The Thetean: A Student Journal for Scholarly Historical The Thetean: A Student Journal for Scholarly Historical
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The Thetean: A Student Journal for
Scholarly Historical Writing
Article 9
2019
How the Pope Played Politics: The Papal Politics of Pope Pius XI How the Pope Played Politics: The Papal Politics of Pope Pius XI
in 1920s and 1930s Italy in 1920s and 1930s Italy
Benjamin Passey
Brigham Young University
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Pope Pius XI and Mussolini: the leaders who
created a treaty between the Holy See and
Italy, 1929.
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S
,
debate on the Catholic Church’s relationship with Italian fascism has
focused on the wartime period and the Vatican’s response or lack thereof
to the Holocaust. However, in recent years, historians have turned their
attention from Pope PiusXII (–) to his predecessor, Pope Pius XI
(–).
On February , the Papacy, with Pope PiusXI at the head, signed a
series of treaties and agreements with Mussolini’s Fascist regime. Many con-
temporary historians have pointed to this moment as the beginning of the
Pope’s subservience to Il Duce. e willingness of the Pope to engage in an
agreement with Mussolini has led to the belief that PiusXI was motivated by
a lust for power and evil intent. However, a closer examination of the policies
of Pius’s ponticate in the s and s paints quite a dierent picture, of
a man better suited to the life of astute diplomat rather than the head of the
Holy See.
Historian David Kertzer has led the charge with his recent book, e
Pope and Mussolini, stirring up scrutiny into the life of Pope Pius XI and his
Benjamin Passey
How the Pope Played Politics
The Papal Politics of Pape Pius XI
in 1920s and 1930s Italy
Paper
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122 The Thetean
contribution to the rise of fascism in Italy.¹ Kertzer asserts that not only did
the church tolerate fascism in an attempt to isolate itself against potential repri-
sals, but also that fascist ideology—including authoritarianism, the intolerance
of political opposition, and the suspicion of Jews—was inspired by Catholic
tradition.² In his book, Controversial Concordats: e Vatican’s Relations with
Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler, Frank Coppa also examines the events lead-
ing up to the signing of the Lateran Treaty.³ Using his vast knowledge of Ital-
ian politics and the social climate in the s, Coppa provides an alternative
explanation for the willingness of the Vatican to reach terms on the Roman
Question, an explanation far less sinister than that oered by Kertzer. Coppa
argues that the church led by Pope Pius XI was motivated by a righteous desire
to mend the relationship between church and state and protect Italians from
the dangers posed by authoritarianism. In his book, e Vatican and Italian
Fascism, 1929–1932, John Pollard takes an alternative approach to that of both
Kertzer and Coppa, tracing what he refers to as “the logical and organic rela-
tionship” which formed between the church and state. He concludes that the
relationship between Pope and Duce were far less cordial than Kertzer claims,
attributing tensions between the two individuals in the years following to
inaccurate expectations for the implications of the conciliazione. Because these
books represent the majority of English-language scholarship on this topic, this
paper will build upon the work of all three historians, examining the calculated
and decisive political decisions of Pope Pius XI, which allowed him to consoli-
date power while establishing himself as one of the most powerful forces against
fascism in Italy.
e willingness of the Vatican headed by Pope PiusXI to cooperate with
Mussolini’s totalitarian regime does not demonstrate weakness or lust for power
on the part of the ponti, but rather a keen eye for political maneuvering and
the opportunity to further papal objectives. Specically under PiusXI, the
Vatican consolidated control of territory and historic sites and solidied the
. David Kertzer, e Pope and Mussolini: e Secret History of Pius 11. and the Rise of Fas-
cism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).
. Frank J. Coppa, Controversial Concordats: e Vatican’s Relations with Napoleon, Mus-
solini, and Hitler (Catholic University of America Press, ), .
. Coppa, Controversial Concordats, .
. John Pollard, e Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929–1932: A Study in Conict (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
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position of the Catholic Church in Italy, all while maintaining the ability to
speak and act freely of the repressive totalitarian regime.
Early Relations between Church and State
In order to understand how the Vatican was able to make such signicant
strides toward greater autonomy and political control in Italy, it is important to
examine the period of Italian unication. During the Risorgimento, or unica-
tion of Italy, the papal states were seized from the church and annexed into the
new nation, with Rome, home of the Vatican, as the capital. In the following
six decades, the relationship between the church and state did not improve.
Pope PiusIX (–) declared himself a “prisoner” in the Vatican, setting
the precedent for the political attitude of the next three popes towards the
Italian state. From their “incarceration” in the Vatican, the popes denounced
the growing separation between the church and state, lamenting not only the
loss of the papal states, but also the secularization of the new nation. Some of
the popes were so disenchanted with the Italian government that they discour-
aged devout Catholics from participating in the politics of the nation that had
robbed them of their territory and had forsaken its Catholic origins. e turn
of the century marked the climax in hostility between church and state, but in
the coming decades, that relationship would gradually transform from one of
resentment and distrust to one of partnership and mutual benet.
Despite the legacy of discord and resentment that marked the decades after
unication, hope of improved relations arose from the devastation of global war.
e First World War and the postwar years lessened the tension and improved
the relations between the Vatican and Rome, as both parties decried the unfair
treatment of Italy at the Treaty of Versailles. With the relationship between
Rome and the Vatican slowly improving, the liberal democratic government,
most notably under Prime Minister Orlando, attempted to end the Roman
. Italian unication, or the Risorgimento (“the Resurgence”), was the political and social
movement that consolidated the independent states of the Italian peninsula into a single
state in the th century. e process began in with the Congress of Vienna and culmi-
nated in , when Rome became the capital of the Kingdom of Italy.
. David Kertzer, Prisoner of the Vatican: e Popes’ Secret Plot to Capture Rome from the
New Italian State (Boston: Houghton Miin, ), .
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Question by oering to renegotiate the Law of Guarantees, a law passed in
in an attempt to reconcile with the Vatican after the Risorgimento. Despite
the best attempts of Orlando and countless Prime Ministers before him, the
Vatican refused to recognize, let alone reach an agreement on, the Law of Guar-
antees. With issues about the church and its relations remaining hostile, it is
no surprise that drastic measures would be required to improve the conditions.
A Relationship of Mutual Benet
e year marked an important turning point in both the course of the
church and state, with the ascent of Pope PiusXI to the papacy in February, and
the rise of Mussolini eight months later, in October. Almost immediately after
assuming the position of prime minister, Mussolini began to vocalize his desire
to reach a settlement with the Vatican, recognizing that a treaty with the Vati-
can would oer immense legitimacy to his regime. Equally interested, the Pope
saw in Mussolini an opportunity that had not been presented to his predeces-
sors: the prospect of negotiating not with a liberal democratic government, but
with an aspiring authoritarian dictator who desired the appearance of a papal
endorsement. Pius’s chance presented itself after the assassination of Giacomo
Matteotti in and the subsequent Aventine Succession. While many politi-
cal parties and organizations in Italy condemned Mussolini and the fascist party
for the removal of political opposition, Pius expressed his conviction that only
Mussolini could “steer the ship [Italian State] into calmer water, providing the
strong hand needed.” However, with a deeper understanding of Pius’s own
agenda and motivation to improve the Vatican’s situation, it is clear that this
expression was one of temporary necessity rather than earnest conviction.
Pius’s praise of Mussolini as a leader continued, although ulterior motives
grew more transparent as time progressed. After a failed assassination attempt
on Mussolini’s life, the Pope went so far as to say that divine intervention had
spared Mussolini’s life. Whatever the Vatican’s assessment of the morality of
Mussolini, a self-proclaimed mangiaprete, or priest-eater, it clearly determined
. omas B. Morgan, A Reporter at the Papal Court: A Narrative of the Reign of Pope Pius
XI (New York: Longmans, Green, ), .
. Antonio Pellicani, Il Papa di tutti, La Chiesa Cattolica, il fascism, e il razzismo, 1929–
1945 (Milan: Sugar Editore, ), .
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that there was divine intervention for him to live since, unlike so many Italian
leaders before him, he could nally resolve the Roman Question; his yearning
for papal backing put him in a position to make concessions that other leaders
would not make. Pius ensured Mussolini’s retention of power by weakening
the Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Peoples Party [PPI]) in with the forced
resignation of adamant anti-fascist and the party’s priest-leader, Father Don
Sturzo. Without a powerful leader, the PPI was in no position to form a coali-
tion government with Matteotti’s socialist party, allowing Mussolini to ascend
to the position of dictator in uncontested.¹
Finalizing the Agreement
With Mussolini formally installed as Il Duce, secret talks began between repre-
sentatives of the Pope and Mussolini in . ese covert exchanges continued
periodically until formal negotiations began in . On February , Pius
announced that the Vatican had concluded a formal settlement with Italy, end-
ing the Roman Question and laying to rest a quarrel that had burdened the
papacy for more than half a century. With the negotiations complete and the
treaty signed, many heralded the reconciliation of the church and state as well
as the end of the Roman Question as the “biggest story of ” and Mussolini’s
most important political maneuver of the decade.¹¹ Nonetheless, contrary to
this popular belief, Pope Pius XI was the true victor of the negotiation.
e Lateran Treaty included three accords: a conciliation treaty that termi-
nated the Roman Question and declared Vatican City to be a neutral and invio-
lable territory; a concordat which regulated church-state aairs in Italy, and a
nancial convention that provided nancial compensation for papal territory
annexed during the unication.¹²
e structure of the agreement demonstrates the political cunning of the
Pope. With one treaty, he eectively resolved the three most pressing issues fac-
ing the Vatican. Article three of the Lateran Treaty put an end to the Roman
Question, granting the church “full ownership, exclusive dominion, and
. Kertzer, e Pope and Mussolini, .
. D. A. Binchy, Church and State in fascist Italy (Oxford University Press, ), –.
. Morgan, A Reporter at the Papal Court, .
. Coppa, Controversial Concordats, .
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126 The Thetean
sovereign authority and jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican.”¹³ Article
one of the treaty codied Catholicism as the “only State religion.”¹ Ordinar-
ily, a provision of this nature would have been addressed only in a concordat
rather than a treaty. However, its presence and position in the Lateran Treaty
reect Pius’s determination to have the privileged position of the church bound
by international law. By agreeing to this article, Mussolini eectively agreed to
allow a foreign power to play a role in Italian internal aairs. is concession on
the part of Mussolini and his Fascist government contradicts the assertion that
Mussolini, rather than the Pope, most beneted from the accord because Mus-
solini simultaneously weakened his totalitarian control politically and socially.¹
Article forty-ve of the Concordat, which accompanied the Treaty, detailed
the powers and privileges aorded to the church as the sole state religion. ese
included compulsory religious instruction in primary and secondary schools,
the ocial adoption by the totalitarian state of the church’s position on mar-
riage and divorce, and the reformation of public policy and state legislation
to harmonize with church teachings.¹ Located at the end of the Concordat,
Article forty-three provided for the immunity of Catholic Action groups from
coercion or control by the fascist government on the condition that the groups
refrain from all political activities.¹ e inclusion of this seemingly insigni-
cant article would become one of the most important parts of the entire Con-
cordat in the coming years, allowing the Pope to openly oppose Mussolini at
the height of Il Duce’s power.
e nal part of the three-part accord was an agreement on nancial com-
pensation for the loss of the papal states during unication. Although this is
the least discussed portion of the agreement, it is one of the most important,
given the serious nancial diculties that faced the Holy See in the s. For
this reason, Pius negotiated relentlessly on the amount of compensation, push-
ing Mussolini to the limit on the matter.¹ Whereas the Lateran Treaty and the
. Article , Lateran Agreement, Treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See,
February .
. Article , Lateran Agreement, Treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See,
February .
. Coppa, Controversial Concordats, .
. Claudia Carlen, Papal Pronouncements. A Guide: 1740–1978, 2 (Pierian Press, ), .
. E.R. Tannenbaum, Fascism in Italy: Society and Culture 1922–1945 (London: Allen
Lane, ), .
. Pollard, e Vatican and Italian Fascism, .
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Concordat took only four months to negotiate, the nancial component of the
agreement took nearly two years.¹ Ultimately, the parties agreed on an immedi-
ate payment to the Vatican of ,, Italian lire and the issue of a bearer
bond with a percent yield and a coupon value of ,,, Italian lire.²
is large infusion of capital drastically improved the nancial situation of the
Vatican, which was so near bankruptcy in that it had to borrow ,
to cover the funeral expenses of Pope Benedict XV (–).²¹
Without Pope
Pius XI’s insistence on the addition of this crucial component of the Lateran
Treaty, it is quite possible that the Vatican would have gone bankrupt, signi-
cantly diminishing their historical role over the next decade.
Mussolini’s Motivation
In return for the concessions Mussolini made in the negotiation of the treaty,
he anticipated the full and considerable support of the Vatican. He was not
disappointed; not long after the signing of the treaty, a plebiscite was held to
replace the Acerbo electoral law, which had allowed the Fascist Party to ascend
to power in . e Vatican instructed Catholics to vote in support of Mus-
solini and the Fascist Party as “eloquent proof of the full support of Italian
Catholics for the Government.”²² Upholding the unspoken agreement to sup-
port Mussolini was only a secondary motive for the Vatican’s instruction to
Catholics to vote for the fascists. In reality, their primary motive was to ensure
the parliamentary ratication of the Lateran Treaty, guaranteed by Mussolini’s
retention of power. e appeal to Catholic voters issued on the eve of the
election stated, “a vote ‘yes’ will signify a binding mandate to Parliament [con-
trolled by Mussolini] to ratify the Pacts [treaty] and to approve the legislation
necessary for the implementation of the Concordat.”²³
. Pollard, e Vatican and Italian Fascism, .
. e Financial Convention Annexed to the Lateran Treaty, , Article .
. Ronald J. Rychlak, Hitler, the War, and the Pope (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visi-
tor, ), .
. A.C.S., S.P.D., C.R. W/R, “Tachi-Venturi,” letter to Mussolini of February ,
in Pollard, e Vatican and Italian Fascism, .
. Bollenttino Ucale, March , “I Cattolici e le Elezioni,” in Pollard, e Vatican
and Italian Fascism, .
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Many fascists inside Italy and around the world viewed Mussolini’s treaty
with the Catholic Church as a betrayal.² Not long after securing his position
as Italian dictator, Mussolini began making statements about the relationship
between church and state that were contrary to the Lateran Treaty. In May ,
only a few months after the signing of the Treaty, Mussolini said, “Within the
state, the Church is not sovereign, nor is it even free ... because it is subordi-
nate ... to the general law of the state. We have not resurrected the Tempo-
ral Power of the Popes, we have buried it.”² Mussolini continued to test the
strength of the treaty by resuming his mangiaprete rhetoric. Despite Mussolini’s
open violations of the treaty, Pius recognized that the accords and concordat
oered him a legal basis to oppose the “totalitarian regime.” In his December
encyclical, Pius upheld the codied role of the church in Italian education,
denouncing Mussolini’s attempts to consolidate control of education as “unjust
and unlawful.”² us, despite Mussolini’s outward violations of the treaty, Pius
continued to use the treaty as a means of insulating himself and the papacy
from Mussolini’s reach.
Counterbalancing Mussolini
Notwithstanding his harsh rhetoric directed at the church and papacy, soon
after signing the Treaty, Mussolini and his government sought the support of
the church to further their expansionist objectives. In November , the Ital-
ian government appealed to the Vatican to use its missions to spread fascist pro-
paganda in Ethiopia. is request was met with the curt response, “it was not
and never had been the policy of the Catholic Church to permit its missions to
be used for nationalistic ends.”² When the government repeated its request in
, it was again met with opposition—this time in the form of an even more
resounding no! Pope Pius XI stated his and the church’s position unequivocally:
. Derek J. Holmes, Papacy in the Modern World 1914–1978 (New York: Crossroad, ),
–.
. Nicolas Cheetham, e Keeper of the Keys: A History of Popes from St. Peter to John
PaulII (London; Macdonald, ), .
. Claudia Carlen, e Papal Encyclicals 1903–1939 (Milwaukee: e Pierian Press,
), .
. L’Italia, “Le Missioni Cattoliche.” November .
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“Nationalism has always been a calamity for the missions, indeed it would be no
exaggeration to say that it is a curse.”²
As early as , protected by the Concordat from fascist intervention, Pope
Pius XI encouraged the growth and participation of Italians in Catholic Action
organizations as a counterbalance to fascism. With Mussolini’s growing resent-
ment and rejection of the Catholic Church, Pius relied on Catholic Action
groups to arm, diuse, and defend Catholic principles in the state and soci-
ety.² In an attempt to limit the control of the Vatican through Catholic Action
groups, and likely in an eort to punish the church for its refusal to back his
expansionist aspirations in Africa, Mussolini embarked on a campaign to dis-
mantle the organizations. Despite his best eorts, the political maneuvering of
Pius kept the Catholic Actions groups alive. e signing of the Catholic Action
Accords in September limited the power of the groups but solidied their
existence as part of Italian society under the protection of the Pope. e Vati-
can left the accords, and was heralded throughout the Catholic world as the
victor; one magazine charged that the “Man of Providence” had succumbed to
thePope.³
Notwithstanding the limitations of the Catholic Action organizations
imposed by the Accords, Pope Pius XI used the groups with maximum
eciency, conducting an ideological campaign against Fascism through pub-
lications and discussion groups that were protected from reprisal by the Pope
himself, in order to condemn totalitarian ideology including the anti-Christian
doctrines of the regime.³¹ e protection provided by the Pope through the
Lateran Agreement allowed Catholic Action groups to grow organically, free
from fascist penetration. ese organizations spread throughout society, ini-
tially drawing the bulk of their memberships from the anti-fascist Federazione
Universitaria Cattolica Italiana (Italian Catholic Federation of University Stu-
dents), or FUCI. Pius described these early devotees as “the apple of his eye
and the light of the entire Catholic family.”³² Protected from Mussolini and his
. Discorsi, vol. II, “Ai Religiosi Missionari,” December , –.
. Coppa, Controversial Concordats, .
. Marc Agostino, Le pape Pie 11. et l’opinion: 1922–1939 (Roma: École française de
Rome, ), .
. Frank Rosengarten, e Italian Anti-Fascist Press (1919–1945); From the Legal Opposi-
tion Press to the Underground Newspapers of World War II. (Cleveland, OH: Press of Case
Western Reserve University, ), .
. Coppa, Controversial Concordats, .
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quest for ideological hegemony by Pope Pius XI, Catholicism was free to com-
pete for the hearts and minds of Italians both old and young. It began slowly
but then picked up momentum, until it was the second largest movement in
Italian, second only to Fascism.
Emboldened Opposition
ough much of the Pope’s opposition to Mussolini was veiled in diplomatic
language or channeled through Catholic Action, his response to Mussolini’s
adoption of the Aryan Manifesto in July was dierent. Pius immediately
branded Mussolini’s anti-Semitic policy as true apostasy, calling for Catholic
Action groups to combat the manifesto with full force. With each address or
policy change that Mussolini issued to advocate racism, Pius responded with
condemnation, coming as close as he possibly could to publicly denouncing
Mussolini. When Mussolini forbade marriage between Aryans and non-Aryans,
Pius condemned the policy as a breach of the Concordat. At the time of his
death in February, Pope Pius XI was drafting an encyclical to be released to the
Catholic world, condemning Mussolini and fascist abuses. When Mussolini
learned of the Pope’s passing he reportedly yelled, “Finally, that obstinate old
man is dead.”³³ ese were not the words of a man who was mourning the loss
of an ally or pawn. Rather, they were the words of an individual relieved to be
rid of a cunning, powerful, and protected revival.
Looking Forward
Many historians have pointed to the signing of the Lateran Agreement in
as the moment Mussolini solidied his inuence over the Catholic Church and
its leader, Pope Pius XI. In reality, the Lateran Agreement allowed the church
to consolidate power, setting the tone for its political and social actions over
the next two decades as well as demonstrating the diplomatic genius of the
Pope. Max Ascoli, an Italian Jewish professor of political philosophy, eectively
summarized the advantages the church derived from the agreement. He said,
. Roger Aubert, e Church is a Secularized Society: e Christian Centuries (Paulist
Press, ) :.
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“e Church keeps intact her moral prestige and the hierarchic framework, her
legal rights are well guarded; the doors of the spiritual world are wide open.”³
Long after his death, the people of Italy continued to reap the rewards of Pius’s
foresight. After the fall of fascism, Catholic Action—the organization that the
pope had gone head to head with Il Duce to preserve—stepped in as the most
inuential movement in Italy, playing a key role in the post-war reconstruction
of Italy.³
Ben Passey is a JD candidate at the George Washington University Law School. He gradu-
ated from Brigham Young University in 2018 where he majored in history and minored
in Africana studies. As a history major, he focused his studies on slavery and revolution,
especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. In his free time, he enjoys reading, travel-
ing, and being in the outdoors.
. Max Ascoli, “e Roman Church and Political Action,” Foreign Aairs, April .
. Coppa, Controversial Concordats, .
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