OFF THE RECORD:
PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT
IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS
APRIL 2019
Everywhere barbarous indifference, hard
egotism on one hand, and nameless misery
on the other, everywhere social warfare,
every man’s house in a state of siege,
everywhere reciprocal plundering under the
protection of the law, and all so shameless,
so openly avowed that one shrinks before
the consequences of our social state as they
manifest themselves here undisguised, and
can only wonder that the whole crazy fabric
still hangs together.
Friedrich Engels, “The Great Towns” (1845)
CONTENTS
FIGURES
Introduction .......................................................................................................................1
Background ...................................................................................................................... 1
A Path To Reform ..............................................................................................................2
What is a Mayor’s Court ...................................................................................................2
Methodology.................................................................................................................... 3
Fair Courts ....................................................................................................................... 5
The Problems with Mayor’s Courts ................................................................................. 6
Overview .......................................................................................................................... 6
Policing For Profit ............................................................................................................7
Race and Class Disparity in Mayor’s Courts .................................................................. 11
Case Study: Amberley ...................................................................................................14
Case Study: Cuyahoga Falls ..........................................................................................16
Severe Punishment for Unpaid Fines and Fees ............................................................ 17
Impact Story...................................................................................................................18
Failure to Consider Ability to Pay ..................................................................................19
Delaying Pleas and Ignoring Evidence ..........................................................................21
Solutions .......................................................................................................................... 22
An Alternative Model .................................................................................................... 22
Recommended Reforms ............................................................................................... 23
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................27
Endnotes ....................................................................................................................... 28
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ 30
Figure 1: 2016 Officer Citation Rates ..................................................................................7
Figure 2: Policing For Profit ................................................................................................ 8
Figure 3: Mayor’s Court Gross Revenue as a Percent of Municipal Revenue in 2016... ..10
Figure 4: Driving While Black .............................................................................................11
Figure 5: Relative Risk of Getting a Citation by Race ....................................................... 12
Figure 6: Who Gets Cited in Amberley ..............................................................................14
Figure 7: Racial Distribution of Citations in Amberley Mayor’s Court .............................15
Figure 8: Who Gets Cited in Cuyahoga Falls ..................................................................... 16
Cover Photo: Whitehall, OH Mayor’s Court
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 1
BACKGROUND
In Ohio’s mayor’s courts, the chances of getting a truly fair and
impartial hearing are almost non-existent.
In our year-long investigation, we found that a substantial
proportion of mayor’s courts operate in ways that suest they
prioritize money over justice.
Every day, Ohioans are threatened with and thrown in jail via mayor’s courts: a
shadowy and unaccountable quasi-judicial system that wrings revenue from drivers.
Mayor’s courts are local courts that hear trafc and other minor offenses.
1
They are
relics from the nineteenth century; only Ohio and Louisiana still have them. Yet,
they are big business here in Ohio. One out of six trafc tickets issued in Ohio in
2016 were issued in municipalities with a mayor’s court.
2
Drivers who go to court for
a ticket are entitled to a hearing from a knowledgeable and impartial judge who will
consider all evidence as part of an ofcial court record.
Mayor’s courts are rife with problems. They operate with perverse incentives to
prioritize revenue generation over delivery of justice. Rather than an impartial
judge, a municipality’s mayor can preside in mayor’s courts. A mayor—who is
responsible for the municipal budget and has substantial power over the police—can
easily abuse their position to control a court that directly contributes to municipal
revenue. Mayor’s courts do not document or record proceedings—there are no
transcripts or audio-recordings. This lack of accountability keeps us in the dark
about the extent to which some mayor’s courts use unconstitutional practices that
can coerce people into paying nes and fees. Lastly, a mayor or magistrate who hears
cases in a mayor’s court is only required to have six hours of training per year, and in
some cases even less.
The police and mayor’s courts in some jurisdictions cite and punish Black community
members at disproportionately high rates when compared to white community
members.
3
Revenue-driven mayor’s courts punish people who cannot afford to pay
their citations with additional citations, nes, driver’s license forfeitures, and jail
time. In doing so, mayor’s courts perpetuate a two-tiered system of justice
that criminalizes poverty.
The United States Supreme Court has found abuses and the inherent conict
of interest in Ohio’s mayor’s courts in four separate cases spanning sixty years.
4
Former Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer called for their abolition
in 2008.
5
The Ohio General Assembly has the primary power to reform the mayor’s
court system. But reforms until now have been minimal.
INTRODUCTION
2 | ACLU OF OHIO
A PATH TO REFORM
WHAT IS A MAYOR’S COURT?
Our courts should be fair, transparent, and accountable to the public they
serve. As they currently operate, few mayor’s courts live up to these principles.
We call on the Ohio General Assembly to uphold these principles by enacting the
following reforms:
1. Restore state funding to municipalities so that court nes and fees
are not used to fund municipal and state budgets. The pressure to collect
revenue through court nes and fees undermines the fair operation of courts.
2. Eliminate mayor’s courts in Cuyahoga, Franklin, Hamilton, and
Summit counties. The majority of prot-seeking and racially-inequitable
mayor’s courts are located in these counties. Mayor’s courts are less centrally-
located and therefore more burdensome to travel to than municipal courts in
these metropolitan counties.
3. Increase education and procedural requirements for mayor’s courts.
Thorough training and clear guidelines for court conduct will help mayor’s
courts function fairly.
4. Expand oversight of mayor’s courts. Comprehensive record-keeping and
reporting requirements will hold court ofcials accountable for court conduct.
5. Abolish driver’s license suspensions for any reason not related to
public safety. Taking away people’s driver’s licenses because they cannot pay
their court-imposed debts unfairly punishes poorer people and makes it harder
for people to get and hold jobs, support themselves, and meet their nancial
obligations.
Mayor’s courts were created in the early nineteenth century when Ohio was a
frontier state with a small court system. Mayor’s courts today hear trafc violations
and violations of local ordinances that occur within their municipal boundaries. Any
municipality that does not have a municipal court and has a population of more than
200 people can establish a mayor’s court.
6
In 2016 and 2017, the
years for which we conducted our research, there were 297 and
295 mayor’s courts, respectively. Mayor’s courts are located in
64 of Ohio’s 88 counties.
7
Mayor’s courts were intended to address problems with the
administration of justice two centuries ago. Today, these courts
are supposed to relieve the burden on the municipal court system
by handling low-level cases. If a mayor’s court is located closer to
a person’s home than the nearest municipal court, it may make it
Mayor’s courts today
hear traffic violations
and violations of local
ordinances that occur
within their municipal
boundaries.
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 3
easier for them to appear in court. Proponents argue that mayor’s
courts give defendants “two bites at the apple” because people who
are found guilty in a mayor’s court may request that their case be
transferred to the presiding municipal court for a new trial.
We found many mayor’s courts that do not live up to these claims.
Mayor’s courts are incentivized to be municipal prot centers, and
their structures reect this. They operate at a low cost compared
to municipal courts because they are informal courts that do not
require a separate court building or full-time staff. We reviewed nancial data from
2016 for eight mayor’s court municipalities and found that these municipalities kept
75 to 85 percent of the revenue they collected from their mayor’s court. We found
evidence that police in some mayor’s court municipalities disproportionately cite
Black and poor people who live in or enter their municipality. Rather than making it
easier to appear in court, people who plead “not guilty” in a mayor’s court must go to
court a second time to have their case heard in a municipal court. We saw Ohioans
who claimed to be innocent of their charges waive their rights to challenge
a citation once they were informed that they would have to appear in court
several more times.
Nearly a third of municipalities with mayor’s courts exhibit characteristics that
fair court advocates have identied as problematic because they indicate revenue-
oriented policing and court practices.
8
These police departments and courts serve the
pecuniary interests of their municipalities and run counter to the interests of justice.
The mayor’s courts highlighted in this report represent both rural and metropolitan
municipalities across Ohio. Our case studies provide clear guidance on how to
reform the mayor’s court system and ensure its fair operation.
Mayor’s courts are
incentivized to be
municipal profit
centers, and their
structures reflect this.
We began our investigation of mayor’s courts by reviewing the Supreme Court
of Ohio’s 2016 Mayor’s Court Summary. Using the Supreme Court’s data, we
rst calculated the median number of citations processed in all mayor’s courts
municipalities in 2016, which is 407, and the median ratio of citations per 100
municipal residents, which is 15.3. We identied municipalities with mayor’s courts
that processed 500 or more citations in 2016 and municipalities with a ratio of 80 or
more citations per 100 municipal residents in 2016. We focused on several questions
for these jurisdictions:
1. Are mayor’s courts operating to provide fair justice?
2. Are mayor’s courts being used to generate municipal prots?
3. Do mayor’s courts disproportionately impact poor people and
people of color?
METHODOLOGY
4 | ACLU OF OHIO
Profit-driven policing
and court practices
orient policing and
adjudication toward
revenue-generation
rather than toward
public safety.
We drew from reports on prot-oriented policing and court practices,
9
racial bias
in policing and court adjudication,
10
and driver’s license suspensions
11
to identify
what data was needed to address these questions. Prot-oriented policing and court
practices include activities such as issuing a high proportion of citations compared
to the municipal population, issuing multiple, and often questionable, charges for
minor infractions, and adding charges, nes, fees and even jail time to people who
do not pay promptly and in full. These practices orient policing and adjudication
toward revenue-generation rather than toward public safety. We compiled and
analyzed quantitative data about 1) citations, both the total number of citations
issued by police ofcers and mayor’s courts in mayor’s court municipalities and
the ratio of all citations compared to the residential municipal population;
12
2) for
each municipality, the average number of trafc citations issued per police offer in
2016; and 3) racial composition of those receiving citations compared to the racial
composition of the issuing municipality for all months and years for which we
compiled data from online court dockets for mayor’s courts.
From September 2017 to November 2018, we collected qualitative
data by observing proceedings in 19 mayor’s courts. We chose
courts that had variations in the number of citations issued and
the ratio of citations to the municipal population. We followed up
on our observations in eight of these mayor’s courts by analyzing
court records and municipal nancial records. We requested
court records and nancial statements from an additional 10
municipalities with mayor’s courts, reviewing documents for a
total of 18 mayor’s courts municipalities, in order to understand
the patterns of citation, adjudication, and revenue collection in
these municipalities. We also requested police stafng data for
2016 for all municipalities in Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General. We combined
this stafng data with data on trafc citations issued by police in each mayor’s court
municipality to estimate the average number of trafc citations issued by full-time
police ofcers in 2016. We reviewed online news reports by searching for reports on
“mayor’s courts” as a search term and searching by name for courts we identied
using the measures described above.
We enlisted the assistance of a Geographic Information System (GIS) expert to
analyze and map citation data from the online docket system of 14 courts. We
collected data on race, home address, charges, nes, fees, court costs, and payments
from these online dockets. We interviewed eight people with pending trafc and local
ordinance violation cases in mayor’s courts. During the course of our investigation,
we spoke with public ofcials including municipal court judges, municipal court
clerks, mayors, magistrates, police ofcers, and municipal solicitors.
13
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 5
The problems with mayor’s court stem from the fundamentally
awed premise that courts should be self-funded by the “users”
of the court system. People who are accused of breaking laws are
regarded as the primary users of the courts and are expected to
fund courts, regardless of whether they can afford court imposed
costs and nes. Court ofcials repeatedly expressed to us their
frustration that they were imposing monetary sanctions on people
who were not able to pay them. When we asked why they did not
waive nancial sanctions in such cases, court ofcials explained
that courts must have funding to operate.
Courts are a public resource. Everyone in our society relies on our courts to uphold
laws, enforce contracts, mediate disputes, and remedy injustices. Proponents of
mayor’s courts argue that mayor’s courts perform these crucial duties for their
communities. When ofcials instead see defendants as a critical revenue
stream, abuses are inevitable. Court ofcials also argue that monetary sanctions
are a fair remedy for breaking laws. As we describe in this report, the compounding
legal consequences and monetary sanctions for poorer people who cannot
immediately pay their nes are unduly severe. They far exceed the consequences
and sanctions borne by people who are well-off enough to pay their initial citations,
making monetary sanctions inherently unfair to poorer people.
We base our recommendations on the premise that the function of courts is to deliver
justice fairly. We address upstream issues that compel mayor’s courts municipalities
to seek revenue through their courts and downstream issues of inadequate training
and oversight that permit harmful court practices. We describe how policing
practices in mayor’s court municipalities reinforce residential segregation. We also
describe a model of restorative justice can be enacted in mayor’s courts and offer
the case study of Yellow Springs, Ohio as guide to implementing restorative justice
practices.
FAIR COURTS
Courts are a public
resource. Everyone
in our society relies
on our courts to
uphold laws, enforce
contracts, mediate
disputes, and remedy
injustices.
Brooklyn, OH Mayor’s Court
6 | ACLU OF OHIO
The problems with mayor’s courts are overwhelming. Mayors have the
authority to direct their municipalities’ police to issue citations, and they can use the
mayor’s court to collect nes and fees for these citations to fund their municipalities.
Municipalities have been especially hard-hit since 2012, when the Ohio legislature
slashed funding to municipalities by $1.17 billion a year.
14
As local governments in
Ohio look for ways to supplement their budgets, they often look to courts as sources
of revenue.
15
This creates perverse incentives for municipalities to balance their
budgets through mayor’s court revenue.
Like mayor’s courts, many municipal courts face the same
pressures to make money for the municipalities in their
jurisdiction. But municipal courts are not run by mayors and city
councils. Their independence from local ofcials is critical to how
they operate. Mayor’s courts, on the other hand, are beholden to the
mayor and city council. Mayor’s courts are also problematic because
they lack transparency and oversight. While municipal courts
record what is said in their courtrooms and record all evidence that
defendants bring to court, we do not know of a single mayor’s court
that records its sessions. When a mayor or magistrate in a mayor’s
court violates a defendants rights, they have no evidence of court
misconduct. Many of the defendants that we spoke with in mayor’s courts recognized
misconduct by court ofcials, but felt that if they challenged court ofcials they
would be punished more severely.
The obvious nancial incentives inherent to mayor’s courts erodes public trust in
our police and court systems. There is evidence that revenue collection activities
compromise the criminal investigation functions of local police departments.
This nding is especially robust in smaller cities where police ofcers tend to be
responsible for investigative and revenue-collecting duties.
16
Some members of
the Ohio legislature recognized the problems with mayor’s courts and tried to
address them. Since 2005, there have been nine bills introduced in the Ohio General
Assembly that attempt to reform or even abolish mayor’s courts. These efforts have
largely failed. Those who want to abolish mayors courts argue that the lack
of transparency and temptation to generate revenue through these courts
make them anathema to the interests of justice. Those who support mayor’s
courts emphasize that mayor’s courts perform a service to their communities and
reduce the burden on the local populace and on municipal courts.
OVERVIEW
THE PROBLEMS WITH MAYOR’S COURTS
Mayor’s courts are
beholden to the mayor
and city council.
Mayor’s courts are also
problematic because
they lack transparency
and oversight.
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 7
Our research nds that there is validity to each of these claims. In their efforts to
squeeze revenue out of defendants, some mayor’s courts saddle people with crippling
debts and even send them to jail for charges resulting from minor trafc violations.
Other mayor’s courts, mainly those in rural areas, reduce travel distances for people
by hearing cases locally. While less active courts may not be driven by nancial
motives, they lack transparency and accountability because mayor’s courts are
not courts of record. We discuss our ndings in detail in the following sections.
The risk that mayors will turn mayor’s courts into revenue engines is not theoretical.
In 2016, the Village of Kirkersville issued more trafc citations than the total
number of village residents (572 trafc tickets and 525 residents). When the
Kirkersville Police Chief resigned from his position in March 2018, he stated that
Kirkersville Mayor Terry Ashcraft had demanded that the Kirkersville police staff
focus on “enforcing trafc laws.” He elaborated that the mayor had threatened to
abolish the police department if they did not follow his order.
17
Kirkersville is not unique. Our analysis of police citation rates suggests that a large
proportion of mayor’s court municipalities allocate police resources toward issuing
citations. In Figure 1, we show that ofcers in almost half of Ohio’s mayor’s courts
issued an average of 50 or more citations in 2016. There is considerable variation
among the number of trafc citations issued by police based on the mayor’s court
municipality where they are employed—indicating that police in some mayor’s
court municipalities are issuing citations at far higher rates than those in
fellow mayor’s courts.
POLICING FOR PROFIT
FIGURE
OFFICER CITATION RATES
151
150
100
50
0
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CITATIONS PER OFFICER
NUMBER OF MAYOR’S COURTS
73
26
6 6
2
3
2
4
2
ABOVE 450
400-449
350-399
300-349
250-299
200-249
150-199
100-149
50-99
0-49
8 | ACLU OF OHIO
The 51 mayor’s court municipalities in which police ofcers issued an average
of more than 100 tickets are distinct from both metropolitan areas and other
mayor’s court municipalities. Figure 2 shows that ofcers in these mayor’s court
municipalities issued an average of 168 trafc tickets each in 2016.
18
In comparison,
police ofcers in other mayor’s court municipalities issued an average of 42.8 trafc
citations each in 2016, and ofcers in Cleveland, Columbus, Akron, and Cincinnati
issued an average of 36.4 trafc citations each in the same year. Another indication
that police ofcers in these municipalities were ticketing to generate revenue
was the practice of issuing multiple citations for each trafc stop. In our review of
citations and through court observations, we found this to be a prevalent practice in
Newburgh Heights, Bratenahl, Parma Heights, Lockland, Whitehall, and Reading.
One possible explanation for these differences in police citation rates is that
metropolitan areas have higher rates of violent crime than suburban and rural
areas
19
where mayor’s courts are located. Because of this, police in metropolitan
areas may spend more of their time dealing with violent crime than police in mayor’s
court municipalities. But this does not satisfactorily explain the stark differences
in citation rates we see between high-citation mayor’s court municipalities and all
other mayor’s court municipalities.
Another possible explanation for the difference in citation rates is that
municipalities in which police issue high numbers of citations have fewer police. In
this case, police ofcers would issue more tickets on average because each ofcer
FIGURE
POLICING FOR PROFIT
CITATIONS PER OFFICER CITATIONS PER 100 RESIDENTS OFFICERS PER 1,000 RESIDENTS
36.4
200
100
0
42.8
8.21
9.7
2.26 2.26 2.12
35.8
168.8
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL COURTS
MAYOR’S COURTS, CITATION RATES LESS THAN 100 PER OFFICER
MAYOR’S COURTS, CITATION RATES GREATER THAN 100 PER OFFICER
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 9
is policing a greater number of people. However, the difference in the average
citation rates per ofcer cannot be explained by differences in police stafng in these
municipalities. In 2016, mayor’s court municipalities in which police ofcers issued
an average of more than 100 trafc citations each had an average of 2.12 ofcers per
1,000 municipal residents. Municipalities in which ofcers issued an average of less
than 100 citations each had an average of 2.26 ofcers per 1,000 residents. Though
there is only a six percent difference in police stafng between these two types of
mayor’s courts municipalities, police ofcers in the 51 municipalities with the
highest average citation rates issued almost four times as many tickets as
ofcers in all other mayor’s courts (see Figure 2).
Another reason for differences in ofcer citation rates may be that municipalities
where police ofcers issue more tickets are more populated, so there is a greater pool
of people that can be ticketed. However, municipalities in which police ofcers issued
more than 100 tickets each in 2016 had an average population 3,967 municipal
residents, which is 33 percent lower than municipalities where police ofcers issued
far fewer citations.
Assuming that there is no variation in driving quality between
drivers in urban, suburban, and rural regions of Ohio, we
would expect the average number of trafc tickets issued per
100 municipal residents to be higher in Cleveland, Columbus,
Cincinnati, and Akron than in mayor’s court municipalities.
Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, and Akron have a denser
structure of freeways, state routes, and local roads than other
regions of Ohio and therefore have more trafc. The average
number of citations issued by city police ofcers and the average
number of citations issued per 100 city residents should be greater
in cities than these averages in mayor’s court municipalities.
Police ofcers in municipalities in which ofcer citation
rates were greater than 100 trafc citations each had a strikingly high
ratio of trafc tickets compared to their municipal resident populations.
Police ofcers in these mayor’s court municipalities issued an average of 35.8 tickets
per 100 municipal residents, which was 436 percent greater than the citation rates
of police ofcers in Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, and Akron, and 369 percent
greater than the citation rates of police ofcers in other mayor’s court jurisdictions. It
is unlikely that police in municipalities with high ofcer citation rates in 2016 were
dealing with a unique population of drivers that committed trafc infractions at
four times the rate of drivers elsewhere in the state. The stark disparities in citation
rates suggest that police resources were used to generate municipal revenue through
issuing trafc citations.
The use of police resources to make money from trafc citations is further supported
by the high proportion of municipal revenue collected through mayor’s courts. Ohio is
not alone in this regard. The 2015 Department of Justice investigation of Ferguson,
Missouri found that “city ofcials consistently set maximizing revenue as the
priority for Ferguson’s law enforcement activity.” Issuing these citations in the rst
The stark disparities
in citation rates
suest that police
resources were
used to generate
municipal revenue
through issuing traffic
citations.
10 | ACLU OF OHIO
instance, coupled with the coercive tactics used to collect these nes, lead to serious
abuses of the residents of Ferguson. The investigation found that approximately 10
percent of the total revenue collected by Ferguson in 2010 came from citations. Using
this gure for comparison, we looked at what proportion of municipal revenue was
collected through mayor’s courts. We obtained municipal and mayor’s court revenue
information for seven municipalities, three in which police issued an average of
100 citations or more in 2016, and four in which ofcers issued fewer than 100
citations on average. Figure 3 shows that two of the three municipalities,
Lockland and Bratenahl, collected nearly ten percent or more of their
2016 municipal revenue through their mayor’s court. We included Newburgh
Heights because our court observations and interviews indicated that Newburgh
Heights’s police ofcers are infamous for issuing trafc citations. We used budget,
police stafng, and ticketing data from 2015 for Newburgh Heights. Police in
Newburgh Heights issued 97.5 tickets each in 2015, and the municipality collected
more than 14 percent of its total revenue that year through its mayor’s court. Though
North Olmsted’s revenue only comprised 3.8 percent of its total revenue, the city
collected $1,366,896 from its mayor’s court, the highest amount of any of the mayor’s
courts we researched.
*Municipalities with average police citation
rates greater than 100 citations per ofcer.
FIGURE
MAYOR’S COURT GROSS REVENUE AS PERCENT
OF TOTAL MUNICIPAL REVENUE IN
BRATENAHL *
NORTH COLLEGE HILL
LOCKLAND *
NORTH OLMSTED *
NEWBURGH
HEIGHTS
(2015)
NORWOOD
PARMA HEIGHTS
15
10
5
0
PERCENTAGE
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 11
The incentive and opportunity to collect revenue explains some of the
hyperactivity of police ofcers in inner-ring mayor’s courts municipalities. Inner-
ring municipalities are suburbs that share a border with their city. In mayor’s
court municipalities near large, demographically diverse cities, the cost of this
hyperactivity is imposed on and felt most deeply by the poorest communities, and is
inequitably distributed across race and class lines.
Figure 4 shows citation data from 14 mayor’s court municipalities. It compares
the percent of Black people that reside in each mayor’s court municipality with the
percent of citations issued by that municipality to Black residents and non-residents.
In all but two municipalities, Silverton and Woodmere, the proportion of citations
issued to Black people is much higher than the Black population of the municipality.
This suggests that there is racial disparity in who is stopped and ticketed
in these municipalities.
To further test racial disparities in ticketing, we calculated the risk of getting a
citation for Black commuters compared to white commuters using county-level
Census data on Black and white commuters in each county. In Figure 5, all risk
ratios above 1 indicate that Black drivers were at greater risk of getting a citation
than white drivers. All ratios below 1 indicate that Black drivers were at lower risk
of getting a citation than white drivers.
Black drivers were at the most extreme risk of getting a citation compared to white
drivers in inner-ring mayor’s court municipalities. This in part stems from the fact
RACE AND CLASS DISPARITY IN MAYOR’S COURTS
FIGURE
* Inner-ring suburb
DRIVING WHILE BLACK
AMBERLEY *
NORWOOD *
PATASKALA
SILVERTON *
FAIRFAX *
CANAL WINCHESTER
PARMA HEIGHTS
NEWBURGH HEIGHTS *
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS *
NORTH OLMSTED
LOCKLAND *
CUYAHOGA FALLS *
WOODMERE
SPRINGBORO
60
40
20
0
PERCENTAGE
PERCENT BLACK IN MUNICIPALITY
PERCENT BLACK CITATIONS
12 | ACLU OF OHIO
that more Black people live near inner-ring suburbs than in the outer suburbs of
Cuyahoga, Hamilton, and Summit counties. A closer look at the racial composition
of the municipalities and their surrounding areas, a more troubling explanation
emerges.
Our analyses suggests that police stops and citations in predominantly white
mayor’s court municipalities in the inner-ring suburbs help preserve racial
boundaries.
20
For example, only 9.5 percent of municipal residents in the Cincinnati
suburb of Amberley are Black, yet 54 percent of citations issued by Amberley police
were issued to Black people. Amberley is located in the 45237 zip code, which is 73.8
percent Black. Residents of Amberley are much richer than their neighbors; the
median value of a house in Amberley in 2016 was $305,500, whereas the median
value of a house in the 45237 zip code is $96,100.
Police in Newburgh Heights issued 50 percent of citations to Black people, yet in
2016 only 19.7 percent of the population of Newburgh Heights was Black. Newburgh
Heights is entirely in the 44105 zip code, which was 74.6 percent Black in that
same year. The average household income in Newburgh Heights was 27 percent
higher than the average household income in the 44105 zip code. Since white
people perceive that property values are inuenced by the racial composition of
municipalities,
21
white enclaves attempt to protect white wealth by preventing Black
people from moving into their neighborhoods. Citations signal to Black drivers who
enter white communities that they are out of place and penalize them for driving
through the community.
Citations issued to Black drivers are disproportionately high when compared to the
number of Black drivers who have access to a car. Using demographic information
from the American Community Survey and estimates on Black and white
households’ access to a vehicle from the National Equity Atlas, we can estimate the
FIGURE
RELATIVE RISK OF GETTING A CITATION BY RACE
AMBERLEY *
NORWOOD *
PATASKALA
SILVERTON *
FAIRFAX *
CANAL WINCHESTER
PARMA HEIGHTS
NEWBURGH HEIGHTS *
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS *
NORTH OLMSTED
LOCKLAND *
CUYAHOGA FALLS *
WOODMERE
SPRINGBORO
4
5
3
1
2
0
RATIO
5.0
4.2
3.6
2.4
2.1
2.0
1.5
1.1
0.7
.06 .06
0.5
0.4
5.1
* Inner-ring suburb
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 13
expected rate of trafc tickets that should be issued to Black and white motorists
based on population rates of drivership. If police wrote tickets in proportion to the
number of motorists, and driving patterns were generally similar across races, at
most 22 percent of tickets should be issued to Black motorists in Cuyahoga County
and 19 percent of citations should be issued to Black motorists in Hamilton County.
Figure 4 shows that with the exception of Cuyahoga Falls, which is a suburb of
Akron, police ofcers in every inner-ring suburb of Cleveland and Cincinnati that we
investigated issued more than 25 percent of citations to Black people.
Our ndings align with a large body of research addressing police tactics
that are used to enforce suburban residential segregation.
22
Research on
policing nds that police ofcers are far more likely to investigate Black drivers in
a white neighborhood, relative to white drivers in a Black neighborhood.
23
Black
drivers in white neighborhoods are more likely to be stopped and questioned than
Black drivers in Black neighborhoods.
24
In addition to disproportionately citing Black community members, our review of
citation data from mayor’s court jurisdictions in Cuyahoga, Franklin, Hamilton, and
Summit counties suggests that revenue-oriented mayor’s court municipalities use
state roads and national highways generate revenue from those passing through
their municipalities on these roads. Roads are a shared public resource; over 70
percent of the costs for maintaining state roads and highways
are paid for through shared pools of state and federal income and
gasoline taxes and state driver’s registration and license fees.
25
Revenue oriented municipalities with mayor’s courts treat
these roads as private tollways, and a disproportionately
high number of these tolls are levied against people who do
not live in their municipality.
We mapped the home address listed on every citation issued by
ofcers accountable to a given mayor’s court using data collected
from the courts’ online dockets. Available court data ranged from
nine months to twelve and a half years. Figures 6 and 8 show
mapped citations issued to community members who live within
a 12 mile radius of the mayor’s court municipality. Because the
average trip distance for drivers in the Midwest is 12.8 miles,
26
these maps capture the majority of drivers likely to pass through the mayor’s court
municipality. We show each person cited as a single dot on the map. The dots are
color-coded to represent the race listed in the citation and the municipalities on the
map are colored to show the racial composition of each municipality.
The two featured maps show that these mayor’s courts issue the majority
of citations to people who do not live in their municipality. This was true
of all 13 mayor’s courts for which we analyzed address data. Ofcers in
Springboro issued 54.2 percent of citations to people who do not reside in Springboro,
the lowest of any of the 13 courts for which we analyzed this data. Ofcers in
Lockland and Silverton issued the highest proportion of citations to people who did
not live in their municipalities, with 95 percent of citations issued to non-residents.
Officers in Lockland
and Silverton issued
the highest proportion
of citations to people
who did not live in
their municipalities,
with 95 percent of
citations issued to
non-residents.
14 | ACLU OF OHIO
The map for Amberley in Hamilton County (Figure 6) demonstrates how wealthy
white communities can function to extract resources from their less economically-
advantaged and Black neighbors through mayor’s courts. A mere 9.5 percent of
the population in Amberley is Black, yet more than half of the citations
issued by the Amberley police were to Black people. Amberley is located in
two zip codes; in one zip code, 75.2 percent of the population is Black, and in the
other zip code 50.9 percent of the population is Black. The median household income
in Amberley was $124,750 in 2016, more than three times the median household
income of $34,186 in the 45237 zip code, and more than twice as much as the $49,974
median income in the 45213 zip code. Amberley also issues a substantial portion
of tickets to their poorer white neighbors. Citations for white and Black people by
Amberley police ofcers are densely clustered around the less wealthy and more
racially mixed southern borders of the village. This suggests that police resources
are allocated to roadways that have through trafc from these areas.
CASE STUDY: AMBERLEY
FIGURE
AMBERLEY
9.5% BLACK IN MUNICIPALITY
54.0% CITATIONS ISSUED TO
BLACK PEOPLE
88.4% WHITE IN MUNICIPALITY
41.9% CITATIONS ISSUED TO
WHITE PEOPLE
21.1% OF CITATIONS ISSUED TO
AMBERLEY RESIDENTS
78.9% OF CITATIONS ISSUED
TO PEOPLE WHO DO NOT LIVE
IN AMBERLEY
Demographic data from American
Community Survey estimates for
2016
Citation data for Amberley is
for all citations issued between
November 2014 and November
2017.
WHO GETS CITED IN AMBERLEY
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 15
The graph below (Figure 7) shows the top ten charges listed on citations issued to
Black community members by Amberley police
27
from November 2014 to November
2017. The most common charge for both Black and white drivers was for speeding,
with 327 and 363 citations respectively. Black drivers were cited for non-safety
related license violations such as driving without a license, not displaying a license,
and operating a vehicle under suspension, much more frequently than white drivers.
Black drivers received 944 charges for license violations, whereas white drivers
received 341 charges. Though Black people have slightly lower rates of drug use
than white people,
28
Amberley police charged Black people with drug possession
2.55 times more often than they charged white people with drug possession. Police
in Hamilton County, where Amberley is located, stopped Black driver’s 1.4 times
more frequently than they stopped white drivers.
29
Though we do not know the
rates at which Amberley police stopped Black drivers relative to white drivers, the
higher number of drug possession charges for Black drivers suggests that police in
Amberley stopped and searched Black drivers more frequently than they searched
white drivers.
Similarly, citations for driving with a child who is not in a car
seat (“Child not in restraint”) were only issued to Black drivers, though
research on car seat use suggests that white drivers also do not comply
with child car seat regulations.
30
FIGURE
DID NOT DISPLAY OPERATOR’S LICENSE
CHILD NOT IN RESTRAINT
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
NO OPERATOR LICENSE
OPERATING A VEHICLE UNDER SUSPENSION
SPEEDING
WHITE
0 100 200 300
BLACK
DISPLAY OF LICENSE PLATE
DRUG POSESSION
WINDOW TINT
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY SUSPENSION
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CITATIONS
IN AMBERLEY MAYOR’S COURT
16 | ACLU OF OHIO
Citations issued by police in Cuyahoga Falls (Figure 8) cluster on the eastern
side of the municipality. Our review of stop locations for Cuyahoga Falls conrms
that police issue many tickets to motorists driving on I-76, suggesting this
busy thoroughfare generates municipal revenue. Citations within the city are
disproportionately issued in the southeastern-quadrant, in an area that has
historically been a working-class neighborhood.
31
In contrast, very few citations are
issued in the wealthier northwestern part of the municipality. Our map shows that
Cuyahoga Falls police issue more citations in the poorer, southeastern area of the
municipality than they do in the wealthier, northwestern area.
CASE STUDY: CUYAHOGA FALLS
FIGURE
CUYAHOGA FALLS
3.7% BLACK IN MUNICIPALITY
17.0% CITATIONS ISSUED TO
BLACK PEOPLE
91.9% WHITE
67.4% CITATIONS ISSUED TO
WHITE PEOPLE
PERCENT OF CITATIONS
ISSUED TO CUYAHOGA FALLS
RESIDENTS COMPARED TO
NON-RESIDENTS, UNKNOWN.
Demographic data from American
Community Survey estimates for
2016
Citation data for Cuyahoga Falls
is for all citations issued between
September 2017 and November
2017.
WHO GETS CITED IN CUYAHOGA FALLS
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 17
Revenue-oriented policing is compounded by the focus on revenue
generation in the mayor’s court. Instead of acting as neutral
arbiters of the law, many magistrates in the mayor’s courts we
observed use their authority—including the threat and reality
of jail time—to compel the payment of nes and fees. We found
problematic court practices in 16 of the 19 mayor’s courts that we
observed or for which we reviewed records.
An especially harmful and common practice is the issuance
of bench warrants, which authorize the arrest and jailing of
an individual for missed court appearances. The majority of
these missed court appearances are for continuances given
for unpaid nes. In 2016, the Lockland Mayor’s Court issued
1,688 warrants, North College Hill’s Mayor’s Court issued 928
warrants, Newburgh Heights Mayor’s Court issued 784 warrants,
and Norwood’s Mayor’s Court issued 712 warrants. Bratenahl
Mayor’s Court issued 125 bench warrants between May 1, 2017
and August 1, 2017. Because mayor’s courts only have jurisdiction
over local ordinance and trafc cases, the majority of these warrants were issued
for minor violations and had little relation to public safety. Jail time would be
considered an unduly harsh penalty for trafc violations, yet mayor’s
courts routinely issue warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated
for failing to appear in court due to unpaid nes and fees for minor
charges.
People who cannot pay their court-imposed debts may avoid coming back to court
because they fear arrest. During our observations of the Lockland Mayor’s Court in
2013 and again in 2017 and 2019, we spoke to three people who described how they
had been handcuffed to a wall in the Lockland police station and instructed to call
friends and family to raise money to pay their nes and fees. Of the 18 courts for
which we reviewed records, 14 courts issued arrest warrants when people failed to
appear in court.
Another way mayor’s courts deprive people of liberty for unpaid nes and fees is
by taking away their driver’s licenses. Under Ohio law, courts can issue license
forfeitures if people fail to appear for a court date. A license forfeiture suspends a
person’s driver’s license; people are required to pay a $40 fee with the Ohio Bureau
of Motor Vehicles and an additional fee from the mayor’s court to have their license
reinstated. We examined electronic dockets from 14 courts and found that ten
mayor’s courts issue license forfeitures when people with unpaid nes miss court
dates.
32
We requested records from ve additional mayor’s courts and found that
these courts issued more than 100 license forfeitures each in 2016. These same
mayor’s courts collectively issued hundreds of citations to people for driving under
a suspended license in the same year. This vicious system of taking away
licenses and then ning unlicensed drivers traps people in a cycle of debt
and tethers them to the mayor’s court indenitely.
SEVERE PUNISHMENT FOR UNPAID FINES AND FEES
During our
observations of the
Lockland Mayor’s
Court, we spoke to
three people who
described how they
had been handcuffed
to a wall in the
Lockland police station
and instructed to call
friends and family to
raise money to pay
their fines and fees.
18 | ACLU OF OHIO
The routine misconduct by prot-oriented mayor’s courts can have serious
consequences for people who have been cited by them, as we found by talking to
Karen G. about her experience in the Lockland Mayor’s Court.
Karen’s daughter still remembers the day when “mommy had her pink bracelets on.”
Unfortunately, Karen was wearing handcuffs, not bracelets. Karen recalls this
traumatizing experience all too clearly. It was a sunny day in May 2010 and her
youngest daughter’s birthday. Karen was on her way to pick up a birthday cake
along with her eldest daughter, but rst she had to attend a hearing at the Lockland
Mayor’s Court.
The trouble began when Karen was cited for driving with expired license plates. The
court staff continued her hearing and instructed her to go to the BMV to ‘straighten
out her license’ and come back in a few weeks. Karen followed the court’s orders and
went back to court just a few days later. Thinking that she would be able to quickly
leave court, and unable to nd childcare, Karen brought her children with her.
Karen gave the Lockland court ofcials her BMV documents and stated that she
just wanted to put this case behind her. The court staff told her that she owed
approximately $600 in nes and costs. Karen was told to be seated and wait to see
the clerk regarding her case. Eventually Karen and her children were taken into
a hallway to see the clerk who stated that she needed to pay her full balance of
approximately $600 before she could leave. Karen assumed she would be given time
to pay or be offered some sort of payment plan. Instead, when Karen stated that she
could not pay in full, an ofcer handcuffed her to the wall in the ‘phone room’
in front of her children. Karen was given one hour to make phone calls to attempt
to come up with $600.
In 2010, Karen’s family income was $30,000 for a family of four. Karen was
unemployed at the time and her husband was on the verge of a lay off so
her family could not afford to pay over $600 on the spot. Karen’s husband picked
up her children, and she was taken to a jail in a neighboring county nearly an hour
from her family. When Karen was placed in the police vehicle, she began to cry. She
was jailed simply because she could not pay, and to make matters worse, she was
forced to endure this humiliating injustice in front of her children on one of their
birthdays. In the face of Karen’s clear distress, the only response of the police ofcer
taking her to jail was to tell her, “You’re a big girl, stop crying.”
The Supreme Court has made it clear that it is unconstitutional to incarcerate an
individual for failing to pay nes and fees that they cannot afford.
33
Nevertheless
Karen was jailed for one a half days, until her husband could pay off her nes and
costs and secure her release.
Although we spoke with Karen nearly four years after this traumatic experience,
she remembers it clearly.
IMPACT STORY
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 19
From our review of records for 18 mayor’s courts and court-watching, we did not
nd a single record of a court assessing people’s ability to pay their nes. Failure to
inquire into the reasons that someone cannot pay their nes results in increased
punishment for people who are too poor to pay them. When Ohioans are jailed for
nonpayment where there has been no inquiry into their ability to pay, this violates
both Ohio law
34
and the U.S. Constitution.
35
Revenue-oriented mayor’s courts make it difcult for people who appear in their
courts to get ne reductions or alternatives such as community service if they are
unable to pay their full nes. During our observations of the mayor’s courts
in Lockland, Reading, Bratenahl, Brooklyn, Newburgh Heights, North
Olmsted, and Parma Heights, magistrates announced to the courtroom
that the court would not issue “payment plans” and that payments were
due in full. We witnessed people who stated they were unable to pay or who asked
for payment plans made into examples for the other people in the courtroom.
For example, in Parma Heights Mayor’s Court on September 14, 2017, the third
person who was called to appear in front of Magistrate George Lonjack stated that
he could not pay the full amount of nes and fees that day. He asked if he could make
a partial payment towards his total nes and fees, and Magistrate Lonjack said
“Speak up. I am going to say this so everyone can hear because we are going to have
to do this every time.” After making the man repeat his request, Magistrate Lonjack
stated that “there are no payment plans” and that he had to “impose on [the person]
to come back to court.” Magistrate Lonjack repeated a common refrain in the mayor’s
courts we observed: “If you pay, you don’t have to see [the magistrate].” During a
different case on the same date, Magistrate Lonjack explained that he was obligated
to impose two sets of court costs for two different citations, even though the citations
for tinted glass and display of license plates were issued during the same trafc stop.
When the person who received these fees stated that he did not have any money to
pay towards his nes and fees, Magistrate Lonjack said “You are in the court with
no money? Truly amazing.” No inquiry into ability to pay was made. Instead the
defendant was issued a continuance of one month, along with instructions that this
possibly indigent person would either have to pay his ne or appear in court.
We used payment data from 14 courts to track payments made on court imposed
nes, fees, and costs for two years. Our research conrms two commonsense
assumptions: that lower court debt amounts are paid more frequently than
higher amounts, and that if people do not pay in the rst six
months, they often do not pay at all. Approximately ten percent
of court-imposed debts remain unpaid, even after several years.
From our court observations, we learned that people are not simply
skipping out on the payment of court debts; instead, they do not pay
because they cannot afford to do so. During our court observation in
Reading on October 16, 2018, a man who could not pay expressed
his frustration that he kept having to return to the court because
the court would not give him a payment plan or dismiss his nes
and court costs. He explained to the magistrate that he could
not pay any money because he was on a xed income and did not
FAILURE TO CONSIDER ABILITY TO PAY
People who stated
they were unable to
pay or who asked for
payment plans were
made into examples
for the other people in
the courtroom.
20 | ACLU OF OHIO
have anything extra to save for his court debts. The man said that he was tired of
constantly having to return to court and was willing to go to jail to clear his case.
We observed several mayor’s court magistrates operate with the presumption that
people are able to pay and are willfully not paying their debts to the court, without
conducting ability-to-pay hearings. These mayor’s courts issue steep nes and
fees and driver’s license forfeitures and bench warrants for unpaid court debts.
This increases people’s court debts, sometimes leading to multiple driver’s license
suspensions from different courts and several sets of reinstatement fees. This
snowballing of suspensions and nes makes it impossible for people to pay off their
debts and return to good standing with their driver’s license. Though courts have
the authority to cancel or discharge nes
36
in their entirety, the mayor’s courts
we observed rarely do so. Instead, most insist on full payment of court debt, issue
continuances for payment, and very occasionally issue payment plans. Because an
estimated one-third of Ohioans live in or near poverty,
37
many people cannot afford
even small payments and are permanently saddled with court-imposed debt.
Magistrates in 14 of the 19 mayor’s courts we observed issued continuances
without assessing people’s nancial capacity to pay their nes and fees.
Rather than reducing or dismissing court debts accordingly, magistrates in mayor’s
courts routinely issue continuances that require people to appear in court until
the total of their nes and fees are paid. Many people may not be able to afford to
pay their ne at all, even if they are given more time to do so. People who return to
court and are still unable to pay their court debts are given additional continuances,
again without any assessment of nancial capacity to pay these debts. We observed
magistrates in Reading, Newburgh Heights, Parma Heights, North Olmsted, and
Whitehall mayor’s courts warn people who had returned to court after several
continuances and were still unable to pay their nes and fees that the court would
only issue a limited number of continuances.
While continuances appear to be helpful by allowing people additional time to pay
their citations, issuing these continuances without assessing whether people can
afford to pay any money at all ignores the sacrices people must make in order to pay
their trafc tickets. We talked with people who delayed paying their utility
bills and even buying groceries to pay their nes.
Continuances are especially harmful for poorer community members who may have
to travel back and forth to the court multiple times because they are unable to pay off
their nes and fees. Continuances in these cases prolong contact with mayor’s courts,
which increases the likelihood that people will miss additional court dates. Because
of this, poorer people face greater risk of being jailed or losing their driver’s
licenses for failing to appear in court than people who can afford to pay
their nes. In our review of the court records of 18 courts, we found thousands of
arrest warrants, license forfeitures, and additional citations that were issued in 2016
for missed court dates that resulted from continuances. Through these practices,
revenue-oriented mayor’s courts turned minor offenses into crippling debts, driver’s
license suspensions, and jail time for people who were unable to pay their nes and
fees.
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 21
The magistrate or mayor who hears cases in a mayor’s courts should act as an
impartial arbiter of the law. Instead, we observed magistrates who attempted to
deter people from pleading not guilty and who disregarded and failed to record
evidence. Mayor’s courts only have to provide a public defender to defendants in
their court if a case goes to trial. Since less than one percent of cases in mayor’s
courts go to trial, most hearings in mayor’s courts are conducted without
any legal support to defendants. Because mayor’s courts do not record their
proceedings, magistrates and mayors who hear cases can use coercive tactics to
pressure people into paying nes to the court.
Rather than register “not guilty” pleas and arrange for these cases to be transferred
to the presiding municipal court, magistrates we observed in North Olmsted,
Newburgh Heights, and Parma Heights instructed people who pled “not guilty”
to wait to speak to a prosecutor before they could have their cases transferred. In
the Newburgh Heights Mayor’s Court, we spoke with a woman who was charged
with operating a vehicle under the inuence of alcohol and pled “not guilty.” The
prosecutor encouraged her to continue her case with Newburgh Heights, and she
did. We learned from court observations and interviews that people often plead
“guilty” after they return to court several times because they want to resolve their
case. As one man in Whitehall mayor’s court said after returning to court for a third
time after being issued continuances for not guilty pleas, he pled guilty because
he “just wanted to get it over with.”
Magistrates in revenue-oriented courts fail to record evidence that people
bring to court in their own defense. On March 13, 2018 in the Highland Hills
Mayor’s Court, we observed Magistrate Don Williams adjudicate a hearing for a
woman who had been charged with reckless operation and failure
to control her vehicle. The woman explained that she had slipped
on “black ice,” a colloquial term describing a clear, undetectable
sheet of ice that can form on asphalt roads in below-freezing
weather conditions. The woman stated that she was not guilty and
had brought written statements to court from people in her ofce
whose cars had also slipped on ice in the same area. Magistrate
Williams did not look at these documents or enter them into her
record. Instead, the magistrate said that “everyone was driving
negligently that day.” Magistrate Williams dismissed the reckless
operation charge but upheld the failure to control charge.
During our observation of the Lockland Mayor’s Court on
November 8, 2017, we witnessed a case where a woman was
charged for speeding more than 10 miles over the limit in a 25
miles-per-hour zone. The woman asked for documentation that
the speed gun had been tested that day and conrmed to be working correctly. The
magistrate stated that the woman would have had to ask for this information before
the court date. Rather than schedule a second arraignment or trial so that the police
department could produce this documentation, the magistrate found the defendant
guilty of speeding without giving her the opportunity to challenge key evidence
about the proper functioning of police equipment.
DELAYING PLEAS AND IGNORING EVIDENCE
Because mayor’s
courts do not record
their proceedings,
magistrates and
mayors who hear
cases can use
coercive tactics with
impunity to pressure
people into paying
fines to the court.
22 | ACLU OF OHIO
We have described the serious problems we found in mayor’s courts in this report.
However, the mayor’s court in Yellow Springs shows that mayor’s courts have the
potential to be centers of justice. We met with Mayor Pam Conine, Ellis Jacobs, a
member of the Yellow Springs Justice System Task Force (JSTF), and Elise Burns,
the Yellow Springs Clerk of Courts to discuss their mayor’s court in October 2018.
Unlike the prot-oriented mayor’s courts highlighted in this report, Yellow
Springs mayor’s court operated at a $35,704 loss in 2017 and an $18,308 loss
in 2018. While the problem of operating at a loss was raised in the village council
meeting on September 4, 2018, citizens and village ofcials remain steadfast in their
commitment to maintaining their local mayor’s court. While the village continues to
manage this decit, the JSTF reviews any proposed changes to the mayor’s court and
evaluates proposals in light of the Six Pillars framework developed by the President
Obama’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing.
38
These pillars are: Building Trust and
Legitimacy; Policy and Oversight; Technology & Social Media; Community Policing
& Crime Reduction; Training & Education; and Ofcer Wellness & Safety.
Mayor Pam Conine and Ellis Jacobs, a member of the task force, described how the
mayor’s court in Yellow Springs adjudicated cases based on these principles. Mayor
Conine stated that she often lowers nes and always allows for payment plans. In
some instances, the Mayor will offer the alternative of community service rather
than imposing a ne. For example, a young man was cited for littering in the nature
preserve in Yellow Springs. Mayor Conine offered him the choice of paying a ne or
performing community service. When the young man opted for community service,
Mayor Conine arranged for him to clean the nature preserve with the park ranger on
a weekend.
The JSTF is an accepted and critical part of the village governing structure in Yellow
Springs. The task force helps the village government address problems in policing,
adjudication, and sentencing in the criminal justice system. While Yellow Springs
is a relatively well-off community in rural Ohio, the report recommendations are
designed to be implemented in every community in the United States. Mayor’s court
municipalities across Ohio can improve their practices if they implement the policies
outlined in President Obama’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing report.
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
SOLUTIONS
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 23
Our ndings indicate the need for comprehensive reform of the mayor’s courts
system. The problems with mayor’s courts are not limited to a few bad-actor
courts or mayors; our analysis of all 297 of Ohio’s mayor’s courts found evidence
that police ofcers in over one–third of municipalities with mayor’s courts issued
citations at rates that far exceed the citations issued by ofcers in non-mayor’s court
municipalities in 2016. Ofcers in these municipalities issue multiple citations for
the same trafc stop, often for minor charges. Our observations of 19 mayor’s courts
and our review of court records for 18 mayor’s courts nds that court procedures
are geared towards levying nes and fees based on the citations issued by the police
and doling out unduly severe punishments to people who cannot pay these nes
and fees. The remaining two-thirds of mayor’s courts do not keep any court records
of proceedings, are infrequently audited, and the mayors and magistrates who
adjudicate mayors courts have limited training. The policing and court practices
in municipalities with mayor’s courts erodes public trust in the criminal justice
system. The Ohio General Assembly must reform the mayor’s court system
so that it is grounded in the principles of fairness, transparency, and
accountability.
The Ohio General Assembly must alleviate the nancial strain on
municipalities by increasing funds to local governments. Incentives for prot-
oriented policing and court practices are built into the mayor’s court system
because municipalities in Ohio are underfunded and because there is little
oversight of mayor’s courts. The Supreme Court of the United States,
39
the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
40
and federal district courts
41
in Ohio have
ruled that there are signicant due process problems with mayor’s courts
caused by revenue-seeking behavior. The courts have held that the
potential to fund municipal budgets from mayor’s courts makes
mayors who hear cases vulnerable to “forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant” and “not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true between the state and the accused.”
42
The systemic underfunding of Ohio’s municipalities increases the pressure
on mayor’s courts to generate revenue for their municipalities. Municipalities
were the hardest hit by changes to the state budget beginning in 2013,
specically the cuts to the Local Government Fund, the elimination of the
estate tax, and the revised business tax deduction. The business tax deduction
alone is a loss of $450 million a year for the state,
43
and it is wealthy Ohioans
who benet the most from these tax cuts.
By funding municipalities adequately through fair taxation, the Ohio General
Assembly will weaken the incentive to balance municipal budgets on the
backs of poor Ohioans. This will improve the lives of all Ohioans, including
those targeted by mayor’s courts.
RECOMMENDED REFORMS
RECOMMENDATION 1:
Restore state funding to municipalities.
24 | ACLU OF OHIO
In 2016, the sum total of citations issued by the mayor’s courts in rural
counties accounted for less than 20 percent of all citations issued by mayor’s
courts that year. Rural mayor’s courts are in communities that are far
from municipal courts and where there is limited or no access to public
transportation.
44
Mayor’s courts that are in rural counties have the potential
to serve their communities by making it easier for people to appear in court.
But rural mayor’s courts remain susceptible to the lack of fairness,
transparency, and accountability that is endemic to all mayor’s courts.
Increasing the educational requirements for all mayor’s courts staff, enabling
municipal courts to appoint magistrates to mayor’s courts, and enforcing the
requirement that mayor’s courts audio record their hearing will make mayor’s
courts more fair accountable to the public.
In 2016, more than ten percent of trials in mayor’s courts were
conducted by a mayor,
45
even though a mayor who conducts mayor’s
court does not need to have a law degree.
46
The Supreme Court of the
United States and other state and district courts in Ohio have found that
mayor’s courts in which mayors adjudicate cases are particularly suspect
for violating defendants’ due process rights.
47
Though some mayors may
adjudicate cases fairly, mayors should not have judiciary powers. Giving
mayors judicial authority consolidates power in the executive ofce and
hinders the ability to use checks and balances to ensure fair governance.
Mayors should be prohibited from hearing cases in mayor’ courts. Magistrates
who are appointed by mayors or municipal councils may not be impartial
because they face pressures from these powerful community members to
generate revenue through the mayor’s court. For this reason, magistrates
should be appointed and paid by the municipal court with jurisdiction in the
area.
Educational requirements should also be increased. Under current law, a
mayor’s court magistrate does have to be a lawyer, but they only need three
years of experience practicing law in Ohio to hear cases in a mayor’s court.
Mayor’s courts in Cuyahoga, Franklin, Hamilton, and Summit counties
should be eliminated for two reasons. First, there is compelling evidence of
racial disparities in mayor’s court municipalities that are inner-ring suburbs
of Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, and Akron. Second, both inner-ring and
outer suburbs with mayor’s courts are less centrally-located than municipal
courts. These mayor’s courts are more difcult to reach by car or public
transportation, which make it harder for people to appear in a mayor’s court
than in a municipal court.
RECOMMENDATION 2:
Eliminate mayor’s courts in Cuyahoga, Franklin, Hamilton, and Summit counties.
RECOMMENDATION 3:
Increase education and procedural requirements for mayor’s courts.
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 25
The Supreme Court of Ohio should be given disciplinary oversight of mayor’s
courts. Currently, there is very little oversight of mayor’s courts by the state
judiciary or the legislature. Yet mayor’s courts issued over 200,000 tickets
a year in 2016 and 2017. Courts that have the power to criminalize and ne
Ohioans should be accountable to Ohio’s highest court.
The Ohio General Assembly should prohibit mayor’s courts from issuing
additional citations, nes, fees, license forfeitures, and bench warrants before
the court conducts an ability-to-pay hearing. Ohio law already requires courts
to give defendants documented ability to-pay hearings with access to legal
counsel; this law protects people from being jailed because they are too poor
to pay their nes. These protections must be extended to additional legal
sanctions to ensure that people are not punished for being too poor to pay their
trafc tickets and other citations. This would prevent the piling up of nes and
fees and the bureaucratic tangle that people face when they try to get their
driver’s license suspensions cleared.
To increase transparency and reduce racially-disparate policing, mayor’s
courts should be required to publish publicly available data on the racial
demographics of the people cited by their municipality’s police ofcers. They
should also be required to publish the number of failure to appear citations,
arrest warrants, arrests that result from these warrants, and the number of
jail days they impose on people along with the racial demographic information
for each of these legal interactions.
The magistrates and mayors who adjudicate in mayor’s courts are
only required to have six hours of training a year for the rst year,
and only three hours a year the following years,
48
to hear cases. This is
far less experience and training than most judges. The Supreme Court of Ohio
instructs mayors to require mayor’s court clerks and other court personnel to
attend mayor’s court training, however this training is left up to the mayors.
There are currently no mechanisms available to the Supreme Court of Ohio
or the Ohio General Assembly to enforce training for clerks and other court
personnel.
The problems from the lack of legal training required in mayor’s courts are
amplied by the lack of accountability and transparency. Though the Supreme
Court of Ohio requires mayor’s courts to audio record their proceedings,
49
we
do not know of a single mayor’s court that records its proceedings.
Legal training should be based on a model of restorative justice that “seeks to
prevent future violence and disruption by nding responses to law-breaking
behavior that are proportionate, meaningful, and enforce accountability.”
50
Our case study of Yellow Springs suggests that mayor’s courts may be ideally
suited to implement restorative justice practices because they primarily
adjudicate low-level, non-violent crimes.
RECOMMENDATION 4:
Expand oversight of mayor’s courts.
26 | ACLU OF OHIO
Ohio issued 3.2 million driver’s license suspensions in 2016. We analyzed
driver’s license suspension data for 2016 from the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles and found that over half of license suspensions were for
nancial reasons that have no relation to public safety. Over 1.2
million suspensions were for failure to show proof of automobile insurance and
an additional 484,000 suspensions were license forfeitures issued for non-
payment of court nes or for missing court dates. Many of these suspensions
were issued to the same individuals, who continue to accumulate suspensions
because they cannot pay the nes and costs required to keep their driver’s
licenses valid. In 2016, drivers with a suspended license had an average of
2.96 suspensions on their license.
It is estimated that three-quarters of people with suspended licenses in the
United States continue to drive.
51
In much of Ohio, especially in rural areas,
there is limited or no public transportation available, leaving people with
limited options for travel. License suspensions criminalize people for driving
to work, taking their children to school, driving to the grocery store, and other
essential everyday tasks. This has made it difcult for people to nd and keep
employment because many jobs require a valid driver’s license, and employers
have also been burdened because they cannot nd workers who have reliable
transportation.
On July 31, 2018, the Ohio General Assembly passed House Bill 336. This
bill gives people with suspended licenses an amnesty period to reinstate their
licenses with no fee or with signicantly lowered fees. However the conditions
for amnesty are narrow, and it’s unknown how many people can qualify for
this program.
We commend this rst step by the Ohio General Assembly to address the
nancial barriers to reinstating suspended driver’s licenses and urge the
state to prevent these suspensions from happening in the rst instance. By
eliminating the nancial causes for license suspensions, the Ohio General
Assembly can improve the lives of millions of Ohioans. They can eliminate
over 1.5 million license suspensions, decriminalize over half a million
Ohioans, make our community members more employable, and help develop
the workforce.
RECOMMENDATION 5:
Abolish driver’s license suspensions for any reason not related to public safety.
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 27
The current mayor’s courts system erodes public trust in the courts and the police.
Prot-oriented mayor’s courts saddle people with debt that they may never be able
to afford to pay, take away their driver’s licenses, and even send people to jail as
their municipal coffers grow. We found that many mayor’s courts near Ohio’s big
cities disproportionately cite Black Ohioans and divert police resources to poorer
communities to collect nes and costs. By citing people in the communities that
surround them, these mayor’s court municipalities impoverish their neighbors to
enrich themselves.
The problems with revenue-oriented policing and courts are most obvious in mayor’s
courts. As Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor has pointed out,
these problems are endemic to any court system that is required to fund itself.
52
Ohioans deserve fair, transparent, and accountable courts that will deliver justice
for all rather than revenue to some. The Ohio General Assembly can require that our
courts uphold these values. We urge the Ohio General Assembly to enact the reforms
recommended here and make Ohio’s mayor’s courts fair to all.
OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
ADOPT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS,
MAKE OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS
FAIR TO ALL.
CONCLUSION
Brooklyn, OH Mayor’s Court
28 | ACLU OF OHIO
1. Ohio Revised Code 1905.01.
2. Statistics for trafc citations are drawn from The Supreme Court of Ohio 2016 Mayor’s Court Summary Report https://www.
supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/mayorscourt/mayorscourtreport16.pdf and The Supreme Court of Ohio 2016 Ohio Courts
Statistical Report https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/annrep/16OCSR/2016OCSR.pdf , accessed 8/30/2017.
3. We use the term “community member” to describe people who interact with one another, live within a bounded geographic territory,
share a common government, and pool resources such as taxes. Communities can be nested, for example, a municipality can be a
community that shares a municipal government and municipal taxes, and a neighborhood within the municipality can also be a
community with shared aesthetic rules and neighborhood funds. In this report, communities are nested at local, municipal, county,
and state levels. The geographic territory of the community is the area within average driving distance of a mayor’s court municipality.
Shared community governments include municipal, county, and state-level governments. Pooled resources include road infrastructure
and municipal, state, and federal taxes. For further discussion of interpersonal, geographic, and governmental denitions of
community, see Karen Christensen and David Levinson, Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World Thousand
Oaks, CA, Sage (2003).
4. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life
Insurance Company v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
5. “Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer Mayor’s Court Testimony, December 2, 2008.” http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2008/
mayorscts_120208.asp, accessed 1/31/2018.
6. Ohio Revised Code 1905.01.
7. Supreme Court of Ohio 2016 Mayor’s Court Summary and Supreme Court of Ohio 2017 Mayor’s Court Summary https://www.
supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/mayorscourt/mayorscourtreport17.pdf, accessed 8/1/2018.
8. These include arresting and jailing people for missed court dates and for unpaid nes without conducting a hearing assessing
defendants’ indigency, issuing high numbers of citations for minor infractions, disproportionately citing Black residents and motorists,
and adding nes and fees for delayed or missed payments. See “The Outskirts of Hope.” American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, April
2013; “Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department.” United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, March 4, 2015.
“A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons” Torie Atkinson, 2015,
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review: (51). A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as a Punishment for the Poor. Alexes
Harris, 2016, New York: Russell Sage.
9. “The Outskirts of Hope;” “Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department;” “A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing
Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons;” A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as a Punishment for the Poor.
10. “Driving While Black: Racial Proling on Our Nation’s Highways.” David B. Harris, American Civil Liberties Union Special Report,
June 1999; “Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice System.” The American Sociological Association, September 2007; “Lack of
Transportation: A symptom of poverty and a cause of poverty.” Athens County Job and Family Services and Hocking-Athens-Perry
Community Action Program, April 2013. “Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department;” “Stopped, Fined, Arrested: Racial Bias in
Policing and Trafc Courts in California.” East Bay Community Law Center, April 2016.
11. “Lack of Transportation: A symptom of poverty and a cause of poverty.” Athens County Job and Family Services and Hocking-Athens-
Perry Community Action Program; April 2013 “Stopped, Fined, Arrested: Racial Bias in Policing and Trafc Courts in California.”
12. Demographic data were taken from the 2010 US Census.
13. We spoke with Shaker Heights municipal court Judge KJ Montgomery, Rocky River municipal court Judges Donna Congeni
Fitzsimmons and Brian Hagan, Rocky River Clerk of Courts Deborah Comery, Yellow Springs Mayor Pam Conine, Yellow Springs
Clerk of Courts Elise Burns, Justice Task Force Member Ellis Jacobs, Bratenahl Mayor John Licastro, Bratenahl Police Lt. Charles
Lobello, Bratenahl Village Solicitor David Matty, Sam O’Leary, Council for Bratenahl, Law Director of Grove City Stephen Smith, and
Magistrate Donald Williams of the mayor’s courts of Highland Hills and Woodmere.
14. “State Cuts Sting Ohio Localities.” Policy Matters Ohio https://www.policymattersohio.org/research-policy/quality-ohio/revenue-
budget/state-cuts-sting-ohio-localities, December 19, 2016.
15. Budget Testimony on behalf of the Supreme Court of Ohio and Ohio’s Judiciary before the Ohio House of Representatives Finance
and Appropriations Committee Transportation Subcommittee Tuesday, March 1, 2017, pp. 13-14. http://search-prod.lis.state.oh.us/
cm_pub_api/api/unwrap/ready_for_publication/cmte_h_transportation_sub_1/testimony/cmte_h_transportation_sub_1_2017-03-01-
0900_175/hb49osc.pdf, accessed 8/15/2018.
16. Goldstein, R., M.W. Sances, and H.Y. You. 2018. “Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service”,
Urban Affairs Review doi:10.1177/1078087418791775.
17. “Kirkersville Police Chief resigns unexpectedly, cites Mayor’s behavior.” Bethany Bruner, The Newark Advocate, March 8, 2018;
“Kirkersville police chief resigns, citing rift with mayor.” Marc Kovac, The Columbus Dispatch, March 8, 2018.
18. For these 51 municipalities in which police ofcers issued an average of more than 100 trafc citations each in 2016, the median
average number of citations issued is 149, interquartile range is 142, quartile 1 is 113 and quartile 3 is 255. Two municipalities,
Kirkersville and Hanging Rock, had average ofcer citation rates that were high outliers. If these two municipalities are excluded, the
average number of citations issued per police ofcers in 2016 in the 49 other municipalities is 162, the median is 147, the interquartile
range is 120, quartile 1 is 113 and quartile 3 is 233.
19. “Urban and Rural Crime” National Center for Victims of Crime, 2016. http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/ncvrw2013/2013ncvrw_stats_
urbanrural.pdf
20. For further discussion of the relationship between policing and residential segregation, see Bass, Sandra. 2001. “Policing Space,
Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions.” Social Justice 28(1): 156-176 and Moye, Richard G.,
Dawn X Henderson, Michele K. Lewis, and Andrea Lewis. 2015. “Moving on up but still falling down: A framework for understanding
the Travon Martin’s of the world.” Race, Gender & Class 22 (1/2): 296-306.
21. Emerson, Michael O., Karen J. Chai and George Yancey. 2001. “Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the
Preferences of White Americans.” 66 (6): 922-935
ENDNOTES
OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS | 29
22. “Race and place: The ecology of racial proling African American motorists.” Albert J. Meehan and Michael C. Ponder (2002). Justice
Quarterly 19(2), 399-430. “Driving while black in suburban Detroit.” Timothy Bates (2010). Du Bois Review, 7(1), 133-150. “Policing
Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions;” “Moving on up but still falling down;”
23. “Race and place: The ecology of racial proling African American motorists.”
24. “Driving while black in suburban Detroit.” Timothy Bates (2010).
25. “Who pays for roads in Ohio?” https://www.policymattersohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Highways_2011920.pdf.
26. Triplett, Tim, Robert Santos and Sandra Rosenbloom. 2015. “American Driving Survey: Methodology and Year 1 Results, May 2013 –
May 2014.” The Urban Institute https://www.urban.org/sites/default/les/publication/49536/2000192-American-Driving-Survey.pdf,
accessed 8/1/2018.
27. Data was collected from the online docket software in December of 2017. It reects citations for a rolling 3 year period, beginning in
November of 2014 and ending in November of 2017.
28. See Table 1.19 in “Results from the 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables.” Center for Behavioral Health
Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/les/
NSDUH-DetTabs2014/NSDUH-DetTabs2014.pdf
29. https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/ndings/, accessed 8/1/2018.
30. Gunn, V.L., R. M. Phillippi and W. O. Cooper. 2005. “Racial differences in child safety restraint use in Tennessee.” Injury Prevention
11:340-342. 2017; Preusser Research Group, Inc. “Florida Observational Survey for Child Restraint Use.” Florida Department of
Transportation, August 17, 2017, https://fdotwww.blob.core.windows.net/sitenity/docs/default-source/safety/safety/2a-programs/op/2
017childrestraintnalreport-8-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=319fe196_0, accessed 3/27/2019.
31. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=9/40.9229/-81.3799&opacity=0.25&city=akron-oh&area=D13.
32. On November 22, 2017, we examined electronic dockets from Amberley; Arlington Heights; Canal Winchester; Cuyahoga Falls;
Fairfax; Lockland; Newburgh Heights; North Olmsted; Norwood; Parma Heights; Pataskala; Silverton; Springboro; and Woodmere.
Only Canal Winchester, Norwood, Parma Heights, and Springboro courts did not have records of license forfeitures.
33. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
34. Under Ohio law, a defendant may only be jailed for willful nonpayment of a ne based on a judge’s determination—at a mandatory
on the record hearing where defendant is represented by counsel—that the defendants has money to pay the ne but refuses to do so.
Ohio Rev Code § 2947.14.
35. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
36. Ohio Revised Code 2947.23(C).
37. Estimates are from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau.
38. Final Report of the President’s Task Force in 21st Century Policing, May 2015. https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_
nalreport.pdf, accessed 12/5/2018.
39. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life
Insurance Company v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
40. DePiero v. City of Macedonia, et. al., 180 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1999).
41. Rose v. Village of Peninsula, 875 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ohio 1995);
42. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
43. “New analysis says much of Ohio’s business tax cut goes to the rich.” Marty Schladen and Jim Siegal, The Columbus Dispatch,
June 22, 2017. http://www.dispatch.com/news/20170622/new-analysis-says-much-of-ohios-business-tax-cut-goes-to-rich, accessed
6/20/2018.
44. “Lack of Transportation: A symptom of poverty and a cause of poverty;” Ohio Statewide Transit Needs Final Report, January 2015.
45. Ohio Supreme Court 2016 Mayor’s Court Report.
46. Ohio Revised Code 1905.031 and The Supreme Court of Ohio Mayor’s Courts Forms Instructions and Education & Procedure Rules,
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JCS/mayors/rules.pdf, accessed 8/30/2017.
47. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life
Insurance Company v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Rose v. Village of Peninsula, 875 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ohio 1995); DePiero v. City of
Macedonia, et. al., 180 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1999).
48. The Supreme Court of Ohio Mayor’s Courts Forms Instructions and Education & Procedure Rules, rules 1,3,4, and 7.
49. The Supreme Court of Ohio Mayor’s Courts Forms Instructions and Education & Procedure Rules, rule 11(B)2.
50. This denition of restorative justice is from the Center for Court Innovation https://www.courtinnovation.org/areas-of-focus/
restorative-justice, accessed 1/15/2019.
51. Research by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, cited in “Too Broke to Drive” https://slate.com/
business/2017/09/state-lawmakers-have-trapped-millions-of-americans-in-debt-by-taking-their-licenses.html, accessed 6/30/2018.
52. Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor’s letter to Auditor Dave Yost, cited in Justice O’Connor’s Letter of January 29, 2018 to Ohio Judges,
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/justices/oconnor/nesFeesBailLetter.pdf, accessed 1/15/2019.
30 | ACLU OF OHIO
This report was researched and written by Sri Devi Thakkilapati, Senior Policy Researcher at the
ACLU of Ohio. Eric Balaban, Senior Staff Counsel at ACLU National Prison Project, co-authored
the report, providing writing assistance and editing the report. Jacob Waggoner, Consulting Data
Analyst and Empirical Research Fellow at Yale Law School, collected online docket data and
produced the municipal citation maps. Jocelyn Rosnick, Advocacy Director at the ACLU of Ohio,
contributed the impact story and editorial feedback on the report. Ben Guess, Executive Director
at the ACLU of Ohio and Celina Coming, Communications Manager at the ACLU of Ohio provided
additional feedback. Dan Rogan, Communications Associate at the ACLU of Ohio, provided design.
Orion Danjuma, Staff Attorney at ACLU Racial Justice Program and Nusrat Choudhury, Deputy
Director of the ACLU Racial Justice Program reviewed and edited this report, as did ACLU National
Prison Project Director David Fathi. Lucia Tian, Brooke Watson, Sophie Beiers, Aaron Horowitz,
and Marie Patino from the ACLU’s National Data Analytics team provided additional analysis and
comments, as well as input on data visualization.
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