US Allies Offensive Cyber: Entrapment Risk or Entanglement

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MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

INTRODUCTION

“I would now like to say something very important for those who may be tempted to

interfere in these developments from the outside. No matter who tries to stand in

our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must

know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as

you have never seen in your entire history.”

- Vladimir Putin’s speech when Russian forces invaded Ukraine February 24, 2022.

utin’s threat to escalate the war in Ukraine in response to external interference

presents a timely reason to reconsider who has the military means to trigger

escalation and perhaps draw allies into the conﬂict. In 1984, Glenn H. Snyder

wrote an analysis of states’ dilemmas in alliances with this issue at its core that

has demonstrably had excellent explanatory and predictive power.

In the Cold War’s

technological strategic context of nuclear and conventional military means, he found

that: “In general, entrapment is a more serious concern for the lesser allies than for the

superpowers […] because the superpowers have a much greater capacity for taking ini-

tiatives (notably nuclear initiatives).”

In NATO, the US controls much of the alliance’s conventional military capabilities

and most of its nuclear weapons. Applying Snyder’s analysis, this vests the US with a

suﬃcient level of control over NATO’s crisis management, to minimize the US’ risk of en-

trapment in conﬂicts. Emergence of cyberspace

as a new venue for military operations

US Allies Offensive Cyber:

Entrapment Risk or

Entanglement Nuisance

Major Mikkel Storm Jensen, Ph.D.

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US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

changes the US strategic environment.

The US was

initially NATO’s only declared actor in cyberspace, but

over the last decade more than half of NATO’s members

have begun developing oﬀensive cyberspace operations

(OCO) capabilities.

Based on Snyder’s analysis, should

the US add proliferation amongst friends and allies to

its concerns over OCO proliferation amongst foes?

The theoretical answer is “yes.” Any increase in al-

lies’ potential for independent initiatives decreases

US ability to control escalation, increasing the risk

of entrapment. The real-world answer depends on the

degree to which OCO has the potential for strategic

impact. The counterargument is that OCO’s potential

military impact even in a crisis would be insigniﬁcant,

thereby rendering allies’ independent deployment of

OCO a manageable risk insofar as entangling an oth-

erwise involuntary US.

Hence, the question is the relative magnitude of

the entrapment threat from US allies’ OCO: Do US

allies’ growing OCO capabilities constitute a credible

risk for entrapment, or are they a mere entanglement

nuisance? US’ strategies do not provide an answer.

Since 2018, they have signaled a more active role

for US OCO capabilities to serve as a deterrent, both

above and below the threshold of armed conﬂict. As

yet, however, no guidance has been forthcoming as to

how allies’ OCO capabilities ﬁt this intent.

Nor does

the academic literature inform this subject, a void this

article seeks to begin ﬁlling.

Following a brief review of pertinent academic lit-

erature, this article presents the theoretical tools de-

ployed. Aer introducing mainly Snyder’s analysis of

alliance dilemmas, the theories are applied to the case

of the US dominant position in NATO. The analysis

then investigates OCO’s inﬂuence on the outcomes of

Snyder’s analysis on entrapment by analyzing how

the technical and operational attributes of military

cyber capabilities eﬀects diﬀer from conventional and

Mikkel Storm Jensen (Ph.D.) is a major in the

Danish army with an operational background

in intelligence analysis. Since 2016, he has re-

searched national cyber strategies. Initially on

the state’s role in societal resilience, but now

mostly focuses on their use of cyber means for

oﬀensive purposes. This article forms part of his

dissertation

on the inﬂuences of oﬀensive cy-

ber capabilities on military alliances, which he

defended in May 2023.

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MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

nuclear means. It demonstrates how OCO are, in some respects, reasonable to analyze on par

with nuclear weapons. The article then reviews the US-published statements and policies on

her own and allies’ OCO capabilities and compares with US policies during the late 1950s

potential proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst NATO members.

The analysis establishes that OCO’s potential for destruction is not comparable to nuclear

weapons but still convincingly capable of creating strategic eﬀects, e.g., escalation, partic-

ularly during a crisis. Thus, in Snyder’s terms, OCO convincingly provides allies with new

means for “independent strategic initiatives” and constitutes an entrapment risk to the US,

particularly during a crisis, albeit less so than nuclear weapons. Furthermore, OCO-prolif-

eration among US allies will be harder to detect and assess than nuclear capabilities. Also,

inﬂuencing allies’ decisions on OCO development will require diﬀerent eﬀorts than counter-

ing allies’ nuclear proliferation. Without aspiring to recommend whether the counter prolif-

eration of NATO allies’ OCO capabilities should be a US strategy, these ﬁndings suggest that

the US could consider incentivizing allies by issuing statements on how to best develop OCO

capabilities to support US policy objectives.

Two ﬁnal caveats should be stated before proceeding to the analysis: Firstly, the analysis is

based solely on information available to the public. Hence, classiﬁed arrangements between

the US and allies may exist, rendering the points on the US’ lack of shared strategic intents

regarding allies’ OCO moot. However, the ﬁndings on allies’ potential as entrapment risk and

the challenges with handling that risk still hold. Secondly, this analysis fully recognizes that

for most NATO allies, going against the interests of the US, particularly in crisis or war, is

something they would likely be highly reluctant to do. Again, this does not change the fact

that states may act irrationally or out of desperation. Hence the analysis remains relevant.

Some Literature on Military Use of Cyber and Alliances

The academic literature on OCO as military means has grown signiﬁcantly over the last

decade, particularly from the either explicitly or implicitly assumed great power perspec-

tive. Both theoretically, e.g., Libicki, and empirically, e.g., Brandon et al.

From the technical

perspective, e.g., Schneider has argued why information technology represents a military

revolution rather than an evolution.

Harknett and Smeets have reviewed the literature ex-

tensively and convincingly to discuss in what ways and how signiﬁcantly oﬀensive cyber

operations can aﬀect interstate conﬂict, but contribute mainly with focal points for further

research.

Cimbala speciﬁcally investigates OCO’s potential eﬀects as a means for escalation

management in general and the risks of nuclear weapons becoming involved.

However, this literature is from the perspective of individual states. The literature is very

limited regarding the use of OCO in or by military alliances: Taillat takes a close look at how

some of the special technical and operational characteristics of OCO inﬂuence collective

security in general, but do not investigate their impact on military alliances.

Smeets and

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US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

Fasana both discuss the values and risks of integration of oﬀensive cyber in military opera-

tions, but neither look into its use in coalitions.

Relevant is also Ang’s analysis of why and

how small states, even if they are part of military alliances ﬁnd it more diﬃcult than large

states to react to hostile activities in the cyber domain below the threshold of armed con-

ﬂict.

Hughes and Colarik touch very brieﬂy upon the theoretical utility of OCO within New

Zealand’s military cooperation with Australia.

However, they do not address challenges

arising from the particular attribute that OCO are likely kept secret from allies. Instead, they

assume that allies will share information on OCO within the Five Eyes intelligence collabora-

tion network. Thus, Hughes et al neither question the interoperability of OCO in the coalition

nor whether Australia or other allies will appreciate New Zealand’s acquisition of oﬀensive

cyber or may have concerns, entrapment, or otherwise. Their assumption of information

sharing is not likely to hold. Allies have strong incentives to keep OCO secret, as demonstrat-

ed by NATO’s SCEPVA-framework (more on that later) for conducting OCO without sharing

information.

White has analyzed some aspects of how cooperation in alliances on OCO and

capabilities should be organized, but like Hughes et al, White does not address the challeng-

es from classiﬁcation of oﬀensive cyber means.

Another aspect of potential concern over

allies’ OCO is provided by Jacobsen who highlights the secrecy induced technical risks to US

cyber enabled intelligence collection.

Smeets has touched upon the threat from entrapment

(as deﬁned later in the article) to US allies from US operations conducted in or through the

allies’ cyberspace and also described NATO’s emerging policies in the ﬁeld.

This article

aspires to enhance the academic understanding by looking at the entrapment threat from

the US perspective.

ENTRAPMENT, ENTANGLEMENT, AND ABANDONMENT

The question posed in this article concerns the eﬀect of emerging military technologies on

alliances seen from the perspective of the alliance’s senior partner. It is a question primarily

directed toward the state’s considerations and resulting actions regarding risks from being

in alliances. It deals in matters of complex security and actions, perhaps clandestine, for

raison d’état rather than based on emerging interstate norms, the composition or interpreta-

tion of alliance treaties, or strategic culture. These are core analytical parameters of Realism,

making that analytical prism a reasonable choice.

Glenn H. Snyder’s pioneering The Security Dilemma In Alliance Politics provides a stan-

dard reference Realist framework for exactly such analysis.

In this, Snyder investigates the

risk and trade-oﬀs for states seeking security in an anarchic international system through

alliances, deploying Mandelbaum’s concepts of abandonment and entrapment to depict the

negative counterpoints to the states’ positive objective of increased security.

For more de-

tailed analysis of how the dominant ally and its security dependent allies interact, Lake’s

Entangling Relations provides valuable perspectives.

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From the US perspective, Snyder’s key concept in the present analyses is entrapment: “En-

trapment means being dragged into a conﬂict over an ally's interests that one does not share,

or shares only partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are

shared, they may be valued in diﬀerent degree.”

Snyder credits Mandelbaum for the term as

he identiﬁed entrapment as a strategic risk in Thycodides’ account of the Peloponnesian Wars:

“When Corcyra seeks an alliance with Athens, the Corinthians, the enemies of Corcyra

warn the Athenians that accepting the Corcyrians as allies will lead to entrapment: “You

will force us to hold you equally responsible with them, although you took no part in their

misdeed.”

Mandelbaum, Snyder and Thucydides are all concerned with entrapment’s worst-case sce-

nario, namely involuntary involvement in a war because of an alliance. To investigate aspects

of entrapment risks with less severe consequences, the analysis draws upon Kim’s use of the

term entanglement.

Kim renames Snyder’s entrapment entanglement and deﬁnes it as a

process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in an unproﬁtable enterprise because of

an alliance. Kim then redeﬁnes and reintroduces entrapment as a separate subset of entan-

glement: “… a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky

or oﬀensive policy not speciﬁed in the alliance agreement.”

In other words, Kim deﬁnes entanglement as a less serious, negative risk than entrapment.

It should be noted that Kim’s use deviates from another use of the term “entanglement” to

describe the degree to which states are formally and politically bound in an alliance. In this

neutral interpretation, entangling is not necessarily harmful and may even be the deﬁning

objective of the alliance.

The present analysis uses Snyder’s and Mandelbaum’s term en-

trapment for the most serious risks, e.g., those that may lead to war, and Kim’s term entan-

glement for risks that have less serious, although still negative consequences.

Snyder’s other key concept is abandonment. Abandonment is, mainly when there are lit-

tle or no alternatives to the dominating ally as a security guarantor, primarily a concern

for the smaller, dependent allies: “alliances are never absolutely ﬁrm, whatever the text of

the written agreement; therefore, the fear of being abandoned by one's ally is ever-present.

Abandonment, in general, is "defection," but it may take a variety of speciﬁc forms: the ally

may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract;

he may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide support in

contingencies where support is expected.”

Small allies’ fear of abandonment may lead to

independent and, from the perspective of the dominating ally, entrapping actions: “Asymme-

tries in indirect dependence chieﬂy aﬀect the partners' relative fears of abandonment. Thus,

when one state has a stronger strategic interest in its partner than vice versa, the ﬁrst will

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US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

worry more about abandonment than the second.” Security dependent allies’ concerns and

the resulting reactions are well demonstrated by De Gaulle’s question to Kennedy In 1961:

“… whether we [the US] would be ready to trade New York for Paris.”

Thus France acquired

an independent nuclear arsenal against the US wishes to ensure escalation in case of a So-

viet invasion.

THE US DOMINANT POSITION IN NATO AND THE RISK OF ENTRAPMENT

NATO is a relevant empirical case study of alliances: It is the US’ oldest and largest col-

lective defense arrangement. Furthermore, most NATO members have technologically ad-

vanced economies that bring OCO capabilities within their reach without signiﬁcant addi-

tional investments. At least sixteen members already claim to pursue such means.

NATO’s

eﬀorts to integrate OCO since at least 2018 provide empirical evidence to the analysis and

have produced academic debate and concrete outcomes, e.g., doctrines and organizational

adaptations like the Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC).

Furthermore, NATO’s well-doc-

umented history allows investigation of historical analogies of emerging technologies.

Snyder argues that the threat from entrapment to alliance members, in general, is lesser

the more they are in control of the alliance’s capabilities for initiatives with the potential to

have strategic impact.

Military capabilities are in this analysis considered to be of strategic

value if they have the potential to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence outcomes in military conﬂict man-

agement.

According to Snyder, the large US military capabilities relative to her allies, have

been a key reducing factor in the risk from entrapment in NATO.

The threat from escalation

of the war in Ukraine right on the border of NATO accentuates the relevance of assessing al-

lies’ emerging OCO-capabilities potential inﬂuence on crisis management: if allies’ OCO are

strategically signiﬁcant, Snyder suggests they increase US risk from entrapment.

US concerns over entanglement and entrapment were present during the formation of

NATO.

This may explain why the key Article 5 in the treaty leaves some leeway – “such

action as it deems necessary” – for the allies to react in case of an attack.

Also, the US has

mitigated NATO’s nominal anarchic nature, where, in principle, a consensus is needed on ev-

ery decision, by occupying key nodes and positions, e.g., SACEUR, and thus dominating not

only through the US forces in Europe but also by having extensive control over the internal

procedures and debates.

It would be a gross mischaracterization to assert that the US has wielded unrestricted

hegemonic power over the alliance at any point in NATO’s history. NATO allies have oen

pursued policy objectives that diﬀered from US interests, particularly when external threats

were perceived as low.

However, the US has always been the senior partner with a deci-

sive inﬂuence over the alliance.

The advantages provided by this dominant position have

played a signiﬁcant role in keeping the US invested in NATO aer the demise of the USSR.

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The US position has been reinforced by European reluctance to transform economic growth

into military power to the same degree as the US and exacerbated by a signiﬁcant decline

in conventional European capabilities aer the Cold War.

The crisis between Russia and

NATO over Ukraine highlights the European allies’ military dependency on the US. Applying

Snyder’s analysis, the US central role in the alliance’s crisis management reduces her risk

of entrapment.

Aspects of the management of the war in Ukraine demonstrate the importance of US con-

trol over military actions that could lead to escalation – and hence implicitly if allies under-

took them without US consent, to entrapment.

Military crisis management – including

with cyber means - is to a large degree dependent on the opponent’s perception.

Hence, it is

vital to notice that Russia has hitherto perceived US inﬂuence in NATO as close to hegemon-

ic, insisting on negotiating solely with the US.

Paraphrasing Thucydides’ entrapment case,

the Russian perception presents a risk that NATO allies’ independent actions could lure

Russia to hold the US responsible. The analysis will not discuss crisis management models,

but simply, recalling Mr. Putin’s barely veiled nuclear threats to deter external interference

in Ukraine, refer to the intuitive observation that the impact of actions initiated by allies

without US knowledge or consent carries a greater risk for entrapping consequences when

international tensions are high.

THE CHALLENGES FROM ALLIES’ OFFENSIVE CYBER

So how does proliferation of emerging military cyber capabilities inﬂuence these dynam-

ics? Defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) do not represent coercive means and are thus ir-

relevant to the question of alliances’ use of military force.

The analytical focus should there-

fore be on OCO. While current NATO doctrine only distinguishes between OCO and DCO,

US doctrines distinguish between two diﬀerent subcategories of OCO, namely cyber-enabled

espionage, Cyberspace Exploitation (OCO-CE), and destructive attacks, Cyberspace Attack

(OCO-CA).

OCO-CE are intrusive but non-destructive operations to collect intelligence,

while cyberspace attacks are operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information

resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.

The US Air Force’s doctrine’s adds further nuances: they rename OCO-CE “cyberspace ISR”

and then straddles the grey zone between exploitation and attack by dividing cyberspace

attacks into Cyber Operational Preparation of the Environment (C-OPE) which are non-in-

telligence enabling activities conducted to plan and prepare for potential follow-on military

operations, and Cyberspace Eﬀects Operations that are actively destructive or disruptive.

Compared to analog means, OCO-CE constitutes a paradigm shi in small allies’ intelli-

gence collection opportunities by widening the scope and lowering the costs and associated

risks.

However, as espionage is not a new phenomenon, allies’ OCO-CE does not per se

present a new challenge to the dominant US position in NATO. Even so, OCO-CE cannot be

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completely discarded as an entrapment risk, as OCO-CE for the purpose of situational aware-

ness, can be diﬃcult to distinguish from OCO-CE conducted as preparations for cyberspace

attacks: C-OPE in USAF terms. Hence, any detected intrusion may be considered threatening

by the targeted entity.

Cyber enabled destructive attacks, however, arguably constitutes a paradigm shi. OCO-

CA’s technical and tactical properties challenge the traditional realist understanding of what

is possible for large states but impossible for small states based on their available resources.

Hitherto, conventional military means with strategic reach or eﬀect, e.g. an intercontinental

missile force, a blue water navy or nuclear weapons, have required states to undertake obvi-

ous and signiﬁcant investments and develop large military-industrial bases. Such costs have

limited proliferation and the necessary infrastructure is visible from space which enables

external observers to assess states’ conventional and nuclear strategic capabilities’ size and

eﬃcacy and may glean information regarding their owner’s intent.

The emergence of OCO-CA has changed this situation and hence the strategic context.

Small states can acquire the necessary means: the cost of entry into the OCO-CA capable

group of states is relatively low. In principle, OCO require commercially available IT equip-

ment and a team of qualiﬁed researchers, soware developers, and operators optimized by

coupling it with national intelligence services’ collection capabilities.

OCO has unlimited

geographical reach if targets are linked to the Internet. As demonstrated by STUXNET, OCO

can reach air-gapped targets with some extra eﬀort.

Unlike conventional strategic means,

OCO do not require large military and industrial investments to develop and deploy, which

means that they can be clandestinely developed with little or no recognizable signature.

Why is this important? As demonstrated above, the US dominates the decision process in

NATO, reducing the risk of entrapment. Lake provides insights that supplement Snyder’s

on alliance dynamics based on access to information: In a hegemony, the hegemonic part-

ner dominates the decision process of other allies e.g., whether to attack or how to react to

external attacks. However, Lake argues it is diﬃcult to eliminate local decisions, especially

in the light of asymmetric information.

Hence, the ability to develop OCO-CA clandestinely

reduces the hegemon’s ability to eliminate the initiatives of other allies.

The relative ease with which OCO-CA can be developed clandestinely reinforces alliance

members’ inclination to keep them secret even from allies.

Involved soware is produced

by organizations typically within or associated with national intelligence services, whose

highly classiﬁed and un-sharable intelligence is a prerequisite for the “tailored” part of OCO-

CA capabilities with tailored access.

Likely even generic OCO-CA means are oen kept

secret at the national level – perhaps because the cyber domain is still a new and hence im-

mature domain for conﬂict. Generic OCO-CA means have yet to be transferred from national

intelligence organizations to regular military forces to become an everyday part of military

operations on a par with other means.

The secrecy surrounding OCO, even in alliances,

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is underlined by the fact that NATO has had to develop the concept of “Sovereign Cyber Ef-

fects Provided Voluntarily by Allies,” or SCEPVAs to integrate OCO-CA in operations via the

Cyber Operational Command, or CyOC.

This allows members to oﬀer NATO OCO-eﬀects,

without disclosing anything about what means are used and what objectives are targeted.

NATO’s joint doctrine for cyberspace operations acknowledges that this is a suboptimal way

to manage operations.

Still, the procedure is a compromise that allows members to support

NATO operations with OCO capabilities without disclosing classiﬁed information. Historical

evidence on multilateral operations involving OCO-CA is currently limited to the 2016 cam-

paign against ISIS: the UK, Australia, and the US all deployed oﬀensive cyber.

It suggests

that inter-organizational de-conﬂiction just within the US was problematic, and decisions,

whether to inform let alone involve allies presented constant dilemmas.

US STATED POSITIONS ON OWN AND ALLIES’ OFFENSIVE CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES

The US is relatively clear regarding the roles of her OCO: in 2018, a new National Cyber

Strategy announced increased emphasis on the role of OCO as a means of deterrence by

punishment. The unclassiﬁed Strategy is kept very general but is a shi towards in-domain

deterrence.

It came alongside new, classiﬁed directions for U.S. Cyber Command (USCY-

BERCOM) that was allegedly given a broader scope for OCO and higher thresholds before

presidential authorization had to be given.

In public interviews and oﬃcial hearings, Mr.

John Bolton, the then National Security Advisor, and General Paul Nakasone, commander

of USCYBERCOM and NSA since 2018, have stressed the importance of the US doctrine

of “persistent engagement”. The persistent engagement doctrine requires the ability to be

constantly present in other nation’s networks to identify threats as they develop and punish

hostile actions.

The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy retains the former strategy’s stat-

ed intent to disrupt and dismantle threat actors.

But while US strategies are clear regarding unilateral use of OCO, available information is

sparse on the US intent regarding OCO’s role in alliances. Regardless of whether or not the

US consider allies’ OCO-capabilities desirable additions to e.g. NATO’s arsenal, the lack of

public statements on the subject may leave allies guessing how best to develop their military

cyber capabilities. To allies, e.g., Denmark, that depend fully on US security guarantees, it is

oen more important how military acquisitions, whether F-35 or OCO-capabilities, contrib-

ute to strengthening the alliance with the US than how they contribute to national defense.

NATO’s recent developments in the ﬁeld do not provide conclusive answers: In line with

the rest of the article’s argument that the US has a dominant position in NATO, the introduc-

tion of the CyOC and the SCEPVA procedures could be interpreted as implicit US approval of

allies’ emerging OCO. However, an alternative explanation could be that the US mainly sees

the SCEPVA procedure to allow for US OCO in NATO operations without disclosing informa-

tion on ways and means to allies.

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Declassiﬁed parts of the US 2006 Strategy and the 2012 Presidential Directive mention

international collaboration on defensive cyber issues.

DCO, including multinational collab-

oration, are uncontroversial regarding entrapment and occur in several arenas, including

NATO.

None of the US strategies apparently place high value on allies’ OCO capabilities.

Neither does any of them mention NATO regarding OCO. The 2023-strategy mentions NATO

(in sect. 5.3), but only with regards to defensive and resilience initiatives.

The 2006 Strate-

gy mentions international cooperation as the very last area under the section on partnering,

aer industry and interagency.

The 2017 National Security Strategy mentions allies in just

one sentence on threat information sharing and mutual assistance in attribution, defen-

sive and hence uncontroversial tasks.

The 2018 National Cyber Strategy hints vaguely at

multinational collaborative eﬀorts to punish misbehavior in the cyber domain but does not

mention OCO directly:

The imposition of consequences will be more impactful and send a stronger message

if it is carried out in concert with a broader coalition of like-minded states. The United

States will launch an international Cyber Deterrence Initiative to build such a coalition

and develop tailored strategies to ensure adversaries understand the consequences of

their malicious cyber behavior. The United States will work with like-minded states to co-

ordinate and support each other’s responses to signiﬁcant malicious cyber incidents, in-

cluding through intelligence sharing, buttressing of attribution claims, public statements

of support for responsive actions taken, and joint imposition of consequences against

malign actors.

This intent is reﬂected in a paragraph in very broad terms on collaboration in the Defense

Department’s cyber strategy.

The 2023-strategy states a similar objective in sect. 5.4. The

new is not more speciﬁc than the former, but the wording “collaborative use of all tools of

statecra” could include OCO. As of November 2023, nothing concrete regarding this initia-

tive has been disclosed.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS – A SOMEWHAT REASONABLE COMPARISON WHEN

CONSIDERING ENTRAPMENT

What justiﬁes seeking an understanding of the emergence of OCO-CA’s inﬂuence on US

alliance policies in the historical case of the emergence of nuclear weapons?

Firstly, high-ranking US politicians and military oﬃcers have compared their concern over

the emerging threats posed by OCO-CA to the threat from nuclear weapons, and their Rus-

sian and Chinese counterparts have expressed similar statements.

To the degree these

perspectives inﬂuence national policy, they are relevant regardless of which degree they

are reasonable from a technical perspective. Hence, the fact that some US decision makers’

concerns over the emergence and proliferation of OCO-CA are comparable to their concern

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over nuclear weapons justiﬁes comparison with their predecessors’ concerns and policy de-

cisions when these weapons entered the world stage.

Secondly, historical evidence suggests that technological changes in a strategic context

have the potential to destabilize international relations and raise the risk of escalation, espe-

cially if they, like OCO-CA, are perceived as giving the aggressor an advantage.

Nye argues

that even though OCO diﬀers in many ways from nuclear weapons, lessons can be drawn

from comparisons, e.g., the need to develop strategies without empirical evidence or histor-

ical experience.

Elaborate constructs and prevailing political fashion led to expensive conclusions based

on abstract formulas and relatively little evidence. […] Cyber has the advantage that with

widespread attacks by hackers, criminals, and spies, there is more cumulative evidence

of a variety of attack mechanisms and of the strengths and weaknesses of various re-

sponses to such attacks. [However] no one has yet seen a cyber war, in the strict sense

of the word, as deﬁned above. [Historical disclosed attack examples] give some inklings

of the auxiliary use of cyber attacks, but they do not test the full set of actions and reac-

tions in a cyber war between states. […] the problems of unintended consequences and

cascading eﬀects have not been experienced.

The Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 of Ukraine has provided some observations re-

garding the eﬃcacy of OCO in interstate war amongst near-peer opponents. As of Novem-

ber 2023, Russian OCO-CA appears not to have achieved signiﬁcant results at neither the

tactical, operational or strategic level.

This is not for lack of trying, though, as Russia has

deployed destructive malware against Ukraine throughout the conﬂict along with less dis-

ruptive, but highly proﬁled attacks against private and government entities in states sup-

porting Ukraine.

The reasons for the lack of impact of OCO-CA in the conﬂict are debated.

Likely they are a combination of oﬀensive and defensive factors, e.g., less competent and

resourceful Russian cyber forces and better Ukrainian cyber resilience (with external sup-

port from both states and private entities) than assessed prior to the conﬂict.

However, the

information available for academic analysis is still sparse at this point, and the events of this

war still leaves analysts room to theorize over OCO-CA’s potential.

Obviously, possession of OCO-CA capabilities does not give a small state the same ability

to conduct strategic power projection as a large state’s conventional means, let alone nuclear

weapons. Also, OCO-CA’s usually (although, as demonstrated by, e.g., NotPetya, far from al-

ways) limited, temporary, and reversible eﬀects are completely diﬀerent from nuclear weap-

ons’ spectacularly enormous, permanent, and irreversible destructivity.

That said, OCO-CA does provide small states new opportunities to reach out far beyond

their borders and inﬂict serious damage, e.g., on critical infrastructure. US strategies ac-

knowledge the theoretical potential for catastrophic damage from OCO-CA and include them

in the threats that the US nuclear arsenal is tasked to hedge against.

THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW

US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

Furthermore, as argued by, e.g., Cimbala, OCO-CA’s technical and operational attributes

make it a destabilizing means with signiﬁcant potential for crisis escalation.

The ambigu-

ities that accompany OCO-CA may further exacerbate the risk of escalation: Commanders

have limited situational awareness.

Discovering that he is under cyberattack, the victim

may be le in doubt whether he has discovered the full extent of the intrusion. Also, the

process of intelligence-based attribution may be time-consuming and initially provide in-

suﬃcient, low-conﬁdence answers.

Lack of information on what has happened, who did

it, and what will happen next, combined with a lack of international norms and historical

experience from empirical precedence to draw on can lead to several unfortunate decisions.

These include unintended escalation and counter strikes against third parties, especially if

the victim is already under pressure, e.g., as an eﬀect of a triggered security dilemma.

As in the classical security dilemma, even non-destructive cyber operations with underly-

ing defensive intent, e.g., OCO-CE intended as routine espionage to maintain normal levels of

situational awareness, may be perceived as oﬀensive – or to use the USAF’s term: cyberspace

operational preparation of the environment – by an opponent and trigger escalation.

This

is especially pronounced in the cyber domain where a perceived, if debated, dominance of

the oﬀensive tends to push towards instability.

These properties combined with a likely

lack of insight into the situational awareness and threat perceptions of the opponent(s) make

OCO-CA or even OCO-CE a potentially de-stabilizing means in a crisis. Particularly if the OCO

are directed (or even just perceived as directed) against the most sensitive areas, e.g., nodes

in a belligerent’s nuclear weapons command and control.

The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture

Review speciﬁcally acknowledge the cyber threat to such nodes.

Finally, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the threshold for using nuclear weapons

and OCO. The threshold for using nuclear weapons is arguably the highest for any military

means, as it has not been used since 1945, and the means is arguably considered taboo.

contrast, many states have demonstrated a very low threshold for using OCO, oen below the

threshold of armed conﬂict.

100

To round oﬀ the discussion in Clausewitzian terms, OCO’s potential for achieving positive

political ends, e.g., concluding a conﬂict to one’s advantage, is very open for debate.

101

Still,

OCO’s potential to achieve negative political ends, e.g., escalation of a crisis, appears con-

vincing.

102

OCO as a means for controlling escalation in crisis and war, is largely a question of

assumptions and educated guesses. The use of OCO signals in a crisis even more uncertainty

than signaling with traditional military means, making escalation even more challenging to

control.

103

US ALLIES, ENTRAPMENT, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A LESSON FROM THE PAST

So, if OCO-capabilities’ strategic risks with regards to military crisis management, particu-

larly during a crisis and heightened international tensions, are in some regards comparable

FALL 2023

MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

to nuclear weapons, how did the US react in the late 1950s when some NATO allies and other

friendly nations wanted to acquire their own nuclear arsenals?

A declassiﬁed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) – a high-level strategic assessment

collaboration between all the US intelligence services – on the topic from 1958 provides

insights on US concerns.

104

The NIE was downgraded from secret to conﬁdential in 1999

and declassiﬁed in 2004. Because the NIE was originally intended for internal use in the

US government only, it was likely written without consideration for diplomatic signaling or

politeness to either friends or foes. Hence, the analyst can arguably have high conﬁdence

in their insights into the US decision process. The NIE precedes Snyder’s 1984 article on

dilemmas in alliances by two decades, but the analysis precisely captures US concerns over

entrapment and allies’ concerns over abandonment, which is stated as a major driver for the

allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons.

105

In 1958, the UK acquired nuclear weapons in the face of stiﬀ US opposition.

106

France had

also overcome the US obstructions and was on the brink of deploying an arsenal. In Europe,

West Germany, Italy, and Sweden – the last friendly nation but not a NATO member, were

beginning to move towards this goal.

The NIE predicted no change in the basic international [bi-polar] system if the allies and

friendly Sweden achieved some nuclear capabilities. However, while the states still regard

the US alliance as essential, nuclear capabilities could render them less responsive to US

policy. The NIE assessed the reduced US inﬂuence as a negative, risk-enhancing outcome

and predicted that it would increase the risk for both conventional and nuclear war to an

undetermined degree. “Such a development is certain to produce strain and diﬃculties if

nothing worse” if the European allies used them “to achieve deeply felt” national aims or the

weapons become available to “almost totally irresponsible governments.”

107

In accordance with Lake’s theoretical expectations, the NIE indicates that while the US’s

dominant position in NATO helped control the political debate, it was insuﬃcient to quell the

allies’ interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

108

UK and France partially developed their ar-

senals out of fear of US abandonment. The French sought to keep their program clandestine

until September 1958 but were unsuccessful, as the NIE detailed in July of that year. The US

gained some control over the UK’s arsenal by supplying its main delivery systems, leaving

the UK capability somewhat reliant on US support. France, however, was able to keep its nu-

clear arsenal completely independent of the US.

109

West Germany was eventually dissuaded

by US assurances of commitment, made credible by a massive US military presence within

her borders that provided assurance but also ensured Germany’s deep security dependence

on the US.

110

Italy’s interest in nuclear capabilities was more motivated by the pursuit of

international prestige rather than immediate security concerns. Aer a half-hearted eﬀort

in the early ﬁies, Italy latched on to the German initiatives to gain leverage with the US on

matters other than the nuclear issue. Hence, they were easy to dissuade.

111

Sweden aproached

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US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

the US in the late ﬁies with requests for support for their nuclear program. They were

turned down but oﬀered to come under the US nuclear umbrella if Sweden abstained from

pursuing nuclear weapons. An independent Swedish program was technically possible but

so expensive that it likely undermined her conventional deterrence capabilities. Hence, Swe-

den gave up its eﬀorts.

112

Instead, Sweden pursued neutrality and defensive autonomy based

on extensive investment in conventional forces. However, tacit collusion and US economic

and technical support were still necessary to achieve a suﬃcient quality of conventional

forces for defensive autonomy, placing Sweden in partial dependency.

113

Compared to the current emergence of OCO amongst NATO members, similarities and

diﬀerences appear. Firstly, in 1958, the US was concerned over the potential nuclear pro-

liferation among allies and friendly states for reasons Snyder would recognize as concerns

over entrapment. Nuclear proliferation would increase their scope for strategic initiatives,

undermining US control and increasing the risk of international “strain and diﬃculties if

nothing worse” if they used them “to achieve deeply-felt” national aims.

114

Some of the US

concern was founded in the recognition that allies’ fear of abandonment might lead them to

take independent (nuclear) actions counter to US interests. The capacity to do so was rec-

ognized as a strong motivating drive for the allies, particularly France and West Germany’s

pursuit of nuclear weapons. Today OCO, particularly OCO-CA, presents an entrapment risk

of a similar nature—both from a technical eﬀects-based perspective and regarding allies’ pos-

sible motivations to acquire OCO. The counter-argument is that the physical impact of OCO is

less catastrophically violent than that of nuclear weapons, and hence only an entanglement

risk is valid and relevant. But, as demonstrated above, OCO has signiﬁcant potential for in-

ﬂuencing, e.g., escalation, especially during a crisis.

Secondly, in 1958, nuclear weapons were expensive, scientiﬁcally challenging, and re-

quired complex means for delivery, which made the allies’ nuclear capabilities relatively

easy for US intelligence to detect and assess.

115

Today, OCO can be developed by allies with

technologically advanced economies, as most NATO members, and it can be done without

leaving much in the way of an intelligence footprint. The counter-argument that OCO, un-

like nuclear weapons, only constitute a risk of entanglement due to their smaller impact is

again arguably less convincing because the much lower entry barrier for the acquisition of

OCO makes them much more accessible, as demonstrated by the speed with which they are

increasing in NATO.

116

Finally, in 1958, despite the costs and challenges required by allies to acquire nuclear

weapons and delivery means, the normal level of US political and organizational dominance

over their allies was insuﬃcient to keep them attentive to US requests. US intelligence had

to discover and evaluate the allies’ progress. An extraordinary military and diplomatic eﬀort

of sticks and carrots was necessary: A mixture of co-option (UK) and threats combined with

positive incentives and promises of unﬂinching commitment (Sweden, West Germany, Italy)

FALL 2023

MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

eventually brought most of them fully or partially back in line. Only in France’s case, the

eﬀorts failed.

117

Today, NATO allies can pursue OCO capabilities independent of US scientiﬁc

or material assistance and realistically with minimal insight from US intelligence in their

progress. Hence, involuntary oversight through intelligence collection on allies’ OCO capa-

bilities will likely provide a lower level of insight than the US had over the allies’ nuclear

capabilities in 1958. Also, this means that if the US should wish to incentivize her NATO al-

lies to develop (or refrain from developing) their OCO capabilities in particular ways, several

sticks were available in 1958, e.g., withholding scientiﬁc support and means of delivery, are

less eﬃcient today. Positive and negative incentives for following agreements remain viable,

but as mentioned, the verify-part of “trust but verify” on OCO will be diﬃcult compared to

nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

NATO Allies’ OCO Capabilities Constitute an Entrapment Risk to the US

This article poses the question whether US allies’ new OCO capabilities risks entrapping

the US or are they more likely to merely constitute an entanglement nuisance—a question to

which current literature provides little in the way of helpful answers.

The proposed argument was the following: If OCO brings into allies’ reach means that can

create an international crisis or seriously undermine US control of the management of a

crisis, then allies OCO capabilities constitute an entrapment risk. If allies’ OCO capabilities

only have limited potential for military impact, they only justify minor concern and thus

constitute a limited risk of nuisance due to unwanted entanglement.

The analysis explains how OCO’s destruction potential of non-U.S. NATO allies falls far

short of the threat of nuclear weapons. Yet this same analysis compellingly concludes that

these OCO capabilities can deliver strategic eﬀects, to include palpable escalation during an

international crisis. They also are much easier to acquire and have an unlimited range, and

do not require complex and costly delivery systems. Thus, in Snyder’s terms, OCO convinc-

ingly provides allies with new means for “independent strategic initiatives.”

118

Thus NATO

and other US allies with technologically advanced economies may pose more than a minor

risk of entanglement.

Recalling the caveat that NATO allies have grave incentives to adhere to US interests, the

analysis ﬁnds that in extraordinary circumstances, allies’ OCO constitutes an entrapment

risk to the US, albeit less so than nuclear weapons. Historical evidence that OCO has been

deployed by many states and on many occasions below the threshold of armed conﬂict sug-

gests that states’ threshold for using OCO is lower than for nuclear and even conventional

means. Again, recalling the caveat, this still suggests a lower threshold for allies’ indepen-

dent initiatives involving OCO.

THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW

US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

Furthermore, the acquisition of OCO can realistically be achieved clandestinely and with-

out US scientiﬁc support or special raw materials, rendering proliferation harder to detect,

and capabilities harder to assess, thus inﬂuencing allies’ decisions on OCO development

requires diﬀerent eﬀorts than nuclear proliferation. Positive incentives remain viable, as do

negative ones if allies (with more diﬃculty compared to nuclear counter-proliferation) are

caught violating agreements. However, the direct 1958-options of disincentives, e.g., with-

holding scientiﬁc support and/or access to delivery means seem less eﬀective in the context

of OCO.

The arguments above are not as such an argument for whether or not the US should dis-

courage, condone or encourage allies to acquire OCO-capabilities. They are arguments for

considering the potential inﬂuence of OCO, particularly OCO-CA, in alliances on the means’

own terms as their tactical and technical properties demonstrably diﬀer suﬃciently from

conventional means for it to be relevant to take these diﬀerences into account.

The ﬁndings lead to another observation: Whether or not counter-proliferation of NATO

allies’ OCO capabilities should be a US strategy, a clear statement from the US as to how

allies can best develop OCO capabilities to support US policy objectives would provide illumi-

nation that is missing in the public discussion today. This is particularly important to allies

for whom improving relations with the US is a (or even the) major factor when considering

acquiring military capabilities, including for OCO.

FALL 2023

MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

NOTES

1. Glenn H. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics, World Polics 36, no. 4 (July 1984), 461–95, hps://doi.

org/10.2307/2010183.

2. Snyder, 484.

3. A global domain within the informaon environment consisng of the interdependent networks of informaon technology

inasuctures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunicaons networks, computer systems, and embedded

processors and conollers. DoD, :DOD Diconary of Military and Associated Terms" (Department of Defense, 2020), 55.

4. Mikkel Storm Jensen, "Oensive Cyber Capabilies and Alliances: Quesonable Assets for Presge, New Risks

of Enapment" (Copenhagen, Universi of Southern Denmark, 2023), hps://portal.ndresearcher.sdu.dk/

les/228130107/Phd_thesis_Mikkel_Storm_Jensen_2023_e_publicaon.pdf.

5. For a discussion of what constutes the sategic environment, see B. J. Sokol, ed., e Marine Corps War College Sagy

Primer (Quanco, VA: Marine Corps Universi Press, 2021), 13-23.

6. Max Smeets, "NATO Members’ Organizaonal Path Towards Conducng Oensive Cyber Operaons: A Framework

for Analysis" Internaonal Conference on Cyber Conict, CYCON 2019-May (2019): 7, hps://doi.org/10.23919/CY-

CON.2019.8756634.

7. Donald Trump, "Naonal Cyber Sategy of the United States of America" (e White House, September 2018), 2-3,

hps://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Naonal-Cyber-Sategy.pdf; ODNI, "ODNI Annual

reat Assessment" (Washington DC: Oce of the Director of Naonal Intelligence, 2021), hps://www.dni.gov/les/

ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassied-Report.pdf.

8. Joe Biden, "Naonal Cybersecuri Sategy 2023" (e White House, 2023), hps://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-con-

tent/uploads/2023/03/Naonal-Cybersecuri-Sategy-2023.pdf; Trump, "Naonal Cyber Sategy of the United

States of America.

9. Jensen, "Oensive Cyber Capabilies and Alliances," 115,119.

10. Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Bryan C. Maness, Cyber Sagy: e Evolving Characr of Power and Coer-

cion (New York: Oxford Universi Press, 2018); Marn C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalaon in Cyberspace, RAND Corpora-

on Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Project Air Force, 2012).

11. Jacquelyn Schneider, "e Capabili/Vulnerabili Paradox and Military Revoluons: Implicaons for Compung,

Cyber, and the Onset of War," Journal of Sategic Studies 42, no. 6 (September 2019), 884-85, hps://doi.org/10.1080

/01402390.2019.1627209.

12. Richard J. Harkne and Max Smeets, "Cyber Campaigns and Sategic Outcomes," Journal of Sagic Studies, 2020,

hps://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1732354.”

13. Stephen J. Cimbala, "Nuclear Crisis Management and Deterrence: America, Russia, and the Shadow of Cyber War," e

Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30, no. 4 (October 2, 2017), 487-505, hps://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1377007.

14. Stéphane Taillat, "Disrupt and Resaint: e Evoluon of Cyber Conict and the Implicaons for Collecve Securi’,

Conmporary Securi Policy 40, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 368-81, hps://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1581458.

15. Max Smeets, "e Sategic Promise of Oensive Cyber Operaons," Sagic Studies Quarrly, Fall (2018): 90-113; Kenton G

Fasana, "Another Manifestaon of Cyber Conict: Aaining Military Objecves through Cyber Avenues of Approach," Defence

Studies 18, no. 2 (2018), 167-87, hps://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1462661org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1462661.

16. Benjamin Ang, "Small States Learn Dierent Survival Lessons," e Cyber Defense Review, no. Winter/22 (2021), 92-99.

17. Daniel Hughes and Andrew Colarik, "Small State Acquision of Oensive Cyberwarfare Capabilies: Towards Building an

Analycal Framework," Inlligence and Securi Informacs, ed. Michael Chau, G. Alan Wang, and Hsinchun Chen (11th

Pacic Asia Workshop on Intelligence and Securi Informacs, Cham: Springer Internaonal Publishing, 2016), 174-75.

18. Mikkel Storm Jensen, "Five Good Reasons for NATO’s Pragmac Approach to Oensive Cyberspace Operaons,"

Defence Studies, May 30, 2022, 1-25, hps://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2080661.

19. White, “Ally or Die: e Unlearned Joint Organizing Lesson and Key to Survival.”

20. Jeppe T. Jacobsen, "Europe Is Developing Oensive Cyber Capabilies. e United States Should Pay Aenon."

Council on Foreign Relaons, 2017, hps://www.c.org/blog/europe-developing-oensive-cyber-capabilies-unit-

ed-states-should-pay-aenon.

21. Max Smeets, "Intelligence and Naonal Securi US Cyber Sategy of Persistent Engagement & Defend Forward:

Implicaons for the Alliance and Intelligence Collecon," 2020, hps://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1729316;

Max Smeets, "NATO’s Cyber Policy 2002-2019: A Very, Very Brief Overview." Cyber References Project (blog), 2020,

hp://maxsmeets.com/2019/12/natos-cyber-policy-between-2002-2019-a-very-very-brief-overview/.

THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW

US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

NOTES

22. Rosenberger, Making Cyberspace Safe for Democracy. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics;" Michael Beckley, "e

Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Securi Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts." Inrnaonal Securi 39, no. 4 (2015), 12.

23. Michael Mandelbaum, e Nuclear Revoluon: Inrnaonal Polics before and ar Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge Uni-

versi Press, 1981), chapter 6; Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics," 466.

24. David A. Lake, Enngling Relaons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universi Press, 1999).

25. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics," 467.

26. Mandelbaum, e Nuclear Revoluon, 151.

27. Tong Kim, "Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Enap States," Securi Studies 20, no. 3 (July 2011), 350-77, hps://

doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.599201.

28. Kim, 355.

29. R. E. Osgood, NATO, e Enngling Alliance (Chicago, 1962).

30. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics," 466.

31. Snyder, 473.

32. De Gaulle, "Foreign Relaons of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962 - Oce of the

Historian," May 31, 1961, hps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/us1961-63v14/d30.

33. Alexander Lanoszka, "Protecon States Trust?: Major Power Paonage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics"

(2014), 185-88.

34. Smeets, "NATO Members’ Organizaonal Path Towards Conducng Oensive Cyber Operaons: A Framework for

Analysis."

35. NATO, "AJP-3.20, Allied Joint Docine for Cyberspace Operaons (Edion A)" (NATO Standardizaon Oce, 2020),

hps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/aachment_data/le/899678/doc-

ine_nato_cyberspace_operaons_ajp_3_20_1_.pdf; L. Brent, "NATO’s Role in Cyberspace," NATO Review, February

12, 2019, hps://www.nato.int/docu/review/arcles/2019/02/12/natos-role-in-cyberspace/index.html.

36. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics," 484.

37. Smeets, "e Sategic Promise of Oensive Cyber Operaons," 92.

38. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics," 484.

39. Lawrence A. Kaplan, "e United States and the Origins of NATO 1946-1949," e Review of Polics 31, no. 2 (1969):

218,221.

40. Lake, Entangling Relaons, 170.

41. Lake, 171.

42. C. Layne, "US Hegemony and the Perpetuaon of NATO," e Journal of Sagic Studies 23, no. 3 (2000), 61.

43. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "e Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Sategic Value in High-Intensi Operaons Is Far Greater

an You ink," Sagy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, ed., L. Odgaard, 2014, 61.

44. Adrian Hyde-Price, "NATO and the European Securi System - A Neo-Realist Analysis," eorising NATO - New Per-

specves on the Atlanc Alliance (London: Routledge, 2015), 48,50, hps://doi.org/10.4324/9781315658001-3.

45. Anthony H Cordesman, "NATO and the Ukraine: Reshaping NATO to Meet the Russian and Chinese Challenge"

(Washington, DC: Center for Sategic and Internaonal Studies, 2022), 5-6, hps://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.

com/s3fs-public/publicaon/220216_Cordesman_NATO_Ukraine.pdf?cS8vKRNOdoYvg3t_y6QMZMSCpadAo90a.

46. Jack Detsch Gramer Robbie, "Biden Adminisaon Debates Legali of Arming Ukrainian Resistance," Foreign Policy,

February 24, 2022, hps://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/24/biden-legal-ukraine-russia-resistance/.

47. Mar J Kari, "Russian Sategic Culture in Cyberspace eory of Sategic Culture – a Tool to Explain Russia's Cyber

reat Percepon and Response to Cyber reat Russian Sategic Culture in Cyberspace eory of Sategic Culture – a

Tool to Explain" (Ph.D. esis, Universi of Jyväskylä, 2019).

48. Fiona Hill, "Russia’s Assault on Ukraine and the Internaonal Order: Assessing and Bolstering the Western Response,"

Brookings (blog), February 2, 2022, hps://www.brookings.edu/tesmonies/russias-assault-on-ukraine-and-the-in-

ternaonal-order-assessing-and-bolstering-the-western-response/; Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger, "U.S. and

NATO Respond to Pun’s Demands as Ukraine Tensions Mount," e New York Times, January 27, 2022, sec. U.S.,

hps://www.nymes.com/2022/01/26/us/polics/russia-demands-us-ukraine.html.

FALL 2023

MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

NOTES

49. See e.g., C. Peoples, "Chapter 18: Sategic Studies and Its Crics," in Sagy in the Conmporary World: An Inoducon to

Sagic Studies, ed., John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, 5th edion (Oxford: Oxford Universi Press, 2016).

50. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., Inrnaonal Polics: Enduring Concepts and Conmporary Issues, 12. ed (Boston:

Pearson, 2015), 151-65.

51.NATO, "AJP-3.20, Allied Joint Docine for Cyberspace Operaons (Edion A)," 16.

52. Joint Chiefs of Sta, "JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operaons" (2018), U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta, June 8, 2018), II-6, hps://

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Docine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf.

53. Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 3-13 Informaon Operaons: Docine, Taccs, Techniques, and Proce-

dures, 2003, 2-11, 2-9, hps://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-13-2003.pdf.

54. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Docine Publicaon 3-12, Cyberspace Operaons, U.S. Air Force, February 1,

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e Journal of Sagic Studies 35, no. 3 (2012), 418, hps://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.663252; "An Interview

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62. Fred M. Kaplan, Dark Territory: e Secret History of Cyber War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016), chap. 8.

63. Pablo Breuer, Interview via Skype October 23, 2020 with Dr. Pablo Breuer, interview by Mikkel Storm Jensen; Gen.

Michael V. Hayden, USAF, Ret, "e Future of ings 'Cyber,'" Sagic Studies Quarrly 5, no. 1, Spring 2011, 5.

64. Bernard E. Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digil Age (Cambridge: Harvard Universi Press, 2015),

8-10. Wiesław Goździewicz, "Sovereign Cyber Eects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA)," Cyber Defense Magazine,

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34, no. 1 (2019), 123, hps://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1532627; Nakashima, "U.S. Military Cyber Operaon

to Aack ISIS Last Year Sparked Heated Debate over Alerng Allies," e Washington Post, May 9, 2017, hps://www.

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69. Trump, "Naonal Cyber Sategy of the United States of America;" Smeets, "Intelligence and Naonal Securi US Cyber

Sategy of Persistent Engagement & Defend Forward: Implicaons for the Alliance and Intelligence Collecon."

THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW

US ALLIES OFFENSIVE CYBER: ENTRAPMENT RISK OR ENTANGLEMENT NUISANCE

NOTES

70. Sanger, "Trump Loosens Secreve Resaints on Ordering Cyberaacks," e New York Times, 2018, hps://www.nymes.

com/2018/09/20/us/polics/ump-cyberaacks-orders.html?acon=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgpe=Ar-

cle&region=Footer.

71. Nakasone, "A Cyber Force for Persistent Operaons," Joint Force Quarrly, 2019, 10–14; Nakasone, Statement of General Paul

M. Nakasone Commander USCYBERCOM before the Senate Commiee on Armed Services (Senate Commiee on Armed

Services, February 14, 2019), hps://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nakasone_02-14-19.pdf; Nakasone

and Michael Sulmeyer, "How to Compete in Cyberspace," Foreign Aairs, August 25, 2020, hps://www.foreignaairs.com/

arcles/united-states/2020-08-25/cybersecuri; JFQ, "An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone;" Nakashima, "White House

Authorizes 'Oensive Cyber Operaons' to Deter Foreign Adversaries," e Washington Post, September 20, 2018, hps://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/naonal-securi/ump-authorizes-oensive-cyber-operaons-to-deter-foreign-ad-

versaries-bolton-says/2018/09/20/b5880578-bd0b-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html; Nakashima, "Trump Gives the

Military More Latude to Use Oensive Cyber Tools against Adversaries," e Washington Post, 2018, hps://www.washing-

tonpost.com/world/naonal-securi/ump-gives-the-military-more-latude-to-use-oensive-cyber-tools-against-adver-

saries/2018/08/16/75f7a100-a160-11e8-8e87-c869fe70a721_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.89e4be3895b0.

72.Biden, "Naonal Cybersecuri Sategy 2023," 14.

73. Mikkel Storm Jensen, "Denmark’s Oensive Cyber Capabilies: Quesonable Assets for Presge, New Risks of Enap-

ment," Scandinavian Journal of Miliry Studies 5, no. 1 (September 9, 2022), 111-128, hps://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.139.

74. D. Rumsfeld, "Naonal Military Sategy for Cyberspace Operaons 2006: (Washington, DC: US DOD, 2006), 17; B. Obama,

"Presidenal Policy Direcve/PPD-20," Presidenal Policy Direcve, 2012, hps://fas.org/irp/odocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf.

75. NATO Cyber Defence Factsheet, NATO, 2021, hps://www.nato.int/nato_stac_2014/assets/pdf/2021/4/pd-

f/2104-factsheet-cyber-defence-en.pdf.

76. Biden, "Naonal Cybersecuri Sategy 2023," 31.

77. Rumsfeld, "Naonal Military Sategy for Cyberspace Operaons 2006," 17.

78. Trump, "Naonal Securi Sategy of the United States of America’ (e White House, 2017), 20, hps://www.white-

house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

79. Trump, "Naonal Cyber Sategy of the United States of America," 21.

80. DoD, "2018 DoD Cyber Sategy and Cyber Posture Review Sharpening Our Compeve Edge in Cyberspace" (U.S.

Department of Defense, 2018), 5, hps://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041659/-1/-1/1/Factsheet_for_Sate-

gy_and_CPR_FINAL.pdf.

81. Biden, "Naonal Cybersecuri Sategy 2023," 32.

82. P. Cirenza, "e Flawed Analogy between Nuclear and Cyber Deterrence," Bullen of the Atomic Sciensts (blog), February

22, 2016, hps://thebullen.org/2016/02/the-awed-analogy-between-nuclear-and-cyber-deterrence/.

83. Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, "Emerging Technologies and Sategic Stabili in Peaceme, Crisis, and

War," Journal of Sagic Studies 42, no. 6 (2019), 883, hps://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626725; Rebecca Slayton,

"What Is the Cyber Oense-Defense Balance?: Concepons, Causes, and Assessment," Inrnaonal Securi 41 (2016), 72-109.

84. Joseph S Nye, "Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Securi?" Sagic Studies Quarrly, no. Winter 2011, 25.

85. See e.g., Jon Bateman, "Russia’s Warme Cyber Operaons in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Inuences, and Implicaons"

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Internaonal Peace, December 2022), hps://carnegieendowment.org/les/

Bateman_Cyber-FINAL21.pdf; J. Reddick, "Finland, Now a NATO Member, Sees an Upck in Cyberaacks," e Record,

April 21, 2023, hps://therecord.media/nland-reports-upck-in-cyberaacks-aer-nato-membership; "Minisies Hit

by Cyber-Aacks," Pressemelding, Government.no (regjeringen.no, July 24, 2023), hps://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktu-

elt/minisies-hit-by-cyber-aacks/id2990098/; FMI, ‘DDoS-angreb på oentlige hjemmesider under Forsvarsministeriet

i december," Forsvarsministeriets Materiel- og Indkøbssrelse, January 4, 2023, hps://www.fmi.dk/da/nyheder/2023/

pm-DDoS-angreb-paa-oentlige-hjemmesider-under-Forsvarsministeriet-i-december-2022/.

86. Bateman, "Russia’s Warme Cyber Operaons in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Inuences, and Implicaons," 11.

87. Bateman, 33.

88. Li, "Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”? e Proliferaon of Cyberwarfare Capabilies and Interstate War," 416;

Bryan R. Early and Victor Asal, "Nuclear Weapons and Existenal reats: Insights om a Comparave Analysis of

Nuclear-Armed States," Comparave Sategy 33, no. 4 (August 8, 2014), 281, hps://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014

.941720; Andy Greenberg, "e Untold Story of NotPea, the Most Devastang Cyberaack in History," Wired, 2018,

hps://www.wired.com/story/notpea-cyberaack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

FALL 2023

MIKKEL STORM JENSEN

NOTES

89. Schneider, ‘e Capabili/Vulnerabili Paradox and Military Revoluons: Implicaons for Compung, Cyber, and the

Onset of War’, 856; Rumsfeld, ‘Naonal Military Sategy for Cyberspace Operaons 2006’, C–1; DOD, ‘2018 Nuclear

Posture Review’ (Department of Defense, 2018), 38, hps://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-

1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

90. Cimbala, ‘Nuclear Crisis Management and Deterrence’.

91. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Vol. 1., ans. J.J. Graham (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd, 1918), 34, hps://

oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/tles/2050/Clausewitz_1380-01_EBk_v6.0.pdf.

92. Jon R Lindsay, "Tipping the Scales: e Aibuon Problem and the Feasibili of Deterrence against Cyberaack,"

Journal of Cybersecuri 1, no. 1 (2015), 56, hps://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/v003.

93. Libicki, Crisis and Escalaon in Cyberspace, 93-97.

94. Libicki, 45-49.

95. Buchanan, e Cybersecuri Dilemma, chap. 4.

96. Slayton, "What Is the Cyber Oense-Defense Balance?: Concepons, Causes, and Assessment."

97. Wan Wiled, Kastelic Andraz, and Krabill Eleanor, "e Cyber-Nuclear Nexus: Interacons and Risks" (UNIDIR,

November 2021), 19, hps://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/NRR/03.

98. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, viii, 57.

99. Nina Tannenwald, "How Song Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?" e Washington Quarterly 41, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 89-

109, hps://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1520553.

100. Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Sagy.

101. For a conceptual discussion on how to assess states’ “cyber power,” see Jelle J. Van Haaster, "Assessing Cyber Power,"

8th Internaonal Conference on Cyber Conict, Tallinn, 2016).

102. Clausewitz, On War, Vol. 1., 42.

103. Lawrence J. Cavaiola, David C. Gompert, and Marn Libicki, "Cyber House Rules: On War, Retaliaon and Escalaon,"

Survival 57, no. 1, January 2, 2015, 81-104, hps://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008300; David C. Gompert and

Marn Libicki, "Waging Cyber War the American Way," Survival 57, no. 4, July 4, 2015, 10,12, hps://doi.org/10.1080

/00396338.2015.1068551; Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," Internaonal Securi 41, no.

3 (2016): 49.

104. CIA et al., "Development of Nuclear Capabilies by Fourth Counies: Likelihood and Consequences" (Naonal Intel-

ligence Esmate (NIE) No. 100-2-58 (Washington, DC: Director of Cenal Intelligence, 1958), hps://www.cia.gov/

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105. CIA et al., 11.

106. Lanoszka, "Protecon States Trust?: Major Power Paonage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics." 176.

107. CIA et al., "Development of Nuclear Capabilies by Fourth Counies: Likelihood and Consequences" (NIE No. 100-2-

58, 3, 14, 16, 18, 19.

108. CIA et al., 17; Lake, Enngling Relaons, 55.

109. Lanoszka, "Protecon States Trust?: Major Power Paonage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics," 177-83, 187-

89.

110. Lanoszka, 112–38.

111. L. Nu, "Italy’s Nuclear Choices," UNISCI Discussion Papers 25, no. January (2011), 171-73.

112. Wilhelm Agrell, Svenska Forinlsesvapen (Falun: Historiska Media, 2002), 298-348.

113. omas Jonter, e Key to Nuclear Resaint (London: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2016), 93-124, 255-69.

114. CIA et al., "Development of Nuclear Capabilies by Fourth Counies: Likelihood and Consequences" (NIE No. 100-2-

58, 18).

115. CIA et al., 11.

116. Smeets, "NATO Members’ Organizaonal Path Towards Conducng Oensive Cyber Operaons: A Framework for

Analysis," 7.

117. Lanoszka, "Protecon States Trust?: Major Power Paonage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics."

118. Snyder, "e Securi Dilemma in Alliance Polics," 484.