Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Michael G. Anderson
The Sta Ride Handbook for the Battle of
Olustee, Florida, 20 February 1864
Cover Image: Brief Respite at Olustee, Michael Hogg, Watercolor on cold-pressed cotton,
2022.
Sta Ride Handbook for the Battle of
Olustee, Florida, 20 February 1864
Michael G. Anderson
Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, KS
An imprint of the Army University Press
ii
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Anderson, Michael G., 1984- author. | Combat Studies Institute
(U.S.). Press, issuing body.
Title: Sta ride handbook for the Battle of Olustee, Florida, 20 February
1864 / Michael G. Anderson.
Description: Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute Press, 2022. |
Includes bibliographical references. | Identiers: LCCN 2022011313 (print) |
LCCN 2022011314 (ebook) | ISBN
9781940804675 (paperback) | ISBN 9781940804675 (Adobe pdf)
Subjects: LCSH: United States. Army--African American troops--History--19th
century. | United States. Colored Troops. | Olustee, Battle of, Olustee,
Fla., 1864. | Command of troops. | Sta rides--Florida--Handbooks,
manuals, etc. | Florida--History--Civil War, 1861-1865--Campaigns.
Classication: LCC E476.43 (print) | LCC E476.43 (ebook) | DDC
973.7/36--dc23/eng/2022/04/04 | SUDOC D 110.17:OL 9
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022011313
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022011314
Combat Studies Institute Press publications
cover a wide variety of military history topics.
The views expressed in this CSI Press publica-
tion are those of the author(s) and not necessar-
ily those of the Department of the Army or the
Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press
publications available for downloading can be
found at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.
The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this doc-
ument as an ocial publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to
use CSI’s ocial seal on any republication without the express
written permission of the Director of CSI.
2022
Michael L. Hogg, Editor
Robin D. Kern, Graphics
iii
Acknowledgements
It is always an honor and privilege to bring to life past battles into the
present with discernable relevancy. Eorts such as this, bringing a less
well-known, relatively smaller American Civil War battle fought in a per-
ceived backwater theater of Florida, cannot be done alone. This study and
its applicability of past lessons to current and future military profession-
als certainly beneted greatly from the input, advice, and expertise of Dr.
Curtis King and Dr. Katharine S. Dahlstrand. The professionalism of the
study’s nal appearance is due to the hard work of editor Michael L. Hogg.
Thanks is due to the Army University Press editorial review board as well
for their selection and acceptance of this project. Without their support
this book would not have been possible in this manner. Many thanks also
to Christopher Lydick, US District Archeologist and Historian, Osceola
National Forest, US Forest Service and his support and knowledge from
many years of providing guided tours and studies of the Olustee battle-
eld. He is assistance added immensely to the project, and his time, eort,
and willingness to share research and experiences of walking the battle-
eld was extremely benecial to this handbook. Unquestionable apprecia-
tion and limitless thanks must go to the friends, peers, and most certainly
my family for their support, suggestions, advice, and patience with this
project as with all others. Thank you. Finally, to the students of the United
States Marine Corps Command and Sta College, Conference Group 7,
2020-2021. May we continue to learn from the past to inuence an uncer-
tain future.
v
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ............................................................................. iii
Publisher’s Note ...................................................................................ix
Illustrations ..........................................................................................xi
Introduction ...........................................................................................1
Part I: The Combatants .........................................................................7
Civil War Armies ............................................................................7
The Leaders ..................................................................................12
Weapons .......................................................................................16
Tactical Doctrine in 1861 .............................................................19
Logistics .......................................................................................22
Engineers ......................................................................................26
Communications ...........................................................................27
Intelligence ...................................................................................30
Medical Services ..........................................................................31
Part II: The Campaign Overview ........................................................39
Strategic Setting ...........................................................................39
Campaign Opening Moves, Florida ........................................40
Henry’s Raid .................................................................................42
The Day of Battle .........................................................................44
vi
Culmination of the Fight ..............................................................52
The Pursuit and Withdrawal .........................................................54
The Aftermath ...............................................................................56
Part III: Suggested Stands and Vignettes ............................................63
Introduction ..................................................................................63
Stand 1: Campaign Overview ..................................................65
Stand 1a: Campaign Overview (US Army Approach) .......... 75
Stand 1b: Campaign Overview (Secessionist Approach) ..... 84
Stand 2a: Henry’s Mounted Raids ...................................... 93
Stand 2: The Developing Skirmish ..................................... 99
Stand 3: Deployment of Hawley’s Brigade ...................... 105
Stand 4: Collapse of the 8th USCT ................................... 111
Stand 5: Deployment of the New York Brigade ............... 117
Stand 6: Secessionist Maneuver ..................................................121
Stand 7: Deployment of the Reserve Brigade ................... 125
Stand 8: Secessionist Pursuit, US Retreat, and Aftermath 133
Stand 8b: Secessionist Pursuit, US Retreat, and Aftermath .......139
Part IV: Integration............................................................................147
Part V: Support ..................................................................................151
Appendix A .......................................................................................153
vii
Appendix B .......................................................................................155
Bibliography .....................................................................................163
ix
Publisher’s Note on the use of Civil War Terms
The Army University Press supports the professional military edu-
cation of Soldiers and leader development. Books are published by our
press that describe the historical facts pertaining to the American Civil
War and acknowledge that the legacy of that war is still at the forefront of
our national conversation. We intend to describe the political and social
situation of the Civil War in a neutral manner. For example, the traditional
terms to describe the opposing sides, North and South, are only used for
grammatical variety, as they ascribe generalities that certainly did not ap-
ply to the totality of the “North” or the “South.” Many local citizens who
resided in states that openly rebelled against the United States government
were not in favor of secession, nor did they believe that preserving slavery
warranted such a violent act.
Similarly, citizens in states who remained loyal to the United States
did not all feel a strong commitment towards dissolving the institution of
slavery, nor did they believe Lincoln’s views represented their own. Thus,
while the historiography has traditionally referred to the “Union” in the
American Civil War as “the northern states loyal to the United States gov-
ernment,” the fact is that the term “Union” always referred to all the states
together, which clearly was not the situation at all. In light of this, the read-
er will discover that the word “Union” will be largely replaced by the more
historically accurate “Federal Government” or “US Government.” “Union
forces” or “Union army” will largely be replaced by the terms “US Army,”
“Federals,” or “Federal Army.”
The Reconstruction policy between the Federal Government and the
former rebellious states saw an increased eort to control the narrative of
how and why the war was fought, which led to an enduring perpetuation
of Lost Cause rhetoric. The Lost Cause promotes an interpretation of the
Civil War era that legitimates and excuses the secessionist agenda. This
narrative has been wholly rejected by academic scholars who rely upon
rigorous research and an honest interpretation of primary source materials.
To rely upon bad faith interpretations of history like the Lost Cause in this
day and age would be insucient, inaccurate, and an acknowledgment
that the Confederate States of America was a legitimate nation. The fact
is that Abraham Lincoln and the US Congress were very careful not to
recognize the government of the states in rebellion as a legitimate govern-
ment. Nonetheless, those states that formed a political and social alliance,
even though not recognized by the Lincoln government, called themselves
the “Confederacy” or the “Confederate States of America.” In our works,
x
the Army University Press acknowledges that political alliance, albeit
an alliance in rebellion, by allowing the use of the terms “Confederate,”
“Confederacy,” “Confederate Army,” for ease of reference and ow of the
narrative, in addition to the variations of the term “rebel.”
xi
Illustrations
Figure 3.1. Strategic Overview ...........................................................65
Figure 3.2. Operational Overview ......................................................66
Figure 3.3. Operational Overview ......................................................75
Figure 3.4. Operational Overview ......................................................84
Figure 3.5. Henry’s Mounted Raids .............................................. 94-95
Figure 3.6. The Developing Skirmish ...............................................100
Figure 3.7. Hawley’s Brigade begins deployment .................... 106-107
Figure 3.8. Hawley’s Brigade fully engaged ............................ 108-109
Figure 3.9. The US left collapses ......................................................112
Figure 3.10. Colquitt pushes Hawley ................................................118
Figure 3.11. Harrison deploys, Barton’s Brigade holds ............ 122-123
Figure 3.12. Montgomery Deploys ...................................................126
Figure 3.13. US Retreats ...................................................................129
Figure 3.14. Pursuit, Retreat, and Aftermath ....................................133
Figure 3.15. Pursuit, Retreat, and Aftermath ....................................139
1
Introduction
The sta ride has a strong base in history as a tool for the education of
the military professional. In 1906, the sta ride entered US military pro-
fessional training through the eorts of Capt. Arthur L. Wagner and Maj.
Eben Swift while at the General Service and Sta School, a precursor to
the Command and General Sta College (CGSC). The fundamentals of
the sta ride in US military education have expanded upon the original
concept, adding additional aspects to it, maximizing its educational value
to the military professional. To fully benet from the instructional attri-
butes of a battle or campaign study on the actual terrain of its execution
involves three phases: detailed preliminary study, a thorough visit to the
actual locations of the campaign or battle (the eld phase), and a nal re-
ective portion set aside to combine the classroom learning with the eld
observations into a fuller understanding of the insights gained by the en-
tire experience (the integration phase). Details on the conduct of sta ride
are found in The Sta Ride: Fundamentals, Experiences, and Techniques
by Peter G. Knight and William G. Robertson.
1
This is available through
the Center for Military History Website: https://history.army.mil/catalog/
pubs/70/70-21.html.
Sta rides are an integral part of the modern US Army’s professional
educational curriculum across its military institutions, from the CGSC, the
Army War College, and institutions throughout the Army school system.
The sta ride is a primary means for continuing professional education
and development, both in the schoolhouse and in line units, for both o-
cers and noncommissioned ocers; all Army leaders can benet. At times,
especially in line units, resources are constrained to properly prepare and
conduct a sta ride. This is where the role of the sta ride handbook ap-
plies. The handbook’s design is to provide background, a list of sites, or
“stands,” to visit in the course of the eld study, resources for guiding
discussion, and suggestions for actual conduct the sta ride.
The Sta Ride Handbook for the Battle of Olustee, Florida, 20 Feb-
ruary 1864 is one in a growing series from the Combat Studies Institute
(CSI) as part of Army University Press intended to support execution of
sta rides throughout the US military. This work on the Battle of Olustee
borrowed liberally from all its predecessors, particularly in the organi-
zational outline of the handbook and Part I, background to the armies.
The author is appreciative and indebted to the excellent eorts of previous
Sta Ride Handbook authors.
2
2
Although there is a considerable connection among all sta ride hand-
books, the Sta Ride Handbook for the Battle of Olustee, Florida, 20
February 1864, has some signicant dierences from others. One of the
aspects that sets the Olustee battle apart from other sta rides is the near
exact parity of forces and equally favorable ground for both combatants,
resulting in a battle that depended even more so than normally on the skills
and application of leadership and resource management, namely logistics
and physical endurance. This battle was a struggle between two forces led
by leaders inexperienced at such high levels of command with many units
that had never served either together or in the case of some regiments ever
before in battle.
It was a multi-brigade meeting engagement providing a clear, system-
atic tactical-level battle for analysis, though by necessity, the tactical na-
ture limits much of the operational analysis found in some other sta rides.
Though there exist signicant operational-level topics to be discussed in
the events leading to the tactical action, it is essentially a study of brigade -
and regimental-level leadership and tactics.
Of importance to this study, a signicant part of the US Army at Olus-
tee was African-American infantry regiments led by white ocers with
African-American noncommissioned ocers (NCOs). These formations
rst saw combat in 1863; in fact, one of the rst African-American regi-
ments to face combat also fought at Olustee, the famous 54th Massachu-
setts Volunteers (Colored). Former slaves, freedmen, and even runaway
slaves comprised these units, and they formed from all over the United
States and rebellious states. Previous, battle-experienced white ocers
and white NCOs seeking a commission volunteered to lead these units for
varied reasons. The extensive use of these United States Colored Troops
(USCT) and state African-American volunteer units in Florida makes that
theater an ideal one to examine the factors contributing to their perfor-
mance. Roughly 20 percent of all USCT regiments within the US Army
saw service in the state of Florida. At Olustee, three of the eight US Army
infantry regiments where African-American infantry units, a high percent-
age for any battle during the war at over a third of the infantry combat
force. The involvement of these African-American regiments within this
study sets the service of the Florida regiments somewhat apart from the
average experiences of USCT units. Typically, in other theaters they were
only a small percentage of the overall forces involved, whereas in Florida
USCT regiments comprised larger percentage of US Army forces.
A sta ride for the Battle of Olustee is a highly relevant, tactical-level
sta ride of an often-overlooked battle, providing an analysis of leader-
3
ship and resource management, and thus it is a departure from some of
the more popular sta ride studies. In addition, this battle was a tactical
defeat for the US force. To study a defeat instead of focusing on a success
provides an important vehicle for both immediate edication but also a
lesson in the art of learning. These factors create unique challenges and
opportunities. Of course, the needs and intentions of the sta ride leader
will shape the goals of this sta ride.
This handbook is structured for a single-day ride with 9 stands. Sta
ride leaders may have to modify the stands to t their schedules, and routes
they travel, but they should always attempt to keep a sense of connection
between stands so that students do not lose the larger context of the Florida
Expedition of 1864.
In addition, sta ride leaders must give the students a chance to con-
duct research and prepare before actually visiting the campaign locations.
The extent of student preparation will depend on available time. At one
end of the spectrum, students might have ample time to explore the sec-
ondary sources and even access certain available primary sources, such
as the passages regarding the battle in War of the Rebellion: A Compila-
tion of the Ocial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
3
On the
other hand, if students have less time to devote to research, an excellent
secondary source is William H. Nulty’s Confederate Florida: The Road
to Olustee, providing an excellent and readable account of the entire cam-
paign of 1864 in Florida and the background of the expedition.
4
The Sta
Ride Handbook for the Battle of Olustee provides a systematic approach
to the analysis of this often forgotten battle outside of the state of Florida.
Part I describes the organization of the United States Army and that
of the Secessionist forces, detailing their weapons, tactics, logistics, engi-
neer, communications, and medical support.
Part II consists of a campaign overview, which establishes the context for
the individual actions studied in the eld. This part can be used as a base for
the preliminary study of the students. Students can supplement the campaign
overview with other secondary and primary sources as time permits.
Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit in order to
obtain a concrete view of the campaign in its critical moments. For each
stand, there is a set of travel directions, an orientation to the battle site, a
discussion of the action that occurred there, vignettes by participants in
the campaign, and suggested analysis questions and topics for discussion.
Part IV discusses the nal phase of the sta ride, the integration
phase. In this phase, students integrate the classroom portion of the sta
4
ride with the eld phase and seek to provide relevant lessons for the
modern military professional.
Part V provides practical information on conducting a sta ride in the
Lake City and Jacksonville Battleeld area, including sources of assis-
tance and logistical considerations.
Appendix A outlines the order of battle for the forces involved on the
day of battle. Appendix B provides biographical sketches of key partici-
pants, appendix C has tactical sketches of the battleeld, and appendix D
provides historical maps of the area. A bibliography suggests additional
sources for preliminary study.
The Battle of Olustee in the Florida Expedition of 1864 campaign is
a powerful example of the eects of leadership on tactics and operations,
and the price paid by the common soldier. The lessons and insights gained
from this complex struggle encompass much of the vast panoply of war-
fare and can provide an unmatched tool for the education of the modern
military professional.
5
Endnotes
1. Peter G. Knight and William G. Robertson, The Sta Ride: Fundamen-
tals, Experiences, and Techniques (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History,
2020).
2. Dr. Curtis S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, Lt. Col. Steven E. Clay
(US Army, Retired), Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864: A
Study in Operational-Level Command (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat stud-
ies Institute Press, 2009).
3. War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Ocial Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies. Vol. 53. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Of-
ce, 1880-1901) Hereafter cited as ORA.
4. William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee (Tuscaloo-
sa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1990).
7
Part I
The Combatants
Civil War Armies
1
The US Army in 1861
The Regular Army of the United States in 1861 was a relatively-small
force, mainly oriented for frontier service, with approximately 16,000 sol-
diers scattered across 79 dierent posts.
2
The Army’s professional force
spread out through numerous small posts divided into a series of depart-
ments based on geography, with the departmental commanders answer-
ing directly to the Army’s general-in-chief, the president’s top appointed
ocer. This organization remained uid, and regularly altered.
3
During
the war, both the US Army and the secessionist forces used geographi-
cally-based, garrison-like departmental commands in this manner. Aside
from the geography-based command structure, there were eld commands.
These army commands, such as the Army of the Potomac, in many ways
superseded the garrison-style command of the departments, and had the
uidity to operate across departments.
The Regulars, those who were in service during peacetime prior to
the war, remained together forming a core of the expanding wartime US
Army. Over the course of the war, this base force naturally faced battleeld
attrition along with disease and desertion. Before the nal year of the war
the Regular force was signicantly depleted, no longer serving as the main
battleeld force for the US Army, replaced by the prolically recruited
state-based volunteer regiments, and then later under the shadow of grow-
ing casualty lists, volunteers became replaced more often with conscripted
draftees. Both armies’ maneuver forces followed the current structure of
militaries of the day modeling partly on Napoleonic formations.
The US Army’s newly created volunteer infantry regiments had a
base stang of 866 to 1,046, varying on approved numbers for the rank-
and-le enlisted. The secessionist states were more deliberate with a strict
10-company infantry regiment of 1,045 soldiers. These ocial numbers
rarely matched the actual numbers in the unit due to the nature of war with
previous casualties, desertion, sickness, and soldiers on approved absenc-
es. Infantry regiments on both sides rarely had more than 200-400 soldiers
once wartime attrition occurred.
4
Filling these formations through recruiting, and later draft boards,
largely rested with the states. This recruiting methodology resulted in state
8
governors promoting creation of new state volunteer regiments, to the det-
riment of other recruiting goals for the Regular Army and for lling loss-
es in already created volunteer units. Secessionist policy revolved around
sending recruits from the same locale to replenish the ranks of depleted
standing regiments; however, the policy of US forces simply supported
creating new regiments at the expense of battle-eected US Army units in
severe need of replacements, resulting over time in many US Army units
losing combat eectiveness. Only on paper did many of these units exist
as full companies, regiments, or brigades. This same occurrence plagued
the secessionist eld forces during the nal stages of the war as well, when
they simply lacked the personnel or ability to send replacements to the
depleted units at the front.
Another aspect of the recruiting method that the Florida Expedition of
1864 illuminated was that some of these regiments, both US and separatist,
lacked veterans, either through the creation of new regiments wholesale or
through the steady inux of replacements into an originally whole veteran
organization. They lost soldiers faster than they could recruit replacements
because states were constantly using new recruits to form new regiments.
This was particularly the case for the US Army regiments. However, the
US forces were not the only units not yet bloodied in battle. The seces-
sionist forces at Olustee also had raw regiments and soldiers, discussed
further later.
For the artillery, which would play a nominal role in Olustee, the
battery remained the most common unit seen on the battleeld with few
exceptions of larger groupings in specic engagements. The volunteer
artillery formations quickly outnumbered the few Regular Army artillery
formations existing pre-war. The common US Army artillery battery had
6 eld pieces, with 80 to 156 soldiers assigned, though like the infantry,
hardly ever all present for any particular engagement. In comparison,
the less resourced secessionist batteries routinely had only four guns and
barely reached their paper strength of eighty artillerymen. A battery of
12-pound Napoleons-type pieces included up to 130 horses for transpor-
tation. Some of the artillery formations in the US Army were “horse”
or ying artillery, which meant even the artillerymen were mounted to
provide more rapid artillery support to fast-advancing, long-range move-
ments (conventional artillery units had horses to move the guns, but the
artillerymen walked).
5
This necessarily increased the number of horses
assigned to an artillery unit.
The cavalry forces of both armies evolved over the course of the war.
They learned that Napoleonic-style cavalry charges failed against the in-
9
creased range of ried infantry weapons, and quickly abandoned this tac-
tic. Cavalry retained the key role of reconnaissance, and also began to
focus more on raids. Cavalry units were typically smaller in number than
their infantry equivalent, for example, secessionist cavalry companies
were usually 76-men strong, compared to infantry companies of around
100 soldiers each. The mobility coupled with the repower now associ-
ated with cavalry forces allowed many leaders to exploit their ability to
conduct large-scale raids. In actuality these raids often failed to decisively
defeat then opposing enemy cavalry or cause enough damage to enemy
infrastructure to make a signicant dierence for a campaign. However,
the mobility and the allure of deep, penetrating raids resonated with many
leaders on both sides of the conict.
6
United States Army in the Florida Expedition of 1864
The Florida Expedition of 1864 fell under Maj. Gen. Quincy Gillmore
who commanded the Department of the South in the US Army, includ-
ing Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour’s District of Florida. Seymour’s Florida
expedition had three infantry brigades with a cavalry brigade in support,
and although numerically this made a division-sized force, they were ad
hoc brigades not typically found under the same division commander, but
rather gathered from multiple commands and coalesced under Seymour
specically for the expedition.
7
Brigade maneuvering alone challenged
many eld commanders, and Olustee was no exception. The brigade com-
manders often fell prey to the pressure and temptation of directly lead-
ing the immediate regiment to their front, as opposed to dispassionately
maintaining broad situational awareness across their multiple regimental
movements of the entire brigade.
For both armies, the brigade typically controlled three to ve regi-
ments and a division controlling two or more brigades. The US Army bri-
gades in Florida were on the lower side of this, with only two to three reg-
iments per brigade, and the overall force equaled roughly a division. For
brigade command, the US Army typically had a colonel, with a brigadier
general commanding a division. In Florida, they struggled to nd enough
ranking ocers, with telling results.
Knowing the US Army manpower shortage, Gillmore hedged his bets
by requesting new African-American infantry regiments. The US Army
rapidly recruited and built the USCT regiments after President Abraham
Lincoln ocially authorized their raising in the Emancipation Proclama-
tion on 1 January 1863. Gillmore’s intentions was to relieve veteran units
currently employed in garrison and siege duties with the African-Ameri-
10
can regiments, allowing the white veteran units to join his mobile expedi-
tion to Florida. If he could get more fresh troops, those untested in battle
to sta the parapets and guard the bases it could free the more experienced
and tested troops to move through Florida. Based on the competing needs
of other department’s operations, the general-in-chief denied the request.
8
Gillmore was left to undertake the expedition with the troops he had, re-
sulting in a portion of his troops being untried, seeing their rst bloodshed
in Florida. The 7th New Hampshire was a mixed unit, composed of mostly
untested replacements with few veterans, while the 8th USCT was, as a
unit, completely untested with only its white leadership having previous
battleeld experience. One of the other African-American units, the 1st
North Carolina Volunteers (Colored), had only seen garrison and siege
duty, no major actions of the level of Olustee. The only Regular Army
force at Olustee was some of the artillery batteries, none of the infantry or
cavalry units were from the pre-war Regular Army, but were all volunteers
or USCT regiments. With his composite “division”, Seymour’s forces, to-
taled 5,500 soldiers, and 16 artillery pieces making up the US forces for
the Florida Expedition.
9
The Secessionists Forces of Middle Florida
As the US oensive operations became clearer, Brig. Gen. Joseph
Finegan received much needed reinforcements from South Carolina and
Georgia from Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard. In the separatist states, the De-
partment of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, which included the Dis-
trict of East Florida under Finegan was commanded by Beauregard. These
reinforcements included ve Georgia infantry regiments under Brig. Gen.
Alfred Colquitt and three additional Georgia infantry regiments under Col.
George Harrison, which came as far as the rail lines carried them, and then
completed their move on foot.
When both Colquitt’s brigade and that of Harrison arrived to support
Finegan in northern Florida, Finegan reshued the forces to create two
infantry brigades and the one cavalry brigade under Col. Caraway Smith,
comprised of Florida cavalry and one Georgia cavalry battalion. Finegan
incorporated the few Florida infantry battalions he had available into the
Georgia infantry brigades. As compared to the US Army regiments, the
only regiment untested prior to Olustee among the out-of-state Georgia re-
inforcement was the 64th Georgia Volunteers; however, all of the Florida
units had varied combat experiences, mostly skirmishes and small-scale
battles, none to the same intensity as Olustee. Finegan’s cumulative forces
amounted to 5,200 soldiers and 12 guns.
10
11
United States Colored Troops
The history of African-American troops in the US Army during the
Civil War encompassed a series of congressional acts, military orders,
and presidential proclamations. In immediate response to Lincoln’s call
for volunteers in spring 1861 hundreds of free African-Americans across
the northern states attempted to volunteer, however, the US War Depart-
ment declined, leaving it to only white Americans to volunteer.
11
Political
and social pressure, along with battleeld attrition contributed to the US
Government’s reassessment of its exclusion policy, slowly starting to ad-
dress freedom of specied slaves in late 1861 and the beginning of Afri-
can-American military service in mid-1862.
Congress passed a series of Conscation Acts during the rst years of
the conict that initially addressed US policy for slaves in occupied seces-
sionist states and runaway slaves who reached US Army lines. The First
Conscation Act in August 1861 simply declared anyone who allowed their
slaves to support secessionist activities forfeited their claim to their slaves,
not necessarily outright freeing them, but more placing them in a legal lim-
bo. This act largely intended to deny secessionist access to slave labor to
support their war eorts without risking losing those slaves once US Army
forces occupied their area. The Second Conscation Act in July 1862 went
even a step further and was the rst to address African-Americans support-
ing the US war eort. This act legally freed secessionist slaves who reached
US lines or those which US forces liberated when coming through or occu-
pying secessionist territory, and authorized the President to employ as many
African-Americans as he deemed necessary to support the war in whatever
way he felt appropriate. On the same day, 17 July, the Militia Act further
allowed for the enlistment of African-Americans in the service of the Unit-
ed States.
12
This initially resulted in using former slaves and volunteer free
African-Americans to serve in labor battalions for constructing US fortica-
tions, camps, and other supporting eorts. This initial use led to continued
strife during the early years of the war, while white US Army regiments
received ten dollars a month for their service, the African-American troops
received seven dollars.
13
Purportedly based on the USCT regiments not used
in battle as the white regiments were, therefore receiving labor battalion
pay, not combat unit pay, the discrepancy remained even when the Afri-
can-American units began seeing combat.
14
In the 8th USCT less than half
accepted the seven dollars pay after their rst battle at Olustee.
15
Modest US successes in late 1862 across the west and south, and at the
battle of Antietam, led to Lincoln’s administering the Emancipation Proc-
lamation on 1 January 1863. While the proclamation politically and legally
12
did little to address the termination of slavery in the northern Border States
and most of the occupied territories held by the US Army, it importantly
opened the way for ocial recognition for raising African-American full-
edged regiments.
16
Some African-American regiments had already been
raised in 1862 by US leaders in specic departments, namely those in com-
mand in the south and west, incurring controversy, the ocial raising of
these units began with approved War Department orders issued in March
1863. The War Department initiated the creation of the United States Col-
ored Troops (USCT) organization in a haphazard manner. Although they
followed the template of regiments formed of infantry, cavalry, and ar-
tillery, with many raised federally by commanders in the eld from run-
away slaves or recruited freedmen, other were raised by governors of the
various states, in like manner to how the traditional US Army regiments
were raised. Attempts to coordinate the naming conventions of these units
caused signicant confusion. Many were named after the southern states
they were associated with or were physically formed in, such as the 1st
South Carolina, or the Native Guards from Louisiana. In other cases, reg-
iments raised in Tennessee took the designation of 1st and 2nd United
States Colored Infantry even though a regiment of the same nomenclature
was already raised in Washington D.C., these inconsistencies have made
the precise number of USCT regiments dicult to determine.
17
During the war, at various times, the War Department attempted to
organize the USCTs by converting and renaming the federally raised reg-
iments into a USCT regimental system from their southern origin state
nomenclatures, such as the 1st North Carolina Volunteers (Colored) that
participated in the Florida Expedition of 1864, to the 35th USCT. This
regiment’s conversion occurred during the Florida expedition, but after
Olustee. However, northern state-recruited units, such as the 54th Massa-
chusetts that also participated in the Florida Expedition of 1864 retained
their state designations, as they were originally state raised not federal-
ly raised. Initially, these state volunteer regiments and those raised under
the purview of a US Army eld commander had no formal structure, but
during the conict the War Department required state volunteer and eld
raised regiments to match the federally raised regiments from the north
themselves matching the traditional US Army regimental structure.
18
The Leaders
When hostilities started in April 1861, the US government and the
newly seceding states faced the rapid demand to eld larger formations.
In the case of the US Army, these formations far exceeded the size of the
standing, peacetime Army, and in the case of the seceding states, it was an
13
army created from the bottom up. With the passions of the times, many
leaders departed the US Army for the secessionist military, 270 of 1,108
Regular ocers resigned and headed to the seceding states. In contrast,
only 26 of 15,135 enlisted men left the Army to join the state secessions.
19
Nearly 25 percent of the serving West Point ocers resigned to serve the
seceding states in 1861. Thirty percent of West Point ocers from the
1830-1861 classes fought for the separatist forces. Of the academy cadets
in 1861, 37 percent withdrew to serve in the seceding states.
20
Both sides
ultimately relied on volunteers to lead the exponentially expanding armies.
Aside from the national military academies, several states had their
own military school system that fed into their ocer corps. These were
more common in the seceding states, for example, Virginia Military In-
stitute, South Carolina’s The Citadel, and the Georgia Military Institute
(secessionist brigade commander at Olustee Col. George Harrison attend-
ed). There were also state military schools that fed the US Army, such as
Norwich University in Vermont (US forces eld commander at Olustee
Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour attended prior to his accession to West Point).
Many of the leaders from both sides had military education, largely
from the United States Military Academy, at West Point, but other institu-
tions as well. In addition, many of the ranking ocers on both sides had
actual wartime experience in the Mexican-American War, and scattered
campaigns on the frontier, but for large part this was in positions no high-
er than company-level.
21
Actual battleeld experience, and in many cases
institutional learning, failed to transfer to the higher levels of command
these leaders held in the war. It took the blood and hard lessons of the
early campaigns to build the skills of both sides’ leadership. In both or-
ganization, the centralized government appointed general ocers, while
lower ranking ocers and volunteer formations’ leadership largely came
through appointments by respective state governors. At the beginning of
the war, company-level ocers were elected by the rank-and-le.
22
Leadership of the USCT, which made up three of Seymour’s eight
infantry regiments, was dierent. War Department policy dictated only
white men could hold commissions, leaving few, limited exceptions for
African-American ocers. These exceptions, those commissions that were
not later rescinded from the African-Americans, were at company-level or
lower positions, and as chaplains, medical ocers, or local recruiters. The
restriction clearly meant to preclude African-American ocers command-
ing—ordering—white soldiers. However, African-Americans served at all
levels up to regimental as noncommissioned ocers.
23
14
USCT ocers were not regionally assigned as was common with most
other regiments, but were selected from across the country at the national
level. These ocers had a high turnover rate, averaging around 80 percent
during the course of the war.
24
The ocers were all volunteers for service
in the USCT regiments. All had to pass a centralized board. Board topics
included tactics, army regulations, limited math, history, and geography. A
result of these boards included a more educated USCT ocer corps; howev-
er, minimal preparation for the board selection process existed. Some states
created a few actual preparatory schools for aspiring applicants. Pennsyl-
vania had the Pennsylvania Free Military School for Applicants for Com-
mands of Colored Troops, commonly held up as a successful model.
25
Ol-
iver Norton served as an USCT ocer in the 8th USCT, a participant at
Olustee, and recounted his test lasting for forty-ve minutes, although noted
most lasted no more than fteen minutes.
26
Norton noted he knew of a lieu-
tenant colonel who failed the board, which added to the rate of 40 percent of
applicants failing the board for various reasons, and on average a fourth of
all applicants actually receiving a commission in a USCT.
Enlisted soldiers from white regiments who received commissions from
the board lled the leadership billets of company grade ocers. White com-
pany grade ocers who passed the boards and accepted commissions in the
USCTs immediately received promotions to serve as eld grades. Over 40
percent of these white ocers had participated in two of more battles, 20
percent had fought in ve battles. The purpose of this was to provide the
USCT units with instant, combat leadership experience, which the War De-
partment found critical to lead African-American troops.
27
Providing this instant stang of battle-experienced white ocers to
man the USCTs, however logical, did so by placing these veterans at lev-
els of responsibility and experience at an inappropriate competency level.
Battleeld experience and competency required of a non-commissioned
ocer to hold the line in a white regiment was not the same as the man-
agement of administrative aairs for the unit, the broader supervision of
training, and the competency to maneuver companies in combat. Like-
wise, the demonstrated knowledge and ability to manage and lead a white
company was vastly dierent from that of controlling and commanding a
battalion or a regiment.
Leadership in the Florida Expedition of 1864
In regards to the Florida Expedition of 1864, the four main leaders
shaping the US Army’s actions and eorts at Olustee were Brigadier Gen-
eral Seymour and his three brigade commanders: Colonels Joseph Hawley,
15
William Barton and James Montgomery. The fourth brigade commander,
Col. Guy Henry, commanded the US cavalry, playing a minor role in the
battle, although a larger role in the campaign’s initial moves. Seymour
operated for the rst time in an independent command, with his superior in
South Carolina. At the brigade-level, both armies only had one brigade led
by an experienced brigade commander, regimental commanders led all the
other brigades, whose sta or company-grade ocers in turn commanded
their regiments.
Colonel Hawley commanded Seymour’s lead brigade during the Flor-
ida Expedition. Three infantry regiments and supported by an artillery bat-
tery formed Hawley’s brigade. Hawley’s own regiment, the 7th Connecti-
cut, was being commanded by Captain Benjamin F. Skinner while Hawley
served as brigade commander. Following Hawley’s brigade was Colonel
Barton’s New York brigade. Three New York infantry regiments without
any artillery attachments formed Barton’s brigade and all were veteran
units. The most seasoned of Seymour’s brigade commanders, and only
true experienced brigade commander, was Colonel Montgomery. Mont-
gomery, the oldest of the US Army commanders and with his anti-slavery
background in “Bleeding Kansas”, was given command of Seymour’s re-
serve brigade, comprised of two of the African-American regiments. Col-
onel Guy Henry was the fourth brigade commander, whose mounted bri-
gade served as the supporting brigade, made up of one cavalry battalion,
one mounted infantry regiment, and one battery of attached horse artillery.
Three ocers had received formal, military education in the US Army
leadership for the Florida Expedition of 1864. The architect of the expedi-
tion, Quincy Gillmore, was a United States Military Academy, West Point,
graduate, rst in his class of 1849. Similarly, his battleeld commander,
Truman Seymour, attended Norwich University, the Vermont state-mili-
tary academy, for two years before going on to graduate West Point, gradu-
ating nineteenth in his class of 1846. Also, Lt. Col. William Reed of the 1st
North Carolina Volunteers (Colored), as a son of an African slave mother
and a Danish father in St. Croix, Virgin Islands, not only attended a foreign
military academy, the Militärakademie Rendsburg in Schleswig-Holstein
(then a part of Denmark), but after graduating, he served in the Danish
army during the First Prussian-Danish War. After immigrating to the US
in 1853, he became a rarity during the American Civil War as a biracial
ocer in a USCT regiment.
The separatist forces in Florida facing the US Army expedition were
more a single, grouped mass, but could be broken down into two brigades
on paper. The secessionists usually had a brigadier general commanding a
16
brigade, and a major general commanded a division. In the Florida cam-
paign, they struggled to match typical ranks with battleeld formations.
Finegan organized his forces into two brigades, in actuality his forces in-
dependently deployed regiments and at times even battalion formations.
Finegan himself was the least experienced of the secessionist leaders
at Olustee though he was the overall commander. The two reinforcement
brigade commanders from Georgia, Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt and Col.
George Harrison both had more battleeld experience. Even the Florida
cavalry commander, Caraway Smith, had more eld experience, though
smaller scale than the Georgia commanders, than did Finegan. Finegan
largely owed his generalship and command to state connections from pre-
war business interests. Wisely, Finegan essentially bestowed battleeld
command to Colquitt for the duration of Olustee and only managed the
forward ow of reinforcements up to the front for Colquitt to employ be-
tween himself and Harrison’s brigade’s portion of the line. Harrison had
the dual distinction of being the youngest secessionist commander at Olus-
tee and the only one who had military education from his schooling at the
Georgia Military Institute.
Weapons
The Springeld served as the most prolic infantry weapon of the war
by both sides. The .58 caliber ried musket came in three models, 1855,
1861, and 1863, with the 1861 model the most common during the war.
First used by the Army in 1855, the Springeld was similar in appear-
ance and operation as the previous smoothbore muskets being a single
shot, muzzleloader. The 1861 model was 56 inches long, with a 40-inch
barrel, weighing slightly over 9 pounds with the 21-inch socket bayonet
attached. The increased range and accuracy due to the riing of the new
Springeld’s bore provided the important dierence in the models, giving
eective range up to 500 yards, coinciding with its rear sight. The Spring-
eld also had enough power to damage at 1,000 yards if a lucky strike
hit the target. This riing system was that of French Army ocer Claude
Minie, ring a round, nonexpanding ball a hollow, cylindrical cone projec-
tile that expanded and twisted along the riing upon percussion ignition.
28
Even with this improvement in range, accuracy, and ballistics, obscuration
still occurred from the black-powder weapon when red repeatedly or in
dense, large groups.
Typical sustained rate of re for a well-trained infantryman was three
rounds per minute, possibly four times per minute with substantial drill-
ing. Under stress and duress in battle, it remained more likely a slower rate
17
of two to three rounds a minutes. The loading and ring of the rie-mus-
ket was a ve-step process. The soldier opened a paper cartridge, poured
powder and bullet down the barrel, fully seating bullet down barrel with a
ramrod, cocking hammer and setting percussion cap to ignite the charge,
with nal trigger pull releasing cocked hammer to create the spark, ignit-
ing the gunpowder, exploding in the barrel, expanding and projecting the
bullet down the ried barrel.
Although the Springeld models remained the most common, there
was no denitive armament for the armies during the war, resulting in over
100 various types, makes, and models of infantry arms. These included
domestic and even international models, the most common international
model being the 436,000 US Army purchased British .577 caliber Eneld
ries, Model 1853 pattern weapons during the war. Though the separatist
forces did import some weapons, including Enelds, the US Navy block-
ade signicantly hampered these attempts. By 1863, indications pointed
to separatist government purchase of only 70,980 traditional Enelds and
9,715 short, carbine-type, Enelds. A further 23,000 additional remained
waiting for successful blockade running.
29
Aside from ried, muzzle-loading muskets, some infantry had
breech-loading or repeating ries, often purchased individually or outt-
ted by the state for specic volunteer regiments. Of these, the two most
common were the breech-loading, single shot Sharps and the repeating
Spencer rie. Though some infantry regiments armed themselves with
these relatively more advanced small arms, mostly the cavalry utilized
these types of ries.
The common US cavalry weapon was the .52 caliber Sharps, which
came in two forms of an 1859 model. The rie was 47 1/8 inch, weighing
8 3/4 pounds, and the carbine model was 8 inches shorter and a pound less
in weight. The common repeater was also a .52 caliber weapon, with both
a rie and carbine model. The seven-shot Spencer rie was 47 inches long,
weighing 10 pounds, while the carbine model preferred by mounted units
was 8 inches shorter, weighing 1 3/4 pounds less. The rie red rimmed,
self-contained cartridges, more resembling modern bullets, loaded through
the butt-stock and feed into the chamber by the trigger guard action.
Over the course of the war, the cavalry arms of both armies moved
further away from the limited armament of sabers and pistols to adopt
more repower intensive weaponry. This coincided with the change in
the utilization of cavalry and a more decisive and intense combat with the
enemy. The preferred weapons were the smaller carbines, shortening the
18
length of typical ries for easier handling on horseback and breech-load-
ing mechanisms to ease the diculty of attempting to muzzle-loading ef-
forts while on horseback and on the move. The emerging technological
market for these weapons systems resulted in multiple models of various
calibers ranging from .52 caliber, to .56 caliber and many in between. The
most common was the Hall, a .52 caliber single shot, breech-loading car-
bine. With continued advancement during the war, the eorts moved from
single shot, breechloaders to repeating carbines, of which the Spencer at
.52 caliber with its seven shots was the favored one.
30
The US forces largely beneted from this improved technology due to
the industrial limitation of the south as well as the Federal imposed block-
ade. This resulted in the secessionist cavalry relying more on tradition re-
power for its mounted forces such as shotguns, multiple pistols, and still
using muzzleloaders, or captured US arms, but the inability to continue to
logistically support these captured weapons with the correct cartridges and
repair parts oset this occurrence.
Both sides employed various artillery pieces. With an eective range
of approximately 1,523 yards, the 6-pounder artillery piece was the most
prolic during the war. As the war progressed, the armies replaced the older
eld piece that had seen service in the Mexican-American War with a newer
model, a 12-pounder called the “Napoleon”, with an eective range exceed-
ing the 6-pounder by approximately 100 yards at 1,619 yards. This new
model served dual roles, ring canister and shell re like a howitzer while
also able to re solid shot like a typical gun system. The Napoleon was a
muzzleloader, typical of the period artillery pieces, and normally serviced
by nine artillerymen, able to re a sustained rate of two shots per minute.
The artillery of the day was composed of four types: solid shot, shell,
canister, and shrapnel. Batteries used solid shot mostly for fortication de-
struction, a projectile battering ram eect. Shells were similar in design as
solid shot only they exploded based o a timed fuse. This had a limited ef-
fect on surroundings from fragmentation, but served a large psychological
eect on the target. Shrapnel shells were similar to shells in that they were
a projectile timed to explode, however, the shrapnel shells were hollowed
and lled with balls of lead or iron to add to the casing’s fragmentation.
This was most eective against advancing infantry in the open. Canister
was an even more eective round against infantry forces than shrapnel but
at a much closer range, typically 400 yards, or closer. In similar concept
to shrapnel, canister was a tin can lled with assorted, damaging items.
However, unlike the shrapnel shell, the explosive charge on ignition shat-
tered the tin can and resulted in a shotgun-like eect right out of the bar-
19
rel, as compared to the shrapnel round, which traveled and then based on
fuse exploded into fragmentation.
31
The secessionists tended to keep their
batteries decentralized, usually attached to the infantry brigades, while the
US Army organized their artillery into independent groups, however, at
times, such as Olustee, the US force also decentralized their batteries for
direct support to specic infantry brigades.
Weapons in the Florida Expedition of 1864
The Florida Expedition of 1864 reected the variety of weapons avail-
able to both armies during the war; however, without doubt the infantry
dominated the battleeld while the cavalry only minimally inuenced the
opening stages of the battle. As for ries, both armies relied heavily on the
Springeld and Eneld models, which were the most common weapons
used by both.
As for infantry small arms, the state volunteers of the 7th Connecticut
Infantry Regiment, a key US Army regiment at Olustee, possessed Spen-
cer repeating ries, which had signicant impact on the unfolding battle.
32
Overall, the variety of small arms weapons and calibers of ammunition
required on the battleeld by each army presented sustainment challenges
that ranged from production and procurement to supplying soldiers in the
eld. Ammunition resupply would be a determining factor in the Battle of
Olustee. Specically, the timely resupply of ammunition, both the resup-
ply of the correct or incorrect ammunition-type directly aected critical
points of the battle.
While the artillery was decently represented in both armies, it played
a minor role in the actual ghting. Although as a focal point, they main-
tained their importance on the eld as infantry objectives and targets. The
US forces at Olustee started the battle with four batteries of artillery. Of
these two were six-gun batteries, with another battery of the four-guns.
The secessionist forces defending Florida had artillery reserves that to-
taled three artillery batteries. Two batteries were four-gun structured bat-
teries. In the case of the march toward Lake City, the US forces at Olustee
had their batteries similarly task organized to support brigades. This was
contrary to normal US Army artillery procedures.
Tactical Doctrine in 1861
Tactical doctrine continually evolved during the course of the war as
technology and extensive scale of the armies forced alterations to the pre-
viously accepted Napoleonic doctrine. Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, then a
1st Lieutenant, wrote the primer on military theory prior to the Civil War
20
titled, Elements of Military Art and Science published in 1846.
33
The pe-
riod’s accepted infantry doctrine, rooted in Napoleonic formations, had
two US Army sources: General Wineld Scott’s work, Infantry Tactics,
published in 1835, and its follow on addition of Rie and Light Infantry
Tactics by Major William J. Hardee, published in 1855. Both emphasized
Napoleonic formations of massed, linear-based formations of up to three
ranks. The only notable dierence between the two foundational works
was the speed adjustment, from General Scott’s “quick time” of 110 steps,
covering approximately 86 yards per minute, to Major Hardee’s “double-
quick time” of 165 steps, covering approximately 151 yards per minute,
drilling the infantry to close the distance to the enemy faster. As the lat-
est tactical manual, then-Major Hardee’s Tactics remained the standard
doctrine used by both sides during the war, with experience-based adjust-
ments made to it by seasoned commanders.
34
The addition by Hardee of speeding the advance to account for the in-
creased lethality of armament technology, failed to shift the balance from
the defense back to the Napoleonic emphasis on the attack. Leaders had
to adjust tactics through trial and error, costly lessons in experience, and
learning curves for adaptability to specic circumstances based on weath-
er and terrain that previously rigid doctrine did not need to take into eect
to be successful. Some of these included opening up the massed forma-
tions, resulting in loss of command and control due to the communication
abilities of the period. In addition, tactics included using mass forces to
overwhelm through numbers the defense, though numerical superiority
was typically a prerequisite for this to be successful. Sometimes, the large
formations attempted mass charges over short distances without halting to
re, though this was rare.
As for rates of re, the lower level tactical commanders typically
controlled and coordinated initial res, with rst volleys being potential-
ly devastating. After the rst volley, the rate of advance, the pressure of
exchanging res typically resulted in the disciplined volley re fading into
individual infantrymen ring as able based on their ability to reload. At
times soldiers working in tandem based on frontage requirements of one
loading while the other red and passing weapons back and forth. This
tactic was predominate in xed fortications in the defense, and not as
common in open eld ghting. Due to the terrain and lack of fortica-
tion, the most common engagement at Olustee was a reght, explained
in more detail below.
Artillery doctrinal reference also evolved over the course the war,
largely due to both changing technology and battleeld experience. Be-
21
fore the war, Major Alfred Mordecai’s Artillery for the United States Land
Service, published in 1849, served as the instruction for the peacetime
Army’s artillerists. Though they lacked many guns to rehearse it on, this
publication served as the guidelines for their training and familiarization
with employment and standards. In 1861 the American artillery employed
the revised instructions found in that year’s published Instructions for
Field Artillery.
35
Cavalry tactics changed signicantly during the course of the war. The
old Napoleonic cavalry charge (with sabers or even pistols) was large-
ly ineective against the longer range of the infantry’s rie-musket. For
much of the rest of the war, cavalry focused on traditional reconnaissance
and security missions. The cavalry began to use its horse-based mobility
as a simple means to get soldiers to the ght quicker, dismounting once
there, and ghting as infantry. The technological advancements in weap-
onry with breech-loaders and repeating ries allowed the smaller, lighter
cavalry to have a larger impact in sustained reghts with infantrymen
compared to engagements of the past.
36
Tactics in the Florida Expedition of 1864
This enamoring of raids found its truest form in the Florida Expedition
of 1864, culminating in the unplanned, pitched battle at Olustee. The US
Army concept of operation in the 1864 campaign was to conduct multiple
long-distance raids from US-aligned enclaves in Florida into secessionist
Florida. This campaign culminated when Seymour’s multi-brigade raid to
destroy the railway line at Lake City collided with the secessionist forces
arrayed to intercept this force just east of Olustee. Leading to the large-scale
infantry struggle at Olustee, mounted cavalry raids by Henry’s mounted bri-
gade typied the Florida campaign of 1864, and was marked by skirmishes
with defending scattered infantry militia and the secessionist Florida cav-
alry brigade under Caraway Smith. Henry’s cavalry had a large measure of
initial success with his mixed cavalry and mounted infantry force in these
long-distance raids reaching out from the eastern coast areas held by the
US Army into the secessionist interior and back to the safety of the coastal
areas. However, both cavalries failed to ll their traditional role of recon-
naissance as the eyes and ears of the slow-moving infantry main body, leav-
ing the larger command devoid of timely situational awareness. The lack
of timely information on the opponent’s movements, size, and location led
both commanders to deploy their forces piecemeal in developing escalation
at Olustee. Essentially a large-scale reght in mostly open terrain without
fortications, the battle at Olustee lacked distinct tactical maneuver once
initiated. Once the engagement was met, the cavalry forces of both sides fell
22
to a non-inuential role. Additionally, Smith’s cavalry performed controver-
sially in its role of pursuit at the conclusion of the battle.
Logistics
Logistical support followed four basic techniques (supply column,
railroad, waterborne, and foraging) within two dierent methods (inland or
sea transport). The apparatus to oversee the logistical support to the armies
consisted of a three-part system: brigade-level and above sta quartermas-
ters; intermediate, forward established supply depots; and capital-based
departmental headquarters sta.
37
Vast networks of civilian contractors
and private suppliers interconnected each of these levels of logistical sup-
port to the armies.
38
With the rapidly expanding armies, coupled with the
secessionist ocer resignations, both armies’ quartermaster departments
entered a crisis early in the war.
Already a small department with only thirty-ve ocers, as more
states passed secessionist legislation, the United States Army Quartermas-
ter Department lost a quarter of its ocers, including its serving Quarter-
master General, then-Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and then-Capt. Abra-
ham C. Myers later Quartermaster General of the Confederacy.
39
The expending army led to scattered postings and assignments of o-
cers ill suited, unprepared, or abusive of their positions within the logistics
enterprise. Inexperienced ocers, too few professional quartermasters or
logisticians immediately available, led to extensive corruption between
the War Department, the eld quartermasters, and the diverse conglomer-
ate of civilian proteers.
40
Early attempts to rein in this corruption through
thorough investigations, while unable to eradicate the criminality, led to
establishing a professionalized logistical corps, setting a standard, stream-
lining logistical support.
41
The exponentially increasing supply budget un-
intentionally incentivized corruption and enabled inadvertent ineciency
with the unprecedented eighteen times increase from 1860 to the 1861
budget, and continuing to increase for the next four years.
42
One of the
lasting laws passed supporting this eort to clean up the acquisitions and
supply procedures of the US Army was the False Claims Act of 1863, a
law enforcing reduction of fraud, waste, and abuse through the guaranteed
protection to whistle-blowers, often referred to as “Lincoln’s Law.”
43
The most common technique of logistical support for both armies was
the supply column, typied by wagon trains. Not only was this a major
supply procedure within the overland method, but it was also an integral
process of all the other techniques and methods. The ubiquitous wagon
trains not only served in their own right as a process across great distances,
23
but they also served as the main technique connecting the supplies brought
in by rail or ship, lling that nal gap between procurement, transporta-
tion, and nal delivery to consumer.
The standard model army wagon was the Conestoga, with inter-
changeable parts, pulled by four to six draft animals, typically able to
move 2,800 pounds but up to 3,700 pounds with their own 270 pounds of
feed. In support of the ever-growing armies, these wagon trains stretched
for miles behind the moving armies.
44
Exemplifying the evolving formal-
ization of movement, the haphazard, uncoordinated loading of wagons be-
came governed by standard regulations on what wagons transported and
what individuals were responsible to transport, and where in the wagon
train specic items traveled.
45
The impact of weather on the 19
th
Century
road system remained the largest mitigating factor for the supply column
technique. Other variables including the amount of forage required to feed
the load bearing animals reduced resupply cargo amounts and the varying
degree of civilian teamsters’ willingness of risk enemy contact in deliver-
ing their goods; however, inclement weather, both extremes of heat and
precipitation most starkly aected the ecacy of the wagon train supply
column method.
When the war began, the US retained 20,000 miles of railroad, largely
interlinked with supporting infrastructure in comparison to the secessionist
states’ 9,000 miles, mostly disconnected and incomplete. The secession-
ist industry base lacked expansion or reliable maintenance ability for its
already limited infrastructure.
46
The US Government instituted the Unit-
ed States Military Rail Roads (USMRR) to manage its railroad network,
though not directly under the Quartermaster Department, the USMRR
was much like the Subsistence Department that provided soldiers’ rations,
though laying outside the Quartermaster Department, shared the typical
experiences of the larger Quartermaster Department.
47
The US Govern-
ment subdivided the railroads, so critical to overland movement of troops
and supplies, into two parts: those railroads in the northern states and those
taken back by the US Army in the secessionist states. The civilian owner-
ship largely managed and maintained their own lines in support to the US
Government, with the government reimbursing, nancing, or contracting
for the use and maintenance of these lines. The USMRR managed and op-
erated those lines taken in the secessionist areas, while the Quartermaster
Department was responsible for procurement and construction or recon-
struction of the southern lines.
48
Identifying the critical expertise of civil-
ian railroad managers, the USMRR in many cases placed civilian person-
nel in key positions to ensure the smooth and ecient operations of seized
24
secessionist rail lines, while even many of the uniformed ocers of the
USMRR were in fact, simply civilian railroad men put in uniform.
49
Brig.
Gen. Hermann Haupt, railroad administrator for the US Army in the East-
ern Theater, established the US Army’s tactical rail system with ve prin-
ciples. “1. No military ocers were to interfere in the running of trains.
2. Supplies would be sent forward only as needed. 3. Trains reaching the
front were to be unloaded immediately by anyone available. Ocers who
refused to cooperate faced dismissal. 4. Where telegraph communications
were unavailable, trains would run according to a rigid schedule. All trains
departed on schedule, fully loaded or not. Extra trains would pick up the
slack. 5. On lines where the absence of sidings prevented opposing trains
from passing each other, convoys of ve or six trains would travel as a
group. Each convoy delivered its cargo and returned to base before the
next convoy started out.”
50
The secessionist never created an organization
similar to the USMRR and only in February 1865 did they begin to exert
governmental control over commercial railroads, resulting in the majority
of the railroad movement of secessionist troops and supplies done so only
with mutual agreement and coordination between secessionist government
authorities and civilian railroad managers.
51
Waterborne logistical support via sea transport quickly evolved to be a
US dominated method. Forts Henry and Donelson’s fall led to the closure
of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, respectively, from secessionist
access, followed by the US capture of New Orleans closing o the Missis-
sippi River’s outlet to the Gulf of Mexico in 1862. Finally, in July 1863,
the capitulation of Vicksburg cut the secessionists completely o from
western river trac and critical supplies coming from Texas, the seces-
sionist’s primary source of beef.
As the conict continued, the US Government’s sea transportation eet
included 753 steamships, 1,100 sailing vessels, and over 800 barges, pur-
chasing or commissioning the construction of an additional three hundred
more vessels. For the river eets, the US accumulated some 599 boats, 91
steamers, 352 barges of various sizes and the balance being diverse small-
er boats.
52
The US naval blockade controlling the coast, the secessionist’s
limitations from the lack of a navy, and the joint US Army-Navy operations
within the east coast inlet waterways and along the western river ways, fa-
cilitated the US forces monopoly of waterborne logistics and transportation.
Foraging, also known as living o the land, was a method employed
by both armies at various times during the war to dierent degrees depend-
ing on the theater, commander, and current national policy and interests, or
out of necessity. By one calculation, each horse required fourteen pounds
25
of hay along with twelve pounds of various grains, while soldiers received
regulation prescribed three pounds of bacon as their daily ration.
53
In many
circumstances it was easier and more expeditious for these armies to obtain
supplies directly from the surrounding countryside and populace, friendly
or enemy. Although as the war continued, certain areas traversed multiple
times by the armies became unable to support armies while simultaneous-
ly the eld armies continued to grow in size making any land insucient
to support the masses without detaching and spreading out the forces to
acquire more forage.
At dierent times, both the US Army and the secessionist forces re-
strained their troops from taking from the locals, and at other times enthu-
siastically encouraged it, variously for eliciting goodwill or as a means
to punish. In some cases, they took only when they could pay for it or
provide a receipt for future compensation, but more common it was taken
as a matter of necessity and justied accordingly by the commanders and
individuals.
Logistics in the Florida Expedition of 1864
Logistics played a critical factor in the Florida Expedition of 1864 in
a variety of ways. It determined the pace and scope of the US raids into
the interior, playing a crucial factor in the timing as Seymour pressed for
the use of a locomotive to supply his advancing brigades. Secondly, in the
Battle of Olustee the logistical resupply of ammunition played an indisput-
ably critical factor for both US and secessionist soldiers.
US supplies came via the sea from the east coast friendly-held Florida
ports of St. Augustine and Jacksonville. From there, the main method uti-
lized the railroads to transport the supplies via locomotive to Seymour’s
forward brigades. The dearth of working locomotives frustrated Gillmore’s
original plans, and his struggle to provide and maintain a repeatedly prom-
ised locomotive to support Seymour’s forces in the eld led to the main
divergence of intention between Gillmore at his headquarters in Hilton
Head, South Carolina, and Seymour in the eld in Florida.
54
Seymour relied heavily on resupply eorts coming from his depot in
Jacksonville directly out to his raiding forces along the route to Lake City,
via wagon and the unreliable locomotive support. However, there was an
advance depot established in the vicinity of Barber’s Plantation to support
the movement towards Lake City, but would not be adequately utilized
during the engagement. The US Army’s approach to foraging was restrict-
ed to taking from secessionist Florida government stores, not from private
citizens, in an attempt to gain local goodwill while damaging the separatist
26
government. This limited the ecacy of foraging for the US Army forces
as the secessionist government stores were already sparse and nearly all
supplies were private claimed ownership. The mismanagement of logistics
aected Seymour’s operations at Olustee.
55
The secessionist’s logistical issues were seriously acute overall, and
specically in separatist Florida very poor. By this time in the war, the
secessionist suered as a whole logistically to support both its people and
its armies. However, in the case of the Florida Expedition of 1864, the
secessionist forces were working with certain advantages with a simpler
theory of logistics even if it was hard to execute in practice due to the over-
all shortages. The primary advantages were from interior lines, friendly
population, and access to railroads and familiarity with the area.
Engineers
The professional engineer ocer corps typically broke up into two
categories, the Corps of Topographical Engineers and the Corps of Engi-
neers. Topographical engineers, also known as Geographers, were map-
makers, explorers, and surveyors, as opposed to the more traditionally
understood Corps of Engineers focused on construction and fortications.
In 1863, the Corps of Engineers absorbed the smaller topographical corps
under one Chief Engineer. As with the rest of the ocer branches, engi-
neers by profession found themselves in a variety of other positions, in-
cluding eld command of combat troops and vice versa.
56
Fifteen engineer
ocers resigned their commissions to serve in the secessionist armies, to
include Generals Robert E. Lee, Pierre G.T. Beauregard, and Joseph E.
Johnston, while several prominent engineer ocers in the US Army rose
to prominence during the war, such as Major Generals Montgomery C.
Meigs, George G. Meade, and Gouverneur Warren.
57
Engineer support in the war went beyond mapmaking and fortica-
tion construction, although these were critical and common functions un-
dertaken by the engineers. Additionally, the engineers became mobility
and counter-mobility managers, alternately creating or rebuilding roads,
bridges, and key infrastructure, facilitating the movement or armies or the
impediment of opponents. These were either temporary eorts, such as
the pontoon bridges to expedite fording and crossing river ways, or lasting
eorts, such as creating or restoring permanent bridges. As wars settled
more sedentary battleelds such as sieges relying on extensive fortica-
tions and more supporting structures, and in stark acknowledgement of the
benet in defensive works, engineers in expertise if not in actual construc-
27
tion became even more relied on while it became more rare to have battles
fought in the open, linear manner.
Engineers in the Florida Expedition of 1864
Engineers on both sides of the conict, largely trained by West Point
as an engineering focused institution, happened to play only minor roles
at Olustee due to the nature of the meeting engagement. The US Army
engineers serving in Florida during 1864 found their most useful utility in
maintaining the means of transportation, roads, waterways, and rail lines.
On the US side, the engineer’s indirect role in the tactical battles was
often less benecial. The secessionists did not have the extensive resourc-
es of their US opponents, and usually being on the defense, they did not
have to construct as many railroads and bridges. The separatists normal-
ly at a disadvantage in capabilities and resources in comparison to the
industrial US forces, but held distinct advantage in familiarity with the
battleeld terrain. Specically, the secessionists fought on their own ter-
rain where many ocers knew the ground from childhood or as with the
reinforcements from Georgia had native Florida units included in their
brigades and in large part the cavalry was Floridian.
The secessionists in Florida utilized the engineer assets mainly to con-
struct xed fortications near Olustee to blunt the US advance towards the
rail line at Lake City, however, events would lead to Olustee fought further
to the east on open ground with neither side employing eld fortications.
The secessionists at this stage in the war had become eective through
repetition at restoring broken rail lines after US raids, and it was the threat
of tearing rail lines that drew the secessionist forces from their hastily pre-
pared fortications at Olustee Station out to the meeting engagement three
miles east of the rail station.
Communication
The armies had three basic operational-level communication methods,
including the telegraph, courier (verbal or written message), and signal
ags, with the additional tactical-level communication method of auditory
(voice or bugle). The telegraph served as a fast-communicative, long-dis-
tance, most technologically modern method in the Civil War. The US
Army beneted more through pre-existing laid telegraph lines and larger
industrial capacity to lay new telegraph lines during steady, prolonged ad-
vances as seen in the northern and western theaters, compared to more ru-
ral secessionist areas and their less developed capability to lay new wires
when advancing outside their territory. Much like the railroad, for the US
28
war eort, the telegraph eorts were subdivided into two parts: United
States Military Telegraph and the US Army Signal Corps. The US Mili-
tary Telegraph, like the USMRR, consisted of a combined civil-military
department that operated the preexisting telegraph lines throughout the
northern states and served as the primary operational-strategic connection
of the eld commanders to the War Department and Administration. The
Army Signal Corps operated the eld, more tactical temporary telegraph
lines, set up for internal communication and patched into the US Military
Telegraph for transmitting messages higher. Both telegraph organizations
suered from the expense of lines and upkeep, 19
th
Century telegraph
technology was not cheap. Additionally, the Army Signal Corps tactical
teams risked capture, and attack as they set up and operated eld telegraph
lines, mostly from guerilla/partisan attacks but also cavalry raids.
58
As for courier-borne messages, both armies utilized this capability,
with the US Army beneting from essential control of the sea, able to de-
liver water-borne messages quickly while the secessionists beneted from
more familiarity with overland routes as they mainly operated within their
own territory for the majority of the war. As with all courier methods, they
were only as good as the messengers themselves, typically an aide or part
of the commander’s sta. In this case, the use of couriers naturally hin-
dered continued sta work through its loss of an aide or staer to carry the
message. Additionally, messages in this manner were at risk of intercep-
tion, loss, or in the case of verbal delivery the memory and accurate rec-
itation of the messenger with a time-consuming method of obtaining clar-
ication or alternative suggestion. Even hand written notes shared many
of the same issues, interception, misinterpretation, prolonged response.
59
The employment of signal ags for communication of ground actions
led to important tactical decisions based on identied key terrain to seize
and hold to exploit height and visibility to maximize the visually based com-
munication method. Major Alfred J. Myer is attributed with bringing ag
telegraphy to the US Army and in time adopted by the secessionist forces.
Colloquially known as “wig wag”, ag telegraphy essentially was commu-
nication through choreographed ag waving to spell messages, and col-
or-coded ags of various sizes. These ag signals could be seen up to fteen
miles, with larger ags allegedly seen upwards to 25 miles away, though
this is largely eected by weather and terrain elevation. A series of xed ag
sites, known as “lines”, further extended range of ag signaling, allowing a
message passed from one xed ag-signaling site to the next down the line.
Though this extended ag signaling it did not match the speed of commu-
nication of the telegraph. Along with terrain and weather aecting the ag
29
signaling eorts, enemy action also did. Flag signaling teams were constant
prioritized targets for the opponent and with the limitations of terrain, the
ideal sites for them known and desired by both sides.
60
The tactical-level communication based on auditory methods large-
ly remained the same with slight variations and changes, notably to bu-
gle calls, as those employed in Napoleonic, linear-style warfare. Verbal
commands and calls from ocers, sergeants, and among the soldiers were
common, if not reliable within the cacophony of combat. Likewise, the
common use of bugle or drum calls, while applied at lower more tactical
levels faced limitations of distance and reliability based on battleeld re-
alities of sound and terrain.
Communication in the Florida Expedition of 1864
Telegraphic communication was the standard for the US forces, almost
exclusively between Brigadier General Seymour and his superior Major
General Gillmore. However, telegraphic communications did not always
mean instant, as in certain cases delays in responses to even telegraphic
communiqués were timely and costly in Gillmore’s management of Sey-
mour’s forward movement.
For the most part, US eld commanders relied most heavily on couri-
ers for tactical command. Seymour at times issued orders directly to reg-
imental commanders, bypassing brigade commanders at the tactical-level
normally in person. However, when communicating via couriers, he uti-
lized the appropriate chain of command.
Finegan relied heavily on couriers at the tactical level, and his interi-
or, defensive lines added to the ease of courier information management.
His simplistic battleeld command, essential delegation to one brigade
commander to manage the ght did minimize confusion over orders but
it also limited timeliness and seizing of opportunity. Though telegraphic
communication did exist for Finegan back to his higher command in west-
ern Florida, it was not as necessary in his defensive plan as were constant
courier contact with his two generally collocated maneuver brigades.
The battleeld exemplied the diculty of a command system, which
relied on auditory-based commands, either from voice command or bu-
gle, in a at, wooded area non-conducive to ag signaling and without
telegraph infrastructure. Communication constraints only exacerbated the
level of experience of leaders at various levels and that of the soldiery
involved in the ghting.
30
Intelligence
A milestone in the evolution of US military intelligence was the for-
mation of the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) within the Army of
the Potomac in 1863 under then-Col. George H. Sharpe. This sta element
was the American origin of the all-source intelligence processing method-
ology and greatly aided a succession of commanders until the end of the
war with timely and relevant varied sourced information processed into
accurate and actionable intelligence. The main sources of information for
the BMI to analyze and process included enemy-oriented sources involv-
ing de-brieng deserters and interrogating prisoners to build order of bat-
tle situational awareness. Additionally, non-combatant sources included
exploitation of open source journalistic newspapers reporting to provide
insights to movements, context to information, and possible conrmation
of information from other sources and the de-brieng of enslaved popu-
lations and US-loyal citizens. Finally, the traditional information gleaned
from cavalry actions and reconnaissance provided commanders a directly
controlled arm of information collection.
61
Not all armies had access to the BMI, and its methodology did not
always fully transfer when, as the US Army in the Western Theater, oth-
ers attempted to copy the system. However, the fundamentals of how it
gathered information was uniform across the war, deserters and prisoners,
newspapers, and cavalry reports. Both opponents also utilized spy rings,
though these were more a strategic intelligence asset rather than an oper-
ational one. The main dierence between the Army of the Potomac with
the BMI and the other eld armies was not the method of information
gathering but the consolidation, synthesis, and provided analysis to the
commander, in this, few other eld commanders beneted.
Intelligence in the Florida Expedition of 1864
The primary source for intelligence during the Florida expedition was
the cavalry, however, both cavalry forces were largely employed more in
a raid or screening capacity, resulting in limited timely intelligence passed
back to the commanders. The other typical intelligence means normal to
the war were mostly limited or non-existent to this campaign. Desertions
were minimal and prior to the major engagement at Olustee prisoners were
largely unavailable by either side to exploit. Likewise, newspapers as an
open source availability played little role due to the speed of operations
and advances contrary to the more prolonged stabilization of lines such as
those in the Virginia area of conict that allowed for the development of
source across line and access to journalist reporting on the opposing side.
31
One aspect that Seymour’s forces did have access to was runaway
or liberated slave population in northeast Florida as a source for relative
information, however, this benet faded as Seymour’s forces advanced
further away from the US-held enclaves on the northeast coast during its
short duration but relative long distance raid deeper into hostile secession-
ist Florida. Additionally, Seymour in Florida along with Gillmore man-
aging from South Carolina did not have the benet of a consolidated, co-
ordinated sta element, such as the BMI in the northern Eastern Theater,
devoted to the all-source analysis of any information that it did obtain,
from either cavalry, slaves, open source, or enemy de-briefs.
Medical Services
Disease, infection of wounds, battleeld deaths, and surgery formed
the principle experiences and focus of medical personnel during the war.
Disease was the most common killer, normal for the period, and most
medical professionals stood helpless in the face of many infections that
originated from grievous battleeld wounds, far outstripping actual battle-
eld deaths.
62
Organizational status and progress through evolutionary im-
provement and painful on-the-job educational experience. Over the course
of the war, the US Army saw approximately 500 volunteer surgeons, an-
other 250 Regular Army surgeons, with nearly 6,000 regimental medical
ocers, and near equal number of civilian contract surgeons who served
at some point over the course of the war. The civilian contract surgeons
were medical professionals either unable to serve or managed to avoid
uniformed service. They mostly served the Army for short periods during
high demand times, such as after major campaigns, or in city general hos-
pitals when military wounded were sent there.
63
The war laid bare the in-
adequacies of the previously used ad hoc system of nurses, attendants,
and orderlies coming from available manpower of the regiments as an
extra duty. This method fell to wayside as unsustainable and an unaccept-
able drain on ghting strength of units and armies in desperate need of
every able-bodied combatant. The grim realities lead to more permanent
roles for certain individuals in medical support occupations. Development
of eld hospitals, based on a use of tents, due to the increasingly large
number of wounded from the massive engagements and even more im-
portantly sprawling eld encampments became a hallmark of change in
the US Army medical department. Field hospitals provided exibility and
overow capacity to the more limited base or general hospitals normally
occupying buildings and located in major cities or in some cases, houses,
barns, and other structures temporarily taken over by armies near camps
or battleelds to serve in addition to tent eld hospitals.
32
Transportation of the mass amounts of wounded associated with the
larger scale of combat than previously seen in America led to innovations
in movement of wounded from the battleeld in variations and evolutions
of rst two wheeled ambulances to more stable Rucker ambulances of two
axles, four wheels. For longer duration trips after removal from the battle-
eld for extended care, trains and later ships were retted specically to
transport wounded further into safe areas.
64
While much of the challenges and conditions faced by the US medical
services applied to the secessionist eorts, there were some aspects unique
to their circumstances. As with their army, the secessionist medical ser-
vices started from scratch as opposed to growing from a nascent service as
with the US Army. The Medical College of South Carolina in Charleston
founded in 1824 was the south’s rst medical school. By 1861 there were
21 medical schools within the seceded state territories from which they
could draw on aside from the initial medical professionals who withdrew
from the US service. However, due to costs and realities of war, all but one
of these schools were forced to close during the rst years of the conict,
with the Medical College of Virginia in Richmond able to remain open.
Length of instruction, faculty, and enrollment in these states leading to
1861 matched those of medical institutions for higher learning in the re-
maining loyal US states, even though students indicated their training at
both northern and southern schools were at times lacking.
65
Initially, three surgeons and 21 assistant surgeons departed the US
Army and formed the nucleus of the secessionist medical corps. The rapid
growth, like the US Army but coupled with the lack of any initial base to
draw on, led to hiring unqualied practitioners, many later needing to be
removed by medical examining boards, and a high reliance on private and
contract medical care that likewise faced a quality control issue for the
secessionist forces.
66
The secessionist largely followed the procedures for hospitals, trans-
portation, and management of the wounded and sick like the US Army,
with the exception of the secessionist quickly losing waterway transpor-
tation as a means of movement and more limited railroad infrastructure.
Two key states, Virginia and Georgia, did boast pre-war ratings as the
sixth and seventh among the US for railroad mileage, although the war
would take its toll, especially on Virginia’s rails early and Georgia’s lat-
er. However, transportation, such as railroads, were maximized, such as
the sprawling 8,000 bed Chimborazo hospital complex in Richmond. The
war-casued transportation breakdown across the secessionist territories as
the war dragged on directly inuenced transportation of not only wounded
33
and ill but also of medical supplies, resulting in eld and some hospital
accounting lack of supplies and instruments.
67
Likewise, the secessionist
altered their manning policy for medical service support from using in-
valid or additional duty soldiers as supporting medical professionals to
having fulltime medical attendants to help the doctors.
68
Medical Services in the Florida Expedition of 1864
For Olustee, the attachment of the medical ship Cosmopolitan and
two other regular transport ships greatly aided in the care, treatment and
transportation of US wounded to better more advanced care facilities
after the Battle of Olustee, namely to facilities at Hilton Head and Beau-
fort, S.C. The Chief Surgeon Adolph Majer also instructed limited medi-
cal supplies be carried as the medical hospital ship Cosmopolitan would
follow with fully stored medical supplies. He commented that the recov-
ered wounded were largely of minor wounds and the current facilities at
Jacksonville and Saint Augustine would suce, and that there was no
need to add eld hospitals.
69
In the secessionist forces, a systemic problem was a lack of trained
surgeons and medical supplies, this manifested in Florida. By the end of
1864, Florida had four major military hospitals, mostly oriented in the
north and middle of the state, which would have supported Olustee ca-
sualties (in Quincy, Tallahassee, Madison, and Lake City).
70
At Olustee
this inferiority of medical facilities and training for the secessionist was
exemplied in an assistant inspector general, Henry Bryan, report made in
Lake City nearly two months after the battle (10 April 1864). The report
criticized the cleanliness and the level of care the still recovering wounded
received, both secessionist and US, to include segregated African-Ameri-
can soldiers. The report details how the massive inux of wounded over-
whelmed the city, resulting in a haphazard occupation of scattered build-
ings being impressed into service as hospitals. Diet, utensils, medicine,
and instruments are sorely lacking in the report. It also goes on to highlight
the troubling emergence of a growing small pox spread through poor iso-
lation. The medical response after Olustee remained disorganized, poorly
supported, and the logistically overwhelmed in secessionist Florida.
71
34
Endnotes
For more expansive detailed analytical examination of the armies, their
tactics, weapons, and doctrine, please see “Part I: Civil War Armies” in Dr.
Curtis S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, and Lt. Col. Steven E. Clay (US
Army, Retired), Sta Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4
May to 15 June 1864: A Study in Operational-Level Command, Second Edition,
(Combat Studies Institute Press: Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), and also Paddy
Grith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Second Edition, (Crowood Press: Lon-
don, 2014), and Brent Nosworthy, The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting
Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War (Carroll & Graf Publishers:
New York, 2005).
1. Clayton R. Newell, The Regular Army Before the Civil War, 1845-1860
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2014), 8, and 50-51.
2. Newell, 22.
3. Dr. Curtis S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, and Lt. Col. Steven E.
Clay (US Army, Retired), Sta Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Vir-
ginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864: A Study in Operational-Level Command, Second
Edition (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 4.
4. King, et al, Sta Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, 15-16.
Horse artillery was present in limited number with the US Army forces at Olust-
ee, see Annex A: Order of Battle.
5. David Frey, Failure to Pursue: How the Escape of Defeated Forces Pro-
longed the Civil War (Jeerson: MacFarland Press, 2016), 242-243.
6. Gillmore’s entire force included additional infantry regiments, including
other African-American regiments; however, these were used in occupational
security and stability operations and were not part of his oensive campaign and
maneuver force, nor engaged in combat during the expedition or present at the
culminating battle of Olustee. As such, these additional regiments and secession-
ist forces in Middle Florida with similar roles are not included in this study.
7. War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Ocial Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Oce, 1880-
1901, (Hereafter cited as ORA), Part 1, Vol. 35, 279.
8. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 288.
9. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 331.
10. William A. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword: The United States Colored
Troops, 1862-1867 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2011), 6.
11. Dobak, 8.
12. Keith P. Wilson, Campres of Freedom: The Camp Life of Black Sol-
diers During the Civil War (Kent, KS: Kent State Press, 2002), 52-53, 55.
13. William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee (Tuscalo-
osa: The University of Alabama Press, 1990), 158.
14.Oliver Willcox Norton, Army Letters 1861-1865 (Chicago: O.L. Deming,
1903), 214-215.
35
15. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword, 9.
16. Dobak, 11.
17. Dobak, 11 and 13. See page 11 for detailed outlining of the USCT
regimental composition.
18. King, et al, Sta Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, 2.
19. Stephen W. Sears, Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the
Army of the Potomac (New York: Houghton Miin, 2017), 36.
20. Newell, The Regular Army, 21 and 48-50.
21. King, et al, Sta Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, 6.
22. John David Smith, “Let Us All Be Grateful that We Have Colored
Troops that Will Fight,” in Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in
the Civil War Era, ed. John David Smith (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2002), 36.
23. Wilson, Campres of Freedom, 12.
Norton, Army Letters, 184 and Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: The
Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Ocers (New York: The Free
Press, 1990), 44-46.
24. Norton, Army Letters 1861-1865, 188 and 184.
25. Smith, “Let Us All Be Grateful,” 37, 39 and Glatthaar, Forged in Battle,
21.
26. King, et al, Sta Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, 11-13.
27. King, et al, 11-13.
28. King, et al, 14.
29. King, et al, 15-16.
30. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 307-308.
31. Newell, The Regular Army, 42-43.
32. Newell, 44. Hardee later resigned and joined the secessionist forces and
served as a lieutenant general.
33. Newell, 43.
34. Frey, Failure to Pursue, 239 and 249.
For more detailed and expansive coverage of logistical structure and ac-
tivities during the American Civil War, see Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support
of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939, (Washington D.C.: Center
of Military History, 1989), 333-452, and James A. Huston, The Sinews of War:
Army Logistics, 1775-1953, (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History,
1997), 159-239.
35. Robert O’Harrow Jr., The Quartermaster: Montgomery C. Meigs,
Lincoln’s General, Master Builder of the Union Army (New York: Simon and
Schuster Paperbacks, 2016), 132-133.
36. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 334.
37. Risch, 335, 340-341, and 345.
38. O’Harrow Jr., The Quartermaster, 128 and Risch, Quartermaster Sup-
port, 386-387.
39. Mark R. Wilson, The Business of Civil War (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006), 38.
36
40. O’Harrow Jr., The Quartermaster, 131.
41. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 420.
42. O’Harrow Jr., The Quartermaster, 167.
43. Christopher R. Gabel, Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War
Strategy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1997), 22.
44. Risch, Quartermaster Support, 382-384 and 395 and 397, 451.
45. Risch, 395-397.
46. Gabel, Railroad Generalship, 13 and 17.
47. Gabel, 18.
48. Gabel, 22.
49. Risch,
, 415.
50. O’Harrow Jr., The Quartermaster, 157.
51. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 282-284.
52. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 285-288.
53. US Army Corps of Engineers: A History (Alexandria, VA: Oce of
History, Headquarters, US Army Corps of Engineers, 2008), 22, 27, and 108-
109.
54. US Army Corps of Engineers, 110.
55. Gary B. Grin, “Strategic-Operational Command and Control in the
American Civil War,” School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: United States Command and General Sta College, March
31 1992), 22-23.
56. Grin, “Strategic-Operational Command and Control,” 15.
57. Grin, “Strategic-Operational Command and Control,” 18-19.
58. Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of
Military Intelligence in the Civil War (New York: Mariner Books, 1996), 569-
570 and Peter G. Tsouras, Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation
of American Military intelligence in the Civil War, (Pennsylvania: Casement,
2018).
59. Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1818-1865 (Washing-
ton D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), 295.
60. Gillett, 288.
61. Gillett, 289-290, for discussion on new roles established and various
types of hospitals, and 293-294 for discussion on innovated and various modes
of transportation for wounded.
62. H.H. Cunningham, Doctors in Gray: The Confederate Medical Ser-
vice, (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1970), 10-12, and 35.
63. Cunningham, 31-32.
64. Cunningham, 120, 122, 51 and 161-162.
65. Cunningham, 71-75.
66. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 301.
67. Cunningham, Doctors in Gray, 54 and 290.
68. Henry Bryan, “Report of Inspection of the General Hospital at Lake
City, Fla,” 10 April 1864.
69. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 301
37
70. Cunningham, Doctors in Gray, 54 and 290.
71. Henry Bryan, “Report of Inspection of the General Hospital at Lake
City, Fla,” 10 April 1864.
39
Part II
Campaign Overview
Strategic Setting
At the end of 1863, the strategic situation confronting US leaders in
Washington and secessionist leaders in Richmond revovled around the af-
termath of the Battle of Chattanooga. Major General Ulysses S. Grant’s
defeat of Gen. Braxton Bragg provided the US with opportunities in the
west.
1
However, the emergency transfer of two US Army corps from Maj.
Gen. George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac in the east brought an end
to Meade’s maneuvering against Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of North-
ern Virginia, thereby causing a cessation of major operations in northern
Virginia. Minimal eort occurred in the east, culminating when Meade
pressed forward as Lee slipped across the Rappahannock and Rapidan
Rivers at Rappahannock Station in November of 1864. As 1864 began,
the western theater was quiet as both armies struggled to recover from
the carnage of Chattanooga. Operations in Virginia were at a lull as both
armies had signicant portions of their manpower reallocated to support
their forces ghting in Chattanooga.
2
Despite the lull, lesser operations in
the southern theater continued and saw much of the heavier ghting that
typically occurred further north and west.
Major General Quincy A. Gillmore’s Department of the South chron-
ically suered from neglect as the US leadership saw the broader southern
theater as unimportant, Florida even less so, as the least populated seces-
sionist state. The US War Department rarely focused on operations outside
Virginia and Mississippi prior to mid-1864.
3
The US Army consistently
used the southern department as a source of reinforcements for the attri-
tion battles further north, creating vast uctuations in manpower availabil-
ity to the department for any internal campaigns and long-term planning.
4
In late 1863 into early 1864, Gillmore’s department was largely tied up in
South Carolina siege operations against Charleston, South Carolina. Addi-
tionally, multiple short term, limited goal expeditionary raids occurred up
and down the coasts of Georgia and northeastern Florida, mainly intended
to harass the secessionists, support the US Navy’s coastal blockade, and
provide access to African-American populations for recruitment to newly
authorized African-American army regiments.
5
For the secessionists of Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard’s tristate Depart-
ment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, the situation was even more
dismal. Even with Gillmore’s neglect in comparison to the other fronts, Be-
40
auregard’s department faced existential danger from the US. The secession-
ists fought against three lines of eort, the US naval blockade strangling
them logistically, coastal raids and siege operations against a major sepa-
ratist stronghold, the culturally and politically symbolic Charleston, and the
growing large-scale ground threat from the combined US armies of the west
after the battle of Chattanooga opened up Tennessee, threatening Georgia
and then inevitably the coastal Carolinas.
6
In this degree, Beauregard’s ap-
proach to Florida was similar to that of the upper US leadership —largely
seen as unimportant. However, it was an important enough source of crit-
ical commissary support to his and further northern secessionist armies in
Virginia, and a reservoir of enslaved labor.
7
While Beauregard’s forces also
served as a ready source of reinforcements for other Virginia and western
secessionist armies, there were dual pressures to protect the aforementioned
resources found in Florida in addition to the basic requirement to defend the
seceded states within in his department from US occupation.
Campaign Opening Moves, Florida: The Battleground State
For the Florida Expedition, Major General Gillmore requested two
things: reinforcements and more horses. He asked for the less demanded
African-American regiments, called United States Army Colored Troops
(USCT), with a clever plan to then swap out veteran white regiments con-
ducting garrison duties with the USCT reinforcements allowing him to use
the white regiments in the upcoming campaign in Florida. If he could get
additional fresh, but untested, troops, ll the parapets and guard the bases,
it could free the more experienced troops for Florida. Maj. Gen. Henry
Halleck, the general-in-chief’s reply was, “As the wants of the Depart-
ment of the Gulf are much more pressing than yours, a part of the colored
regiments have been sent there.”
8
Halleck’s message was clear: Gillmore
must undertake the expedition with the troops he had, including the large
portion of untried soldiers.
Gillmore additionally requested 1,500 horses and equipment to sup-
port his Florida expedition, allowing him to mount a larger part of his
infantry and increase his speed and mobility across country, following his
concept of the Florida Expedition being a large-scale raid, moving fast
across a hardly contested peninsula seizing goods, recruiting slaves, and
holding railroads for following foot infantry.
9
Initially, Halleck confused
by Gillmore’s unclear and ill-communicated objectives for the expedition,
indicated his disinclination to support any additional requests.
Gillmore replied by specifying four purposes to the expedition. First,
he intended to open Florida commerce up to trade with the rest of the
41
Union. Second, to deny the other separatist states access to Florida’s food
supplies, mainly beef cattle from Florida was commonly shipped north to
the other secessionist armies once the supplies from the western seceded
states were cut o with the fall of Vicksburg and US control of the Mis-
sissippi River in July 1863. A part of this objective intended to disrupt the
allegation that secessionists were tearing up Florida railroads to be re-laid
in Georgia and the southwest to increase railroad mileage. Third, to pro-
vide another outlet for recruitment of additional African-American regi-
ments from the Florida enslaved population. Lastly, the expedition intend-
ed to achieve enough Floridians taking the oath of allegiance to the United
States “to inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her
allegiance.”
10
With enough loyal, Union oath-taken Floridians, the state
would be able to participate in the upcoming contested 1864 presidential
election in the similar manner of the US-occupied Louisiana and Tennes-
see former secessionist states. The Lincoln Administration declared any
state reaching ten percent of its 1860 eligible electorate that took an oath
of allegiance to the United States formed a new state government recog-
nized by Washington. Along with this oath came a pardon and amnesty.
As for congressional representation, the US Congress reserved the right
to reestablish senators and representatives of returning states.
11
Even so
explained, Halleck’s initial denial stood concerning Gillmore’s additional
support requests for his Florida expedition, though conrming permission
for Gillmore to undertake his expedition with what he had as he saw t.
The US Army conducted several successful forays along Florida’s
northeastern coast, with the large port city of Jacksonville changing hands
a few times. Virtually all the US expeditions were short-term, with limited
aims. Though largely successful against the limited secessionist forces in
Florida opposing these incursions, they lacked long-term, signicant gains
due to the US leadership commonly cutting them short and redirecting the
department’s eorts and regiments elsewhere. The most lasting impact was
the recruitment of African-Americans to bolster the ranks of the growing
USCT forces, notably those of the 1st and 2nd South Carolina Infantry.
12
This provided Gillmore with a sense of superiority of arms over the seces-
sionist forces he anticipated Seymour to face in the expedition of 1864.
The US Army’s Florida Expedition began on 4 February 1864. Gill-
more, the department commander, gave eld command to Brig. Gen. Tru-
man Seymour, who commenced his amphibious movement from Hilton
Head, South Carolina to Jacksonville, Florida. As soon as the US forces
settled in with minimal contest at Jacksonville, Seymour began pushing
his mounted brigade under Col. Guy Henry, the force of cavalry, mounted
42
infantry, and attached “foot cavalry”—fast marching infantry. Occupa-
tional duties and securing of his lines of communication consumed near-
ly half of his force, leaving only three infantry brigades and his caval-
ry brigade available for sustained oensive actions, cutting his original
forces of 7,000 soldiers to 5,500 available for the campaign. Notably, the
2nd South Carolina Infantry, an African-American regiment largely made
up of Floridians recruited during an earlier expedition, was left to secure
Jacksonville even though they had far better knowledge of the area than
the other regiments Seymour would take with him to the Florida interior.
13
The cavalry brigade saw the majority of the command’s action as they
ranged far from the main force, pushing the limits of the US Army’s oper-
ational reach. Gillmore began pressing the War Department, particularly
to secure locomotive support for the expedition along the railroad into
the Florida interior. The important line ran through Baldwin, Olustee, and
Lake City, all of which had rail stations and resided at intersections with
wagon trails, Baldwin being the only one serving as a railroad hub.
Henry’s Raids
On the night of the 8
February, the mounted force under Henry pushed
out of Jacksonville on the Florida Expedition’s inaugural raid. The force’s
composition included the 40th Massachusetts Infantry (mounted), the In-
dependent Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry, with support from Elder’s
Horse Battery of artillery. They surprised the nearest secessionist forces at
Camp Finegan, quickly scattering them. They succeeded in taking over a
hundred prisoners and capturing eight artillery pieces without loss.
14
Colonel Henry’s force pressed further, raiding the railroad junction at
Baldwin, twenty miles west of Jacksonville, continuing its deep raid. In
the cavalry’s wake, another African-American regiment was consumed as
the 3rd USCT assumed security and stability duties at Baldwin.
15
Only a
few days later, Colonel Henry’s mounted force was ambushed at Barber’s
Plantation by secessionist defenders, ghting through them pushing to
Sanderson where the US Army advance stalled when faced by a small se-
cessionist infantry force before it melted into the woods. Simultaneously,
riverboat raids launched out of the US enclave at Fernandina, just north of
Jacksonville, captured numerous prisoners, recruited Africans to man fu-
ture USCT regiments, and seized over one million dollars of goods, while
pressing as far as 50 miles inland.
16
When the US Army mounted brigade
attacked Sanderson, they faced the rst signicant resistance by secession-
ist forces, although this force broke and retreated after sustained pressure
from the mounted US force.
43
This rst resistance at Barber’s Plantation turned Seymour cautious,
and he wrote to Gillmore about the hardened resolve of Florida to remain
in the confederacy. However, he noted the successes the expedition thus
far, urging caution with a withdrawal to a Jacksonville-Palatka-Fernandina
defensive line of the coast to hold what they had already taken. Gillmore
replied, directing him to concentrate his forces around Sanderson and not
risk defeat while pursuing the retreating, scattered secessionist defenders
to Lake City where reports suggested a gathering force.
17
The secessionist reinforcements concentrating on Brig. Gen. Joseph
Finegan’s location near Lake City looked to make a stand. On 12
Feb-
ruary, Gillmore ordered Seymour to concentrate his forces at Baldwin, a
small adjustment from his previous order to hold Sanderson. This directive
came from reports of a mounted secessionist force potentially threatening
Seymour’s right (north) ank. He further instructed Seymour to deploy
scouts to his front and right ank. He ended his communiqué with a terse
but telling line, “The locomotive has not arrived yet.”
18
A day later Sey-
mour responded to Gillmore writing, “I have no apprehension of the force
you mention.” He further went to say a retreat to Baldwin would “make
it impossible for us to advance again.” He nished with a request stating,
“All goes well here, and there are several operations of importance that
can be eected, upon which I should like to consult you.”
19
The following
day, Seymour sent Henry’s 40th Massachusetts Cavalry on a raid south to
Gainesville, where they remained distributing the separatist government
food stores to the locals while not taking or destroying any private prop-
erty. Two days later, secessionist Florida cavalry drove them o. Henry’s
hard-pressed mounted force continually and aggressively prosecuted deep
raids into separatist Florida. On the 18 February, elements of Henry’s bri-
gade, the dismounted attached infantry (foot cavalry) marched such great
distances supporting the mounted portions of Henry’s command that their
feet bled, and they demanded to go no further.
20
This was the rst example
of exhaustion plaguing the combat eectiveness of the US forces.
Seymour sent Gillmore another communication of intention on 17
February. Seymour not only ignored Gillmore’s standing order to con-
solidate at Baldwin, but Seymour communicated his intention to advance
beyond even Sanderson. In his communication, he acknowledged the
frailty of his logistical situation due to the absence of the locomotives,
these delays forcing him to remain where he was able to feed his men
and his diculty accumulating enough supply stores to move towards
Lake City. “I propose to go without supplies… with the object of de-
stroying the railroad near the Suwannee that there will be no hander of
44
carrying away any portion… All troops are therefore being moved up to
Barber’s.”
21
Although clearly ordered to reconsolidate and pull back to
Baldwin and advance no further, Seymour believed he faced an opportu-
nity and requested Gillmore to come to confer. Gillmore did not go south
to Florida, and in absence of any further communication, Seymour ig-
nored his direction to withdraw to Baldwin, instead pursuing a perceived
opportunity to complete one of the expedition’s stated goals: the denial
of railroads being broken up in north Florida for shipment northwest to
connect Georgia to separatist western Florida.
With this advance west from Barber’s Plantation to destroy the rail-
road across the Suwannee, Seymour ventured towards the concentrated
secessionist forces at Lake City. Since the landings on 8 February, Finegan
accumulated all the secessionist forces he could to block the westward ad-
vance of the US Army expedition. By the morning of 20 February, when
Seymour’s command left Barber’s Plantation for Lake City, Finegan re-
ceived his nal reinforcements in the form of Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt’s
brigade from Georgia. The immediate demand to defend a nal supply
reservoir Florida had become for the secessionist forces as a whole a de-
ciding factor in Beauregard balancing broader risk with his prompt sup-
plying of critical reinforcements to Finegan. The loss of the Mississippi
River denied the eastern half of the secessionist access to Texas cattle,
with Virginia largely denuded of resources after years of foraging; Florida
remained a primary supplier of food for the secessionist armies across the
theaters east of the Mississippi.
Major General Seymour later recalled that with the best information
he had on hand he expected that the secessionist forces he faced around
Lake City were between 4,000 to 5,000 men. With his own force roughly
5,500 strong, Seymour admitted he advanced against orders, with limited
supplies, and far from reinforcement, against a nearly— if not exactly—
sized enemy force, who were on the defense, automatically giving the se-
cessionist an advantage over the attacking US Army forces.
The Day of Battle
The night prior to the battle, neither army sought to update its sit-
uational awareness. Neither army sent out patrols for reconnaissance or
solicited any information from locals. Finegan remained committed to his
plan to build eld fortications near Olustee Station, 13 miles east of Lake
City. He displayed no intention to advance, but rather preferred to allow
the US forces to be drawn into an attack on his prepared defensive works.
Meanwhile, Seymour felt no apprehension for his advance and planned
45
to move his forces to Lake City where he expected to meet secessionist
resistance. Seymour intention was to seize and destroy the railroad bridge
over the Suwannee River.
22
There were two avenues of approach the US Army’s advance took.
These were the dirt road paralleling the more cleared railroad track and the
track itself. Smaller sandy dirty trails also converged on the trail junction at
Olustee. On the morning of 20 February, Seymour’s command commenced
its march towards Lake City at 0600. He divided the US forces into three
groups for the march. The advance guard was Colonel Henry’s mounted
brigade and four cannons of Battery B, 1st US Artillery, horse artillery. Fol-
lowing the advance guard was the main body, made up of Col. Joseph Haw-
ley’s brigade with six guns from Battery E, 3rd US Artillery, and then Col.
William Barton’s New York brigade with attached artillery support from six
guns of Battery M, 1st US Artillery and Battery C, Rhode Island Heavy Ar-
tillery. Accompanying the main body traveled the medical and supply trains
and Seymour. Last in the movement was the rear guard, the reserve brigade
of Col. James Montgomery composed of the African-American regiments.
23
The US force chose speed over security based on previous actions
since the expedition’s landing, when most diculty with the secessionist
was keeping them from escaping. Thus far the US Army had faced mini-
mal resistance with Henry’s cavalry raids conducted with near impunity,
experiencing only signicant resistance around Barber’s Plantation and
even then the secessionist had in the end abandoned the eld to the US
cavalry force. This presented Seymour and his commanders with a mis-
placed sense of condence in a perceived weak will and poor battleeld
performance of their opponent before they faced Finegan’s organized and
Georgia reinforced force at Olustee. This overcondence resulted in a less
disciplined approach march and a confused initial engagement, lacking
sound tactical employment and understanding. The cavalry consistently
outpaced its supporting infantry, and the cannons were unprepared for
quick action.
24
The US mounted force encountered scattered resistance
after only an hour departure from Barber’s Ford site (the forward most
US Army camp), facing only some dismounted and mounted secessionist
who red a few shots and then retired, drawing the US cavalry forward.
Separatist Col. Caraway Smith, commanding Finegan’s cavalry brigade,
advanced around 1000 to ascertain the distance of the US advance. A com-
bined force of elements of Colquitt and Col. George Harrison’s infantry
regiments supporting, moved forward under the command of Colquitt.
They moved forward near noon to support the secessionist cavalry having
made contact with the US mounted force.
46
Finegan’s concept was to use the cavalry and these two advance in-
fantry regiments to skirmish and draw the US forces back to the seces-
sionist main lines at the constructed breastworks outside Olustee Sta-
tion—to become Camp Beauregard.
25
However, US cavalry commander
Colonel Henry stopped his pursuit until the lead infantry under Hawley
caught up.
26
Between 1400 and 1500, nearly fteen miles into the march, the lead
elements of Hawley’s brigade, the 7th Connecticut having passed through
Sanderson, linked up with Henry’s mounted force. Following the 7th Con-
necticut one and a half miles behind was the 7th New Hampshire in the
center and 8th USCT was the trail element. The brigade’s supporting ar-
tillery traveled in the center with the New Hampshire infantry. Seymour
ordered Hawley to deploy the Connecticut infantry as skirmishers, at rst
only a few companies, but he quickly ordered forward the entire regiment,
though this regiment was understrength from leave and expired enlist-
ments, consolidated into four companies from original ten.
Of Hawley’s three infantry regiments, only the Connecticut regi-
ment was full of veterans, however, due to a leave rotation was not fully
manned. The New Hampshire regiment was a veteran organization but had
just received a large inux of untested troops to replace the expiration of
many veteran enlistments. The 8th USCT was led by experienced white
ocers, but its rank and le African-American troops were entirely un-
tested in battle.
27
The 7th Connecticut moved forward as skirmishers, concentrat-
ing on the north side of the railway line and dirt road. The secession-
ists fell back into new lines that Colquitt’s infantry regiments and
Harrison’s brigade formed. At this time, Capt. Benjamin Skinner
served as acting commander of the Connecticut regiment since Col-
onel Hawley, the normal regimental commander, was acting brigade
commander.
Skinner had been on the sick list that morning, but to
be with his men he accompanied them to the eld and performed
so admirably that he was mentioned favorably for his actions in the
ocial reports of the battle.
28
Skinner responded to the concentrat-
ing re by bringing up Elder’s Horse Battery. The skirmishers laid
down, allowing the battery to re a round overhead, then stood up
and advanced a short distance and then laid down again to allow for
a second artillery round red overhead.
29
Once the battery red the
second round, it received a reply by a barrage of three to four enemy
47
guns. The initial artillery exchange denoted how the ght was fast
becoming hotter than initially thought by both sides.
Seymour ordered Captain Skinner to advance his entire regiment to-
gether to capture the enemy’s artillery, if possible. Skinner deployed his
regiment to the right of the road, stacking his reserve companies to his
right ank to avoid a anking movement by the arrayed secessionist forc-
es.
30
Skinner’s regiment advanced 200 to 300 yards to take the enemy
artillery, suddenly nding itself facing the secessionist’s rst organized
line of resistance. When the US elements engaged the secessionists around
1400 they had not eaten or rested in seven hours, having marched nearly
16 miles over loose sand for the units walking the railroad and its parallel-
ing dirt road or through boggy turf and knee-deep water for the units that
anked the road.
31
On the separatist side, around noon Finegan’s plans began to change.
He ordered Colquitt to move forward portions of his brigade and parts of
Harrison’s brigade forward to stop reported US destruction of the railroad.
Finegan later claimed the apparent lack of aggression of the US Army,
likely Henry’s mounted force’s halt for the infantry to catch up, inspired
him to send forward Colquitt to press the issue. Advancing forward un-
der orders from Finegan, Colquitt took eld command while Finegan re-
mained with the reserve forces at the defensive works outside Lake City.
Colquitt advanced to the most forward secessionist position, preparing
the line for the approaching US skirmishing infantry from Skinner’s Con-
necticut regiment.
Colquitt arranged the defense centered on the railroad and dirt road,
pushing out units to both sides, while keeping the majority of the artillery
stationed on the road. The eld, with its scattered pines and no underbrush,
fast became the battleground neither general expected
32
Neither side hav-
ing time to prepare defensive positions on the impromptu battleeld both
would ght from formations or from behind the limited trees.
Soon after the deployment of Colquitt, Finegan worried the advance
force he sent forward to prod a seemingly cautious US formation may
become tangled with too great a force to withdraw back to the defensive
works. Finegan made the decision to send forward Colonel Harrison with
virtually the rest of the secessionist forces starting around 1530. The piece-
meal employment, thereby decided the ght would take place at Ocean
Pond outside of Olustee on open ground and not at Camp Beauregard with
the prepared defensive positions.
33
Likewise, as the secessionist general
sent his regiments forward haphazardly, the US commander employed
48
his brigades forward individually, neither side concentrating their forces
for decisive maneuver, drawing the engagement out from the rst shots
around 1400 until the close of the battle around 1800.
For a short time, Skinner’s 7th Connecticut faced the concentrated
power of the secessionist line, and did so in scattered skirmishing forma-
tion until Skinner pulled his reserve companies forward. The rapid re of
the Connecticut soldiers’ Spencer repeating ries played havoc on the 64th
Georgia as the Union forces advanced, pushing the separatist line back a
couple of hundred yards before they regrouped and began a seesaw, forc-
ing the Connecticut soldiers back.
Once Seymour realized his advancing skirmish towards Lake City had
become a meeting engagement just east of Olustee Station, he pushed the
artillery forward in the center to strike the secessionist lines while an in-
fantry regiment anchored the artillery’s ank, protecting it from enemy
attack. With one brigade tied to anchoring the supporting artillery, Sey-
mour intended to swing his second brigade around the US right, to ank
the separatist lines.
34
Hawley’s brigade made the rst attempt. As Hawley’s initial regiment,
the 7th Connecticut retreated on the north side of the road, he ordered the
7th New Hampshire Infantry Regiment forward in their place. The New
Hampshire soldiers intended to anchor the north ank of the US artillery
on the road, with the untried 8th USCT directly protecting the artillery
along the railroad. For Seymour’s tactic to work, these two infantry regi-
ments had to hold the artillery’s line while Barton’s advancing New York-
ers became the maneuver brigade, anking the secessionist line pinned by
the US artillery.
Artillery played a critical role in battles of the period, however, at
Olustee the inuence and eect of the artillery on the battle was minimal,
beginning with Seymour’s artillery out front too far too early. The artillery
pushed out, and the two infantry regiments failed to anchor on the cannons
ank eectively. By the time the US artillery concentrated, it was said to
be “within one hundred yards of the enemy front” by a New York Times
reporter witnessing the battle.
35
Though perhaps the close distance was an
exaggeration, the artillery’s advanced exposure was true.
The secessionist volleys targeted the US artillery immediately with a
devastating re. Within the rst 20 minutes, 40 of the 50 US Army artillery
draft horses fell; 45 of the 85 artillerymen killed, or wounded.
36
The artil-
lery never recovered from the initial blow, and struggled the entire ght to
support the US infantry. Their exposure and heavy losses neutralized them
49
for the reminder of battle.
37
Artillery, though the ground was open and
at, the skies clear, and the opposing forces both out in the open did not
play a critical role. During the developing engagement, the artillerymen
failed to properly employ their guns, and the continuous infantry musketry
throughout the four-hour long engagement kept them from ever having the
lull to properly set up their eld pieces.
The rst US disaster of the day was the rout of the 7th New Hampshire
Regiment. While the New Hampshire soldiers advanced along the north-
ern route, they encountered the retreating 7th Connecticut, and instantly
came under heavy enemy re. The confusion of passing the lines of the
Connecticut troops and the intensifying secessionist re as the Georgians
advanced to meet the 7th New Hampshire became too much for the New
Hampshire unit and their lines broke.
38
Though the 7th New Hampshire had seen many battles previously,
the ranks were only half lled with veterans, the rest untried soldiers.
39
They reorganized themselves towards the rear of the lines, and for the
remainder of the battle formed a battle line and waited.
40
Hawley located
the reconstituted 7th Connecticut resupplying their exhausted ammunition
and moved the Connecticut formation to the south of Colonel Barton’s
fast approaching New York brigade as it marched to the north of the road,
lling the gap created by the broken New Hampshire unit.
41
The only re-
maining regiment of Hawley’s brigade still engaged was the untested 8th
USCT moving to the edge of the road near the exposed artillery.
Unlike the untried 64th Georgia, with a veteran unit beside it to bolster
it against the 7th Connecticut’s furious onslaught, the isolated 8th USCT
bore the full brunt of the enemy re while Barton’s New Yorkers moved
forward. One of the critical factors in the initial performance of a unit in
the face of its rst ght is the inuence and actions of its leaders. Colonel
Hawley was the regimental commander of the 7th Connecticut regiment
but acted as the brigade commander. Instead of accompanying the untest-
ed unit, Hawley followed the 7th New Hampshire to the north side of the
road, where Hawley’s own 7th Connecticut was retreating while under re.
After the New Hampshire formation broke and both the New Hampshire
and Connecticut regiments were re-forming to the rear as Barton’s brigade
advanced, Hawley remained with them, mostly with the reconstituting 7th
Connecticut. While Hawley looked after these two regiments, his untried
8th USCT received its rst baptism of re. There is no evidence of racial
prejudice, although he did look to his brigade’s two white regiments and
did not go to the front with his one African-American regiment, of note
one of those two regiments was in fact Hawley’s own.
50
The 8th USCT was ordered to a run, a “double-quick” half of a mile
to the front. As they arrived and attempted to deploy from line of march to
battle line they did so under concentrated enemy re as they were the only
US infantry regiment on the eld. Half of the regiment did not even have
their rst round loaded before they came under re. They still wore their
knapsacks, not having time to discard them along the approach march,
and their sergeants wore their scarlet sashes, making them, along with the
always-conspicuous ocers, perfect targets for enemy sharpshooters.
42
Hearing the sound of the guns, they thought they were from Henry’s cav-
alry skirmishing with enemy pickets. They knew they were moving up
to the ght and to prove themselves, but they did not understand the full
situation and arrived under re, and unprepared
The regiment began to take re coming from its south ank, which
was completely uncovered. Lieutenant Oliver Norton, of the 8th USCT,
wrote his regiment was “drilled too much for dress parade and too little
for the eld…They can march well, but they cannot shoot rapidly or with
eect, some of them can, but the greater part cannot.”
43
The musket re
was short range and intense. Struggling to get into the ght, Col. Charles
W. Fribley, commanding the regiment, gave the order to retire, ring as
they moved back to nd support. Shortly, enemy re struck Fribley, killing
him where he stood. His death was soon followed by the severe wounding
of his second-in-command, Major Burritt. Seymour’s after-action report
attributed the breaking of the 8th USCT to the loss of their fearless leader
and not to any lack of skill or devotion. With both the commander and the
executive ocer killed, command of the regiment fell to Capt. Romanzo
Bailey and the regiment began to break.
44
The 8th USCT stood under withering re, in confusion, struggling
to ght for an hour and a half. The 8th USCT attempted to rally on the
artillery but by then command had fallen to Captain Bailey and he noticed
that they were nearly exhausted of ammunition. For the third time the reg-
imental commander, this time now only a company commander, ordered
a nal retreat.
45
As the regiment fell back it became intermingled with the
US artillery on the road, secessionist to the front and to the south anking
them and a road crowded with westward advancing follow-on Union in-
fantry. The 8th USCT had extremely limited maneuverability as they fell
back, only increasing their suering. This congestion and erce musketry
and booming artillery naturally only added to the tendency of ight for
those in their rst battle.
As Hawley’s brigade was breaking up, Barton’s New York brigade
arrived, swinging to the north side of the road to ll the New Hampshire’s
51
regiment’s gap. The ghting had not exceeded twenty minutes before Col-
onel Barton received the orders to move forward, but due to the crowded
roads and the distance of the approach march, it would take time before
the New Yorkers were in line of battle, during which time Hawley’s bri-
gade reeled and fell back.
46
While the 8th USCT weathered its storm on
the southern ank of the US line, the New Yorkers began the ght over
the cultivated, open eld on the northern ank. Barton’s brigade came to
reinforce the Union line. The seesaw battle was hard fought, each side
struggling to advance and alternately being pressed back.
On the other side of the eld as the second US Army brigade became
engaged, Colquitt sent back for more reinforcements and resupply of am-
munition.
47
Finegan dispatched Colonel Harrison with the rest of his bri-
gade, bringing Colquitt the 23rd Georgia, the 1st Georgia Regulars, the
rest of the 32nd Georgia, and 6th Florida Battalion with a light artillery
battery. Colquitt immediately fed these reinforcements directly into his
ghting line. The 6th Florida Battalion was sent to the extreme southern
ank, enlading the 8th USCT, ring into their exposed ank, playing a
signicant part in the USCT regiment’s dissolution and capturing the guns
and national colors. Meanwhile, the 23rd Georgia went to the north ank,
buttressing the weary 64th Georgia infantrymen. Harrison’s arrival with
the Georgian infantry and the replacement artillery moved forward to the
line, joining the others while the artillery simply did a battle hando where
the new artillery replaced the exhausted and out of ammunition artillery in
the center of their line.
48
For the secessionist forces, a supply crisis arose.
They were running out ammunition just as the Barton’s brigade stubbornly
engaged the north ank even as the 8th USCT collapsed on the southern
ank. Colquitt ordered a halt to the advance while the recently arrived
units maintained a constant re to keep the US Army’s attempts to ad-
vance in check, but the regiments from earlier in the day remained, bayo-
nets xed, not ring a shot, holding their ground waiting for ammunition.
49
Colquitt gave Harrison command of the northern portion of the battle
line and when Harrison arrived there found what Colquitt already knew—a
dangerous lack of ammunition. Harrison passed his resupply concerns to
Colquitt who assured him ammunition was coming. The regiments on the
southern ank stood for 15 to 20 minutes without a round, holding their
ground as the US forces in front of them reformed. Recognizing the extreme
danger facing his portion of the line, Harrison took logistical matters into his
own hands. He dismounted, provided his horse to a sta ocer, sending him
with the rest of the sta on horseback to make runs back and forth to the rear,
bringing what ammunition they could carry from the logistic train a half
52
mile back at the Olustee Station. In several trips they succeeded in bring-
ing up enough ammunition to reopen their concentrated volleys on Barton’s
New Yorkers as they advanced across the farmer’s eld.
50
Culmination of the Fight
When Barton’s New Yorkers entered the battle, the lines steadied for
a brief moment. The secessionists shifted reinforcements, struggling with
ammunition shortages. Meanwhile, the US struggled to deploy the infan-
try from order of march formation into battle lines. While this occurred,
Hawley’s brigade fell back as Barton’s was entering the fray, Col. James
Montgomery’s reserve brigade still delayed down the congested road.
At this point, with the additional reinforcements, the secessionist lines
enveloped both anks of the US position. The New Yorkers and opposing
Georgian and Florida troops faced each other and embraced in a sustained
exchange of erce ring, only punctuated by demands for ammunition
resupply. Barton’s regiments’ losses were heavy as they largely fought in
and around the cultivated eld, the most open space on an already open
battleeld. As they approached the battle, the New Yorkers understood the
importance their resilience would be. Seymour was blunt to Barton of the
New Yorkers’ mission, and Barton in turn emphatically impressed it upon
his regiments. The New Yorkers engaged in the heaviest ghting of the
battle, and for four hours took all that the separatists had, doing so in the
most exposed position on the eld
The New Yorkers continued to maintain their re as they moved back,
running low on their ammunition just as the separatists received more sol-
diers and fresh cartridges. While the New Yorkers under Barton struggled
to hold the eld, slowly pressed back, Montgomery’s reserve brigade ar-
rived on the scene, meeting the retreating New Yorkers. Montgomery’s
arrival brought forward the last US infantry brigade.
The 54th Massachusetts of Montgomery’s Brigade had departed the
US camp at 0830, though the advance guard of cavalry had left at around
0600. It took over two hours for the other brigades of the US Army column
to leave the encampment before the 54th Massachusetts, the lead element
of Montgomery’s brigade departed. When the battle commenced, the 54th
Massachusetts was towards the rear, securing the wagon train. With the
ghting intensifying, Seymour ordered the 54th Massachusetts forward at
a run, the “double quick,” for two miles to the sound of the guns. Follow-
ing behind the 54th Massachusetts was the 1st North Carolina Volunteers
(Colored), who received similar orders and ran at a trot with all their gear
and weapons for three miles straight into battle, tossing aside knapsacks,
53
blankets and haversacks moving through the loose sand trails o the side
of the congested road.
51
The employment of the reserve brigade by Seymour occurred at 1600,
two hours into the ght, roughly halfway through. He still attempted to ex-
ecute his initial plan, this time anchoring the two African-American regi-
ments around the 7th Connecticut as the center with the remaining artillery
along the road. Meanwhile, Colonel Henry’s mounted force demonstrated
against the anks engaging occasionally with the separatist cavalry under
Caraway Smith.
52
The 54th Massachusetts formed in what was the center of the US lines
between the railroad and the dirt road that paralleled it. Montgomery’s
brigade advanced among the shattered remnants of the Hawley’s New
Hampshire and 8th USCT regiments and broken US Army artillery. To
the Massachusetts’s soldiers’ north was the stubbornly ghting but pres-
sured New York brigade, retreating from the cultivated eld. They were
being replaced by the 1st North Carolina Volunteers (Colored) regiment.
Seymour’s nal infantry brigade separated around the line formed by the
7th Connecticut, who now oset from the road to the south a few hundred
yards had become the US center, the only US regiment formed in any sort
of a battle line. The Connecticut soldiers, resupplied since their expendi-
ture of ammunition from the rst meeting engagement, set their repeating
ries sites at 600 yards and continued to lash out at the enemy lines from
the ries’ increased range.
53
Colonel Edward N. Hallowell directed the Massachusetts’s regiment
during the ght from a shattered tree stump directly behind his men’s line
of battle. He adjusted his companies to pull back on the extreme south
ank to account for the extended enemy lines anking his regiment. The
Massachusetts veterans reported seeing many sharpshooters in the trees on
the secessionist side, some claim this accounted for the inordinate amount
of ocers and sergeants killed in the ght, especially on the southern
ank, held mainly by African-American regiments, the 8th USCT and then
the 54th Massachusetts infantry.
54
The 54th Massachusetts moved through swampy ground, pushing
forward, while ring. As they grew low on ammunition, Colonel Mont-
gomery ordered the 54th Massachusetts to retreat. The regiment put in
a request for ammunition but received a delivery of the wrong caliber of
ammunition for their weapons. Their attempts at a resupply failing, they
had no choice but to continue the retreat. They stopped, in good order r-
ing every 20 to 30 yards as they retreated, keeping the secessionist at bay.
54
To the north of both the 54th Massachusetts and the at an oblique
angle to the 7th Connecticut line, the 1st North Carolina Volunteers (Col-
ored) advanced taking the place of the New Yorkers falling back with-
out ammunition near the farmer’s eld. The New Yorkers were moving
to the rear consecutively by battalions, one covering the other as it moved
back until it reached the remainder of the Connecticut regiment’s lines.
Once aligned with the Connecticut formation, the New Yorkers began to
reorganize while Montgomery’s brigade took the brunt of the enemy re.
From that point, Barton’s regiments, along with the Connecticut infantry,
prepared to work with the Henry’s cavalry to cover the inevitable US re-
treat as Seymour became highly concerned that continual attempts by the
ever-expanding secessionist lines would completely ank his forces.
55
The nal push came with the arrival of the additional ammunition
and the nal reserves led personally by Finegan. Maj. Augustus Bonaud’s
Battalion, the 27th Georgia and the 1st Florida Battalion were placed in
the center of the lines to keep up a re as the ammunition was distribut-
ed. Once completed, Colquitt ordered a general advance across the entire
front, using his extended line with orders to Harrison to simultaneously
pressure both anks of the US forces. The US lines at this point made up
of the 1st North Carolina to the north, the 7th Connecticut in the center
with some of Barton’s men intermingled, and the 54th Massachusetts to
the south.
56
Colquitt’s men pressed forward with renewed spirit as well as
relled cartridge boxes, against a physically exhausted and low on ammu-
nition US force.
With the secessionist advance, Seymour ordered a full retreat back
towards the previous night’s camp. A lackluster pursuit by the separat-
ist forces allowed for a more orderly withdrawal than might have been
expected for the defeated US forces. Darkness fell around 1800 to 1900
when the ghting slowly ceased. The 7th Connecticut deployed again
as rear a guard with Barton’s remaining regiments and Colonel Henry’s
mounted brigade to keep the enemy away from the slow moving wounded.
The Pursuit and Withdrawal
The secessionists moved a couple of miles from the battleeld before
ending the entire pursuit. Finegan arrived at the battleeld with the nal
reinforcements towards the twilight of the battle, as darkness fell ordering
Colquitt to take command of the pursuit. However, Finegan withdrew his
order at Colquitt’s recommendation due to the fatigue of the soldiers from
the long battle, the lack of food, and general disadvantages of following
the US forces in the dark. From Caraway Smith, the cavalry commander,
55
Finegan received what later was determined to be unfounded rumors of
a suspected prepared US ambush, and Smith claimed some of the sepa-
ratist’s infantry may be ring at their own cavalry in the darkness. Fine-
gan ordered Smith to continue to prod with his cavalry through the night
but Smith did nothing.
57
The secessionist pursued only six miles from the
site of the ght in four days, by which time the beaten US force already
reached Jacksonville a day prior.
As the secessionist advanced, they reported taking ammunition from
the US dead and wounded on the eld and capturing over 130,000 rounds
of ammunition that had been sitting at Barber’s Station, the previous US
camp. The US Army had tried to destroy the stockpile when they passed
through Barber’s during their retreat, but the secessionist managed to re-
cover most of it. They also captured ve US artillery pieces, 1,600 mus-
kets, and an unusually high number of wounded and prisoners, nearly a
thousand total.
58
In an examination of the ocial reports of the command-
ers, at least one regiment in each US Army brigades and, in fact the New
York brigade as a whole, retreated in light of ammunition issues. The 7th
Connecticut retreated after their initial push as their Spencer repeating ri-
es ran low. Barton’s New Yorkers withdrew for lack of munitions after
nearly the entire four hours in contact. The 54th Massachusetts fell back
after delivery of the wrong type of ammunition resupply. Only the Con-
necticut force received a resupply and returned to the line, serving as the
rear guard in the retreat with the mounted force under Henry. This in light
of the fact the secessionists found nearly 200,000 rounds of ammunition
cached at Barber’s Ford.
The US management of logistics is in sharp contrast to that of the
secessionist. Though it was easier for them to provide for logistics, the
fact remains they planned accordingly and acted decisively to address the
expenditures. The secessionist forces at a critical moment when Hawley’s
brigade was breaking and Barton’s New Yorkers were coming on line had
to postpone the rate of re and advance due to low ammunition. In fact,
portions of the secessionist line had no ammunition and for nearly half an
hour simply stood their ground in the face of the US forces until reinforce-
ment arrived to add re to the line.
Henry’s mounted force and the skirmishers of the 7th Connecticut cov-
ered the US retreat struggling down the road. Hawley wrote that his prized
regiment, the 7th Connecticut marched 36 miles in one day and fought
continuously for three hours in heavy engagement.
59
It was between 0200
and rst light on the 21 February, before the entire US force reached the
56
rally point at Barber’s. They reconsolidated, took note of their losses, and
continued the movement back to the US enclave at Jacksonville.
Various accounts agree on the carnage and suering of the US walk-
ing wounded during the retreat. Some of Henry’s cavalry dismounted and
placed wounded on their horses for movement after all the wagons were
lled, but even so many were left on the eld and alongside the road for
the secessionist to capture.
60
The temperature reached freezing, nearly an
inch thick on the ponds and swamplands, adding misery to the withdraw-
al.
61
When the US forces reached Barber’s Station they attached mules
to railway cars and lled the cars with wounded for the journey back to
Jacksonville.
The reports and fears of a secessionist pursuit drove Seymour to drive
his beaten army back to the safety of the defenses of Jacksonville. It had
been a “devilish hard rub,” and the expedition was over. The mule-pulled
cars gathered at Baldwin Station where a locomotive nally arrived, long
overdue, and the men hooked up the cars. Several miles from the station,
the locomotive broke down and the weary 54th Massachusetts soldiers
and members of the rear guard 7th Connecticut hauled the cars by manual
labor until another set of draft animals arrived. They pulled the cars for
three miles before additional draft horses arrived and nished hauling the
wounded to Jacksonville.
The Aftermath
The casualties were severe on both sides. Though the raw numbers
pale in comparison to the numbers in many of the more well-known battles
in the other theaters of the war, by proportion to the number of contestants,
the Battle of Olustee was a bloodbath on a scale as large as many of the
bigger battles. For the US Army forces under Brigadier General Seymour,
the losses were costly, crushing any further desires of a “liberated” Florida
or a renewed Florida Expedition.
Seymour lamented the exceeding loss of ocers in the battle. In
his report he specically names, Colonel Fribley, commander of the 8th
USCT, Lieutenant Colonel Reed, mortally wounded, commander of the
1st North Carolina Volunteers (Colored), Reed’s executive ocer Major
Bogle severely wounded, and Colonels Henry Moore and Simeon Sam-
mon both regimental commanders and wounded from Barton’s New York
brigade. Total losses were 55 ocers and 1,806 soldiers, killed, wounded
or missing.
62
Secessionist losses reported initially after the battle by Brigadier Gen-
eral Finegan were 53 killed, 841 wounded, mostly only slightly.
63
The US
57
expedition’s chief surgeon, Maj. Adolph Majer, commented that the recov-
ered wounded were largely minor wounds and the facilities at Jacksonville
and Saint Augustine suced, there being no need to add eld hospitals.
Surgeon Majer’s report indicated the majority of wounded of the US Army
were slight and ve hundred at least would be back to duty in less than a
month. Few injuries required surgery and most were to lower extremities.
Upon reaching the coast, the US Army transferred the most serious cases
to the hospital ship Cosmopolitan. His report included a comment on an
attempt to persuade the secessionist to allow a ag of truce to gather US
wounded from the eld, claiming the secessionists denied such a request.
Later attempts to recover articles and bodies after the battle for burial by
families in the north also were denied by the separatists, even after the
lines in Florida were settled for the duration of the war.
64
The Battle of Olustee shared many tactical characteristics found in
other Civil War battles. The assaults by both the US Army and the seces-
sionist forces were piecemeal, frontal, and largely uncoordinated, and
failed to provide a decisive defeat, or rout. This resulted in a bloody
struggle between two equal forces on equally favorable ground slugging
it out until one side decided it had suered enough and withdrew. The re-
sult of these two stubborn and determined opposing forces ghting in the
conditions of 1864 is what led to the high percentage of casualties both
sides experienced. Every secessionist soldier lost was one they could
ill-aord to replace, and in this manner, Olustee impacted the secession-
ist’s southern department in its manpower attrition relatively more than
the US losses did.
Gillmore’s rst state objective for the Florida Expedition of 1864 con-
cerned opening the state’s commerce up to trade with the northern states.
In this regard, the re-occupation of the large Jacksonville port beneted
this, however, the inability to project US control into the interior of the
state still minimized the degree of trade. The US continued to only hold
the coastlines and ports of Florida, struggling to maintain any large ar-
eas of the state’s interior. For Gillmore’s second objective of cutting o
the rest of the secessionist forces from Florida’s source of food supply
and railroads, the Olustee defeat kept US forces from reaching the Lake
City rail line, failing to deny secessionist access to Florida commissary
supplies and railroad. As for Gillmore’s intention to open up Florida Afri-
can-American populations as a source for additional regiments, the expe-
dition mildly succeeded as some numbers of Floridian African-American,
though limited and less than anticipated, came over to, and supported, the
US forces, mainly in northeast Florida. The nal objective given for the
58
Florida expedition involved the expediting return of Florida to the Union,
tied to the desire to achieve this in time to eect the presidential election
of 1864.
The Presidential election of 1864 ended in the re-election victory of
Abraham Lincoln over the Democratic candidate Gen. George B. Mc-
Clellan by 400,000 popular votes and Lincoln’s electoral vote sweep
212 to 21, from all but Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey. Colorado
and Nevada were newly admitted states, and occupied, previously se-
cessionist states of Louisiana and Tennessee held elections.
65
Notably,
Florida failed to obtain the required Unionist population for consider-
ation of electoral representation. In this manner, The Florida Expedition
of 1864 failed in its main political aim. Florida fully re-admitted to the
Union on 25 June 1868, among the rst batch of states early in post-war
Reconstruction.
66
In a “bold experiment in democracy,” soldiers voted
via absentee ballot in the election in all but three states that blocked this
right, one of which being New Jersey that Lincoln lost. Of the soldier
ballots recorded in twelve of these states, Lincoln received 119,754 to
McClellan’s 34,291, the absentee soldier vote in the other seven states
authorizing such votes was likely similar.
67
Seen as a largely sideshow theater of the war to begin with, Flori-
da essentially returned to an under-resourced and limited attention area
of operations for the remainder of the war, settling into a stalemate after
Olustee. Georgia reinforcements went back up and faced Sherman’s of-
fensive through Georgia and the Carolinas, his Atlanta and Bentonville
Campaigns becoming the last major southern theater oensives of the war
in conjunction with newly promoted and appointed Lt. Gen. Ulysses S.
Grant’s Overland and Appomattox Campaigns in Virginia.
68
While Florida remained a drain on limited secessionist manpower as
the residual US presence required appropriately-proportioned defensive-
considerations, the only remaining Florida operation undertaken was the
combined US Army and US Navy Saint Marks Expedition into the Flori-
da Panhandle in March 1865. The Saint Marks Expedition mainly served
as a diversion to support the larger US Army move on secessionist-held
Mobile, Alabama.
69
This eort supported the increasing strangulation of
the secessionist blockade running eorts along the Gulf Coast, the only
portion of the coast still supporting separatist’s ports after the fall of North
Carolina’s Fort Fisher in January 1865.
70
59
Endnotes
1. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 680-681.
2. David Frey, Failure to Pursue: How the Escape of Defeated Forces Pro-
longed the Civil War (MacFarland Press: Jeerson, 2016), 296-297.
3. This slightly changed with the coordinated southeastern campaigns of
Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in late 1864 across Georgia and the Carolinas
although even it was conducted in tandem with major Virginia operations.
4. William A. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword: The United States Colored
Troops, 1862-1867 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2011), 36.
5. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword, 35, 40-49, and 61.
6. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 744. Major General William T. Sher-
man’s combined army that would move south in mid-1864 included the Army of
the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio.
7. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword, 65.
8. War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Ocial Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies, Part 1, Volume 35 (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Oce, 1880-1901), 279.
9. ORA, Pt. 1, Vol. 35, 279.
10. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 279.
11. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 699.
12. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword, 41-43.
13. Dobak, 64 and 69. The occupational security and stability duties
consumed several infantry regiments, including most of the African-American
regiments such as the 2nd South Carolina, 3rd South Carolina, 55th Massachu-
setts, and 3rd USCT.
14. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 281.
15. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword, 63.
16. William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), 278-280
17. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 282.
18. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 283-284.
19. ORA, Part 1, Vol. 35, 283-284.
20. William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee (Tuscaloo-
sa: The University of Alabama Press, 1990), 111.
21. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 283-284.
22. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 123.
23. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 288.
24. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 124-125.
25. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 331.
26. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 126-129.
60
27. Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War,
1862-1865 (Little, Brown and Company: New York, 1998), 142; Nulty, Confed-
erate Florida, 144.
28. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 306.
29. Letter from Private Milton Woodford to his wife, dated 23 February
1864, Bornet and Woodford. “A Connecticut Yankee Fights,” 246.
30. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 307.
31. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 132-133.
32. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 288.
33. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 332.
34. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 288.
35. Trudeau, Like Men of War, 140.
36. Hondon B. Hargrove, Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War (McFarland
and Company: Jeerson, 1988) 165.
37. Davis, The Civil War, 290.
38. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 304 and 311.
39. Trudeau, Like Men of War, 142.
40. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 304, 311.
41. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 304.
42. Sergeant Major Rufus S. Jones, letter to Editor, The Christian Recorder,
dated 24 March 1864, published 16 April 1864.
43. Oliver Willcox Norton, Army Letters 1861-1865 (O.L. Deming: Chica-
go, 1903), 202.
44. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 312.
45. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 312.
46. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 301-302.
47. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 343 and 332.
48. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 343-344.
49. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 344.
50. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 349-350.
51. Trudeau, Like Men of War, 145.
52. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 289.
53. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 304 and 308.
54. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 164.
55. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 302 and 305.
56. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 344.
57. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 332 and 353.
58. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 333-334.
59. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 305.
60. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 174-175.
61. Daniel L. Schafer, Thunder on the River: The Civil War in Northeast
Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), 187.
62. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 289.
63. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 333.
64. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 301.
61
65. J.G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1969), 476; McPherson, Battle Cry
of Freedom, 805.
66. Randall and Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 619.
67. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 804.
68. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword, 70-71.
69. ORA, Series 1, Vol. 49, Pt. 1, 558-559.
70. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 820-821.
63
Part III
Suggested Stands and Vignettes
Introduction
The standard Olustee sta ride is composed of 8 suggested stands to
support a comprehensive study and analysis of the Florida Expedition of
1864 and the Battle of Olustee. This version of the sta ride involves one
vehicular movement to Olustee Battleeld Historic State Park (5890 Bat-
tleeld Trail Road Olustee, Florida 32087). The Olustee Sta Ride intends
to be a single-day event. Part III: Suggested Stands and Vignettes presents
three variations of the sta ride: the core sta ride (Stands 1-8) analyze
equally US Army and secessionist decisions, and actions centralized at the
state historic battleeld park property, alternately, the handbook provides
two additional variations of the standard on site itinerary. For a more US
Army-centric approach to the battleeld there are two additional stands
outside of the historic battleeld park, traveling east to west (Stands 1a,
2a, and 2-8). For the US Army-centric sta ride variation Stand 1a: Cam-
paign Overview (US Army Approach) is conducted further west between
Jacksonville and the battleeld at the site of an important ford over the St.
Mary River, in vicinity of a cavalry skirmish, and supply depot (Veterans
Memorial Park, 6433 US-90, Glen St Mary, FL 32040). Continuing to
follow the route taken by the US Army the next stand is at a historical
marker noting the location of the US Army camp at Sanderson used as
a supply depot for cavalry raids prior to the nal march to Olustee (at or
near 13966 US-90, Sanderson. FL 32087 / 30° 15.057′ N, 82° 16.157′ W),
the historical marker is on US-90, on the right when traveling west. This
site was also a secessionist camp prior to the US Army occupation of the
site. These additional stands make this sta ride a 9-stand sta ride. For
a more secessionist-centric approach there are two stands outside the his-
toric battleeld park (Stands 1b, 2-7, and 8b), making this an eight-stand
sta ride. Coming west to east, Stand 1b: Campaign Overview (Seces-
sionist Approach) is conducted at the Olustee Beach / Camp Beauregard,
where the secessionist built eld fortications and intended for the battle
to take place prior to being drawn out to the Olustee pine barren (Olustee
Beach, Pine St., Sanderson, FL 32087). The second stand is also outside
the battleeld park: Stand 8b: Secessionist Pursuit, US Army Retreat, and
Aftermath. This stand is conducted at the Sanderson camp historical mark-
er (see Stand 2a: Henry’s Mounted Raids for location details). The camp
at Sanderson changed hands one more time to become a secessionist camp
64
depot for the remainder of the war. When following this sta ride itinerary,
be sure to skip Stand 8 to avoid overlapping with the Stand 9b information.
While some additional stands from the army-centric variations over-
lap (Sanderson camp historical marker is used for both US Army as
Stand 2a and secessionist-centric Stand 8b), separate suggested stand
narratives are included below for the same stand to emphasize dierent
analysis at the dierent points in the narrative based on the point of view
of the sta ride’s approach. Certainly, the maps, vignettes, and analysis
of all stands add value and can be incorporated and mixed between the
itineraries of these three suggested variations, each one oering various-
ly focused approaches.
65
Stand 1: Campaign Overview (19 February 1864)
Directions: The rst stand is centered at the scattered picnic tables
near the entrance of the main trailhead loop across the road from the Visi-
tor’s Center and Olustee Battleeld Monument. There is parking along the
front of the Visitor’s Center.
Orientation: To the east was the US Army camp along the northern
Florida coast centered around the reoccurring occupation of Jacksonville.
To the west, the direction of the US Army’s advance, was the secessionist
forces, with the main body congregating around the Lake City railroad
hub. Facing northwest there is a close representation of the open pine-bar-
ren terrain that characterized the area’s Florida landscape of the 1860s.
Charleston
Department of South Carolina, Georgia,
and Florida (P.G.T. Beauregard)
Strategic Overview, Winter of 1863‒1864
Washington, DC
Election of 1864
Chattanooga Campaign
23‒25 November
Army of the Cumberland (Ulysses Grant)
Army of the Tennessee (Braxton Bragg)
Mine Run Campaign
27 November‒2 December
Army of the Potomac (George Meade)
Army of Northern Virginia (Robert Lee)
Hilton Head
Department of the
South (Quincy Gillmore)
Figure 3.1. Strategic Overview. Graphics courtesy of Army University Press Sta.
66
Scattered pine trees, clumps of bunched palmettos, scattered long grass,
and compacted soil. To the south of this position lies the old dirt road (now
US-90 used to drive into park), and the parallel Florida Atlantic and Gulf
Railroad line. These were the two main high-speed avenues of approach
to the site, all other movement conducted on smaller winding foot trails or
through the brush. On 20 February 1864, participants commented it was
a clear sky day, with a comfortably warm feeling; however temperatures
dipped that evening, leading to a freeze, it can be assumed this change was
felt as the day drew on.
Description: In late 1863-early 1864, the war’s end was still in
doubt. The strategic situation was certainly beginning to favor the US
but the secessionists remained a potent ghting force. Maj. Gen. Quin-
cy Gillmore, US Army Department of the South commander, proposed
Charleston
Department of South Carolina, Georgia,
and Florida (P.G.T. Beauregard)
Hilton Head
Department of the South
(Quincy Gillmore)
Jacksonville
US Army seizure and
occupation (7 February)
Baldwin
US Army Seizure
(10 February)
Olustee
Battle of Olustee
(20 February)
Lake City
Florida Gulf and
Atlantic Railroad Hub
James Island and Savannah
Secessionist reinforcements from James
Island and Savannah combine at Savannah
for movement to Lake City (8 February)
Operational Overview, February 1864
Figure 3.2. Operational Overview. Graphics courtesy of Army University Press Sta.
67
four objectives for the Florida Expedition of 1864 meant to help cripple
the secessionist, bolster the US war eort, and inuence the election of
1864. Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour served as his battleeld commander
in northeastern Florida.
When the expedition was undertaken, the US Army based operations
from Jacksonville, a major port city in northeastern Florida with a long
history of changing hands and allegiances during the war, retaken by
Seymour’s waterborne forces from Hilton Head on 7 February 1864. The
Florida expedition intended to deny the secessionist access to the com-
missary goods they had been requisitioning from Florida to support the
separatists states and armies to the north, mainly beef cattle. The seces-
sionist struggled since the rst few years of the war ravaged much of the
agricultural lands in Virginia, and the loss of the Mississippi River control
split the secessionists from their cattle lands to the west. The US Navy
blockade also severely hindered the supply of the secessionist. The Florida
expedition also targeted the Florida railroads. First for disruption of the
transportation of before-mentioned commissary goods north as well as the
rumored secessionist intentions to dismantle Florida railroads to move the
rails north to better connect the railroads of northwest Florida with south-
ern Georgia and Alabama.
With the forces he had on hand, Seymour began to conceive of a
long-range raid, moving deep into secessionist Florida to seize a major
rail hub to fulll Gillmore’s espoused broader expeditionary aims. This he
planned to deny the railroad to the separatists, draw their forces to ght
him in a defensive position, and destroy the secessionist army in Florida,
securing the loyalty of the state. From a 14 February face-to-face meeting
in Jacksonville with Seymour, Gillmore returned to his headquarters in
Hilton Head, South Carolina, to monitor the static sieges of the rest of his
command, leaving Seymour in charge. Seymour, with his forces based
in Jacksonville, vacillated between bold raids into the countryside, most-
ly of mounted forces, and along the network of northeast Florida river
ways, with a more hesitant, defensive mindset to hold what they already
had. Tension developed between Gillmore and Seymour over the back and
forth approaches to the execution of the Florida expedition, and Seymour’s
various reports, and ever changing emphasis of operations.
Through the logistical considerations expressed by Gillmore, it ap-
peared this was going to be nothing more than a large-scale raid. He or-
dered Seymour have the soldiers carry six days rations, half of which
would pre-baked; in addition, they would take with them only their haver-
sacks, blankets and knapsacks and sixty round of ammunition per soldier.
68
The rest of the encampment of the regiments would follow, limiting the
amount of wagons per regiment. Some have taken this to mean for the ex-
tent of the expedition the US forces were to travel light, and fast, however,
this indicated Gillmore’s instructions applied indenitely, not only to the
initial waterborne movement from South Carolina to occupy Jacksonville.
In his order he states, “leaving the rest to follow,” indicating to some that
the rest of the expedition’s baggage and wagon trains would follow. An
assessment of the continued portage of the allocated transport ships of the
expedition going back and forth from Jacksonville to Hilton Head between
the 7 February seizure of Jacksonville and the 17 February departure, al-
lowed the typical logistical support to accumulate to accompany the US
Army movement.
1
However, the guidance remained limiting forage in an
attempt to accrue good favor, only take from the secessionist government
supplies, not from private citizens.
As in other theaters of conict, the secessionists worked along interior
lines as the defending force. In addition, they were ghting along railways
in opposition to the US designs to capture or destroy those very railways.
The secessionist forces had the relative luxury to choose where they would
make their stands and in most cases, as with the defense of Olustee, chose
rail hubs for the precise same reason that the US forces identied these
hubs as legitimate objectives: because of their logistical utility. The re-
sult being the US forces advanced to secure better logistical hubs (either
for destruction to deny them or to use them as with the locomotive both
Gillmore and Seymour desired to support Florida operations), while the
secessionists simply fought to railroad access. Additionally, by not taking
from the locals, the US left materials and support for the secessionist gov-
ernment to requisition from its own people to support itself, by this time in
the war the secessionist were struggling to survive.
Three key commanders formed the separatist leadership at the Battle
of Olustee: Brigadier Generals Joseph Finegan and Alfred Colquitt with
Colonel George Harrison. Finegan matched Seymour in overall command
and responsibility for the secessionist forces. Finegan’s state connections
secured him his rank and position, keeping Finegan in his home state and
in charge of the defense of the Florida interior. He had no prior military
experience before the Civil War and in fact had not commanded in battle
prior to the confrontation at Olustee.
2
Possibly as result of this, Colquitt
commanded the secessionist movement and placement of units on the eld
of battle, comparable to Seymour’s tactical management his brigades. Af-
ter identifying the US incursion, Finegan received much of his needed
reinforcements from South Carolina and Georgia from Gen. Pierre G.T.
69
Beauregard. These reinforcements included Colquitt and Harrison along
with the crucial infantry support. Upon determination of the US Army
march across Florida, Colquitt’s brigade immediately set out by rail to
reinforce Finegan’s far-outnumbered Florida state force. However, the rail
lines did not connect, indeed, one of the US goals was to destroy and deny
the secessionist use of the rail lines in Florida to connect them to those of
the upper south. Colquitt led his brigade on a forced march for thirty miles
in 24 hours, arriving the night of 18 February, only to rest and ret for 24
hours on the 19 February and then be pushed into an intense infantry ght
on the 20th. Even more astonishingly then the 30 miles in 24 hours was
that he did it without losing one man as a straggler or to injury.
3
Finegan divided his composite force into two infantry brigades and
a separate cavalry brigade. The 1st Brigade was given to Colquitt and
consisted of the 6th, the 19th, 23rd, 27th, and the 28th Georgia Infantry
Regiments, along with the 6th Florida Infantry Battalion. He was also giv-
en an attached four-gun battery of the Chatham Artillery. Harrison’s 2nd
Brigade was composed of the 32nd and 64th Georgia Volunteers, the 1st
Georgia Regulars, 1st Florida Battalion, and Bonaud’s Battalion with Gue-
rard’s artillery attached. Colonel Harrison normally led the 32nd Georgia
Volunteers, but at Olustee he served as a brigade commander. Harrison’s
military education at the Georgia Military Institute made him the only se-
cessionist senior leadership at Olustee with a professional military educa-
tion. However, Colquitt had invaluable experience from his service in the
Mexican-American War even though lacking a military academic instruc-
tion. All the cavalry were consolidated under Col. Caraway Smith, ap-
proximately 600-strong and consisting of the 2nd, and 5th Florida Cavalry,
and the 4th Georgia Cavalry. The 2nd Florida Cavalry normally served
under Smith, who was now acting brigade commander.
The dearth of experienced brigade commanders eected both sides at
Olustee. Though both forces had at least one experienced and assigned bri-
gade commander, they had numerous regimental commanders taken from
their commands and elevated to a position of more responsibility and im-
portance. For some it was not a negative event, but for others the struggle
to detach themselves from their regiments to serve the greater good as a
brigade commander had broadly impactful results. There is a purpose be-
hind having a brigade commander and a regimental commander. When the
regimental commander is to be the acting brigade commander it is not just
one but two chains of command disrupted, as a regimental commander is
leading the brigade and a company or sta ocer is leading the regiment.
It simply added another layer of stress and confusion to the experience that
70
is the fog of war. This insucient chain of command stang would most
tellingly reect on the advancing forces of the US Army, not surprising
due to the inherent variables that fall on an attacking force as opposed to a
static defensive formation.
Vignettes
Excerpt from communiqué between General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Hen-
ry Halleck to Major General Gillmore in response to Gillmore’s request to
mount an expedition into Florida and requesting more colored troops, 22
January 1864:
As the wants of the Gulf are much more pressing than yours,
a part of the colored regiments have been sent there. In regard
to your proposed operations in Florida, the Secretary replied
that the matter had been left entirely to your judgment and
discretion, with the means at your command. As the object
of the expedition has not been explained, it is impossible to
judge here of its advantages or practicability. If it is expect-
ed to give an outlet for cotton, or open a favorable eld for
the enlistment of colored troops, the advantages may be su-
cient to justify the expense in money and troops. But simply
as military operations I attach very little importance to such
expeditions. If successful they merely absorb more troops in
garrison to occupy places, but have little or no inuence upon
the progress of the war.
4
Excerpt from Gillmore’s reply to Halleck, 31 January 1864:
In reply to your letter of the 22nd instant I beg leave to state
that the objects and advantages to be secured by the occupation
of that portion of Florida within my reach…First. To procure
an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, turpentine and the other
products of that State. Second. To cut o one of the enemy’s
sources of commissary supplies. He now draws largely upon
the herds of Florida for his beef, and is making preparations to
take up a portion of the Fernandina and Saint Mark’s Railroad
for the purpose of connecting the road from Jacksonville to
Tallahassee with Thomasville, on the Savannah, Albany, and
Gulf Railroad, and perhaps…on the Southwestern Railroad.
Third. To obtain recruits for my colored regiments. Fourth.
To inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida
to her allegiance…I am expected to accomplish these objects
with the means at my command.
5
71
Excerpt from Maj. Gen. Quincy Gillmore orders to Brig. Gen. Truman
Seymour, 4 February 1864:
The men will carry six days’ rations, three of which should
be cooked. They will also carry knapsacks, haversacks, and
blankets, and not less than 60 rounds of ammunition per
man, leaving the rest to follow. The camp equipage will be
left behind, packed up, in charge of 1 commissioned ocer
from each regiment and 2 enlisted men from each company.
You will take two wagons for each foot regiment and one
wagon for each mounted company, and six days’ forage for
animals, if possible. You will see that no females accompany
your command, and will give strict orders that none shall
follow except regularly appointed laundresses, who will
be allowed to accompany the baggage of their respective
commands. Only a small quantity of medical supplies need
be taken. The medical director has been ordered to furnish
ambulances, and the hospital steamer Cosmopolitan, with a
full supply of medical stores, will, it is expected, follow the
command in a few hours.
6
Excerpt from communique from Brigadier General Seymour to Major
General Gillmore, 17 February 1864:
The excessive and unexpected delays experienced with the
locomotive, which will not be ready for two days yet, if at all,
have compelled me to remain where my command could be
fed; not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me
to execute my intentions of moving to Suwannee River. But
now I propose to go without supplies, even if compelled to
retrace my steps to procure them, and with the object of de-
stroying the railroad near the Suwannee that there will be no
danger of carrying away any portion of the track. All troops
are therefore being moved up to Barber’s, and probably by the
time you receive this I shall be in motion in advance of that
point. That a force may not be brought from Savannah, Ga., to
interfere with my movements, it is desirable that a display be
made in the Savannah River, and I therefore urge that upon the
reception of this such naval forces, transports, sailing vessels,
&co. , as can be so devoted may rendezvous near Pulaski, and
that the iron-clads in Wassaw push up with as much activity
as they can exert. I look upon this as of great importance, and
shall rely upon it as a demonstration in my favor.”
7
72
Excerpt from communique Major General Gillmore to Brig. Gen. Tru-
man Seymour, 18 February 1864:
I am just in receipt of your two letters of the 16th and one of
the 17th, and am very much surprised at the tone of the latter
and the character of your plans as therein stated. You say that
by the time your letter of the 17th should reach these head-
quarters your forces would be in motion beyond Barber’s,
moving toward the Suwannee River, and that you shall rely
on my making a display upon the Savannah River, with “na-
val forces, transports, sailing vessels,” and with iron-clads up
from Wassaw, & co., as a demonstration in your favor, which
you look upon “as of great importance.” All this is upon the
presumption that the demonstration can and will be made ;
although contingent not only upon my power and dispo-
sition to do so, but upon the consent of Admiral Dahlgren,
with whom I cannot communicate in less than two days. You
must have forgotten my last instructions, which were for the
present to hold Baldwin and the Saint Mary’s South Fork, as
your outposts to the westward of Jacksonville, and to occupy
Palatka, Magnolia, on the Saint John’s. Your project distinctly
and avowedly ignores these operations and substitutes a plan
which not only involves your command in a distant move-
ment, without provisions, far beyond a point from which you
once withdrew on account of precisely the same necessity,
but presupposes a simultaneous demonstration of “great im-
portance” to you elsewhere, over which you have no control,
and which requires the co-operation of the navy. It is impos-
sible for me to determine what your views are with respect to
Florida matters, and this is the reason why I have endeavored
to make mine known to you so fully. As may be supposed, I
am very much confused by these conicting views, and am
thrown into doubt as to whether my intentions with regard to
Florida matters are fully understood by you. I will therefore
reannounce them briey: First, I desire to bring Florida into
the Union under the President’s proclamation of December
8, 1863; as accessory to the above, I desire, second, to re-
vive the trade on the Saint John’s River; third, to recruit my
colored regiments and organize a regiment of Florida white
troops; fourth, to cut o in part the enemy’s supplies drawn
from Florida. After you had withdrawn your advance, it was
73
arranged between us, at a personal interview, that the places
to be permanently held for the present would be the south
prong of the Saint Mary’s, Baldwin, Jacksonville, Magnolia,
and Palatka, and that Henry’s mounted force should be kept
moving as circumstances might justify or require. This is my
plan of present operations. A raid to tear up the railroad west
of Lake City will be of service, but I have no intention to oc-
cupy now that part of the State.
8
Excerpt from Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard report, 25 March 1864.
General Finegan was advised of what was done, and instruct-
ed to do what he could with his means to hold the enemy at
bay, and to prevent the capture of slaves ; and at the same time
I reported to you this hostile movement and my intention to
repel it, as far as practicable, with infantry to be withdrawn
from Charleston and Savannah...This was done, indeed, to a
hazardous degree; but, as I informed the honorable Secretary
of War by telegraph the 9th ultimo, I regarded it as imperative
to at – tempt to secure the subsistence resources of Florida.
General Finegan was also apprised of these re-enforcements
on February 11, and instructed to maneuver mean time to
check or delay the enemy, but to avoid close quarters and un-
necessary loss of men…The want of adequate rolling stock on
the Georgia and Florida railroads, and the existence of the gap
of some 20 miles between the two roads, subjected the con-
centration of my forces to a delay which deprived my eorts
to that end of full eect.
9
Analysis
• How could the relationship between Major General Gillmore and
Brigadier General Seymour inuence the expedition?
• What could be possible causes of friction among the both armies’
senior leadership? How could these concerns be mitigated to have
unity of eort and command?
• What factors inuenced Gillmore’s goals for the Florida Expedi-
tion of 1864?
• What risks did Gillmore accept with what forces, capabilities, and
information he had available to him for his proposed expedition?
How did he attempt to mitigate risk?
74
• How was the Florida Expedition of 1864 a risk or a gamble for the
Gillmore’s forces under Seymour?
• What factors contributed to General Beauregard’s risk assessment
for sending additional reinforcements to Finegan in Florida?
75
Stand 1a: Campaign Overview (US Army Approach)
Directions: From Jacksonville, take I-10 West to US-301 North. Take
exit onto US-90 West. Continue for 15 minutes on US-90. Conduct the
stand at Veterans Memorial Park, 6433 US-90, Glen St Mary, FL 32040.
Orientation: The Veterans Memorial Park is just across where US-
90 crosses the St. Mary’s River, in this area, known as Barber’s after a
local wealthy plantation owner had a scattering of plantation houses and
Charleston
Department of South Carolina, Georgia,
and Florida (P.G.T. Beauregard)
Hilton Head
Department of the South
(Quincy Gillmore)
Jacksonville
US Army seizure and
occupation (7 February)
Baldwin
US Army Seizure
(10 February)
Olustee
Battle of Olustee
(20 February)
Lake City
Florida Gulf and
Atlantic Railroad Hub
James Island and Savannah
Secessionist reinforcements from James
Island and Savannah combine at Savannah
for movement to Lake City (8 February)
Operational Overview, February 1864
Figure 3.3. Operational Overview. Graphics courtesy of Army University Press Sta.
76
was a main fordable area over the St. Mary River. In this area there was
a cavalry skirmish during one of Col. Guy Henry’s raids (10 February,
next Stand 2a with more details) and was used as a supply depot by the
US Army during their movement east from Jacksonville. With the river
previously crossed behind you, the small boat launch area in front, fac-
ing generally northeast along this route the US forces traveled on 17-18
February. This wooded park area and waterway is reective of what the
area foliage typied the area and the various winding small waterways of
northeast Florida, which both armies navigated, forded, and conducted
small boat raids on during the war in Florida. Secessionist to delay, deter,
and disrupt US operations and US Army raids to gather intelligence and
free enslaved persons and recruit them to man new African-American
regiments being raised. On 20 February 1864, participants commented
it was a clear sky day, with a comfortably warm feeling; however tem-
peratures dipped that evening, leading to a freeze, it can be assumed this
change was felt as the day drew on.
Description: In late 1863-early 1864, the war’s end was still in
doubt. The strategic situation was certainly beginning to favor the US
but the secessionists remained a potent ghting force. Maj. Gen. Quin-
cy Gillmore, US Army Department of the South commander, proposed
four objectives for the Florida Expedition of 1864 meant to help cripple
the secessionist, bolster the US war eort, and inuence the election of
1864. Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour served as his battleeld commander
in northeastern Florida.
When the expedition was undertaken, the US Army based operations
from Jacksonville, a major port city in northeastern Florida with a long
history of changing hands and allegiances during the war, retaken by
Seymour’s waterborne forces from Hilton Head on 7 February 1864. The
Florida expedition intended to deny the secessionist access to the com-
missary goods they had been requisitioning from Florida to support the
separatists states and armies to the north, mainly beef cattle. The seces-
sionist struggled since the rst few years of the war ravaged much of the
agricultural lands in Virginia, and the loss of the Mississippi River control
split the secessionists from their cattle lands to the west. The US Navy
blockade also severely hindered the supply of the secessionist. The Florida
expedition also targeted the Florida railroads. First for disruption of the
transportation of before-mentioned commissary goods north as well as the
rumored secessionist intentions to dismantle Florida railroads to move the
rails north to better connect the railroads of northwest Florida with south-
ern Georgia and Alabama.
77
With the forces he had on hand, Seymour began to conceive of a
long-range raid, moving deep into secessionist Florida to seize a major
rail hub to fulll Gillmore’s espoused broader expeditionary aims. This
he planned to deny the railroad to the separatists, draw their forces to
ght him in a defensive position, and destroy the secessionist army in
Florida, securing the loyalty of the state. From a 14 February face-to-
face meeting in Jacksonville with his Seymour, Gillmore returned to his
headquarters in Hilton Head, South Carolina, to monitor the static sieges
of the rest of his command, leaving Seymour in charge. Seymour, with
his forces based in Jacksonville, vacillated between bold raids into the
countryside, mostly of mounted forces, and along the network of north-
east Florida river ways, with a more hesitant, defensive mindset to hold
what they already had. Tension developed between Gillmore and Sey-
mour over the back and forth approaches to the execution of the Florida
expedition, and Seymour’s various reports, and ever changing emphasis
of operations.
Through the logistical considerations expressed by Gillmore, it ap-
peared this was going to be nothing more than a large-scale raid. He or-
dered Seymour have the soldiers carry six days rations, half of which
would pre-baked; in addition, they would take with them only their hav-
ersacks, blankets and knapsacks and 60 rounds of ammunition per soldier.
The rest of the encampment of the regiments would follow, limiting the
amount of wagons per regiment. Some have taken this to mean for the ex-
tent of the expedition the US forces were to travel light, and fast, however,
this indicated Gillmore’s instructions applied indenitely, not only to the
initial waterborne movement from South Carolina to occupy Jacksonville.
In his order he states, “leaving the rest to follow,” indicating to some that
the rest of the expedition’s baggage and wagon trains would follow. An
assessment of the continued portage of the allocated transport ships of the
expedition going back and forth from Jacksonville to Hilton Head between
the 7 February seizure of Jacksonville and the 17 February departure, al-
lowed the typical logistical support to accumulate to accompany the US
Army movement.
10
However, the guidance remained limiting forage in an
attempt to accrue good favor, only take from the secessionist government
supplies, not from private citizens.
As in other theaters of conict, the secessionists worked along
interior lines as the defending force. In addition, they were ghting
along railways in opposition to the US designs to capture or destroy
those very railways. The secessionist forces had the relative luxury to
choose where they would make their stands and in most cases, as with
78
the defense of Olustee, chose rail hubs for the precise same reason that
the US forces identied these hubs as legitimate objectives: because
of their logistical utility. The result being the US forces advanced to
secure better logistical hubs (either for destruction to deny them or to
use them as with the locomotive both Gillmore and Seymour desired
to support Florida operations), while the secessionists simply fought to
railroad access. Additionally, by not taking from the locals, the US left
materials and support for the secessionist government to requisition
from its own people to support itself, by this time in the war the seces-
sionist was struggling to survive.
After identifying the US incursion, Florida secessionist-Brig. Gen.
Joseph Finegan received much needed reinforcements from South Caroli-
na and Georgia from Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard. These reinforcements
included Colquitt and Harrison along with the crucial infantry support.
Upon determination of the US Army march across Florida, Colquitt’s bri-
gade immediately set out by rail to reinforce Finegan’s far-outnumbered
Florida state force. However, the rail lines did not connect, indeed, one of
the US goals was to destroy and deny the secessionist use of the rail lines
in Florida to connect them to those of the upper south. Colquitt led his
brigade on a forced march for 30 miles in 24 hours, arriving the night of
18 February, only to rest and ret for 24 hours on 19 February, and then
be pushed into an intense infantry ght on the 20th. Astonishingly, his
unit endured the trek without losing a single straggler soldier or anyone
to injury.
11
The dearth of experienced brigade commanders eected both sides at
Olustee. Though both forces had at least one experienced and assigned bri-
gade commander, they had numerous regimental commanders taken from
their commands and elevated to a position of more responsibility and im-
portance. For some it was not a negative event, but for others the struggle
to detach themselves from their regiments to serve the greater good as a
brigade commander had broadly impactful results. There is a purpose be-
hind having a brigade commander and a regimental commander. When the
regimental commander is to be the acting brigade commander it is not just
one but two chains of command disrupted, as a regimental commander is
leading the brigade and a company or sta ocer is leading the regiment.
It simply added another layer of stress and confusion to the experience that
is the fog of war. This insucient chain of command stang would most
tellingly reect on the advancing forces of the US Army, not surprising
due to the inherent variables that fall on an attacking force as opposed to a
static defensive formation.
79
Vignettes
Excerpt from communique between President Abraham Lincoln to
Maj. Gen. Quincy Gillmore, 13 January 1864:
I understand an eort is being made by some worthy gentle-
men to reconstruct a loyal State government in Florida. Flor-
ida is in your department, and it is not unlikely that you may
be there in person. I have given Mr. Hay a commission of
major and sent him to you with some blank books and other
blanks to aid in the reconstruction. He will explain as to the
manner of using the blanks, and also my general views on the
subject. It is desirable for all to co-operate; but if irreconcil-
able dierences of opinion shall arise, you are master. I wish
the thing done in the most speedy way possible, so that when
done it will be within the range of the late proclamation on
the subject. The detail labor, of course, will have to be done
by others, but I shall be greatly obliged if you will give it
such general supervision as you can nd convenient with your
more strictly military duties.
12
Excerpt from communiqué between General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Hen-
ry Halleck to Major General Gillmore in response to Gillmore’s request to
mount an expedition into Florida and requesting more colored troops, 22
January 1864:
As the wants of the Gulf are much more pressing than yours,
a part of the colored regiments have been sent there. In regard
to your proposed operations in Florida, the Secretary replied
that the matter had been left entirely to your judgment and
discretion, with the means at your command. As the object
of the expedition has not been explained, it is impossible to
judge here of its advantages or practicability. If it is expect-
ed to give an outlet for cotton, or open a favorable eld for
the enlistment of colored troops, the advantages may be su-
cient to justify the expense in money and troops. But simply
as military operations I attach very little importance to such
expeditions. If successful they merely absorb more troops in
garrison to occupy places, but have little or no inuence upon
the progress of the war.
13
Excerpt from Gillmore’s reply to Halleck, 31 January 1864:
In reply to your letter of the 22nd instant I beg leave to state
that the objects and advantages to be secured by the occupation
80
of that portion of Florida within my reach…First. To procure
an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, turpentine and the other
products of that State. Second. To cut o one of the enemy’s
sources of commissary supplies. He now draws largely upon
the herds of Florida for his beef, and is making preparations to
take up a portion of the Fernandina and Saint Mark’s Railroad
for the purpose of connecting the road from Jacksonville to
Tallahassee with Thomasville, on the Savannah, Albany, and
Gulf Railroad, and perhaps…on the Southwestern Railroad.
Third. To obtain recruits for my colored regiments. Fourth.
To inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida
to her allegiance…I am expected to accomplish these objects
with the means at my command.
14
Excerpt from Maj. Gen. Quincy Gillmore orders to Brig. Gen. Truman
Seymour, 4 February 1864:
The men will carry six days’ rations, three of which should
be cooked. They will also carry knapsacks, haversacks, and
blankets, and not less than 60 rounds of ammunition per
man, leaving the rest to follow. The camp equipage will be
left behind, packed up, in charge of 1 commissioned ocer
from each regiment and 2 enlisted men from each company.
You will take two wagons for each foot regiment and one
wagon for each mounted company, and six days’ forage for
animals, if possible. You will see that no females accompany
your command, and will give strict orders that none shall
follow except regularly appointed laundresses, who will
be allowed to accompany the baggage of their respective
commands. Only a small quantity of medical supplies need
be taken. The medical director has been ordered to furnish
ambulances, and the hospital steamer Cosmopolitan, with a
full supply of medical stores, will, it is expected, follow the
command in a few hours.
15
Excerpt from communique from Brigadier General Seymour to Major
General Gillmore, 17 February 1864:
The excessive and unexpected delays experienced with the
locomotive, which will not be ready for two days yet, if at all,
have compelled me to remain where my command could be
fed; not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me
to execute my intentions of moving to Suwannee River. But
81
now I propose to go without supplies, even if compelled to
retrace my steps to procure them, and with the object of de-
stroying the railroad near the Suwannee that there will be no
danger of carrying away any portion of the track. All troops
are therefore being moved up to Barber’s, and probably by the
time you receive this I shall be in motion in advance of that
point. That a force may not be brought from Savannah, Ga.,
to interfere with my movements, it is desirable that a display
be made in the Savannah River, and I therefore urge that upon
the reception of this such naval forces, transports, sailing ves-
sels, &c. , as can be so devoted may rendezvous near Pulaski,
and that the iron-clads in Wassaw push up with as much activ-
ity as they can exert. I look upon this as of great importance,
and shall rely upon it as a demonstration in my favor.”
16
Excerpt from communique from Brigadier General Seymour to Maj.
Gen. Quincy Gillmore, 17 February 1864:
I have sent for the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts entire to
come to this point; the Tenth Connecticut (eight companies)
to remain at Saint Augustine, two companies to go to Picolata.
I shall not occupy Palatka or Magnolia at this moment; when
I do portions of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts will be sent
from Jacksonville. The Fifty-fth Massachusetts will remain
here for the present or until the Twenty-fourth relieves it. The
Second South Carolina and Third US Colored Troops are at
Camp Shaw (late Finegan) for instruction and organization.
The First North Carolina will be left at Baldwin, detaching
three companies to Barber’s. Colonel Barton will have the
Forty-seventh, Forty-eighth, and One hundred and fteenth ;
Colonel Hawley will have the Seventh Connecticut, Seventh
New Hampshire, and Eighth U. S. Colored Troops; Colonel
Montgomery the Third United States and the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts ; Colonel Henry the cavalry and Elder’s bat-
tery; Captain Hamilton the artillery. As soon as possible Met-
calf’s section will be sent back.
17
Excerpt from communique Major General Gillmore to Brig. Gen. Tru-
man Seymour, 18 February 1864:
I am just in receipt of your two letters of the 16th and one
of the 17th, and am very much surprised at the tone of the
latter and the character of your plans as therein stated. You
82
say that by the time your letter of the 17th should reach these
headquarters your forces would be in motion beyond Bar-
ber’s, moving toward the Suwannee River, and that you shall
rely on my making a display upon the Savannah River, with
“naval forces, transports, sailing vessels,” and with iron-clads
up from Wassaw & Co., as a demonstration in your favor,
which you look upon “as of great importance.” All this is
upon the presumption that the demonstration can and will be
made; although contingent not only upon my power and dis-
position to do so, but upon the consent of Admiral Dahlgren,
with whom I cannot communicate in less than two days. You
must have forgotten my last instructions, which were for the
present to hold Baldwin and the Saint Mary’s South Fork, as
your outposts to the westward of Jacksonville, and to occupy
Palatka, Magnolia, on the Saint John’s. Your project distinctly
and avowedly ignores these operations and substitutes a plan
which not only involves your command in a distant move-
ment, without provisions, far beyond a point from which you
once withdrew on account of precisely the same necessity,
but presupposes a simultaneous demonstration of “great im-
portance” to you elsewhere, over which you have no control,
and which requires the co-operation of the navy. It is impos-
sible for me to determine what your views are with respect to
Florida matters, and this is the reason why I have endeavored
to make mine known to you so fully. As may be supposed, I
am very much confused by these conicting views, and am
thrown into doubt as to whether my intentions with regard to
Florida matters arc fully understood by you. I will therefore
reannounce them briey: First, I desire to bring Florida into
the Union under the President’s proclamation of December
8, 1863; as accessory to the above, I desire, second, to re-
vive the trade on the Saint John’s River; third, to recruit my
colored regiments and organize a regiment of Florida white
troops; fourth, to cut o in part the enemy’s supplies drawn
from Florida. After you had withdrawn your advance, it was
arranged between us, at a personal interview, that the places
to be permanently held for the present would be the south
prong of the Saint Mary’s, Baldwin, Jacksonville, Magnolia,
and Palatka, and that Henry’s mounted force should be kept
moving as circumstances might justify or require. This is my
plan of present operations. A raid to tear up the railroad west
83
of Lake City will be of service, but I have no intention to oc-
cupy now that part of the State.
18
Analysis
• How could the relationship between Major General Gillmore and
Brigadier General Seymour inuence the expedition?
• What could be possible causes of friction among the both armies’
senior leadership? How could these concerns be mitigated to have
unity of eort and command?
• What factors inuenced Gillmore’s goals for the Florida Expedi-
tion of 1864?
• What risks did Gillmore accept with what forces, capabilities, and
information he had available to him for his proposed expedition?
How did he attempt to mitigate risk?
• How was the Florida Expedition of 1864 a risk or a gamble for the
Gillmore’s forces under Seymour?
84
Stand 1b: Campaign Overview (Secessionist Approach)
Directions: From Lake City take US-90 E/E Duval Street. east for ap-
proximately 13 miles until turning left on Pine Street. Follow Pine Street
until it ends at the Olustee Beach parking lot. There are restrooms near the
parking lot. Olustee Beach, Pine St., Sanderson, FL 32087.
Orientation: Modern-day Pine Street essentially ran the main path-
way through the hasty laid out Camp Beauregard. Secessionist eldworks
faced east. The northernmost eld works ended at the edge of the lake
while the southernmost stretched over 600 feet on the other side of modern
Charleston
Department of South Carolina, Georgia,
and Florida (P.G.T. Beauregard)
Hilton Head
Department of the South
(Quincy Gillmore)
Jacksonville
US Army seizure and
occupation (7 February)
Baldwin
US Army Seizure
(10 February)
Olustee
Battle of Olustee
(20 February)
Lake City
Florida Gulf and
Atlantic Railroad Hub
James Island and Savannah
Secessionist reinforcements from James
Island and Savannah combine at Savannah
for movement to Lake City (8 February)
Operational Overview, February 1864
Figure 3.4. Operational Overview. Graphics courtesy of Army University Press Sta.
85
US-90 and the railroad line. Some of the remaining eldworks mounds
remain near the current woodline. On 20 February 1864, participants com-
mented it was a clear sky day, with a comfortably warm feeling; however,
temperatures dipped that evening, leading to a freeze, it can be assumed
this change was felt as the day drew on.
Description: In late 1863-early 1864, the war’s end was still in
doubt. The strategic situation was certainly beginning to favor the US
but the secessionists remained a potent ghting force. Maj. Gen. Quin-
cy Gillmore, US Army Department of the South commander, proposed
four objectives for the Florida Expedition of 1864 meant to help cripple
the secessionist, bolster the US war eort, and inuence the election of
1864. Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour served as his battleeld commander
in northeastern Florida.
When the expedition was undertaken, the US Army based operations
from Jacksonville, a major port city in northeastern Florida with a long
history of changing hands and allegiances during the war, retaken by
Seymour’s waterborne forces from Hilton Head on 7 February 1864. The
Florida expedition intended to deny the secessionist access to the com-
missary goods they had been requisitioning from Florida to support the
separatists states and armies to the north, mainly beef cattle. The seces-
sionist struggled since the rst few years of the war ravaged much of the
agricultural lands in Virginia, and the loss of the Mississippi River control
split the secessionists from their cattle lands to the west. The US Navy
blockade also severely hindered the supply of the secessionist. The Florida
expedition also targeted the Florida railroads. First for disruption of the
transportation of before-mentioned commissary goods north as well as the
rumored secessionist intentions to dismantle Florida railroads to move the
rails north to better connect the railroads of northwest Florida with south-
ern Georgia and Alabama. With the forces he had on hand, Seymour began
to conceive of a long-range raid, moving deep into secessionist Florida to
seize a major rail hub to fulll Gillmore’s espoused broader expeditionary
aims. This he planned to deny the railroad to the separatists, draw their
forces to ght him in a defensive position, and destroy the secessionist
army in Florida, securing the loyalty of the state. Seymour, with his forces
based in Jacksonville, vacillated between bold raids into the countryside,
mostly of mounted forces, and along the network of northeast Florida river
ways, with a more hesitant, defensive mindset to hold what they already
had. Tension developed between Gillmore and Seymour over the back and
forth approaches to the execution of the Florida expedition, and Seymour’s
various reports, and ever changing emphasis of operations.
86
Through the logistical considerations expressed by Gillmore, it ap-
peared this was going to be nothing more than a large-scale raid. He or-
dered Seymour have the soldiers carry six days rations, half of which
would pre-baked; in addition, they would take with them only their haver-
sacks, blankets and knapsacks and sixty round of ammunition per soldier.
The rest of the encampment of the regiments would follow, limiting the
amount of wagons per regiment. Some have taken this to mean for the ex-
tent of the expedition the US forces were to travel light, and fast, however,
this indicated Gillmore’s instructions applied indenitely, not only to the
initial waterborne movement from South Carolina to occupy Jacksonville.
In his order he states, “leaving the rest to follow,” indicating to some that
the rest of the expedition’s baggage and wagon trains would follow. An
assessment of the continued portage of the allocated transport ships of the
expedition going back and forth from Jacksonville to Hilton Head between
the 7 February seizure of Jacksonville and the 17 February departure, al-
lowed the typical logistical support to accumulate to accompany the US
Army movement.
19
However, the guidance remained limiting forage in an
attempt to accrue good favor, only take from the secessionist government
supplies, not from private citizens.
As in other theaters of conict, the secessionists worked along interior
lines as the defending force. In addition, they were ghting along railways
in opposition to the US designs to capture or destroy those very railways.
The secessionist forces had the relative luxury to choose where they would
make their stands and in most cases, as with the defense of Olustee, chose
rail hubs for the precise same reason that the US forces identied these
hubs as legitimate objectives: because of their logistical utility. The re-
sult being the US forces advanced to secure better logistical hubs (either
for destruction to deny them or to use them as with the locomotive both
Gillmore and Seymour desired to support Florida operations), while the
secessionists simply fought to railroad access. Additionally, by not taking
from the locals, the US left materials and support for the secessionist gov-
ernment to requisition from its own people to support itself, by this time in
the war the secessionist was struggling to survive.
Three key commanders formed the separatist leadership at the Battle
of Olustee: Brigadier Generals Joseph Finegan and Alfred Colquitt with
Col. George Harrison. Finegan matched Seymour in overall command and
responsibility for the secessionist forces. Finegan’s state connections se-
cured him his rank and position, keeping Finegan in his home state and
in charge of the defense of the Florida interior. He had no prior military
experience before the Civil War and in fact had not commanded in battle
87
prior to the confrontation at Olustee.
20
Possibly as result of this, Colquitt
commanded the secessionist movement and placement of units on the eld
of battle, comparable to Seymour’s tactical management his brigades.
After identifying the US incursion, Florida secessionist-Brig. Gen.
Joseph Finegan received much needed reinforcements from South Caroli-
na and Georgia from Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard. These reinforcements
included Colquitt and Harrison along with the crucial infantry support.
Upon determination of the US Army march across Florida, Colquitt’s bri-
gade immediately set out by rail to reinforce Finegan’s far-outnumbered
Florida state force. However, the rail lines did not connect, indeed, one of
the US goals was to destroy and deny the secessionist use of the rail lines
in Florida to connect them to those of the upper south. Colquitt led his
brigade on a forced march for 30 miles in 24 hours, arriving the night of
18 February, only to rest and ret for 24 hours on 19 February, and then
be pushed into an intense infantry ght on the 20th. Astonishingly, his
unit endured the trek without losing a single straggler soldier or anyone
to injury.
21
Finegan divided his composite force into two infantry brigades and
a separate cavalry brigade. The 1st Brigade was given to Colquitt and
consisted of the 6th, the 19th, 23rd, 27th, and the 28th Georgia Infantry
Regiments, along with the 6th Florida Infantry Battalion. He was also giv-
en an attached four-gun battery of the Chatham Artillery. Harrison’s 2nd
Brigade was composed of the 32nd and 64th Georgia Volunteers, the 1st
Georgia Regulars, 1st Florida Battalion, and Bonaud’s Battalion with Gue-
rard’s artillery attached. Colonel Harrison normally led the 32nd Georgia
Volunteers, but at Olustee he served as a brigade commander. Harrison’s
military education at the Georgia Military Institute made him the only se-
cessionist senior leadership at Olustee with a professional military educa-
tion. However, Colquitt had invaluable experience from his service in the
Mexican-American War even though lacking a military academic instruc-
tion. All the cavalry were consolidated under Col. Caraway Smith, ap-
proximately 600-strong and consisting of the 2nd, and 5th Florida Cavalry,
and the 4th Georgia Cavalry. The 2nd Florida Cavalry normally served
under Smith, who was now acting brigade commander.
The dearth of experienced brigade commanders eected both sides at
Olustee. Though both forces had at least one experienced and assigned bri-
gade commander, they had numerous regimental commanders taken from
their commands and elevated to a position of more responsibility and im-
portance. For some it was not a negative event, but for others the struggle
to detach themselves from their regiments to serve the greater good as a
88
brigade commander had broadly impactful results. There is a purpose be-
hind having a brigade commander and a regimental commander. When the
regimental commander is to be the acting brigade commander it is not just
one but two chains of command disrupted, as a regimental commander is
leading the brigade and a company or sta ocer is leading the regiment.
It simply added another layer of stress and confusion to the experience that
is the fog of war. This insucient chain of command stang would most
tellingly reect on the advancing forces of the US Army, not surprising
due to the inherent variables that fall on an attacking force as opposed to a
static defensive formation.
Vignettes
Excerpt from report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan, 13 February 1864:
This expedition is really formidable, and, organized as it is
with so large a force of cavalry or mounted infantry, threatens
disastrous results, unless checked at once by a sucient force.
The enemy is fortifying Baldwin, and also, I understand, a
position on the Little Saint Mary’s. I should have more caval-
ry to prevent their superior mounted force from making raids
into the rich counties of Alachua and Marion, and not only
running o the negroes by the Saint John’s River, but destroy-
ing the large amounts of sugar and syrup which has not yet
been sent to market. The supply of beef from the peninsula
will of course be suspended until the enemy is driven out.
22
Excerpt from Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard report, 25 March 1864:
General Finegan was advised of what was done, and instruct-
ed to do what he could with his means to hold the enemy at
bay, and to prevent the capture of slaves ; and at the same time
I reported to you this hostile movement and my intention to
repel it, as far as practicable, with infantry to be withdrawn
from Charleston and Savannah...This was done, indeed, to a
hazardous degree; but, as I informed the honorable Secretary
of War by telegraph the 9th ultimo, I regarded it as imperative
to attempt to secure the subsistence resources of Florida. Gen-
eral Finegan was also apprised of these re-enforcements on
February 11, and instructed to maneuver mean time to check
or delay the enemy, but to avoid close quarters and unneces-
sary loss of men…The want of adequate rolling stock on the
Georgia and Florida railroads, and the existence of the gap of
some 20 miles between the two roads, subjected the concen-
89
tration of my forces to a delay which deprived my eorts to
that end of full eect.
23
Excerpt from Maj. Gen. Quincy Gillmore orders to Brig. Gen. Truman
Seymour, 4 February 1864:
The men will carry six days’ rations, three of which should
be cooked. They will also carry knapsacks, haversacks, and
blankets, and not less than 60 rounds of ammunition per
man, leaving the rest to follow. The camp equipage will be
left behind, packed up, in charge of 1 commissioned ocer
from each regiment and 2 enlisted men from each company.
You will take two wagons for each foot regiment and one
wagon for each mounted company, and six days’ forage for
animals, if possible. You will see that no females accompany
your command, and will give strict orders that none shall
follow except regularly appointed laundresses, who will
be allowed to accompany the baggage of their respective
commands. Only a small quantity of medical supplies need
be taken. The medical director has been ordered to furnish
ambulances, and the hospital steamer Cosmopolitan, with a
full supply of medical stores, will, it is expected, follow the
command in a few hours.
24
Excerpt from communique from Brigadier General Seymour to Major
General Gillmore, 17 February 1864:
The excessive and unexpected delays experienced with the
locomotive, which will not be ready for two days yet, if at all,
have compelled me to remain where my command could be
fed; not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me
to execute my intentions of moving to Suwannee River. But
now I propose to go without supplies, even if compelled to
retrace my steps to procure them, and with the object of de-
stroying the railroad near the Suwannee that there will be no
danger of carrying away any portion of the track. All troops
are therefore being moved up to Barber’s, and probably by the
time you receive this I shall be in motion in advance of that
point. That a force may not be brought from Savannah, Ga., to
interfere with my movements, it is desirable that a display be
made in the Savannah River, and I therefore urge that upon the
reception of this such naval forces, transports, sailing vessels,
&co. , as can be so devoted may rendezvous near Pulaski, and
90
that the iron-clads in Wassaw push up with as much activity
as they can exert. I look upon this as of great importance, and
shall rely upon it as a demonstration in my favor.”
25
Excerpt from communique Major General Gillmore to Brig. Gen. Tru-
man Seymour, 18 February 1864:
I am just in receipt of your two letters of the 16th and one
of the 17th, and am very much surprised at the tone of the
latter and the character of your plans as therein stated. You
say that by the time your letter of the 17th should reach these
headquarters your forces would be in motion beyond Bar-
ber’s, moving toward the Suwannee River, and that you shall
rely on my making a display upon the Savannah River, with
“naval forces, transports, sailing vessels,” and with iron-clads
up from Wassaw & Co., as a demonstration in your favor,
which you look upon “as of great importance.” All this is
upon the presumption that the demonstration can and will be
made; although contingent not only upon my power and dis-
position to do so, but upon the consent of Admiral Dahlgren,
with whom I cannot communicate in less than two days. You
must have forgotten my last instructions, which were for the
present to hold Baldwin and the Saint Mary’s South Fork, as
your outposts to the westward of Jacksonville, and to occupy
Palatka, Magnolia, on the Saint John’s. Your project distinctly
and avowedly ignores these operations and substitutes a plan
which not only involves your command in a distant move-
ment, without provisions, far beyond a point from which you
once withdrew on account of precisely the same necessity, but
presupposes a simultaneous demonstration of “great impor-
tance” to you elsewhere, over which you have no control, and
which requires the co-operation of the navy. It is impossible
for me to determine what your views a.re with respect to Flor-
ida matters, and this is the reason why I have endeavored to
make mine known to you so fully…. As may be supposed, I
am very much confused by these conicting views, and am
thrown into doubt as to whether my intentions with regard to
Florida matters arc fully understood by you. I will therefore
reannounce them briey: First, I desire to bring Florida into
the Union under the President’s proclamation of December
8, 1863; as accessory to the above, I desire, second, to re-
vive the trade on the Saint John’s River; third, to recruit my
91
colored regiments and organize a regiment of Florida white
troops; fourth, to cut o in part the enemy’s supplies drawn
from Florida. After you had withdrawn your advance, it was
arranged between us, at a personal interview, that the places
to be permanently held for the present would be the south
prong of the Saint Mary’s, Baldwin, Jacksonville, Magnolia,
and Palatka, and that Henry’s mounted force should be kept
moving as circumstances might justify or require. This is my
plan of present operations. A raid to tear up the railroad west
of Lake City will be of service, but I have no intention to oc-
cupy now that part of the State.
26
Analysis
• What factors contributed to General Beauregard’s risk assessment
for sending additional reinforcements to Finegan in Florida?
• What could be possible causes of friction among the both armies’
senior leadership? How could these concerns be mitigated to have
unity of eort and command?
• What factors inuenced Gillmore’s goals for the Florida Expedi-
tion of 1864?
• How was the Florida Expedition of 1864 a risk or a gamble for the
Gillmore’s forces under Seymour?
• How did Finegan’s plan include characteristics of the defense?
93
Stand 2a: Henry’s Mounted Raids (8–18 February)
Directions: Continue west on US-90 for 7.6 miles. The historical
marker should be on the right side of US-90 when traveling east at or near
13966 US-90, Sanderson, FL 32087 / 30° 15.057′ N, 82° 16.157′ W.
Orientation: The historical marker stands in the vicinity of the orig-
inal boundaries of the small 1864 town of Sanderson. This site was rst
a secessionist depot prior to Colonel Henry’s mounted raid (10 February)
drove them back west. Facing west along US-90 continues the US Army’s
approach along the road. From this camp, the Olustee battleeld is o this
route slightly over 8 miles. The Barbers ford site and additional US Army
depot is back along the same route 7.6 miles. The Olustee Railroad depot
is ten miles further down the route with the US Army’s main objective of
Lake City roughly 23 miles further down this route. When Henry’s raiders
passed through here it was evening. Both armies in turns used Sanderson
as a camp and depot due to its location along the main road east-west
across north Florida connecting to Jacksonville.
Description: The nature and military goals of the Florida Expedition
of 1864 led Gillmore to seek additional horses to mount more of his in-
fantry, increasing the range and speed of the large-scale raid that the ex-
pedition intended. His request subsequently denied, Seymour did mount
some infantry on horses to improve his speed and range of a lead force,
these from Col. Guy Henry’s 40th Massachusetts Volunteers as a mounted
infantry regiment with attached “B” Battery of 1st Horse Artillery under
Capt. Samuel S. Elder. The Independent Battalion of Massachusetts Cav-
alry of Maj. Atherton H. Stevens Jr. rounded out Herny’s mounted infan-
try/cavalry brigade of the US Army forces.
The US Army’s information concerning the forces to their front during
their westward advance was spotty at best, the cavalry forces and mount-
ed infantrymen of Henry’s brigade encountering scattered, uncoordinated
resistance in a series of mounted raids conducted while Seymour’s main
body gathered in Jacksonville. Over several days, Herny’s forces ranged
in back and forth raids on Baldwin, a town of 15 buildings largely oriented
around a railroad station, including a hotel on 9 February, seizing a many
prisoners and some cannon without resistance. Pushing through the town
after capturing those secessionist forces that did not ee, a detachment
crossing the St. Mary’s River encountered a secessionist force near Bar-
ber’s Plantation, reported to be 150 strong including secessionist infantry.
After short but erce ghting, the cavalry force pushed through, broke the
secessionist’s resistance, and forced a crossing of the river but at high cost
94
of 25 US Army casualties at unknown but slight loss to the disappearing
secessionists. Along the raiders march evidence of secessionist destroyed
supplies, food stores, military wares, and cotton contributed to the losses
secessionist-Florida incurred as Henry’s troopers also seized military and
secessionist-government stores left behind.
Pressing on through the night of 9-10 February, the mounted force
came into Sanderson, capturing more stores and nding evidence of more
self-destruction by the secessionist to delay US Army advance. Seymour’s
force slowly followed each of these stops, taking Barbers, and then moving
to Sanderson while Henry’s troopers ranged further out. The slowly inten-
sifying resistance, rst none at Baldwin, then a blooding at the St. Mary’s
to
Jacksonville
5
Cedar
Creek
Ocean
Pond
Georgia
Florida
St. Marys
River
1
2
4
Baldwin occupied
(9 February).
Ambush at Barbers /
St. Marys (10 February).
Sanderson
(evening 10 February).
Olustee Depot important
railroad hub.
Secessionsts / Rebel
reinforcements from
across state and Georgia
rally at Lake City
(approximately 12
February).
Henry’s mounted raid
to Gainesville
(14‒17 February /
approximately 50 miles).
3
6
5
N
Stand 2a: Henry’s Mounted Raids
Florida Atlantic &
Gulf Central Railroad
Baldwin
Barbers
Sanderson
Lake City
Olustee
Depot
1
3
4
6
2
Figure 3.5. Henry’s Mounted Raids. Graphics courtesy of Army University Press Sta.
95
River, drew Seymour into his caution.
Part of Henry’s force moved towards the
expedition’s intended objective of Lake
City only grew more resistance. Anoth-
er detachment of troopers moved south-
west further into the interior of the state
to Gainesville on 14 February, where for
nearly two and a half days held o two
secessionist cavalry companies’ attacks,
destroyed secessionist stores, passed
out secessionist-government goods to
dispossessed locals before returning.
Though boasting, the slow accumula-
tion of intensifying resistance delaying
the US Army advance created hesitation
in Seymour who halted his advance and
began his back and forth equivocation
with Gillmore over the locomotive, the
degree of secessionist commitment, and
logistics, leading up to his 17 February
decision to begin his large-scale ad-
vance towards Lake City.
Vignettes
Excerpt from communique from
Maj. Gen. Quincy Gillmore to Gener-
al-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, 9
February 1864:
The advance, under Col. Guy V.
Henry, comprising the Fortieth Massachusetts Infantry, the
Independent Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry, under Major
Stevens, and Elder’s horse battery (B, First Artillery), pushed
forward into the interior on the night of the 8th; passed by the
enemy, drawn up in line of battle at Camp Finegan, 7 miles
from Jacksonville; surprised and captured a battery, 3 miles in
rear of the camp, about midnight, and reached this place about
sunrise this morning. At our approach the “enemy abandoned
and sunk the steamer Saint Mary’s and burned 270 bales of
cotton a few miles above Jacksonville. We have taken, with-
out loss of a man, over 100 prisoners, 8 pieces of excellent
to
Jacksonville
5
Cedar
Creek
Ocean
Pond
Georgia
Florida
St. Marys
River
1
2
4
Baldwin occupied
(9 February).
Ambush at Barbers /
St. Marys (10 February).
Sanderson
(evening 10 February).
Olustee Depot important
railroad hub.
Secessionsts / Rebel
reinforcements from
across state and Georgia
rally at Lake City
(approximately 12
February).
Henry’s mounted raid
to Gainesville
(14‒17 February /
approximately 50 miles).
3
6
5
N
Stand 2a: Henry’s Mounted Raids
Florida Atlantic &
Gulf Central Railroad
Baldwin
Barbers
Sanderson
Lake City
Olustee
Depot
1
3
4
6
2
96
eld artillery, in serviceable condition and well supplied with
ammunition, and other valuable property to a large amount.
27
Excerpt from communique from Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour to Maj.
Gen. Quincy Gillmore, 11 February 1864:
Colonel Henry was at Sanderson at 6 o’clock last night. He
was opposed at Saint Mary’s South Fork by about 150 men
(infantry), and had some 25 killed and wounded, inicting but
slight loss upon the enemy, who disappeared in the woods
unmolested. He is pushing on toward Lake City this morning
as far as he can with safety. The One hundred and fteenth
is at Saint Mary’s South Fork, and the Forty-seventh, For-
ty-eighth New York, Seventh New Hampshire, and two guns
are en route from here. We shall be at Sanderson to-night. The
stores at Sanderson were destroyed by the enemy. I am con-
vinced that a movement upon Lake City is not, in the present
condition of transportation, admissible, and indeed that what
has been said of the desire of Florida to come back now is a
delusion. The backbone of rebeldom is not here, and Florida
will not cast its lot until more important successes elsewhere
are assured.
28
Brigadier Truman Seymour to Brig. Gen. J.W. Turner, Gillmore’s
chief of sta, 17 February 1864:
I have to report that on the 13th instant a command of Fortieth
Massachusetts Volunteers…. Left Sanderson for Gainesville,
Fla., which point was reached on the morning of the 14th.
Immense stores of cotton, of turpentine and rosin, sugar, to-
bacco and supplies of all kinds , were captured. In accordance
with instructions…no private property was destroyed or mo-
lest. The public subsistence stores were distributed among the
inhabitant, who were suering for or want of them. Probably
$1,000,000 worth of property fell into our hands, but it could
not be removed and it was not considered advisable to destroy
it. On the evening of the 14th, being posted behind bales of
cotton, in a favorable position, was attacked by two compa-
nies of cavalry under Captain Dickinson, who were repulsed
with loss of several men and of the majority of their horses.
Gainesville was held by this small force for fty-six hours,
and Captain Marshall, having accomplished his mission’, re-
turned to this place this morning, the 17th.
29
97
Correspondence of an unidentied civilian newspaper reporter, New
York Herald, embedded with Col. Guy Henry, commander US Army Cav-
alry Brigade, describing their February 10th and 11th march west from
Barber’s Plantation towards Lake City:
The roads were perhaps a little more open and we passed sev-
eral beautiful and extensive savannahs covered with saron
colored grass and mottled with little oasis of green hammocks
...on which grazed droves of wild cattle and hogs.
February 14th 1864 correspondence of a Mr. Whittemore, New York
Times reporter, embedded with Col. Guy Henry, commanding US Army
Cavalry Brigade, describing the country between Barber’s Plantation and
Lake City:
The country through which we passed is low, level, and
marshy. The road on each side is anked with pine forests, but
by no means dense…The eye is wearied with viewing nothing
but pine trees.
Analysis
• How does the success of Henry’s raids inuence Seymour’s vacil-
lating position on progressing the campaign?
• How did, or did not, Henry’s mounted force fulll the roles typical
of cavalry or mounted formations?
• What were some of the indicators of the enemy that Henry’s raids
exhibited that inuenced US Army assumptions? How could they
have been mistaken?
• How did Seymour’s use of Henry’s cavalry demonstrate the fun-
damentals of reconnaissance?
99
Stand 2: The Developing Skirmish (reported at 1400, 20 Febru-
ary 1864)
Directions: From Stand One (vicinity of park welcome center for
sta rides arriving from Stand 1a or Stand 2b) walk southwest towards the
Cemetery along US-90 and the railroad. Follow the park boundary fence
east from the entrance of the park and the cemetery gate is facing inside
the park. Once in the cemetery, a tall cross stands in the center commem-
orating the US Army soldiers buried there after the battle and is the site of
Stand Two.
Orientation: The US infantry skirmishers from Captain Skinner’s 7th
Connecticut Regiment arrayed roughly north to south across the advanc-
ing front with the railroad in their center (railroad and parallel modern
US-90). Facing due west were thin secessionist lines awaiting further re-
inforcements arrayed in battle line roughly northwest to southeast inter-
rupting the US advance towards Lake City. The ground of the pine barren
was open, with scattered trees and limited underbrush, giving fair elds of
observation for the footsore and weary US infantry. The sun was high with
the early afternoon, initial contact reported at 1400. A reporter accompa-
nying the US Army forces in Florida remarked on 20 February 1864 what
a warm day with clear skies. He said the terrain near Olustee was free of
underbrush, level with an open, park-like pine forest.
30
Only the scattered
pines interrupted visibility. The chilled weather was from the end of the
Florida winter season characterized by a lack of precipitation.
Description: Early on the morning of 20 February, Seymour began
the nal push of his forces from Barbers towards Lake City. The rst ones
that left were the mounted force under Colonel Henry. As the sun rose
higher, the rest of Seymour’s forces began to get into the order of move-
ment and wind their way out of the previous night’s campsite and move
towards the secessionist territory. Hawley’s brigade followed behind the
mounted force with Barton’s New Yorkers in the middle while Montgom-
ery’s reserve brigade held the rear with the baggage train having grown to
approximately two miles in length between Montgomery’s brigade and the
New Yorkers. Approximately, the rst troops departed around 0600 and it
was not for two more hours later at 0800 that Montgomery’s brigade even
started to move from the bivouac site.
The 7th Connecticut was the most experienced and reliable of the in-
fantry regiments and would be called upon to perform at its best at Olus-
tee. The other two infantry regiments of Hawley’s brigade were the 7th
New Hampshire and the 8th United States Colored Troops (USCT). The
100
N
8th USCT
7th CT
(2 Co.)
Elder’s
Art
7th CT
(2 Res Co.)
64th GA
32nd GA
(2 Co.)
US Cav
(Henry)
Slave
Cabins
7th NH
Cone’s Head
Swamp
Stand 2: The Developing Skirmish
1
2
3
4
1
2
4
Initial contact occurs two
miles east of this cross-
road at small stave-mill /
woodstock.
Remainder of Haley’s
Brigade advances toward
Henry’s skirmish action.
His forces move along two
separate routes of march.
Advance elements of
Henry’s Cavalry Brigade
(including two companies
of 7th CT) push Rebel
Forces back toward
Olustee Station for over
an hour after initial contact
at stave-mill at noon.
Cle
ared field under
cultivation at time of
battle.
Battle of Olustee
Early skirmishing between
Henry’s Cavalry force as
Hawley’s Brigade
approaches action to
deploy into battle.
Rebel Cav
0 200 400 600 800 1,000
Yards
3
Ocean
Pond
4
Upland Forests / Grasslands
Wetlands / Swamps
Figure 3.6. The Developing Skirmish. Map courtesy of Christopher Lydick.
101
New Hampshire regiment was under Col. Joseph C. Abbott, and though
a veteran regiment was understaed like the 7th Connecticut due to leave
and full of untested replacements. Likewise, the third infantry regiment
under Hawley was the untested 8th USCT under command of Col. Charles
W. Fribley. The 3rd Artillery Regiment’s “E” Battery under command of
Capt. John Hamilton rounded out Hawley’s brigade.
As the US forces advanced, Henry’s mounted infantry and cavalry
troopers faced sporadic ghting from scattered skirmishers. This intensity
was no more than they had faced from their previous movements inland
from the US-enclaves along the coast. The secessionist cavalry and scat-
tered infantrymen red a few rounds and then broke apart, retreating, re-
forming and ring a few more rounds further along the route. They consis-
tently maintained limited contact with the US forces and drew them more
towards Olustee, where the secessionist under Finegan intended to lead
the US forces to attack a few miles east of Lake City. Here, the secessionist
planned to ght a defensive battle from their prepared works, which were
still under construction. Fear of the advancing US forces destroying the
railroad, Finegan began sending forward infantry units and nally moved
Colquitt forward to establish a strong line of defense. In this moment, the
secessionists abandoned the original plan to ght a defensive battle at the
ramparts of Olustee but instead to meet the advancing US forces in the
open a few miles east of Olustee in a developing engagement.
As the consistent skirmishing continued, Seymour ordered up the
entire 7th Connecticut infantrymen as dismounted skirmishers to bolster
Henry’s mounted troops. Leading to the eld, Captain Skinner recalled
they “marched without rest and over bad ground; many swamps, ditches,
pickets, and fences intervened to obstruct.”
31
When Skinner approached
the railroad and dirt road intersection, he found the mounted troops laa-
gered and seemingly waiting for the infantry to arrive before they pushed
any further up the road. Once arrived, the infantrymen passed and ad-
vanced. US horse-drawn artillery red a round, receiving a salvo in reply
from multiple secessionist artillery pieces. In response, the 7th Connecti-
cut advanced more determinedly to seize the opposing artillery at approx-
imately 1400. As the US infantry moved forward, they soon faced no lon-
ger an enemy skirmish line but a determined and well-formed battle line
of secessionist infantry anked by cavalry.
Private Milton, a skirmisher in the lead Connecticut company, re-
counted in a letter home, “As soon as we were deployed, were ordered
to advance, keep cool, take good aim and not waste our ammunition.”
32
As skirmishers, they were formed into a line, soldiers spaced ve yards
102
apart, spreading out over half a mile with a reserve company directly to
their rear about a hundred yards. The separatists retreated, always keep-
ing within sight. The Connecticut skirmishers exchanged re, advancing
a few miles.
33
From the secessionist side, at 1400 Colquitt arrived forward and found
the secessionist cavalry retreating and the enemy infantry advancing
quickly. Colquitt immediately deployed his infantry regiments to form the
rst secessionist main line of resistance, the line Skinner initially saw after
passing the US mounted force in laager. Colquitt sent forward the 19th
Georgia to the south side of the road and the 28th Georgia on the north
side of the road. Along with the 28th on the north side were the untested
in battle 64th Georgia and the portions of the 32nd Georgia, each of which
Finegan sent earlier to reinforce Smith’s cavalry and now were absorbed
into Colquitt’s command. The 6th Georgia was pushed even further to the
north, to oset the US Army’s apparent attempts to ank the secessionist
line, which in fact was Skinner’s deployment of his reserve companies
to stop what they thought was an apparent enemy anking attempt. The
available separatist artillery held the road, and their lines nalized for the
time being with Colquitt’s orders for Smith’s cavalry to secure the two
anks.
34
Smith sent the 2nd Florida Cavalry to cover the southern ank
while the 4th Georgia Cavalry took the north side.
35
Private Woodford wrote, “a rattle of riery is seldom heard from
so few men,” commenting on the intensity from their repeating ries…
Each man of us had a tree to cover him, and every one took good aim…
the rest of the regiment came up... they scattered, every man taking a
tree and ghting on his own hook, just like skirmishers.”
36
Olustee was
the 64th Georgia’s rst combat; however, the hardcore experienced 28th
Georgia veterans buttressed the 64th Georgia whose demonstrated calm-
ness under the skirmisher’s repeating ries’ withering re steadied the
raw soldiers.
37
The secessionist struck the Connecticut soldiers with “well-direct-
ed volleys of musketry” in Skinner’s post-battle assessment. From the
rapid expenditure of ammunition in the repeating ries during their skir-
mishing and initial push forward, the 7th Connecticut soon found them-
selves running low on ammunition and being pressured by a resurgent,
advancing enemy line. The US Army skirmishers began to retreat. The
7th Connecticut had pushed themselves so deep into the enveloping se-
cessionist lines as to form a semi-circle resulting in re from three sides.
The footsore, under-strength regiment conducted a ghting withdrawal,
ring as they retreated.
38
103
Vignettes
Excerpt from secessionist veteran William F. Penniman’s 1901 Per-
sonal Reminisces of the 4th Georgia Cavalry Regiment describing condi-
tions during the Battle of Olustee:
The battleeld was a plain open pine barren, no earthworks
or any protective spots, the land as level as a billiard table.
Our whole regiment, in fact the 2nd Florida also, moved like
clockwork, falling back in echelon movement, tolling the
Yankees directly back to where Colquitt’s Brigade lay in the
wiregrass, until when within a few hundred yards of them, we
at the trot quickly moved by the ank, leaving the two armies
opposite each other.
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt, com-
mander of the secessionist’s First Brigade, 26 February 1864:
About 2 miles from Olustee Station I found the enemy ad-
vancing rapidly and our cavalry retiring before them. I threw
forward a party of skirmishers and hastily formed line of battle
under a brisk re from the enemy’s advance. The Nineteenth
Georgia was placed on the right and the Twenty-eight Geor-
gia on the left, with a section of Captain Gamble’s artillery in
the center. The Sixty-fourth Georgia and the two companies
of the Thirty-second Georgia were formed on the left of the
Twenty-eight, and the Sixth Georgia Regiment was sent still
farther to the left to prevent a ank movement of the enemy in
that direction. Instructions were sent to Colonel Smith, com-
manding cavalry, to place his regiments on the extreme anks
and to guard against any movement of the enemy from either
side.
The line infantry was then ordered to advance, which was gal-
lantly done, the enemy contesting the ground and giving way
slowly. Perceiving that the enemy were in strong force, I sent
back for re-enforcements and a fresh supply of ammunition.
39
Excerpt from the ocial report of Capt. Benjamin Skinner, acting
commander of the 7th Connecticut Infantry serving as skirmishers of the
US Army main body, 25 February 1864:
Our advance soon came up with the enemy’s advance guard
and exchanged a few shots with them, when they retreated,
ring occasionally as they went. We followed them in this
104
way about 3 miles, when after ring a few shots from our
advance battery, Captain Elder’s, the enemy replied with a
battery of three or four guns, when I was directed by General
Seymour to go forward with the rest of my command and, if
possible, secure the enemy’s battery…After moving up 200
or 300 yards I found the enemy drawn up in line to receive
us and in position to support their battery…Here I discovered
threat the enemy were intrenched [sic] and delivered well-di-
rected volleys of musketry. I found also that my ammunition
was very nearly expended…there was no support in sight, I
had already pushed so far in the enemy’s center that my line
formed a semicircle, and that I was receiving the enemy’s re
from three sides. At this juncture I determined to withdraw
and save my command…Those who had ammunition red as
they withdrew and divided to the right and left in order to
unmask the Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers,
who approached.
40
Analysis
• How did the initial contact exemplify aspects of today’s meeting
engagements or a movement to contact?
• As many Civil War commanders were familiar with Antoine-Hen-
ri Jomini, which principles of war did the opposing forces exhibit
at the onset of hostilities at Olustee?
• What action of Colquitt’s shaped the developing battle?
• Evaluate Captain Skinner’s actions as a skirmishing force. What
risks did he accept?
• What leadership factors for both forces most aected the opening
engagement?
105
Stand 3: Deployment of Hawley’s Brigade (approximate 1400-
1430, 20 February 1864)
Directions: From Stand Two walk northeast back to the main trail-
head entrance near Stand One site. Enter trailhead and follow path until
arrival at the main open Reenactment eld (the old farmer’s eld), to the
north of the trail.
Orientation: Hawley’s brigade was the rst US brigade to move
into the Olustee battle with his 7th Connecticut Regiment already hav-
ing been engaged serving as the expedition’s skirmishers. Starting with
the open eld to the rear, ahead and to the east is the main avenue of
approach following the parallel road and railroad tracks. From this di-
rection and spread along this approach were Hawley’s advance brigade’s
remaining two infantry regiments moving to support the northern ank
of the engaged US Army artillery. To the north (the US right), the 7th
New Hampshire Regiment moved forward towards the Connecticut skir-
mishers. To the south of the US center (along the US left), along the
railroad and dirt road paths moved the 8th USCT into a thickly wooded
area, just below the open cultivated elds slight more to the north, on the
right of the US line.
Directly to the west and in front of the spreading US infantry reg-
iments was the rapidly growing secessionist lines, a mixture of Geor-
gian and Florida infantry units of varying degrees of experience being
fed into the line just as they arrived from Lake City. Seymour observed
the Olustee battleground was, “favorable for the movement of troops,”
and that the ground “was rm and even…covered with pine timber was
devoid of underbrush.”
41
A secessionist participant echoed these obser-
vations. Secessionist Lieut. M.B. Grant, an engineer ocer, wrote that
the battle took place “upon ground which furnished a fair eld to both
parties, and no advantage to either.”
42
The lack of underbrush minimized concealment for the infantry and
provided little cover by scattered pine timber. The scattered pines trees
limited observation and elds of re—the land was at. The overall eld
was largely at and even, however, it was dotted with small swamps and
scattered ponds.
43
The swamp aspects of the terrain slowed down and lim-
ited some maneuverability on the eld, mainly that of the advancing US
forces. Hawley’s brigade immediately came to the support of its skirmish-
ers shortly after the main engagement began at 1400.
Description:The initial trend for the US deployment by Seymour was
a traditional linear warfare technique. This tactics of placing the artillery
106
in the center advanced from the infantry, anked on either side by an in-
fantry regiment for its defense, and accompanied by another brigade’s
movement to ank the enemy lines, was a concept Seymour employed at
Olustee. It was this tactical concept Seymour fully embraced, attempting
to fulll throughout the duration of the developing Olustee engagement.
With each deployment of his successive brigades, Seymour attempted to
complete this tactic in the face of growing secessionist numbers and ex-
tending, enveloping lines.
Quickly into the reght, Hawley’s 7th Connecticut Infantry Regi-
ment found itself running low on ammunition, extremely overextended
and vastly outnumbered. They waged a ghting retreat as they fell back to
the approaching main body of the friendly forces.
As the 7th Connecticut withdrew, the rest of Hawley’s brigade de-
ployed forward in preferred technique of anchoring the artillery with two
infantry regiments, allowing follow on maneuvering infantry units to ank
2
1
4
3
1
2
4
3
US advance (led by Rebel
feigned retreats) comes to a
standstill as additional
elements of Hawley’s brigade
come into theater piecemeal,
causing Rebel forces to shift
from feigned retreat to line of
battle.
All four companies of 7th CT
reunite. 8th USCT advances
to the front and prepares to
deploy with the remainder of
the south portion of Hawley’s
brigade.
7th NH attempts to deploy,
but is di
sorganized. Their
unserviceable Springfield
muskets add to the confusion.
Great disorder on the north
flank of Hawley’s developing
line.
Colquitt’s brigade marching
east from Olustee Station to
reinforce Rebel forces
confronted with larger and
larger US forces due to
piecemeal deployment of
Hawley’s brigade in their front.
Cleared field under cultivation
at time of battle.
Battle of Olustee
Henry’s brigade is halted.
Hawley’s brigade deploys
north and south, as
Colquitt’s brigade arrives
at theater.
0 200 400 600
800
Yards
Cone’s
Head
Pond
Farm
Structures
Slave
Cabins
Hawley’s Brigade Begins Deployment
N
Gamble’s
Art
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
7th CT
(all 4 Co.)
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Elder’s
Art
7th NH
32nd GA
(2 Co.)
8th USCT
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
Road to Ocean Pond
Ro
ad to
Jack
sonville
5
5
Upland Forests / Gras
slands
Wetlands / Swamps
Figure 3.7. Hawley’s Brigade begins deployment. Map courtesy of Christo-
pher Lydick.
107
a xed enemy. In this case, the 7th New Hampshire
moved to the north (right ank) of the artillery centered
on the road while the 8th USCT anchored the southern
ank near the railroad itself.
While the New Hampshire infantry advanced, they
conducted an uncoordinated passage of lines under
re with the retreating Connecticut forces seeking am-
munition resupply and regrouping to the rear. Through
conicting orders from the brigade commander and the
regimental commander, Col. Joseph C. Abbott, the New
Hampshire regimental commander deployed from col-
umn of march into battle lines pivoting the movement o
the wrong company. Hawley ordered to pivot from the
eighth company into line of battle, but Abbott ordered
it done o the rst company.
44
Hawley, accompanying
Abbott, immediately corrected him. Abbott ordered a
halt and a facing movement trying to get the regiment
deployed as Hawley ordered.
45
Under intense re, with
confusion and misdirection from multiple orders the 7th
New Hampshire, a mix of veteran and brand-new sol-
diers, broke ranks and fell back in disorder. One compa-
ny stood its ground for a time but without support and
becoming the sole focus of the enemy lines this company
broke as well, with ocers pursuing the retreating sol-
diers, attempting to rally them. A gap opened on the US Army’s right ank.
The retreating Connecticut forces divided and went right and left around the
forming New Hampshire soldiers.
46
The New Hampshire regimental losses
included eight killed, wounded, or missing ocers and two hundred killed,
wounded, or missing soldiers, a total of 208 casualties.
47
On the left ank, the 8th USCT moved into battle at a quick step. This
was the unit’s rst combat. Their rapid movement to the front resulted in
them facing the enemy’s re with many holding unloaded weapons. Due
to training restraints, many soldiers had not even red a weapon or even
trained to load one yet as garrison and manual labor was the most com-
mon use of the African-American units. The 8th USCT advanced too far
and were exposed to the enemy before they had come into line of battle,
maneuvering from the march column into battle lines while under focused
re. The secessionist forces continued to feed reinforcements into their
lines as the US Army’s New York brigade advanced forward to serve as
the maneuver unit to Hawley’s base of re anchored on the artillery.
2
1
4
3
1
2
4
3
US advance (led by Rebel
feigned retreats) comes to a
standstill as additional
elements of Hawley’s brigade
come into theater piecemeal,
causing Rebel forces to shift
from feigned retreat to line of
battle.
All four companies of 7th CT
reunite. 8th USCT advances
to the front and prepares to
deploy with the remainder of
the south portion of Hawley’s
brigade.
7th NH attempts to deploy,
but is disor
ganized. Their
unserviceable Springfield
muskets add to the confusion.
Great disorder on the north
flank of Hawley’s developing
line.
Colquitt’s brigade marching
east from Olustee Station to
reinforce Rebel forces
confronted with larger and
larger US forces due to
piecemeal deployment of
Hawley’s brigade in their front.
Cleared field under cultivation
at time of battle.
Battle of Olustee
Henry’s brig
ade is halted.
Hawley’s brigade deploys
north and south, as
Colquitt’s brigade arrives
at theater.
0 200 400 600
800
Yards
Cone’s
Head
Pond
Farm
Structures
Slave
Cabins
Hawley’s Brigade Begins Deployment
N
Gamble’s
Art
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
7th CT
(all 4 Co.)
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Elder’s
Art
7th NH
32nd GA
(2 Co.)
8th USCT
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
Road to Ocean Pond
Road
to
Jackso
nville
5
5
Upland Forests / Grassl
ands
Wetlands / Swamps
108
From the outset, both forces’ artillery struggled. Seymour’s ocial
report of the battle regarding the artillery included a telling, though char-
acteristically terse line, “Exposed greatly to sharpshooters this force suf-
fered correspondingly.”
48
A secessionist engineer accompanying Finegan’s
forces observed of the artillery re of both sides, “judging from the marks
upon the trees, [artillery re] was entirely too high, and did comparatively
little damage.”
49
The eectiveness of artillery during the battle was poor
and largely failed to inuence the conduct of the battle.
Vignettes
Excerpt from ocial report of Col. Joseph Hawley, acting commander
US advance brigade, 27 February 1864:
Taking the Seventh New Hampshire, and leaving the Eight to
go in on the left of a pond or swamp, near which was a portion
of our artillery, we hurried on…
Figure 3.8. Hawley’s Brigade fully engaged. Map courtesy of Christopher
Lydick.
N
0 200 400 600
800
Yards
Hawley’s Brigade Fully Engaged
1
2
4
When brigades of Hawley
and Colquitt deploy and form
traditional lines of battle, the
character of engagement
dramatically shifts from open
skirmish to general battle on
ground of neither officer’s
choosing.
Colquitt’s brigade deploys
with massed infantry in the
center, supported by artillery
along the tracks with cavalry
on the flanks.
After 2+ hours of skirmishing,
7th CT is relieved by 8th
US
CT deploying into line.7th
CT retires / regroups as rear
guard for Hawley’s brigade.
7th NH unable to fully deploy
or maintain fire due to
confusion / weapons.
Portions retreat as others
manage to hold out as
Barton’s brigade advances
to aid.
Barton’s brigade advancing
toward the theater to rapidly
support Hawley's brigade.
Slave cabins used as field
hospital by surgeon Adolph
Majer.
Cleared field.
Battle of Olustee
Deployment of Hawley’s
and Colquitt’s brigades into
traditional lines of battle.
Barton’s brigade advances
to deploy into the line.
3
4
5
6
5
6
1
2
3
Farm
Structures
Cone’s
Head
Pond
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
47th NY
7th CT
(4 Co.)
8th USCT
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Gamble’s
Art
Hamilton’s
Art
7th NH
(retiring)
7th NH
(fighting)
7
7
Upland Forests / Gra
sslands
Wetlands / Swamps
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
109
We met the skirmishers of the Seventh Connecticut
falling back, ring, before the enemy…I distinctly
ordered the Seventh New Hampshire to deploy on
the eight company, which would have brought the
left of the line near the pond. Somebody must have
misunderstood the order, for a portion of the regi-
ment was going wrong, when myself and sta and
Colonel Abbott repeated it vigorously, but vainly.
All semblance of organization was lost in a few mo-
ments, save with about one company, which faced
the enemy and opened re. The remainder constant-
ly drifted back, suering from the re which a few
moments’ decision and energy would have checked,
if not suppressed. Most of the ocers went back
with their men, trying to rally them. The brave col-
or-bearer Sergt. Thomas H. Simington, Company B,
obeyed every word or signal, and sometimes faced
the enemy alone. Though wounded, he carried the
colors to the end of the battle.
50
Excerpt from the ocer report of Col. Joseph Ab-
bott, commander 7th New Hampshire Volunteers, 27
February 1864:
My regiment was moving by the left ank and re-
mained in that order until we were under the re of
the enemy. The regiment was then brought by company into line
and closed in mass. The order was then given by myself to de-
ploy upon the rst company and the deployment commenced. At
this moment I was informed by yourself [Col. Hawley] that the
deployment was not as you intended, and I at once commanded,
‘Halt; front!’ but the re of the enemy had now become very se-
vere, and in the attempt to bring the regiment again into column
confusion ensued, followed by faltering on the part of some of
the men, and nally in almost a complete break. About 100 of the
regiment remained upon the ground occupied by the column and
the remainder fell back a short distance.
51
Analysis
• What factors may have attributed to the miscommunication be-
tween the brigade commander and the regimental commander?
How could they have been mitigated?
N
0 200 400 600
800
Yards
Hawley’s Brigade Fully Engaged
1
2
4
When brigades of Hawley
and Colquitt deploy and form
traditional lines of battle, the
character of engagement
dramatically shifts from open
skirmish to general battle on
ground of neither officer’s
choosing.
Colquitt’s brigade deploys
with massed infantry in the
center, supported by artillery
along the tracks with cavalry
on the flanks.
After 2+ hours of skirmishing,
7th CT is relieved by 8th
USCT
deploying into line.7th
CT retires / regroups as rear
guard for Hawley’s brigade.
7th NH unable to fully deploy
or maintain fire due to
confusion / weapons.
Portions retreat as others
manage to hold out as
Barton’s brigade advances
to aid.
Barton’s brigade advancing
toward the theater to rapidly
support Hawley's brigade.
Slave cabins used as field
hospital by surgeon Adolph
Majer.
Cleared field.
Battle of Olustee
Deployment of Hawley’s
and Colquitt’s brigades into
traditional lines of battle.
Barton’s brigade advances
to deploy into the line.
3
4
5
6
5
6
1
2
3
Farm
Structures
Cone’s
Head
Pond
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
4
7th NY
7th CT
(4 Co.)
8th USCT
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Gamble’s
Art
Hamilton’s
Art
7th NH
(retiring)
7th NH
(fighting)
7
7
Upland Forests / Grass
lands
Wetlands / Swamps
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
110
• What factors contributed to the collapse of the 7th New Hamp-
shire Volunteers? How could they have been mitigated?
• How could the rearward passage lines while under re of the 7th
Connecticut with the 7th New Hampshire been better conducted?
• What factors inuenced the minimized role of the cannons but
high casualties to the artillery?
• How did the north Florida terrain aect the employment of the
artillery?
• How could the forces have adapted during the initial infantry en-
gagement to better employ their respective artillery?
111
Stand 4: Collapse of the 8th USCT (approximate 1400-1600, 20
February 1864)
Directions: To Stand Four, walk southeast back down the main trail
head the direction previously walked approximately 200 yards until arrive
at the trail juncture with the Service Road.
Orientation: To the north of this intersection is the right of the 8th
USCT, where the New Hampshire infantry struggled in the more open
pine barren grounds near the cleared cultivated farmers eld. Orienting to
the south towards the front of the park entrance is the left of the 8th USCT,
where the consolidated US artillery battery set up along the railroad and
main approach route. The African-American troops anchored the south-
ern, or left, ank of the US line as Seymour moved to bring up Barton’s
experienced brigade of New Yorkers to swing north, around the 7th New
Hampshire Regiment into the open farmer’s eld, to strike the secession-
ists left.
This occurred shortly after the skirmishers made rst contact, in less
than half an hour, between 1430-1500 Hawley’s brigade was forming and
Barton’s New Yorkers were swinging from line of march towards the open
farmer’s eld.
Description: In the words of the regimental surgeon, the 8th USCT
“commenced dropping like leaves in autumn”
52
Lieutenant Oliver W. Nor-
ton of the 8th USCT recorded that the soldiers stood and took the beating,
they seemed scared, “stunned, bewildered…curled to the ground.”
53
In an attempt to execute Seymour’s intent to anchor the US artillery
with two infantry regiments and then use the following New York brigade
as a maneuver unit to ank the secessionist lines, the 8th USCT took to the
south, or left, of the US lines which were centered on the road that had the
advance artillery on it.
While the 7th New Hampshire and the 7th Connecticut struggled through
their passage of lines on the northern, or right side, of the US line, the 8th
USCT moved into position. The brigade commander, Hawley, accompanied
the 7th New Hampshire into line as they replaced Hawley’s normal com-
mand, the 7th Connecticut. As they moved into position at the double-quick
they were struck by intensive and concentrated small-arms re from the
enemy formation across the wooded eld. The 8th USCT had moved so
quickly to the sound of the guns that they were under enemy re before they
successfully transitioned from column of four into column of twos—their
battle line. In addition, either from their lack of training, heat of the moment
or from their lack of situational awareness, many of the 8th USCT entered
112
Combined forces of Colquitt
and Harrison pushing Barton’
s
brigade and slowly retaking
ground lost during Harrison’s
deployment.
Barton’s brigade holds their
position. He gives up ground
slowly against Colquitt and
Harrison’s combined front.
Rebel right flank wheels left
to press the US left flank
which begins to collapse.
Five pieces of US artillery are
captured in the confusion.
US forces withdraw during
flank collapse.
1st NC (35th USCT) deploys
into line of battle in open
terrain to reinforce and cover
Barton brigade’s retreat.
54th MA preparing to go into
line of battle and support the
collapsing US left flank.
US Cavalry repositioning to
support the collapsing
US left flank.
Finegan commits remaining
reserve regiments (1st FL Bn,
27th GA, and Bonaud’s Bn).
Open field.
Battle of Olustee
Harrison and Colquitt’s forces
press Barton back. Rebel
right wheels left and begins to
collapse the US left. Five US
cannons lost.
47th NY
1
2
4
3
N
0 200 400 600 800
Yards
5
4
5
6
2
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
Rebel Cav
(Scott)
8th
USCT
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Guerard’s
Art
Hamilton’s
Art
6
3
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
48th NY
115th NY
7h CT
(Res)
54th NH
8th USCT
(retiring)
Langdon’s
Art
Metcalf’s
Art
7th CT
1st GA
Reg
23rd GA
6th FL
32nd
GA
Wheaton’s
Art
Gamble’s
Art
Cone’s
Head
Pond
Finegan
(Res)
Farm
Structures
Slave
cabins
1st NC
35th USCT
7
7
8
8
Stand 4: The US Left Collapses
9
9
Upland Forests / Grasslands
Wetlands / Swamps
Figure 3.9. The US left collapses. Map courtesy of Christopher Lydick.
113
combat with unloaded weapons. The enemy re quickly targeted the non-
commissioned ocers and ocers as they attempted to rally the men. The
command and control of the regiment suered greatly. First, secessionist
re struck down the regimental commander, followed by the wounding and
removal from the eld of the major who took command after him.
While the 8th USCT stood their ground, knowing as an Afri-
can-American regiment their conduct was highly scrutinized, the seces-
sionists continued to conduct their standard tactic, extending their lines
with each additional arrival of reinforcements. This resulted in a anking
envelopment and soon the 8th USCT received murderous re from the
front and its far ank.
As the regiment drifted back, the artillerymen begged for the in-
fantry not to leave them unprotected as the secessionist continued their
intense pressure. The 8th USCT attempted to rally around the guns but
the ring was too intense and the casualties continued to increase. The
8th USCT broke and retreated. The ocers and remaining sergeants
attempted to rally the retreating African-American troops around the
artillery, notably Hamilton’s battery, as their mission was to anchor
and defend the ank of the US artillery. The re was heavy and the
artillerymen, already having been under continuous re since the open-
ing shots, pleaded with the retreating infantry to remain with them. As
the African-American troops streamed past the artillery towards the
road and safety, Lieut. Elijah Lewis was stopped by an artilleryman
who cried, “Don’t leave the battery; bring your ag and rally the men
around it.” Lewis, who at the time was carrying the national ag he had
taken from a dead color bearer, moved towards the cannons. Norton
stopped him and said, “Don’t carry that ag; give it to one of the men,
and help form some kind of a line.”
54
Captain Bailey and his lieutenants managed to keep some of the soldiers
with the guns for a time. It was during this chaotic period of retreat, the de-
volving command of the regiment, and harsh musketry and artillery barrag-
es that the 8th USCT lost their national ag, leaving it beside the artillery’s
guns. The “color company,” commonly understood as today’s headquarters
company, composed the command team and held responsibility for the col-
ors to signify to the regiment where to rally. The 8th USCT’s color company
suered 30 of 43 men in the company killed, wounded or missing, losing
ve color bearers and three sergeants while passing the ag around.
55
The 8th USCT ceased any further participation in the battle. In the
ninety minutes of combat their losses amounted to ten killed, wounded
114
and missing ocers out of a pre-battle total of twenty-one. Of the enlisted,
to include sergeants, 333 killed, wounded, or missing out of 544, leaving
total casualties at 343 of 565 soldiers of the regiment, among the highest
percentage for any one regiment during the war.
56
Later claims asserted the 8th USCT soldiers simply did not know how
to use their weapons properly and those who did possessed too little train-
ing to eectively do it while under re. The 8th USCT knew each time a
colored regiment went into a ght more than their individual reputation
was at stake, but rather the broader question of the African-American’s
ability and willingness to ght was on the line. Because of this belief, the
ocers of the 8th USCT give credit to the deant stand of the regiment
even as it was combat ineective, it still held its ground, taking the beating
for as long as it could, until it lost its leadership.
Vignettes
Excerpt of a letter dated 1 March 1864 written by Lieut. Oliver Will-
cox Norton, Company K, 8th USCT:
The country is covered with scattered pines, most of them
blazed for turpentine. The ground between the trees is covered
with a dense growth of coarse grass and palmetto shrubs. At
intervals there are swamps, not deep, but broad and wet.
Excerpt from the ocial report of Capt. Romanzo C. Bailey, acting
commander of 8th USCT, 24 February 1864:
[W]e had been advancing until within about 1,000 yards of the
enemy, Colonel Fribley received orders to ‘put his regiment in,’
when we were ordered to change direction to the left, moving
now in double-quick time by the right ank on a line nearly
parallel with the railroad and about 300 yards to its right. We
were soon under re of the enemy, when our line of battle was
formed under a terric re of musketry at short range, we ap-
parently being opposed by the entire left wing of the enemy
who very soon poured in a deadly re on our left ank, which
was unprotected wholly. Colonel Fribley now ordered the regi-
ment to fall back slowly, which we did, ring as we retired, be-
ing unable to withstand so disastrous a re. The order had just
reached me on the extreme right when the colonel fell mortally
wounded. The command now devolved on Major Burritt, who
soon received two wounds and retired from the eld, the regi-
ment at this time engaging the enemy with steadiness, and hold-
ing the ground for some time near Hamilton’s battery, which
115
we were trying to save. We here lost 3 color-sergeants and 5 of
the color guard while attempting to save one gun, but we were
driven back, leaving the gun and, as I afterward learned, the
color beside it during the excitement.
I now learned that I was in command of the regiment, and
seeing that a regiment at least of the enemy was moving down
the railroad to again attack our left, and knowing that our am-
munition was exhausted, I took the responsibility to withdraw
the regiment from the eld.
57
Excerpt from personal letters of Lieut. Oliver Norton of the 8th USCT:
No new regiment ever went into their rst ght in more unfa-
vorable circumstances...We had very little practice in ring…
though they could stand and be killed, they could not kill a
concealed enemy fast enough to satisfy my feelings…Colo-
nel Fribley had applied time and time again for permission to
practice…target ring and been always refused.
58
Analysis
• What contributed to the collapse of the 8th USCT? What mea-
sures could have mitigated the collapse and rout?
• How much of the failure of the 8th USCT lay with the regiment’s
preparation and employment, the brigade’s holistic actions, or
specic enemy action regardless of the 8th USCT’s particular cir-
cumstances?
• What could Hawley have done or ordered that may have mitigat-
ed the defeat of his brigade?
• Why did the loss of senior leadership decisively play in the col-
lapse of the 8th USCT?
117
Stand 5: Deployment of the New York Brigade (approximate
1420-1500, 20 February 1864)
Directions: To Stand Five retrace path back up main trailhead loop
northeast to return back to the open Reenactor’s Field. Move to the north
most edge of the cleared open eld. This open eld would have been ap-
proximately three times this size during the time of the battle and open, at
and cultivated by the nearby farm.
Orientation: From the east emerging from the scattered pines would
be the approaching New York brigade under Colonel Barton, all three of
his regiments moving up through a disintegrating 7th New Hampshire
Regiment. The New Yorkers entered an open farmer’s eld on the far
north of the battleeld on the US right ank. Directly ahead and to their
left was a thickening secessionist force, with some moving across the
New Yorker’s front to the right, extending the enemy line. To the New
Yorker’s left, southern ank, was the forward pushed and exposed US
artillery and battered 8th USCT. Colquitt was located directly behind
and centered on the secessionist lines until Colonel Harrison’s arrival at
which time they split the ever-extending secessionist line between them.
Finegan remained further behind at Lake City. A signicant portion of
the ght on the northern side of the battleeld took place in an open,
cultivated farmer’s eld. Barton’s report claimed his brigade moved
forward into the ght within twenty minutes of it beginning, indicating
sometimes around 1420 in the afternoon.
Description: The New York brigade under Barton was the second US
Army brigade to enter the battle. Much like the 8th USCT troops, Barton’s
infantry began to take re from the opposing main line directly to the
west as well as from its northern, exposed ank. One separatist participant
commented that they used the trees for cover more eectively than the US
infantry, which accounted for their high number of wounded in the arms
and hands but less killed compared to the US forces.
59
The New York brigade’s infantry regiments were the 115th New York
under Col. Simeon Sammon, the 47th New York under Col. Henry Moore,
and the 48th New York under Maj. William B. Coan, who commanded the
48th New York in place of Barton who served as the brigade commander –
all were veteran outts. The brigade moved to the extreme right of the US
lines to ank the far left ank of the secessionist, while Hawley’s retreat-
ing brigade had been meant to anchor the artillery. Barton’s regiments took
the north side of the road, moving through and around the open farmer’s
eld. The regiments arrayed with the 47th
New York Infantry Regiment
118
Figure 3.10. Colquitt pushes Hawley. Map courtesy of Christopher Lydick.
Cone’s
Head
Pond
47th NY
1
2
4
Portion of 7th NH hold
position until Barton’s
brigade can relieve and
reinforce their position.
Barton’s brigade deploys
into line of battle in open
terrain and advances to fill
the void left by elements of
Hawley’s brigade compelled
to retire from the field.
Most of 7th CT withdrawn to
reserve position; some
soldiers still pinned down
with the 8th USCT and
US artillery.
Colquitt’s brigade pus
hing
hard against Hawley’s
struggling and pinned
forces.
Harrison’s brigade reaches
theater after ordered forward
from Olustee Station to
support Colquitt’s forces
as the battle intensifies
in scope.
Surgeon Adolph Majer
relocates field hospital to
the rear under heavy fire.
Cleared field.
Battle of Olustee
Deployment of Barton’s
brigade into line of battle to
relieve Hawley’s forces.
Battle
lines tighten to close
proximity.
3
N
0 200 400 600 800
Yards
5
4
5
6
1
2
Farm
Structures
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
Harrison’s
Bde
8th USCT
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Gamble’s
Art
Hamilton’s
Art
7th NH
(retiring)
7th NH
(fighting)
6
3
Slave
cabins
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
48th NY
115th NY
7th CT
(Res)
Stand 5: Colquitt Pushes Hawley
7
7
Upland Forests / Grasslands
Wetlands / Swamps
119
taking the southern ank of the brigade nearer to the road with the 48th
New York taking the center of the line, and the 115th New York along the
most northern ank of the line. As the Barton’s soldiers advanced through
the collapsing New Hampshire infantry, they became the only infantry on
the US north (right ank), entering an open eld and taking the full brunt
of the enemy re.
60
As more enemy forces arrived on the eld, the secessionist execut-
ed a standard deployment of forces, continuing to extend their lines and
outanked the New Yorkers. For much of the ght Barton’s soldiers took
concentrated re from the front and their open right ank. The New York
brigade stood their ground the longest of any of the US regiments at Olus-
tee and in some of the ercest ghting on the battleeld, actually inicting
signicant damage to the enemy. Finally, the New Yorkers retreated due to
their sustained losses and lack of ammunition. Barton’s New Yorkers suf-
fered accordingly for their stand, costing seventeen ocers killed, wound-
ed, or missing and 794 enlisted killed, wounded or missing for a total
casualty loss of 811 soldiers. This was the numerically most of any brigade
at the ght, US or secessionist, and it made up for more than half the total
losses of Seymour’s command at Olustee.
61
Vignettes
Excerpt from the ocial report of Col. William B. Barton, acting com-
mander of the New York Brigade, 27 February 1864:
[T]he ring had continued not to exceed twenty minutes when
I was ordered to move forward. This I did in line of battle,
taking a position on the right of the line (just vacated by the
retreat of two regiments of another brigade), and at once be-
came hotly engaged. The enemy’s re was both musketry and
artillery, and was extremely intense and galling.
His re was rapid, accurate, and well sustained, and for a
long time sorely pressed, but the indomitable and uninching
courage of my men and ocers at length prevailed and after
nearly four hours of the hardest ghting, the enemy’s left was
forced back, and he was content to permit us to retire; which
we did, by direction of the commanding general, between 6
and 7 o’clock, in admirable order, notwithstanding our heavy
losses, and with not a single round of ammunition remaining.
The re during a great portion of the time we were engaged
was both direct on our front and oblique on our anks. The
enemy formed three distinct lines of battles against us, con-
120
stantly bringing up fresh troops, and nally attacking in close
column. All their eorts against us were, however, frustrated,
and in their last attempt their loss must have been immense.
The conduct of my command cannot be too highly spoken
of. They knew, for I had been so informed by the command-
ing general, that everything depended on their good behav-
ior, and for four hours, without shelter, did they stand in line
of battle, receiving from an enemy…all he had to give in the
way of punishment.”
62
Analysis
• What factors inuenced the actions of the New York Brigade’s
maneuver and resiliency in their stand?
• Seeing the terrain, considering what Barton knew at the time and
the pressures, what may have Barton have done dierently with
his brigade?
• At this point, assessing Seymour’s plan and its reality of piece-
meal brigade deployment, accounting for terrain, opposing and
friendly forces and capabilities, with a second brigade at risk of
collapse, how should Seymour weigh his next move?
• How did the combatants at Olustee apply the principles of Unied
Land Operations?
121
Stand 6: Secessionist Maneuver (reported 1530, 20 February 1864)
Directions: To Stand Six return to the main trailhead loop and follow
small trail o main loop immediately south of the Reenactor’s Field, mov-
ing southwest down small trail that cuts through the main trail loop for
approximately 100 yards.
Orientation: Facing eastward from this point orients from view of the
secessionist lines towards the approaching US forces. From the center of
these lines Colquitt coordinated the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements
into line directly into a main battle line as soon as they arrived to bolster
weakened points in the center from US heavy ring. From this point, se-
cessionist forces moved mostly to the left, to the north, to outank the US
Army forces moving towards the open eld, while other reinforcements
plugged gaps. Few forces shifted to the right, to the south, since most US
Army forces were drifting to the north of the railroad lines.
Description: It was no secret to both sides as the afternoon continued
that the US forces were approaching from and tied themselves to the sin-
gle road network with their artillery and the parallel rail tracks. With the
infantry fanning out from the focal point of the artillery, both sides raced
to maneuver forces to the anks of their opponent, resulting in the seces-
sionists winning the foot race. First cracking the 8th USCT on the southern
end of the battleeld and seriously crippling US artillery, shortly thereafter
on the northern end of the line decisively engaging the New York Brigade,
thereby stunting the US attempt to strike their left ank to the north of the
main battle line. Both Finegan moving up to Olustee Station and Seymour
behind his main lines at Olustee fed their forces in piecemeal to the ght.
Seymour one brigade at a time, and Finegan mixes of regiments and even
battalions sent forward, slowly accumulating into both his brigades com-
mitted. The secessionist strove to extend the battle lines until they could
engage the US forces with frontal and anking res, a tactic commonly
relied on during the war.
During the initial movements of the battle Colquitt commanded and
controlled the secessionist lines and maintained control of the line for
most of the ght. Finegan, the overall commander, remained at Olustee
Station and managed the ow forward of reinforcements until late in the
afternoon before coming forward to take command during the abortive
pursuit. It was with the arrival of Colonel Harrison that Colquitt had some
respite from tactical battleeld command of the entire force, at which time
Colquitt and Harrison divided control of the line in half. Colquitt main-
122
tained command and control of the southern, or right, ank of the lines
while Harrison took the north, or left, ank.
While Colquitt commanded the lines, he deployed the forces in an
eort to bolster low ammunition units and to extend the lines to enlade
the US forces. Identication of critical resupply issues and opportunist
deployments to ank US units played havoc with the US advances and
subsequent brigade deployments. The replacement of units running low
on ammunition until they could coordinate for a resupply allowed the se-
cessionists to maintain an intense re on the revolving US Army infantry
regiments as they engaged in the ght. Every US regiment commented
on the intense and heavy re they received. Likewise, the ever extending
of the enemy lines both to the north and the south continually stretched
Figure 3.11. Harrison deploys, Barton’s Brigade holds. Map courtesy of Christopher
Lydick.
Combined forces of Colquitt
and Harrison begin pushing
Barton’s brigade hard to
retake ground lost during
Harrison’s deployment.
Barton’s brigade relieves
Hawley’s forces, pushing
Colquitt’s brigade back as
Harrison’s brigade deploys
into Colquitt’s line of battle.
7th CT & 8th USCT split up.
Some pinned down in front
line positions with artillery
and some retired to rear
guard posit
ions.
7th NH regrouping and with-
drawing to the rear.
Montgomery’s brigade ordered
to the front at the double-quick.
They were positioned behind
the wagon trains during
Seymour’s line of march and
were 2 miles to the rear of
Barton’s brigade.
Scott’s cavalry arrives on the
field late in the engagement
due to hard riding during
previous 24 hours.
Open field.
Battle of Olustee
Deployment of Harrison’s
brigade into line of battle with
Colquitt creates a reinforced
Rebel line almost a mile long.
Barton’s forces hold,
Hawley’s
men struggle. Montgomery is
ordered to the front with all
possible speed.
47th NY
1
2
4
3
N
0 200
400 600 800
Yards
5
4
5
6
1
2
Farm
Structures
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
Rebel Cav
(Scott)
8th USCT
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Guerard’s
Art
Hamilton’s
Art
7th NH
6
3
Slave
cabins
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
48th NY
115th NY
7th CT
(Res)
54th NH
1st NC
35th USCT
8th USCT
(Res)
Langdon’s
Art
Metcalf’s
Art
7th CT
1st GA
Reg
23rd GA
6th FL
32nd
GA
Wheaton’s
Art
Gamble’s
Art
Cone’s
Head
Pond
7
7
Upl
and Forests / Grasslands
We
tlands / Swamps
Stand 6: Harrison Deploys, Barton’s Brigade Holds
123
the advancing US forces and every US
Army regiment on either ank from all
the successive brigades commented on
the danger to their anks.
Vignettes
Excerpt from the ocial report of
Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt, command-
ing secessionist First Brigade, 26 Feb-
ruary 1864:
The line infantry was then or-
dered to advance, which was
gallantly done, the enemy con-
testing the ground and giving
way slowly. Perceiving that the
enemy were in strong force, I
sent back for re-enforcements
and a fresh supply of ammuni-
tion. The Sixth Florida Battalion
and Twenty-third Georgia Reg-
iment soon arrived for my sup-
port. The Sixth Florida Battalion
was formed on the right of the
Nineteenth Georgia and in such
position as to come in on the left
ank of the enemy The Twen-
ty-third Georgia was put on the
left of the Sixty-fourth Georgia.
Colonel Harrison, coming up with the Thirty-second and First
Georgia Regulars took position on the left; between the Twen-
ty-third and Sixth Georgia Regiments, and was instructed to
assume the general direction of the left of the line.
The section of Gamble’s artillery in the center having been
disabled by the loss of horses and injury to limber, Captain
Wheaton, who had early arrived upon the eld with the Cha-
tham Artillery and had taken position on the right, was or-
dered to the center to relieve Captain Gamble. This battery
moved forward and took position under a heavy re, and con-
tinued to advance with the line of infantry until the close of
the action…After our line had advanced about one-quarter of
Combined forces of Colquitt
and Harrison begin pushing
Barton’s brigade hard to
retake ground lost during
Harrison’s deployment.
Barton’s brigade relieves
Hawley’s forces, pushing
Colquitt’s brigade back as
Harrison’s brigade deploys
into Colquitt’s line of battle.
7th CT & 8th USCT split up.
Some pinned down in front
line positions with artillery
and some retired to rear
guard posit
ions.
7th NH regrouping and with-
drawing to the rear.
Montgomery’s brigade ordered
to the front at the double-quick.
They were positioned behind
the wagon trains during
Seymour’s line of march and
were 2 miles to the rear of
Barton’s brigade.
Scott’s cavalry arrives on the
field late in the engagement
due to hard riding during
previous 24 hours.
Open field.
Battle of Olustee
Deployment of Harrison’s
brigade into line of battle with
Colquitt creates a reinforced
Rebel line almost a mile long.
Barton’s forces hold,
Hawley’s
men struggle. Montgomery is
ordered to the front with all
possible speed.
47th NY
1
2
4
3
N
0 200 4
00 600 800
Ya
rds
5
4
5
6
1
2
Farm
Structures
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
Rebel Cav
(Scott)
8th USCT
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Guerard’s
Art
Hamilton’s
Art
7th NH
6
3
Slave
cabins
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
48th NY
115th NY
7th CT
(Res)
54th NH
1st NC
35th USCT
8th USCT
(Res)
Langdon’s
Art
Metcalf’s
Art
7th CT
1st GA
Reg
23rd GA
6th FL
32nd
GA
Wheaton’s
Art
Gamble’s
Art
Cone’s
Head
Pond
7
7
Upla
nd Forests / Grasslands
Wetl
ands / Swamps
Stand 6: Harrison Deploys, Barton’s Brigade Holds
124
a mile the engagement became general and the ground was
stubbornly contested.
63
Excerpt from Lieut. M.B. Grant, secessionist engineer ocial report,
27 April 1864:
There was no preconceived plan of battle or combined
movement of our troops after Colquitt put them in position
on the eld.
64
Analysis
• As a defensive force in a meeting engagement, did the secession-
ist successfully balance maintaining the initiative while also re-
maining adequately reactive to the US Army’s maneuver?
• What critical decisions did Colquitt make up to this point in the
ght?
• What factors led to Colquitt’s critical decision points once the
ghting intensied?
• How did the secessionist forces employ their one untried unit, the
64th Georgia in comparison to the US Army’s 7th New Hamp-
shire and 8th USCT?
125
Stand 7: Deployment of the Reserve Brigade (reported at 1600,
20 February 1864)
Directions: To Stand Seven continue southwest approximately 50
yards until reaching intersection of small trail with the main trail loop.
Follow main trail south directly back to the Visitor’s Center. The Stand is
on the southeast, backside, of the center, all the way south to the trees near
the park border with Highway 90.
Orientation: Seymour’s nal brigade employed at Olustee was Col-
onel Montgomery’s brigade—the “Colored Brigade,” his reserve bri-
gade. The 1st North Carolina Volunteers (Colored) moved westward, on
the right, more northern edge of the road, while the veteran 54th Massa-
chusetts Volunteers paralleled the railroad tracks, closer to the southern
side of the US Army’s axis. Having been behind the expedition’s supply
wagon train, both regiments had to reform around the wagon train and
then proceed forward towards the ght for two miles. The 1st North Car-
olina was sent to the support of the New York Brigade on the north side
(right ank) of the US artillery centered on the road, while the 54th Mas-
sachusetts went to the south side (left ank) to cover the ground formerly
held by the 8th USCT directly alongside the railroad and the artillery.
Members of the 54th Massachusetts recalled they advanced during the
battle “some 200 yards through a swamp,” which accordingly slowed
them down, fatigued them, and broke up some degree of their order.
65
The reserve brigade deployed at 1600 and then moving at a brisk trot
two miles behind with the wagon train laagered between them neared the
battleeld likely around 1630.
Description: The two infantry regiments with two attached artillery
batteries formed Seymour’s reserve brigade under Montgomery. The 1st
North Carolina Colored Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. William N.
Reed, later that month was re-agged the 35th USCT and at Olustee was
untried by re, having served previously in labor and garrison guard du-
ties during siege operations in South Carolina. The Florida campaign was
their rst eld operation. Colonel Edward N. Hallowell commanded the
54th Massachusetts Volunteers, which had seen signicant combat in the
south, but as a result had many replacements. Capt. Looms L. Langdon
commanded the attached “M” Battery of the 1st Artillery Regiment, and
Lieut. Henry H. Metcalf commanded the detachment of “C” Battery of
the Heavy Artillery of Rhode Island. With the deployment of his third and
nal infantry brigade, Seymour still attempted his original plan to secure
either ank of an artillery unit with infantry regiments, allowing for a third
maneuver unit to ank the enemy. The New York brigade began to fall
126
Figure 3.12. Montgomery Deploys. Map courtesy of Christopher Lydick.
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
Farm
Structures
Slave
cabins
0 200 400 600 800
Yards
N
Stand 7a: Montgomery Deploys
1st NC (35th USCT) relieves
Barton’s right flank, allowing
him to retire in good order.
54th MA relieves the left
flank of Barton’s brigade and
allows for their withdrawal.
Rebel ammunition begins to
run low while Montgomery
deploys his brigade.
Portions of Henry and
Hawley’s commands take up
reserve positions to help
facilitate US withdrawal.
US forces retiring after
col
lapse of US left flank.
Finegan’s remaining reserve
regiments deploy to take up
reserve positions.
Captured US guns.
Open field.
Battle of Olustee
Montgomery deploys his
force, allowing Barton’s
brigade to retire as Rebel
troops push back against US
forces before beginning to
run low on ammunition.
Hawley and Henry organize
a rear guard reserve for
Montgomery.
47th NY
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
Rebel Cav
(Scott)
6th GA
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Guerard’s
Art
48th NY
115th NY
7th CT
(Res)
US
Forces
(retiring)
1st NC
(35th USCT)
1st GA
Reg
23rd GA
6th FL
32nd
GA
Wheaton’s
Art
54th MA
Guerard’s
Art
27th GA
1st FL
Bonaud
Bn
1
4
5
6
2
3
7
1
2
4
3
5
6
7
8
8
Upland Forests / Grasslands
Wetlands / Swamps
127
back for lack of ammunition and due to intensity of enemy re just as the
1st North Carolina moved up to support.
The 54th Massachusetts lled the hole left by the broken 8th USCT.
The 54th Massachusetts deployed under re, struggling to steady its
lines and contain the enemy’s attempts to extend their lines and envelop
the entire line, capitalizing on the retreat of the 8th USCT. The Massa-
chusetts infantry moved to the front for over a mile at the double-time, a
jog in full gear with shouldered arms, through swamps and directly into
the re of the enemy as they secured a ank that had been forced open
by the breaking of the 8th USCT. Hallowell received a courier message
from one of Seymour’s aides, “For God’s sake, Colonel, double-quick
or the day is lost!”
66
With esprit, they faced the enemy and matched the
secessionist’s intense and sustained re. Calling out as they advanced,
“Three cheers for Massachusetts and seven dollars a month!,” the 54th
Massachusetts exemplied their strong élan even in ghting for seven
dollars a month pay when white infantry regiments received ten dollars
a month.
67
This advance occurred under erce volleys from the now re-
inforced, resupplied, advancing secessionists. There were times that the
54th’s ocers and NCOs had to restrain their soldiers from advancing
out of courage and to maintain a disciplined line of battle, anchored on
the much abused US artillery that was over-extend for the duration of
the battle.
The 1st North Carolina came up in time to cover the New Yorker’s
retreat, itself taking heavy casualties, especially among its leadership with
both the regimental commander, Reed, and the second-in-command Major
Bogle becoming casualties. As they absorbed the blows, the 54th Massa-
chusetts held its ground, exchanging re with the secessionist, but strug-
gled as the only regiment to hold the entire left ank as more enemy units
extended the line around its ank.
The departure of the New Yorkers, giving the open farmer’s eld
to the enemy opened the 1st North Carolina’s ank to enemy re, and
they were forced to defend the extreme right ank of the US position
from encirclement. The re began to slacken as both sides began to
run low on ammunition and the critical moment of logistical planning
emerged as the furiously ring infantry of both sides needed ammuni-
tion resupply.
As the afternoon wore on, the US lines were struggling to maintain or-
der under punishing re. The infantry rate of re was taking its toll on the
discipline and the ammunition supplies of both sides. Hawley’s advanced
128
force, the 7th Connecticut Infantry retreated due to lack of ammunition,
followed by the New York brigade retreating under pressure and depleting
their ammunition, while the secessionist continually sent back for more
ammunition. Before Montgomery’s brigade stabilized the situation, more
enemy units arrived on the battleeld replacing the regiments out of am-
munition, allowing units with exhausted ammunition to bide their time for
the resupply while the secessionist line as a whole maintained a steady
rate of re. The US forces had no respite as the secessionist rotated forc-
es, waiting on resupply while the reinforcements picked up the slackened
re. As secessionist units ran out of ammunition, they retreated just as re-
placements came up to take their place. When the 54th Massachusetts ran
low on ammunition, they received the wrong caliber ammunition in their
resupply and were forced to retreat.
Harrison recalled along his portion of the secessionist line, “It was
whispered down the line…that our ammunition was failing and no ord-
nance train in sight.” However, a nal resupply of ammunition arrived
along with more reinforcements, giving an overwhelming re superi-
ority, allowing them to threaten a full envelopment of the US line. At
this point Seymour issued the orders for a full withdrawal back east
from the eld.
Vignettes
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, com-
mander US forces at Olustee, 25 March 1864:
Barton’s brigade, close at hand, was now formed on the
ground occupied by the Seventh New Hampshire, and the Fif-
ty-fourth Massachusetts had replaced the Eight US Colored
Troops and a rapid re was opened, the inuence of which
was soon visible. The left of the enemy’s line was forced
backward, and in the hope of still eecting my original in-
tention, the First North Carolina was brought up to the right
of Barton’s brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel Reed in the most
brilliant manner. The entire force was hotly engaged save the
cavalry…Lieutenant-Colonel Reed was mortally wounded
while managing his regiment with conspicuous skill, and his
major (Bogle) was severely hurt.
The colored troops behaved creditably—the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts and the First North Carolina like veterans.
It was not in their conduct that can be found the chief cause
of failure.
68
129
Cone’s
Head
Swamp
Farm
Structures
Slave
cabins
0 200 400 600 800
Yards
N
Stand 7b: US Retreats
1st NC (35th USCT) slowly
giving ground and retiring
following Barton’s
withdrawal.
54th MA slowly giving
ground and retiring
following Barton’s
withdrawal.
Portions of Henry and
Hawley’s commands in
reserve positions to help
facilitate US withdrawal.
Rebel left flank swings to
the right to engage the right
flank of Montgomery’s
brigade.
Finegan orders his re-
maining reserves for
ward to
engage Montgomery’s
brigade.
Captured US guns.
Open field.
Battle of Olustee
Montgomery’s troops hold.
Rebel left wheels right
pressing Montgomery’s
forces on two sides. At dusk
the battle ends.
Rebel Cav
(Clinch)
Rebel Cav
(McCormick)
US Cav
(Henry)
Rebel Cav
(Scott)
64th GA
28th GA
19th GA
Guerard’s
Art
7th CT
(Res)
US
Forces
(retiring)
1st NC
35th USCT
1st GA
Reg
23rd GA
6th FL
Wheaton’s
Art
54th MA
Guerard’s
Art
27th GA
1st FL
Bonaud
Bn
4
5
6
2
3
1
2
4
3
5
6
US
Forces
(retiring)
US
Forces
(retiring)
6th GA
Upland Forests / Grasslands
Wetlands / Swamps
7
1
7
Figure 3.13.US Retreats. Map courtesy of Christopher Lydick.
130
Excerpt from the ocial report of Col. Edward Hallowell, commander
54th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1 March 1864:
It marched in charge of wagon train to Olustee at which place
the train was stopped and the regiment moved forward at the
double-quick about 2 miles, where it was formed in line be-
tween the railroad and dirt road, under a sharp re from the
enemy. In this formation it advanced some 200 yards through
a swamp, driving the enemy from some guns and checking
the advance of a column of the enemy’s infantry. After ring
about 20,000 cartridges, the men of the regiment were ordered
to retreat…A new line was formed on the right of the dirt road
where the regiment stayed till after dark, when it as ordered,
through Colonel Barton, to march back.
69
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt, com-
mander secessionist First Brigade, 26 February 1864:
After our line had advanced about one-quarter of a mile the
engagement became general and the ground was stubbornly
contested. With two batteries of artillery immediately in our
front and a long line of infantry strongly supported, the enemy
stood their ground for some time until the Sixth Florida Bat-
talion, on the right ank and all the troops in front pressing
steadily forward, compelled them to fall back and leave ve
pieces of artillery in our possession. At this time, our ammu-
nition beginning to fail, I ordered the commanding ocers to
halt their regiments and hold their respective positions until
a fresh supply could be brought from the ordnance wagons,
which, after much delay, had arrived upon the eld.
Major Bonaud’s battalion came upon the eld, followed
soon after by the Twenty-seventh Georgia Regiment and the
First Florida Battalion. These troops were put in position
near the center of the line and a little in advance, to hold the
enemy in check until the other commands could be supplied
with cartridges. As soon as this was accomplished I ordered
a general advance.
70
Excerpt from the ocial report of Col. George Harrison, commander
secessionist Second Brigade, 22 February 1864:
In about this position the eld was hotly contested by both
parties for about an hour, when the enemy gave way slowly
before the close pressure of our gallant men…but soon a new
131
line of the enemy appeared and our advance was checked. His
resistance now seemed more stubborn than before for more
than twenty minutes when the enemy sullenly gave back a
little…It was whispered down the line…that our ammunition
was failing and no ordnance train in sight. This I immedi-
ately reported to General Colquitt, who urged that we hold
our ground, stating that ammunition would certainly reach
us directly. This…was heroically complied with by my com-
mand, many of them for fteen or twenty minutes standing
their ground without a round of ammunition. Seeing the criti-
cal position of aairs, I dismounted myself, placed one of my
sta whose horse had been disabled upon mine, who, together
with the remainder of my sta and couriers, was employed in
conveying ammunition from a train of cars some half mile or
more distant…By several trips they succeeded in supplying
sucient ammunition to our line to enable the reopening of
a rapid and eective re, before which the enemy had com-
menced to retire slowly, still keeping up their re upon us...
Under instructions from General Colquitt I now threw forward
the Sixth and Thirty-second Georgia Regiments…to ank the
enemy upon their right, which movement succeeded admira-
ble, for soon their right was exposed to a cross-re, which told
upon their ranks with ne eect. A general advance of our line
now drove the enemy, who retreated, at rst sullenly, but now
precipitately, before our victorious arms for some miles.
71
Analysis
• How did Seymour’s employment of his reserve brigade embody
the principles of a reserve?
• What factors explain the performance of Montgomery’s Afri-
can-American regiments in comparison with the 8th USCT’s per-
formance?
• What factors led to Seymour’s decisions to disengage his forces?
• Compare and contrast secessionist ammunition management with
that of the US Army.
• Evaluate the secessionist tactics. Were Colquitt’s employment of
his units sound or just lucky in their results against this particular
opponent?
132
• What risks did Colquitt face in the switch to the oensive? How
did he balance or mitigate these?
• How did the combatants at Olustee apply, or attempt to apply, te-
nets such as simultaneity, synchronization, and exibility?
133
Stand 8: Secessionist Pursuit, US Retreat, and Aftermath (re-
ported at 1800, 20 February–0200, 21 February 1864)
Directions: To Stand Eight, walk directly north approximately 75
yards to the Olustee Battleeld Monument formation near the Visitor’s
Center.
Orientation: The Olustee Battleeld Monument marks a good spot to
turn and facing northeast down US-90, orients well the direction of the US
Army retreat and the stuttering secessionist pursuit.
Description: As the full US retreat commenced, secessionist com-
mand and control broke down in confusion and attempts to pursue. Or-
ders issued by Finegan, who now arrived at the battleeld, clashed with
orders issued by Colquitt, who had controlled the tactical battle for most
of the day. Finegan acquiesced to Colquitt’s experience, rescinding his
commands to pursue the US forces in light of his soldiers’ fatigue, lack of
food and water, and the growing darkness.
The cavalry under Colonel Smith still received multiple orders from
Finegan to maintain contact and pressure on the retreating US soldiers,
Figure 3.14. Pursuit, Retreat, and Aftermath. Graphics courtesy of Army Universi-
ty Press Sta.
to
Jacksonville
Cedar
Creek
Ocean
Pond
Georgia
Florida
St. Marys
River
1
2
4
US Army passes through
Sanderson (9 February /
8 miles from Olustee).
Secessionists pursuit ends
3 miles from Olustee.
US Army passes through
Barbers / St. Marys
overnight (20‒21 February).
Wounded are loaded on
mule-hauled railcars.
US Army wounded hauled
by one locomotive at
Baldwin, 11 miles from
Barbers / St. Marys.
Continue moving to
Jacksonville, additional
22 miles. Secessionists
reoc
cupy Barbers (23
February) then Baldwin
(24 February). By then
the US Army was part of
Jacksonville defenses.
.
3
Florida Atlantic &
Gulf Central Railroad
Baldwin
Barbers
Sanderson
Lake City
Olustee
Depot
3
2
4
1
Stand 8: Pursuit, Retreat, and Aftermath
N
Olustee
Battlefield
134
however, these orders in confusion with Colquitt’s orders for the general
pursuit to end, meant that even the cavalry failed to pursue and harass the
retreating US Army. The 5th Florida Cavalry arrived on the eld late and
in disrepair from their long march, man and beast too weary to make any
major contribution to the ght. Once the meeting engagement turned into
a general ght, neither side utilized its cavalry, instead relegating them
to sparring on the extreme anks. Seymour did employ Henry’s mounted
forces to screen the retreat. Smith defended his actions by highlighting the
general confusion of the pursuit, reports later proved false of the US forc-
es setting up ambushes, other instances of rumored friendly re between
the secessionist infantry and the Smith’s mounted soldiers and the general
diculty of operating at night after a near full day of ghting.
On the US side, they saw their retreat as organized. They suered from
unfounded reports of pursing secessionists, spurring Seymour to push his
forces back to the safety of Jacksonville, stopping only to gather supplies
and destroy what they could not take with them. In the end, the pursuit
reached where the US stopped on the rst night of their retreat, by which
time the US forces had reached the safety of Jacksonville.
Even though it was a clear defeat and terminated the ambitious Flor-
ida Expedition of 1864, the expedition had not been a total disaster for
the US, even if its dening battle was a defeat. The expedition destroyed
various supplies through upper-central Florida in excess of one million
dollars, disrupted normal shipments of goods to the secessionist armies
to the north, recruited over a hundred slaves both damaging secession-
ist-Florida economy and adding to the US Army’s African-American reg-
imental manpower, captured a couple of hundred prisoners, inspired even
more to defect, and seized eight cannons. However, they did fail to restore
Florida in time to count towards the election of 1864, and suered signif-
icant casualties and ve cannons lost at Olustee. Although Barton’s New
Yorkers suered the worse brigade casualties and his own 47th New York
Infantry Regiment suered the highest ocially reported raw casualties at
313, one analysis claims the 8th USCT loss was the third worse regimental
proportional loss suered in the war during one engagement with 310 to-
tal casualties.
72
Total US Army losses initially reported by Seymour were
55 ocers and 1,806 soldiers, killed, wounded or missing.
73
Secessionist
losses reported initially after the battle by Brigadier General Finegan were
53 killed, 841 wounded, mostly only slightly.
74
In the end, the secessionists held Florida, containing the US forces
to its enclaves along the coastlines. By May of 1864, two-thirds of the
soldiers from both sides who had been sent to Florida had been removed
135
to other theaters, and Florida had returned to a sideshow theater until the
conclusion of the war.
Vignettes
Excerpt from the ocial report of Capt. Benjamin Skinner, acting
commander 7th Connecticut Infantry, 25 February 1864:
Soon after this the engagement closed though we took position
in line two or three times. I was directed by Colonel Hawley
to report to Colonel Barton, of the Forty-eight Regiment New
York Volunteers, which I accordingly did, and by his direction
deployed 125 of my men as rear guard for the army (which
had now left the eld), making a line of nearly half a mile in
length, a body of our cavalry being behind me. I occupied this
relative position and marched in this manner until I reached
Barber’s Ford, for a distance of about 18 miles from the bat-
tle-eld, when I marched my command onto the same ground
that it had occupied before leaving Barber’s Ford the morning
before, my men having marched a distance of 36 miles, 18 of
which was marched without rest and over bad ground, many
swamps, ditches, pickets, and fences intervened to obstruct
my march.
75
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan, com-
manding secessionist forces at Olustee, 26 February 1864:
They contest the ground stubbornly, and the battle lasted for
four and a half hours. At the end of this time, the enemy’s
lines having been broken and reformed several times, and two
ne, Napoleon and three 10-pounder Parrott guns and one set
of colors captured from them, they gave way entirely, and
were closely pressed for 3 miles until night-fall. I directed
Brigadier-General Colquitt to continue the pursuit, intending
to occupy Sanderson that night; but in deference to his sug-
gestion of the fatigue of the troops, the absence of rations,
and the disadvantages of pursuit in the dark, and in conse-
quence of a report from an advanced cavalry picket that the
enemy had halted for the night and taken a position (which
was subsequently ascertained to be incorrect), I withdrew the
order. During the continuance of the battle, also after the en-
emy had given way, I sent repeated orders to Colonel Smith,
commanding cavalry, to press the enemy on his anks and to
continue in the pursuit. But through some misapprehension
136
these orders failed to be executed by him, and only two small
companies on the left, and these but for a short distance, fol-
lowed the enemy.
The enemy retreated that night, hastily and in some confu-
sion, to Sanderson, leaving a large number of their killed and
wounded in our possession on the eld. Their loss in killed,
both oces and men, was large.
The victory was complete and the enemy retired in rapid re-
treat, evacuating in quick succession Barber’s and Baldwin,
and falling back on Jacksonville. The enemy’s forces were
under command of Brig. Gen. T. Seymour, who was present
on the eld.
76
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, com-
manding US forces at Olustee, 25 March 1864:
[T]he troops were withdrawn in perfect order from Sanderson
and then to Saint Mary’s, Colonel Henry’s cavalry, supported
by the Seventh Connecticut, serving as rear guard. From loss
of horse alone, I was compelled to leave six guns on the eld,
and a small portion of the badly wounded were left in the
power of the enemy from the insucient means to remove
them.
The losses had been heavy, particularly among superior of-
cers... A losing battle received little praise, but ocers and
men, nevertheless, often display soldierly qualities far beyond
those that are brought out by success. The conduct of Colo-
nel Barton’s brigades was glorious, and I cannot too highly
comment the pertinacity with which it held to its work…The
colored troops behaved creditably—the Fifty-fourth Massa-
chusetts and the First North Carolina like veterans. It was not
in their conduct that can be found the chief cause of failure,
but in the unanticipated yielding of a white regiment from
which there was every reason to expect noble service, and at a
moment when everything depended upon its rmness.
77
Analysis
• What type of engagement characteristics does Olustee mani-
fest—a meeting engagement, movement to contact, a spoiling at-
tack, or something else?
137
• Why did both armies suer proportionally high percentage of ca-
sualties?
• Were the explanations for the lackluster secessionist pursuit valid?
What could have made the pursuit more successful?
• How did the competency of the leadership at various levels inu-
ence the battle?
• How successful was the US Army in achieving the expedition’s
goals even though defeated at Olustee?
• What impacts did the Florida Expedition of 1864 have on the war
in general?
139
Stand 8b: Secessionist Pursuit, US Retreat, and Aftermath
Directions: Depart the historic battleeld park, traveling east on
US-90. At or near 13966 US-90, Sanderson. FL 32087 / 30° 15.057′ N,
82° 16.157′ W), the historical marker is on US-90, on the left when trav-
eling east.
Orientation: 8 miles to west is the Olustee battleeld, beyond that
west another 16 miles is Lake City, the main railroad hub targeted by the
US expedition and prized for transportation by the Florida secessionist. A
further 39 miles east down US-90, the old north Florida roadway is Jack-
sonville, the main port and concentration of US forces in northern Florida.
Sanderson, much like Jacksonville, changed hands multiple times during
the course of the war. First, a secessionist camp and depot, then taken by
Henry’s mounted force (see Stand 2a: Henry’s Mounted Raids for more
commentary), then retaken after Olustee by Finegan’s forces, who held
it for the remainder of the war as a supply depot and camp for the forces
that kept the US Army enclave at Jacksonville isolated. Overnight on 21
February 1864, the ground hardened and froze from the drop in weather.
Figure 3.15. Pursuit, Retreat, and Aftermath. Graphics courtesy of Army Universi-
ty Press Sta.
to
Jacksonville
Cedar
Creek
Ocean
Pond
Georgia
Florida
St. Marys
River
1
2
4
US Army passes through
Sanderson (9 February /
8 miles from Olustee).
Secessionists pursuit ends
3 miles from Olustee.
US Army passes through
Barbers / St. Marys
overnight (20‒21 February).
Wounded are loaded on
mule-hauled railcars.
US Army wounded hauled
by one locomotive at
Baldwin, 11 miles from
Barbers / St. Marys.
Continue moving to
Jacksonville, additional
22 miles. Secessionists
reoc
cupy Barbers (23
February) then Baldwin
(24 February). By then
the US Army was part of
Jacksonville defenses.
.
3
Florida Atlantic &
Gulf Central Railroad
Baldwin
Barbers
Sanderson
Lake City
Olustee
Depot
3
2
4
1
Stand 8: Pursuit, Retreat, and Aftermath
N
Olustee
Battlefield
140
Description: As the full US retreat commenced, secessionist com-
mand and control broke down in confusion and attempts to pursue. Or-
ders issued by Finegan, who now arrived at the battleeld, clashed with
orders issued by Colquitt, who had controlled the tactical battle for most
of the day. Finegan acquiesced to Colquitt’s experience, rescinding his
commands to pursue the US forces in light of his soldiers’ fatigue, lack of
food and water, and the growing darkness.
The cavalry under Colonel Smith still received multiple orders from
Finegan to maintain contact and pressure on the retreating US soldiers,
however, these orders in confusion with Colquitt’s orders for the general
pursuit to end, meant that even the cavalry failed to pursue and harass the
retreating US Army. The 5th Florida Cavalry arrived on the eld late and
in disrepair from their long march, man and beast too weary to make any
major contribution to the ght. Once the meeting engagement turned into
a general ght, neither side utilized its cavalry, instead relegating them
to sparring on the extreme anks. Seymour did employ Henry’s mounted
forces to screen the retreat. Smith defended his actions by highlighting the
general confusion of the pursuit, reports later proved false of the US forc-
es setting up ambushes, other instances of rumored friendly re between
the secessionist infantry and the Smith’s mounted soldiers and the general
diculty of operating at night after a near full day of ghting.
On the US side, they saw their retreat as organized. They suered from
unfounded reports of pursing secessionists, spurring Seymour to push his
forces back to the safety of Jacksonville, stopping only to gather supplies
and destroy what they could not take with them. In the end, the pursuit
reached where the US stopped on the rst night of their retreat, by which
time the US forces had reached the safety of Jacksonville.
Even though it was a clear defeat and terminated the ambitious Florida
Expedition of 1864, the expedition had not been a total disaster for the
US, even if its dening battle was a defeat. The expedition destroyed var-
ious supplies through upper-central Florida in excess of one million dol-
lars, disrupted normal shipments of goods to the secessionist armies to the
north, recruited over a hundred slaves both damaging secessionist-Flori-
da economy and adding to the US Army’s African-American regimental
manpower, captured a couple of hundred prisoners, inspired even more to
defect, and seized eight cannons. However, they did fail to restore Florida
in time to count towards the election of 1864, and suered nearly signif-
icant casualties and ve cannons lost at Olustee. Although Barton’s New
Yorkers suered the worse brigade casualties and his own 47th New York
Infantry Regiment suered the highest ocially reported raw casualties
141
at 313, one analysis claims the 8th USCT loss was the third worse regi-
mental proportional loss suered in the war during one engagement with
310 total casualties.
78
Total US Army losses initially reported by Seymour
were fty-ve ocers and 1,806 soldiers, killed, wounded or missing.
79
Secessionist losses reported initially after the battle by Brigadier General
Finegan were 53 killed, 841 wounded, mostly only slightly.
80
At the close of the expedition, the secessionists held Middle Florida,
containing the US forces to its enclaves along the coastlines. By May of
1864, two-thirds of the soldiers from both sides who had been sent to
Florida had been removed to other theaters, and Florida had returned to a
sideshow theater until the conclusion of the war.
Vignettes
Excerpt from the ocial report of Capt. Benjamin Skinner, acting
commander 7th Connecticut Infantry, 25 February 1864:
Soon after this the engagement closed though we took position
in line two or three times. I was directed by Colonel Hawley
to report to Colonel Barton, of the Forty-eight Regiment New
York Volunteers, which I accordingly did, and by his direction
deployed 125 of my men as rear guard for the army (which
had now left the eld), making a line of nearly half a mile in
length, a body of our cavalry being behind me. I occupied this
relative position and marched in this manner until I reached
Barber’s Ford, for a distance of about 18 miles from the bat-
tle-eld, when I marched my command onto the same ground
that it had occupied before leaving Barber’s Ford the morning
before, my men having marched a distance of 36 miles, 18 of
which was marched without rest and over bad ground, many
swamps, ditches, pickets, and fences intervened to obstruct
my march.
81
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan, com-
manding secessionist forces at Olustee, 26 February 1864:
They contest the ground stubbornly, and the battle lasted for
four and a half hours. At the end of this time, the enemy’s
lines having been broken and reformed several times, and two
ne, Napoleon and three 10-pounder Parrott guns and one set
of colors captured from them, they gave way entirely, and
were closely pressed for 3 miles until night-fall. I directed
Brigadier-General Colquitt to continue the pursuit, intending
to occupy Sanderson that night; but in deference to his sug-
142
gestion of the fatigue of the troops, the absence of rations,
and the disadvantages of pursuit in the dark, and in conse-
quence of a report from an advanced cavalry picket that the
enemy had halted for the night and taken a position (which
was subsequently ascertained to be incorrect), I withdrew the
order. During the continuance of the battle, also after the en-
emy had given way, I sent repeated orders to Colonel Smith,
commanding cavalry, to press the enemy on his anks and to
continue in the pursuit. But through some misapprehension
these orders failed to be executed by him, and only two small
companies on the left, and these but for a short distance, fol-
lowed the enemy.
The enemy retreated that night, hastily and in some confu-
sion, to Sanderson, leaving a large number of their killed and
wounded in our possession on the eld. Their loss in killed,
both oces and men, was large.
The victory was complete and the enemy retired in rapid re-
treat, evacuating in quick succession Barber’s and Baldwin,
and falling back on Jacksonville. The enemy’s forces were
under command of Brig. Gen. T. Seymour, who was present
on the eld.
82
Excerpt from Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard’s report, 25 March 1864:
Everything indicates that the rout of the enemy at Ocean
Pond, or Olustee, was complete; nevertheless, the fruits of the
victory were comparatively insignicant, and mainly because
of the ineciency of the ocer commanding the cavalry at
the time, in consequence of whose lack of energy and capacity
for the service no serious attempt was made to pursue with his
command, while the exhaustion of the infantry, so gallantly
and eectively handled and engaged, and our want of subsis-
tence supplies and ammunition, made an immediate pursuit
by them impracticable.”
83
Excerpt from the ocial report of Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, com-
manding US forces at Olustee, 25 March 1864:
The troops were withdrawn in perfect order from Sanderson
and then to Saint Mary’s, Colonel Henry’s cavalry, support-
ed by the Seventh Connecticut, serving as rear guard. From
loss of horse alone, I was compelled to leave six guns on the
eld, and a small portion of the badly wounded were left
143
in the power of the enemy from the insucient means to
remove them.
The losses had been heavy, particularly among superior of-
cers... A losing battle received little praise, but ocers and
men, nevertheless, often display soldierly qualities far beyond
those that are brought out by success. The conduct of Colo-
nel Barton’s brigades was glorious, and I cannot too highly
comment the pertinacity with which it held to its work…The
colored troops behaved creditably—the Fifty-fourth Massa-
chusetts and the First North Carolina like veterans. It was not
in their conduct that can be found the chief cause of failure,
but in the unanticipated yielding of a white regiment from
which there was every reason to expect noble service, and at a
moment when everything depended upon its rmness.
84
Analysis
• Were the explanations for the lackluster secessionist pursuit valid?
What could have made the pursuit more successful?
• What may have contributed to the dierence in risk assessment
between Smith, Colquitt, and Finegan for the pursuit?
• How did the competency of the leadership at various levels inu-
ence the battle?
• How successful was the US Army in achieving the expedition’s
goals even though defeated at Olustee?
• How should the secessionist characterize their results: tactically,
operationally, and strategically?
• What impacts did the Florida Expedition of 1864 have on the war
in general?
144
Endnotes
1. Christopher Lydick, interview by author, phone conversation, 30 July
2021.
2. William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Oluste (The Univer-
sity of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, 1990, 19.
3. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 121-122.
4. War of the Rebellion: A Compilaon of the Ocial Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Oce, 1880-
1901, (Hereafter cited as ORA), Volume 35, Part 1, 279.
5. ORA, Volume 35, Part 1, 279.
6. ORA, Volume 35, Part 1, 280.
7. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 284.
8. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 285-286.
9. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 322.
10. Christopher Lydick, interview by author, phone conversation, 30 July
2021.
11. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 121-122.
12. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 278.
13. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 279.
14. ORA, Volume 35, Part 1, 279.
15. ORA, Volume 35, Part 1, 280.
16. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 284.
17. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 284-285.
18. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 285-286.
19. Christopher Lydick, interview by author, phone conversation, 30 July
2021.
20. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 19.
21. Nulty, 121-122.
22. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 324-325.
23. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 322.
24. ORA, Volume 35, Part 1, 280.
25. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 284.
26. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 285-286.
27. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 281.
28. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 281-282.
29. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 296-297.
30. William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstrucon in Florida
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), 286-287.
31. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 309.
32. Letter from Private Milton Woodford to his wife, dated 23 February
1864, reproduced in Vaughn D. Bornet and Milton M. Woodford. “A Connecti-
cut Yankee Fights at Olustee: Letters from the Front,” The Florida Historical
Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 3 (January 1949), 246.
145
33. Letter from Private Milton Woodford to his wife, dated 23 February
1864, Bornet and Woodford. “A Connecticut Yankee Fights,” 246.
34. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 343.
35. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 352.
36. Letter from Private Milton Woodford to his wife, dated 23 February
1864, Bornet and Woodford. “A Connecticut Yankee Fights,” 246 and Letter
from Private Milton Woodford to Brother Johnson dated 27 February 1864,
Bornet and Woodford. “A Connecticut Yankee Fights,” 256.
37. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 130, 135.
38. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 308.
39. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 343.
40. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 307-308.
41. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 288.
42. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 341.
43. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 303.
44. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 304.
45. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 311.
46. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 308.
47. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 298.
48. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 290.
49. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 343.
50. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 303-304.
51. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 311.
52. Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War,
1862-1865 (Little, Brown and Company: New York, 1998), 141-143.
53. Oliver Willcox Norton, Army Leers 1861-1865 (O.L. Deming: Chica-
go, 1903), 199
54.ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 312-314.
55. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 312-314.
56. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 312.
57. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 311-312.
58. Norton, Army Leers 1861-1865, 202.
59. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 341.
60. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 302.
61. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 298.
62. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 301.
63. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 343-344.
64. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 341.
65. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt 1, 315.
66. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 315.
67. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 158.
68. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 289-290.
69. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 315.
70. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 344.
71. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 349-350.
146
72. Hondon B. Hargrove, Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War (McFarland
and Company: Jeerson, 1988), 166.
73. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 289.
74. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 333.
75. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 308-309.
76. ORA, Vol. 25, Pt. 1, 332-333.
77. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 289-290.
78. Hargrove, Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War, 166.
79. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 289.
80. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 333.
81. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 308-309.
82. ORA, Vol. 25, Pt. 1, 332-333.
83. ORA, Vol. 35, Pt. 1, 323.
84. ORA, Part 1, Volume 35, 289-290.
147
Part IV
Integration
Introduction
As this handbook has previously emphasized, a sta ride consists of
three phases. The rst phase is the “Preliminary Study Phase.” Completing
this phase before the visit to the battleeld prepares the students for the
visit. The second phase is the “Field Study Phase.” This phase conduct-
ed on the battleeld and enables students to understand historical events
through analysis of the actual terrain. The nal phase of a sta ride is
the “Integration Phase.” No sta ride is complete without an integration
phase, because it is critical for the students to understand what happened,
why it happened, and, most importantly, what can be learned from the
study of the battle or campaign.
There are several factors that the sta ride leader should consider
when planning for, and conducting, the integration phase. First, the leader
must work with the organization that is participating in the ride and select
a time and location for the integration session. Occasionally, units may
have to depart shortly after the last stand of the eld phase, and the sta
ride leader must conduct the integration phase on the battleeld imme-
diately after completing the eld study phase. However, when possible,
students should have some time for personal reection and thought before
the integration phase. Thus, the integration phase is best if conducted the
day after the eld study phase ends. Even if you cannot wait an extra day,
it is best to do the integration session at a location dierent from the last
stand, a place comfortable and dry that will encourage open discussion
from all the participants.
The sta ride leader should organize the integration phase based on
the unit, time available, and intended training objectives. The leader can
conduct the integration phase in a format similar to an after action re-
view (AAR), or may simply lead a discussion with participants on what
they learned. You can have specic students brief particular items, or just
have an open discussion with minimal structure. It is important to keep in
mind that the integration phase is not an AAR of the ride itself (i.e., ways
to improve the ride). While it is useful to seek constructive criticism in
order to continue to improve the ride, this should be done at another time
or perhaps with written AAR comments. Instead, the integration phase is
for the students of the campaign to integrate their preliminary study with
the eldwork to gain insights that are relevant to their current duties and
148
enhance their professional development. Whatever method the sta ride
leader chooses to employ, the most important thing to remember is that the
participants should do the majority of the talking.
One method that often produces a fruitful integration phase is to con-
duct the session in three parts based on three broad questions. Sometimes,
the leader need only present the general question and let others carry the
conversation, or the leader may have to ask more follow-up questions to
prod the discussion. Each of the three questions is discussed below.
What aspects of the campaign had you developed in the preliminary
study phase that changed or were strongly reinforced because of your
study of the ground?
This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to a sta
ride, otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. Of
course, students may develop a wide range of answers based on personal
study and observations in the eld. Some of the more popular aspects of
the discussion of terrain for the Battle of Olustee include the utilization
and placement of artillery and the resulting lack of eectiveness, the role
of maneuver in open terrain of close-ranked infantry and the lackluster
pursuit and utilization of mounted forces in the battle. The sta ride lead-
er can ask a related question, which may also generate good discussion:
Did seeing the terrain alter your opinion of any of the leaders and their
decisions?
What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have re-
mained the same since the Olustee battle?
The answers to the “changed” aspects will probably seem more obvi-
ous to the modern military professional and often related to technology.
This may include changes in weapons, communications, and numerous
other pieces of equipment. The aspects that have “remained the same” may
not seem as numerous at rst, but the students will often build on some
initial answers and nd many good items. The role of key personalities;
the importance of intelligence; the need for strong, positive leadership and
an ability to motivate soldiers; the importance of maneuverability; warrior
ethos; element of surprise; courage; and fear are just some of the items
of warfare that seem to have changed little since 1864. Depending on the
group, you may want to ask a few more focused questions. For example,
if you have an infantry unit, you can ask the following: What aspects of a
movement to contact have changed and what aspects have remained the
same? What insights can the modern military professional gain from the
Olustee Battle that remain relevant today?
149
Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast number
of arenas. Once again, the type of unit participating in the sta ride might
help to guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit
might focus the commander’s situational awareness, intelligence gather-
ing, and the importance of reconnaissance.
These concepts are suggestions; the sta ride leader may use some of
them, use another framework, or simply let the students take the discus-
sion in whatever direction they want.
The suggested integration phase questions are to aid in sparking dis-
cussion, not to provide hard and fast “rules” of warfare. Note that the
handbook provides examples of possible answers to the questions, but it
does not attempt to provide a list of “right” answers. The sta ride lead-
er should take time before the session to write down his or her own an-
swers to these questions to have some potential ideas to generate student
discussion. At the same time, the sta ride leader should strive for the
participants to develop their own answers, and thus be prepared to let the
discussion roam many dierent paths.
151
Part V
Support
1. Information and assistance
a. The Sta Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, can provide advice and assistance on every aspect of the sta ride.
The Sta Ride Team may also provide facilitators to lead an Olustee Battle
Sta Ride. Visit the Combat Studies Institute website for information on
obtaining sta ride assistance and/or leadership. Sta Ride Team support
includes background information, detailed knowledge of the battle and
battleeld, and familiarity with the Olustee battleeld area.
Address: Combat Studies Institute Sta Ride Team
ATTN: ATZL-CSH
290 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Telephone: Commercial: (913) 684-2131
Website: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Education-
al-Services/Sta-Ride-Team-Oerings/
Email: usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.armyu-aup-srt@
mail.mil.
b. The Olustee Battle Sta Ride takes place on a Florida Historic State
Park. It is important to contact the sta of the park and let them know you
are conducting a sta ride. Olustee Battleeld Historic State Park does
have a visitor’s center on the premises.
Address: Olustee Battleeld Visitor Center
5890 Battleeld Trail Road
Olustee, Florida 32087
Telephone: Olustee Battleeld Visitor Center
(386) 758-0400
Website: http://www.oridastateparks.org/olusteebattleeld/
152
2. Logistics
a. Meals. There are many restaurants in Jacksonville and Lake City
area that are convenient to hotel locations, if lodging is a consideration,
and should take care of breakfast and dinner. Lunch can either be a box
lunch carried on the vehicles or you can eat at nearby restaurants, although
options can be limited along portions of I-10 and US 90 between Jackson-
ville and Lake City. Dependent on longevity of time on site, there are pic-
nic areas at the primary sta ride location, the Olustee Battleeld Historic
State Park.
b. Lodging. Groups can nd many hotels in the Jacksonville or Lake
City area if travel time requires they remain overnight. If the group wants
to cut down on lodging costs, there are many military bases in Florida, but
most are not as conveniently located as the hotels.
c. Travel. If the group is ying to the area, the Jacksonville airport is
the most convenient to use. Once on the ground, larger groups will need
to contract for a bus—make sure it has a microphone and public address
system as well as a restroom. Smaller groups (less than 20) might nd it
easier for parking and maneuvering to use rental vans.
3. Other considerations
a. A reconnaissance of the stands and route just prior to execution of
the ride is imperative for a successful sta ride.
b. Ensure that every member of the group has water. Additionally,
Olustee Battleeld Historic State Park has public restrooms. Plan for ad-
equate use of these facilities.
c. Ensure that your group has proper clothing for inclement weather.
Thunderstorms can occur in any season. Signicant walking is required at
the Olustee Battleeld State Historic Park. Comfortable boots or hiking
shoes are recommended. We recommend that you do not wear sandals or
running shoes.
d. Mosquitoes, ants, chiggers, ticks, and other insects are prevalent
from March to October, so insect repellent is advised. Poison ivy is also
present in some of the more remote areas o the preserved site.
e. Road trac and construction in Jacksonville and immediate sub-
urbs can be heavy along normal urban schedules, once outside of the city
center further west on I-10 to US 90 trac lightens during approach to
Olustee Battleeld Historic State Park.
153
Appendix A
Order of Battle (Olustee, 20 February 1864)
1. US Army Forces
Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, Commanding
Col. Joseph Hawley, the lead brigade, commanding
Capt. Benjamin F. Skinner, 7th Connecticut Infantry Regiment
Col. Joseph C. Abbott, 7th New Hampshire Infantry Regiment
Col. Charles W. Fribley, 8th United States Colored Troops
Capt. John Hamilton, “E” Battery, 3rd US Artillery
Col. William Barton, New York brigade, commanding
Col. Simeon Sammon, 115th New York Infantry Regiment
Col. Henry Moore, 47th New York Infantry Regiment
Maj. William B. Coan, 48th New York Infantry Regiment
Col. James Montgomery, the reserve, trail brigade, commanding
Col. Edward N. Hallowell, 54th Massachusetts Volunteers
(Colored)
Lt. Col. William N. Reed, 1st North Carolina Volunteers (Col-
ored)
Capt. Loomis L. Langdon, “M” Battery, 1st US Artillery
Lieut. Henry H. Metcalf, “C” Battery, Rhode Island Artillery
Col. Guy Henry, Mounted Brigade, commanding
Maj. Atherton H. Stevens Jr., Independent Battalion Massa-
chusetts Cavalry
Col. Guy Henry, 40th Massachusetts Volunteers (retained com-
mand)
Capt. Samuel S. Elders, “B” Horse Battery, 1st US Artillery
154
2. Secessionist Forces
Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan, Commanding
Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt, 1st Brigade, commanding
Col. John Lofton, 6th Georgia
Col. James Neal, 19th Georgia
Lt. Col. James Huggins, 23rd Georgia
Col. Charles Zachry, 27th Georgia
Capt. William Crawford, 28th Georgia
Major Pickens Bird, 6th Florida Battalion
Capt. Robert Gamble, 1st Florida Artillery
Capt. John Wheaton, Chatham’s Battery
Col. George Harrison, 2d Brigade, commanding
Col. John Evans, 64th Georgia Volunteers
Major Washington Holland, 32d Georgia Volunteers
Capt. Henry Cannon, 1st Georgia
Major Augustus Bonaud, Bonaud’s Battalion
Lieutenant Col. Charles Hopkins, 1st Florida Battalion
Capt. John Guerard, Guerard’s Battery
Col. Caraway Smith, Mounted Brigade, commanding
Lieutenant Col. Abner McCormick, 2d Florida Cavalry
Col. Duncan Clinch, 4th Georgia Cavalry
Major George Scott, 5th Florida Cavalry
155
Appendix B
Biographies of Primary Participants
Brigadier General Truman Seymour. Brigadier General Truman
Seymour was born in 1824 in Vermont, making him no older than forty
years in 1864 at the time of the battle. Having a deceptively youthful ap-
pearance, Seymour was known for his aggression and his rashness. He at-
tended Norwich University for two years before enrolling in United States
Military Academy at West Point. He was a graduate of West Point, class
of 1846, commissioned and trained as an artillery ocer, having service
in both the Mexican-American War as well as the Third Seminole War in
Florida. This provided Seymour with a conventional war experience in
Mexico as an artilleryman as well as skills as an artilleryman in an uncon-
ventional war in the Third Seminole War. In addition to being a two-time
war veteran, this gave him a taste of combat in the hot, humid and unfor-
giving Floridian environment. Service in the Third Seminole War, waged
in the 1850s, provided Seymour with the most recent “ocial” wartime
service possible prior to hostilities. Only the small-scale “Indian wars”
of the western expansion and the “Bloody Kansas” vigilantism along the
border-states was more recent applications of organized violence.
When the American Civil War broke out, then-Captain Seymour was
serving at Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina for the initial
bombardment of the war. After service there, Seymour would attain his rank
through brevets for gallant distinction in the Seven Day’s Battle and the
Second Battle of Manassas as well as at the Battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam),
thereby developing his military reputation and each time progressively giv-
ing him larger commands, but as of yet no command autonomy.
In addition, Seymour was no stranger to using the African-Amer-
ican recruited troops in full-scale battle as some other US Army com-
manders were. It was Seymour who, under command of Major General
Quincy A. Gillmore, led the unsuccessful initial attack on Fort Wagner,
James Island, SC. In July, 1863 at the Battle of Fort Wagner when
Seymour used the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (Colored) his
command suered 1,515 casualties of a force of 5,264.
1
This was a
sharp casualty percentage as a result of a frontal assault across open
ground on fortied positions.
Of those 1,515 casualties was Seymour himself, having been wounded
in leading the ground forces under Gillmore on the assault of Fort Wagner.
This wound kept Seymour from eld duty from July 1863 until January
156
1864, returning from clearly a serious wound, just in time to take the eld
command for the Florida Expedition, launched in February 1864.
2
After the defeat at Olustee, Seymour was removed from command
of the Florida District and transferred north to serve in the Army of the
Potomac. He would serve with distinction in the Wilderness, be captured
and exchanged and further serve in the Battles of Petersburg and be pres-
ent at the Appomattox Court House for the surrender of General Robert
E. Lee. Before the end of the war he would achieve the brevetted rank
of major general.
Following the end of the Civil War, Seymour continued to serve in the
peacetime army, commanding forts in Florida, Massachusetts and Maine.
Upon retirement he lived in Europe and painted. He died in Florence, Italy
and was buried there in 1891.
Colonel Joseph Hawley. Colonel Joseph Hawley commanded what
would be Seymour’s lead brigade on the afternoon of the battle. Born
in Stewarteville, North Carolina in 1826, Hawley had graduated from
Hamilton College in Clinton, New York in 1847. Hawley was an edu-
cated lawyer, passing the Bar in 1850. He lived in Hartford, Connecticut
practicing law.
3
He had no prior military experience before the outbreak of the Ameri-
can Civil War. He volunteered in the US Army and was given a captaincy
with no formal military education or training. He served as a captain in
the 1st Connecticut Infantry at the First Battle of Bull Run and would gain
recognition, promotion and transfer to the newly formed 7th Connecticut
Infantry where he rose to command that regiment. He was in command of
this regiment when the Florida Expedition was launched, however, from
among the regiments in the brigade he was selected to serve as the brigade
commander. His brigade, the advance brigade of the Union forces in Flor-
ida, was the 7th Connecticut Infantry Regiment, the 7th New Hampshire
Infantry and the 8th United States Colored Troops (USCT).
Following the Battle of Olustee, Colonel Hawley and his command
transferred north and served in Gen. Alfred Terry’s Division in the X
Corps. He further served with distinction during the Siege of Petersburg
and went on to take command of the division and served as General Ter-
ry’s Chief of Sta.
Following the end of the war, Hawley would serve as General Terry’s
Chief of Sta in the Department of Virginia, leaving the army in 1866 as
a brevetted Major General. Following his military service, Hawley served
as Connecticut state governor from 1866-1667. He served two terms as the
157
US Representative to Congress and four terms as a US Senator. He died
weeks after stepping down from his senate seat in Washington in 1905.
Colonel William Barton. Colonel William Barton, born in 1836, was
the son of a clergyman and hailed from New Jersey. He was a graduate of
Princeton College. He had no prior military education or service before the
American Civil War. He volunteered and was granted a captaincy when
he joined. He rose to command the 48th New York Infantry Regiment
and was with them at the failed attack on Fort Wagner, where Seymour
received his wound. The 48th New York, along with the 47th New York
and the 115th New York made up the New York Brigade within Seymour’s
Florida Expedition, and of those regimental commanders, Barton would
be selected to lead the brigade to Olustee. The New York Brigade was the
most experienced brigade of Seymour’s entire force, as all three regiments
were long-time veterans of the war and thus reliably held the center of
Seymour’s order of movement.
Colonel Barton’s brigade would have good standing in the Battle of
Olustee and he would lead a promising and successful further career as a
brigade commander in the war, showing his leadership at Olustee was not
a uke. Barton’s actions as a brigade commander were eective and what
was needed.
Following his exemplary performance as brigade commander at Olus-
tee, Barton continued to lead the New York Brigade as it was transferred
north to join the Army of the Potomac. He saw further service in the Wil-
derness and again in the following Siege of Petersburg. Outside of Rich-
mond, he was wounded through the lungs which spurred debilitating com-
plications that eventually resulted in a discharge from service. He never
fully recovered.
Following the war, Barton became involved in private business. Once
those ventures failed he involved himself in the theatre business. he man-
aged theatres on both the East and West coasts in what became a succesful
post-war career. He died in June 1891 from lung complications.
Colonel James Montgomery. Colonel James Montgomery was a -
ery abolitionist, born 22 December 1814 in Ohio. His family was always
one on the edge of the American frontier and he would later move to Mis-
souri and then to Kansas. He was educated, served as a teacher and then a
preacher. He was related to a War of 1812 general who fell at the Battle of
Quebec, however, he had no formal military education or training. Though
Montgomery did not have formal military training prior to the American
158
Civil War he did have experience as an ardent abolitionist participating in
the “Bleeding Kansas” vigilantism leading to the Civil War.
4
The oldest of the US Army commanders, it is no wonder that with
his anti-slavery background in “Bleeding Kansas” that Montgomery was
given command of Seymour’s reserve brigade, comprised of two Afri-
can-American regiments. This brigade was made up of the 1st North Car-
olina Infantry (Colored) and the famed 54th Massachusetts Volunteers
(Colored). The Florida campaign would be their rst eld operation. Of
Seymour’s brigade commanders, Montgomery was the only one who was
an experienced brigade-level ocer.
After the Battle of Olustee, Montgomery left the army in September of
1864 and returned to Kanasas. There he nished out the war serving in the
6th Kansas State Militia and participating in the defense of Kansas from
secessionist raids.
Following the end of the war, Montgomery returned to his farming in
Kansas and did so until his death in the end of 1871.
Colonel Guy Henry. Colonel Guy Henry was the fourth brigade com-
mander for the US Army expedition, commander of the mounted brigade,
but even he was ocially the commander of one of the brigade’s mounted
infantry regiments and only led the brigade in lieu of a true brigade com-
mander. Guy Henry was born in Fort Smith, Indian Territory (modern-day
Arkansas) on March 9, 1839. He attended The United States Military
Academy at West Point, graduating in the spring of 1861. He served at
the First Battle of Bull Run and in the ghting around Charleston before
serving as the commander of the mounted brigade during the Florida Ex-
pedition of 1864.
Following the Battle of Olustee, Henry continued to serve, transfer-
ring with his command north to the Army of the Potomac. Henry and his
mounted infantrymen from Massachusetts went on to see action at the
Battle of Cold Harbor. For his actions in this battle Henry was awarded the
Medal of Honor in 1893. After Cold Harbor, Henry saw further action in
the Siege of Petersburg.
After the Civil War ended Henry remained in the army and served
with distinction in the Western Plains Indian Wars. He obtained his brevet
for gallantry to brigadier general from his actions in the Battle of Rosebud
in Montana. Later he would lead a provincial division in the invasion of
Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American War and would serve as the rst
governor of the province in 1898. He would die a year later in New York
from pneumonia and is interned in Arlington Cemetery.
159
Brigadier General Joseph Finegan. Brigadier General Joseph Fine-
gan was born in Ireland in 1814 and when he came to the United States his
family worked in agriculture in Florida.
5
A well-connected businessman
who specialized in railroad construction and operations was a partner of
the pre-secession Senator David C. Yulee, who would later own the rail-
road that Finegan helped build and would later defend from US military
destruction. Finegan’s state connections secured him his rank and posi-
tion, keeping Finegan in his home state and in charge of the defense of the
Florida interior. He had no prior military experience before the American
Civil War and in fact had not commanded in battle prior to the confronta-
tion at Olustee.
6
For this reason there were held various misgivings both
state and in the larger confederacy as to Finegan’s capabilities but events
would transpire at a rate that thrust Finegan against Seymour regardless of
Secessionist misgivings of his command abilities.
Following his victory at Olustee, Finegan’s lackluster pursuit of the
retreating Union forces to Jacksonville led to his removal as commander
of Middle and East Florida. In May of 1864 he along with a brigade of
soldiers was transferred north to serve with General Lee’s Army of North-
ern Virginia. With Lee’s army, Finegan saw further action in the Battle
of Cold Harbor. Following Cold Harbor, in March of 1865 Finegan was
again transferred, this time south back to Florida where he ended his nal
military service with the surrender.
Following the end of the war, Finegan struggled to regain his property
that had been taken by the Freedman’s Bureau, he lived for a time in Sa-
vannah, Georgia, but returned to Florida, served as a state senator. He died
in Florida in 1885.
Brigadier General Alfred Colquitt. Brigadier General Alfred
Colquitt was born in 1824 in Monroe, Georgia. Twenty years later he grad-
uated from Princeton College in 1844 and had studied law, passing the Bar
in 1846. His plans for private practice in law were interrupted, however,
by his service in the Mexican-American War, that seminal military experi-
ence and christening in battle of so many American Civil War participants.
During the war against Mexico, Colquitt served as a major, largely on a
sta. After the war, Colquitt led a public service life, rst in congress and
then in state government.
7
Colquitt’s American Civil War service prior to the Battle of Olustee
was mainly with secessionist Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jack-
son’s corps and Colquitt rose to brigade commander under the famous se-
cessionist general. His brigade would participate in virtually every major
160
battle with Jackson’s corps. After Jackson’s death at the Battle of Chancel-
lorsville, Colquitt and his brigade were transferred to the southern theater
and were serving with General Pierre G.T. Beauregard when the US Army
expedition to Florida was realized.
Colquitt’s command of the secessionists at Olustee would earn him the
moniker by some as the “hero of Olustee”. His role would be instrumental
in the secessionist actions. Sent forward to develop the battle for Finegan,
Colquitt would be given complete command of the secessionist front as
Finegan committed more and more of his regiments to the growing ght.
Though Colquitt was not an experienced multi-brigade commander, he
was an experienced commander, as demonstrated at Olustee.
After the Battle of Olustee, Colquitt, along with his command, was
again transferred north to serve with the Army of Northern Virginia. He
served in the Siege of Petersburg and transferred out of the Army of North-
ern Virginia to serve in the Carolinas, rising to the rank of major general
until the capitulation.
After the war, Colquitt returned to ght Reconstruction in his home
state of Georgia. He served as state governor from 1876-1882. In 1883 he
ran for one of the US Senate seats for Georgia and won. He remained one
of the Georgia senators until 1894 when he died.
Colonel George P. Harrison, Jr.. Colonel George P. Harrison, Jr. was
born near Savannah, Georgia on 19 March 1841. He received his educa-
tion from the Engham Academy and then the Georgia Military Institute,
located in Marietta, Georgia. When the war broke out Harrison gained his
commission as a second lieutenant and served in the 1st Georgia Regulars.
From there he quickly gained experience and moved up through the ranks.
8
Colonel Harrison’s military education at the Georgia Military Institute
made him the only secessionist senior leadership at Olustee with a profes-
sional military education. However, Colquitt had invaluable experience
from his service in the Mexican-American War even though lacked a mil-
itary academic instruction. Having been born in 1841, Harrison was also
the youngest of the secessionist major leaders.
After Olustee, Harrison maintained a brigade command and returned
north from Florida. He served as a part of Major General Lafayette Mc-
Law’s Division in the Carolinas, notably at the Battle of Bentonville and
was present at the capitulation at the Bennett House.
After the end of the war, Harrison moved to Alabama, studied law and
passed the state Bar and practiced law until he ran for oce. He served in
161
the state senate from 1878-1884. Following that he served two terms in the
US Senate representing Alabama until 1897. After the end of his political
career he returned to practicing law and civilian business before his death
in July 1922.
Colonel Caraway Smith. Colonel Caraway Smith commanded the
secessionist cavalry brigade, himself a regimental Florida cavalry com-
mander. Prior to Olustee, Smith’s command, the 2d Florida Cavalry, saw
little action more than skirmishes with small US Army raiding parties. The
Battle of Olustee was the largest and most signicant conict Smith would
participate in. Following Olustee, Smith and his 2d Florida Cavalry were
one of the few units to remain in Florida, the rest being transferred north to
serve with General Lee’s army. This may or may not have been a result of
the criticism leveled on him and his cavalry command for their lackluster
pursuit of the defeated US Army forces following Olustee. Regardless,
Smith and his command would participate again for only the second time
largely as a whole unit in the Battle of Natural Bridge near the Florida
capitol of Tallahassee. In this battle the secessionists repulsed an US Army
raid meant to capture the secessionist state capitol.
He did not live long past the end of the war, dying in 1868 in Florida.
162
Endnotes
1. Daniel L. Schafer, Thunder on the River: The Civil War in Northeast Flor-
ida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), 178. and Nulty, Confeder-
ate Florida, 118.
2. Schafer, Thunder on the River, 178.
3. “Hawley, Joseph Roswell, (1826-1905),” Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress, 1774-Present, hp://bioguide.congress.gov (accessed
January 12, 2012).
4. William G. Cutler, History of the State of Kansas (Chicago, IL: A.T.
Andreas, 1883).
5. Schafer, Thunder on the River, 102.
6. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 19.
7. “Colquitt, Alfred Holt, (1824-1895)”, Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress, 1774-Present, hp://bioguide.congress.gov (accessed
12 January 2012).
8. “Harrison, George Paul, (1841-1922).” Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress, 1774-Present, hp://bioguide.congress.gov (accessed
31 January 2012).
163
Bibliography
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present.
“Colquitt, Alfred Holt, (1824-1895).” http://bioguide.congress.gov (ac-
cessed 12 January 2012).
—. “Harrison, George Paul, (1841-1922).” http://bioguide.congress.
gov (accessed 31 January 2012).
—. “Hawley, Joseph Roswell, (1826-1905).” http://bioguide.congress.
gov (accessed 12 January 2012).
Cutler, William G. History of the State of Kansas, “Era of Peace, Part
43.” (Chicago: A.T. Andreas, 1883) http://kancoll.org/books/cutler/eraop/
era-of-peace-p43 (accessed 12 January 2012).
Davis, William Watson. The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964.
Dobak, William A. Freedom by the Sword: The United States Colored
Troops, 1862-1867. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2011.
Fishel, Edwin, C. The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of
Military Intelligence in the Civil War. New York: Mariner Books, 1996.
Frey, David. Failure to Pursue: How the Escape of Defeated Forces
Prolonged the Civil War. Jeerson: MacFarland Press, 2016.
Gabel, Christopher R. Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civ-
il War Strategy. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
1997.
Gillett, Mary C. The Army Medical Department, 1818-1865. Wash-
ington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987.
Glatthaar, Joseph T. Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black
Soldiers and White Ocers. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
Grin, Gary B. “Strategic-Operational Command and Control in the
American Civil War.” School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Command and General Sta Col-
lege, 31 March 1992.
Hargrove, Hondon B. Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War. Jeer-
son: McFarland and Company Publishers, 1988.
164
King. Curtis S., and William Glenn Robertson, Steven E. Clay. Sta
Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June
1864: A Study in Operational-Level Command, Second Edition. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009.
Letter to the Editor, Sergeant Major Rufus S. Jones. The Christian
Recorder, dated 24 March 1864, published 16 April 1864.
Letter from Private Milton Woodford to his wife, dated 23 February
1864, reproduced in Vaughn D. Bornet and Milton M. Woodford. “A Con-
necticut Yankee Fights at Olustee: Letters from the Front”, The Florida
Historical Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 3 (January 1949).
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era.
New York: Ballantine Books, 1988.
Newell, Clayton R. The Regular Army Before the Civil War, 1845-
1860. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2014.
Norton, Oliver Willcox. Army Letters 1861-1865. Chicago: O.L.
Deming, 1903.
Nulty, William H. Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee. Tus-
caloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1990.
O’Harrow Jr., Robert. The Quartermaster: Montgomery C. Meigs,
Lincoln’s General, Master Builder of the Union Army. New York: Simon
and Schuster Paperbacks, 2016.
Randall J.G. and David Donald. The Civil War and Reconstruction.
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1969.
Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the
Corps, 1775-1939. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989.
Schafer, Daniel L. Thunder on the River: The Civil War in Northeast
Florida. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010.
Sears, Stephen W. Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the
Army of the Potomac. New York: Houghton Miin, 2017.
Smith, John David. “Let Us All Be Grateful that We Have Colored
Troops that Will Fight,” in Black Soldiers in Blue: African American
Troops in the Civil War Era, editor John David Smith. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Trudeau, Noah Andre. Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil
War, 1862-1865. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1998.
165
Tsouras, Peter G. Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation
of American Military intelligence in the Civil War. Pennsylvania: Case-
ment, 2018.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History. Alexandria, VA: Oce of
History, Headquarters, US Army Corps of Engineers, 2008.
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Ocial Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies. 128 vols. Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Oce, 1880-1901.
“William B. Barton.” New York Times, June 14, 1891. http://localhis-
tory.morrisville.edu/sites/unitinfo/barton-48 (accessed 12 January 2012).
Wilson, Keith P. Campres of Freedom: The Camp Life of Black Sol-
diers During the Civil War. Kent, KS: Kent State Press, 2002.
Wilson, Mark R. The Business of Civil War. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006.
Combat Studies Institute Press
An Imprint of Army University Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
