. 3d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Where no responsive pleadings have been filed and the initial pleadings have never

previously been amended, it is error to dismiss a complaint with prejudice. – Confession of

error by appellee for dismissal in contravention of clear case law and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).

In Re: Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure – Form

12.350, 346 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 2022)

Modifies Fla. Fam.Law R.P. Rule 12.350 to more accurately reflect the parties to a family

law action by inserting respondent and modifying defendant to third-party defendant.

Dike v. Dike, 336 So. 3d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

Repetitive pro se filing of appeals of non-appealable, non-final orders may lead to sanctions

and prohibition on further pro se appellate filings.

Polo v. Hernandez, 338 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

A hearing on exceptions to the report of a general magistrate is mandatory under Fla. Fam.

Law R. P. Rule 12.490(f). It is error to deny a timely motion to vacate an order ratifying the

report of a magistrate when no hearing was conducted on timely filed exceptions to the

report.

Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

In the absence of exceptions, a trial court does not err in adopting the report of the general

magistrate without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Marcelus v. Aqua Finance, 337 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

While a court may dismiss an action if a party fails to attend a case management conference

or a pretrial conference, the court may do so only if the conduct is willful and contumacious,

and it makes specific findings supporting that determination.

Pimienta v. Rosenfeld, 346 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

It is not error to deny a request for continuance on the basis that a psychological report is

not yet ready when the record shows that the delay in completion of the report is the result

of conduct by the party seeking the continuance. – The Mother in this case sought a continuance,

which was denied, and then elected not to participate in the subsequent three-day trial that resulted

in an award of sole timesharing to the Father along with ultimate decision making to the Father

based upon the recommendation of the guardian ad litem. Thereafter, she appealed the denial of

her motion for continuance of the trial.

Moquin v. Bergeron, 338 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Trial court erred in equitably distributing property under § 61, Fla. Stat. because a valid

and enforceable premarital contract existed directing the parties to employ the laws of

Quebec. - A forum court must initially apply its own conflict of law rule with respect to a contract,

such as a premarital agreement, in order to determine the law it must apply. Florida follows the

conflicts of law rule where, if the place of making the contract and performing it are not the same,

the laws of the place in which the contract was made shall govern matters of execution,

interpretation and validity. Generally, Florida courts enforce contractual choice-of-law provisions

unless enforcing the chosen forum’s law would contravene strong Florida public policy.§

61.040(4), Fla. Stat. has codified that any attempt to apply the law of a foreign country is void if

it contravenes the strong public policy of this state or if the law is unjust or unreasonable.

In re: Amendments to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.340, and

Forms 12.930(b) and 12.930(c), 346 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2022)

Effective July 14, 2022.

Modifies Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.340(b) to exclude from the ten additional interrogatories

authorized to be sent to a party the expert interrogatories authorized by Fla. Fam. L. R. P.

12.280.

Hunter v. Robertson, 346 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Per curiam affirmed. – A trial court’s adoption of Wife’s proposed final judgment after failing

to make oral findings or conclusions of law was not an improper delegation of its decision-making

authority under Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So.2d 383 (Fla. 2004) because: (a) the final judgment

was not verbatim adoption of proposed order; (b) the Husband had opportunity to submit proposed

final judgment and object to Wife’s proposed final judgment; and (c) the trial court actively

participated in hearing. Further, the Husband failed to raise an objection to the proposed final

judgment based upon the “verbatim theory” and therefore cannot now complain error for the first

time on appeal. Musgrave v. Musgrave, 290 So. 3d 536, 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

Massey v. Thomas, 342 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Where a district court of appeal encounters an express holding from the Florida Supreme

Court on a specific issue and a subsequent contrary dicta statement on the same specific

issue, the district court of appeal is to apply the Florida Supreme Court’s express holding in

the former decision until such time as the Florida Supreme Court recedes from the express

holding. – On April 6, 2020, the Florida Supreme Court issued AOSC20-23 regarding

comprehensive COVID-19 emergency measures for Florida trial courts and required trial courts

to implement certain procedures to mitigate the effects of the public health emergency and to keep

courts operating at the fullest extent consistent with public safety. The Florida Supreme Court

amended AOSC20-23 to require chief judges of the trial courts to issue administrative orders that

would require the presiding judge for each civil case to manage civil cases in a specific manner.

The plain language of this order directed the trial court to “strictly comply” with the Florida Rules

of General Practice and Judicial Administration by concluding litigation “as soon as it is

reasonable and justly possible to do so” and by applying “a firm continuance policy allowing

continuances only for good cause shown.” No language in the order required or authorized the

trial court to automatically dismiss the case, effectively with prejudice, for failure to adhere to a

court-ordered deadline in contravention of prevailing law.

The Court dismissed the underlying matter in this case with prejudice because it interpreted

AOSC20-23 to require strict compliance with time deadlines or face dismissal. This conflicts with

the factors set forth in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1993), which identifies six factors

for consideration by a trial court judge to determine whether a sanction less severe than dismissal

with prejudice appears to be a viable alternative. Since the Court misinterpreted AOSC20-23 as

requiring strict compliance without regard to Kozel, it erred.

Decuir v. State, 343 So. 3d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.516 requires parties to serve

their filings on all parties or the parties’ counsel in the case and to include a certificate of

service reflecting the time and method of such service.

Pursuant to § 28.215, Fla. Stat., the clerk of the circuit court shall provide ministerial

assistance to pro se litigants, which shall not include the provision of legal advice. Such

assistance does not require the clerk of the circuit court to serve the petitioner’s filings for

him/her.

Becker v. Becker, 343 So. 3d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Although a return of service of process is presumptively correct, the invalidity of service may

be established by clear and convincing evidence.

Drop service is appropriate when an individual being served attempts to evade service. – The

Wife filed a motion to dismiss Husband’s petition for dissolution of marriage based on improper

service. The evidence presented at the hearing showed the process server clearly identified that he

“had a summons and complaint and that [the Wife] was being served with a lawsuit”, that she

didn't accept the court papers, that she didn't answer to her name, that she did not wait for an

explanation of the contents of the papers, and that she proceeded into her father's house instead of

accepting such service. Further, the evidence established that after the Wife evaded service, her

father blocked access and said the process server would have to “deal with him.” Accordingly, the

process server placed the papers in a conspicuous location and screamed to anyone listening that

the Wife has been served. The trial court denied her motion. The issue is whether the failure of the

process server to inform Wife of the contents of the items rendered service defective. It did not.

Allen v. Allen, 346 So. 3d 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

It is not an abuse of discretion when a court denied motion to reopen supplemental final

judgment that specified Former Husband’s pension obligations to Former Wife under a

previously entered consent judgment in order to allow Former Husband to take additional

testimony from a witness who had testified at a previous trial.

Although motion to reopen was timely, it was not based on claim of newly discovered

evidence and would not have yielded any testimony that could have altered trial’s result.

Further, Former Wife would have been unfairly prejudiced by having to retry central issue.

In Re: Amendments to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 and Family

Law Rule of Procedure 12.530, 346 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 2022)

The following sentence is added to rules 1.530(a) and 12.530(a): “To preserve for appeal a

challenge to the sufficiency of a trial court's findings in the final judgment, a party must raise

that issue in a motion for rehearing under this rule.”

Additionally, added is the following Court Commentary to both rules: “The amendment to

subdivision (a) does not address or affect, by negative implication, any other instance in

which a motion for rehearing is or might be necessary to preserve an issue for appellate

review.”

Mandelko v. Lopresti, 345 So. 3d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Because an incorporated marital settlement agreement was ambiguous, enforcement is not

possible until trial court determines parties’ intent at the time they entered agreement.

Remand for evidentiary hearing for purpose of determining parties’ intent regarding

distribution/payment of Former Husband’s pension benefits and resolving ambiguity based

on relevant evidence. – Although a trial court may be motivated to do what it considers fair and

equitable, it retains no jurisdiction to rewrite the terms of a marital settlement agreement under the

guise of enforcing the agreement, nevertheless, if the settlement agreement's terms are ambiguous,

the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties’ intent before ruling on a

motion to enforce the agreement.

Cleveland Wellness Med., LLC v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 346 So. 3d 1278 (Fla.

5th DCA 2022)

The trial court erred by relying on a judgment from a separate case that was not attached to

the complaint or incorporated by reference when it granted the Defendant’s motion to

dismiss. – The Appellate Court determined that the Court effectively relied on information outside

of the Complaint when granting the motion to dismiss. This was error because the trial court is

constrained to the four corners of the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss.

In re Amendment To Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.200,

2022 WL 4241850 (Fla. 2022)

Fla. Fam. Law R. P. Rule 12.200, which governs Case Management and Pretrial

Conferences, was amended to delete a sentence stating, “Orders setting pretrial conferences

must be uniform throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the court.”

Singer v. Singer, 347 So. 3d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The Trial Court erred when it failed to follow a procedural stipulation entered into by the

parties.

Jamerson v. Dixon, 346 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)

Generally, where an order dismisses a complaint without prejudice, the order is not a final,

appealable order. However, there is an exception when the record clearly indicates that the

Plaintiff's right to pursue the case requires the filing of a new case because that is effectively

a final order.

Athienitis v. Makris, 346 So. 3d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

The Former Wife’s procedural due process rights were violated when the Trial Court

awarded the Former Husband relief not framed by his pleadings and the Former Wife was

not present at the hearing. – During a Zoom hearing on a number of matters, both parties were

present, and the trial court began the hearing by outlining the matters set for that day. One of the

matters not set for that day was the reapportionment of parenting coordinator fees. However,

during the hearing, the Former Wife received an adverse ruling from the Court and logged off of

the Zoom. Subsequently, the Former Husband testified that he was also seeking reimbursement of

the parenting coordinator’s fees. The Trial Court granted the Former Husband’s request. On

appeal, the Former Husband argued that the issue was tried by implied consent, but the Appellate

Court disagreed because “unpled issues tried when a party does not appear are not tried by consent,

but in absentia.” As this issue was not tried by expressed or implied consent, it was reversible error

for the trial court to grant the requested relief.

Johansson v. Johansson, 2022 WL 4360609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

The trial court committed reversible error because its written order was inconsistent with

its earlier oral pronouncement, which requires reversal.

White v. Lee-Yuk, 2022 WL 4360606 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Although a mother and her former wife were the only two legally recognized parents on the

child's birth certificate and pending paternity petition had not been adjudicated, putative

father had statutory standing to oppose mother's petition to temporarily relocate with child

out of state.

Contreras v. Heartwood 47, LLC, 2022 WL 4360178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

Property rights cannot be adjudicated in dissolution proceedings where service is by

publication, except to the extent that the court obtains in rem jurisdiction over particular

real property described in the notice of action.

Table of Authority

Cases

A.L.P. v. State, 343 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ................................................................ 23

Adams v. Adams, 340 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ................................................. 12, 30, 35

Airbnb v. John Doe, 336 So. 3d 698 (Fla. 2022) ....................................................................... 38

Allen v. Allen, 346 So. 3d 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) .................................................................. 41

Antunes v. Oliveira, 341 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)......................................................... 17

Arzillo v. Arzillo, 343 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ......................................................... 8, 35

Athienitis v. Makris, 346 So. 3d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)........................................................ 42

Baruti v. Vingle, 343 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ............................................................. 25

Bates v. Bates, 345 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) .................................................................. 17

Beacon Park Phase II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Eagle Vista Equities, LLC, 346 So.

3d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).................................................................................................... 20

Becker v. Becker, 343 So. 3d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ............................................................. 41

Birnbaum v. Mortman, 3412 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)................................................ 18

Briggs v. Briggs, 336 So. 3d 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) .............................................................. 7

Brooks v. Basdeo, 336 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ........................................................... 24

Brown v. Norwood, 343 So. 3d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ........................................................ 16

Cadavid v. Saporta, 344 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)........................................................ 31

Carlson v. Frengut, 2022 WL 4230393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) .................................................. 14

Ceballos v. Barreto, 337 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)............................................................ 4

Chatani v. Blaze, 346 So. 3d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) .............................................................. 36

Chmilarski v. Empire Fire, 340 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)............................................. 22

Cini v. Cabezas, 343 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ............................................................. 23

Cleveland Wellness Med., LLC v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 346 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA

2022) ......................................................................................................................................... 42

Collier v. Collier, 343 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)............................................................... 8

Collins Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Riveiro, 348 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)............................... 32

Contreras v. Heartwood 47, LLC, 2022 WL 4360178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ........................... 43

Cummings v. Cummings, 342 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) .............................................. 29

Davis v. State, 347 So. 3d 315 (Fla. 2022).................................................................................. 23

Decuir v. State, 343 So. 3d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ................................................................ 40

Dep't of Revenue by Zelaya v. Trochez, 343 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)........................ 37

Devalon v. Sutton, 344 So. 3d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................................................ 27

Dike v. Dike, 336 So. 3d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ............................................................ 18, 38

Dorvilien v. Verty, 335 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).......................................................... 14

E.M. v. E.G., 343 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)....................................................................... 5

Edwards v. Alphonse, 345 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) .................................................... 19

Erskine v. Erskine, 344 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).......................................................... 30

Fetchick v. Fetchick, 346 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ................................................ 32, 37

Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ............................................ 18, 39

Fine v. Fine, 338 So. 3d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)..................................................................... 18

Florida Water and Mold Restoration, LLC v. American Integrity Insurance Company of

Florida, 335 So. 3d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ....................................................................... 38

Frownfelter v. Frownfelter, 338 So. 3d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)........................................... 30

Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) .......................................................... 24, 27

Goulding v. Goulding, 341 So. 3d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ..................................................... 31

Green v. Bordiuk, 344 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ............................................................ 26

Hassenplug v. Hassenplug, 346 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ......................................... 5, 35

Hasson v. Hasson, 339 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)......................................................... 29

Hernandez v. Mendoza, 346 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................................... 4, 18

Hiatt v. Mathieu, 2022 WL 3640297 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ........................................................ 5

Holt v. Holt, 343 So. 3d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)...................................................................... 36

Hunter v. Robertson, 346 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)..................................................... 40

In re Amendment To Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.200, .................................. 42

In re: Amendments To Florida Evidence Code, 347 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 2022).......................... 28

In re: Amendments to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.340, and Forms 12.930(b)

and 12.930(c), 346 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2022) ............................................................................ 39

In re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Florida Family Law Rules of

Procedure, and Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms, 2022 WL 2721400

(Fla. 2022) ................................................................................................................................ 20

In Re: Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure – Form 12.350,

346 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 2022)..................................................................................................... 38

In Re: Amendments to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 and Family Law Rule of

Procedure 12.530, 346 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 2022) ..................................................................... 41

Inman v. Inman, 345 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................................................. 13

Jamerson v. Dixon, 346 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ......................................................... 42

Jimenez v. Aviles, Heuston and Heuston Legal, PLLC, 337 So. 3d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

................................................................................................................................................... 28

Johansson v. Johansson, 2022 WL 4360609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).............................. 19, 33, 43

Julio v. State, 342 So. 3d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).................................................................... 19

Karisma Hotels & Resorts Corporation Ltd. v. Hoffman, 346 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA).... 20

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 330 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) ............................................... 11, 33

Kirby v. Kirby, 345 So. 3d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ......................................................... 11, 34

Klement v. Kofsman, 337 So. 3d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ....................................................... 24

Kraus v. Kraus, 344 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).......................................................... 13, 27

Lavrik v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 338 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................. 20

Lentino v. McKinney, 339 So. 3d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) .................................................... 25

Levy v. Donnenfeld, 338 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)........................................................... 4

Logreira v. Logreira, 2022 WL 4360595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)................................................... 6

Malek v. Malek, 2022 WL 2821933 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ......................................................... 36

Mandelko v. Lopresti, 345 So. 3d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).............................................. 36, 42

Marcelus v. Aqua Finance, 337 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)........................................... 39

Martin v. Martin, 344 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)............................................................ 10

Massey v. Thomas, 342 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ......................................................... 40

McDaniel v. McDaniel, 340 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).................................................... 15

McGowan v. McGowan, 344 So. 3d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)................................................... 9

Menada, Inc. v. Arevalo, 341 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)............................................... 22

Merriman v. Adler, 338 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ................................................ 30, 34

Miedes v. Ideses, 346 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ................................................................ 6

Mitchell v. Flatt, 344 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)............................................................... 32

Moquin v. Bergeron, 338 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) .......................................... 12, 30, 39

Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)........................................................ 36

Nelson v. Mirra, 335 So. 3d 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).............................................................. 37

Nizahon v. Bach, 339 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)........................................................... 30

O'Brien v. O'Brien, 2022 WL 4002177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)............................................ 14, 20

Oddo v. Oddo, 340 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)................................................................... 4

Olguin v. Olguin, 339 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ........................................... 8, 12, 15, 34

Orth v. Orth, 338 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) .................................................................... 19

Oyebanji v. Collier, 336 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 1

DCA 2022)......................................................... 14

Oyebanji v. Collier, 336 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)......................................................... 33

Padmore v. Padmore, 335 So. 3d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)........................................................ 7

Payne v. Koch, 336 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ................................................................ 4

Petrinic v. Petrinic, 346 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................................................ 8

Pimienta v. Rosenfeld, 346 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)................................................... 39

Polo v. Hernandez, 338 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) .......................................................... 38

Rich v. Rich, 346 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. 2d 2022)............................................................................. 33

Rivera Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rosello, 336 So. 3d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ............................. 28

Rosaly v. Konecny, 346 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ..................................................... 6, 26

Saad v. Abud, 341 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ................................................................. 29

Sadlak v. Trujillo, 336 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)...................................................... 4, 15

Shavers v. Shavers, 2022 WL 3868022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).................................................... 19

Shaw v. Shaw, 337 So. 3d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................................................. 11, 14

Shenoi v. Shenoi, 345 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).............................................................. 17

Shir Law Group, P.A. v. Carnevale, 345 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).............................. 32

Singer v. Singer, 347 So. 3d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ....................................................... 33, 42

Smith v. Smith, 338 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).......................................................... 8, 34

Spann v. Payne, 346 So. 3d 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ................................................................. 7

SPC Fortebello, LLC v. Catuogno, 343 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)............................. 25

Stevens v. Hudson, 345 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) .......................................................... 26

Thomas v. Thomas, 335 So. 3d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ......................................................... 24

Tinoco v. Lugo, 342 So. 3d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ................................................................ 15

Travis v. Travis, 346 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ....................................................... 18, 35

Twigg v. Twigg, 346 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).................................................................. 8

Valente v. Raissi, 343 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).............................................................. 29

Wallace v. Torres-Rodriguez, 341 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)......................................... 17

Webking v. Webking, 340 So. 3d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ..................................................... 35

Werner v. Werner, 339 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ........................................................ 25

White v. Lee-Yuk, 2022 WL 4360606 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ................................................. 6, 43

William Hamilton Arthur Architect, Inc. v. Schneider, 342 So. 3d 757 (Fla 3d 2022)......... 27

Your Support Solution, P.A. v. Ovalles, 343 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)........................ 29

Florida Statutes & United States Code

§ 28.215, Fla. Stat. ....................................................................................................................... 40

§ 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. .................................................................................................................. 29

§ 57.105(4), Fla. Stat. .................................................................................................................. 28

§ 57.105, Fla. Stat. ....................................................................................................................... 28

§ 61.040(4), Fla. Stat. .................................................................................................................. 39

§ 61.075(1)(i), Fla. Stat.................................................................................................................. 9

§ 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. .............................................................................................................. 8, 34

§ 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. .............................................................................................................. 8, 34

§ 61.075(6)(a), Fla. Stat............................................................................................................... 10

§ 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. .................................................................................................................... 9

§ 61.076, Fla. Stat. ....................................................................................................................... 10

§ 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. .............................................................................................................. 12, 34

§ 61.13(2)(b)3.a., Fla. Stat............................................................................................................. 4

§ 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. ...................................................................................................................... 6

§ 61.13(4)(c)(6), Fla. Stat. ............................................................................................................. 7

§ 61.13001, Fla. Stat. ..................................................................................................................... 6

§ 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat................................................................................................................. 13

§ 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. .................................................................................................................... 29

§ 61.16, Fla. Stat. ......................................................................................................................... 30

§ 61.30(2)(a)(9), Fla. Stat. ........................................................................................................... 15

§ 61.30(3)(g), Fla. Stat................................................................................................................. 15

§ 741.30, Fla. Stat. ....................................................................................................................... 24

§ 744.301(1), Fla. Stat. ................................................................................................................ 37

§ 90.2035, Fla. Stat. ..................................................................................................................... 28

§ 90.502(4)(a), Fla. Stat............................................................................................................... 27

10 U.S.C.A. 1201.......................................................................................................................... 10

10 U.S.C.A. 1408(4)(A) ............................................................................................................... 10

Florida Rules of Procedure

Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.280. ........................................................................................................... 39

Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.340(b) ....................................................................................................... 39

Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b) ........................................................................................................ 19, 33

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) ................................................................................................................ 38

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c) ................................................................................................................ 25

Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.516.................................... 40

Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.5(f)(3)(A) ............................................................... 29