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adverse character swap is not materially harmful given the tax-indifference of most private equity
investors and the limitations on miscellaneous itemized deductions. But what about the
management fees that are not converted via fee waiver? While the manager gets to shelter some or
all of that income with its out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., strategy #3), without any other restructuring
the compensation deductions with respect to management fees that are left unconverted would be
allocated to the private equity fund’s investors, who cannot utilize the deductions. If there’s
anything a tax lawyer hates, it’s to see a perfectly good deduction go to waste. Strategy #4 aims to
solve this problem.
Strategy #4 involves pushing management fee deductions down from the fund whose
owners generally do not pay U.S. taxes down to the portfolio companies who do. They accomplish
this through the use of excessive monitoring and transaction fees charged to the portfolio
companies and management fee offsets. Without management fee offsets, excessive fees paid by
portfolio companies would significantly alter the economic deal between managers and investors,
leaving managers with a windfall that is borne by investors. Management fee offsets, which typically
reduce management fees by the monitoring/transaction fees on a dollar-for-dollar basis, are
designed to prevent this distortion.
The end result is that, though the pre-tax economics are
unchanged, compensation deductions are purportedly moved from the fund level down to the
portfolio company level.
A. Application of Existing Law to Monitoring Fees
As I have explained in detail previously, this strategy ordinarily does not work under current
law.
The portfolio companies claim compensation deductions for monitoring fees paid, but these
deductions are not allowed under section 162. In order for a taxpayer to deduct purported
compensation for services, there are two independent conditions: (i) the payor must have, in
making the payment, a compensatory purpose, or stated differently, an intent to pay compensation,
and (ii) the amount paid must be reasonable in light of the services that are being provided.
In
most reported cases involving the deductibility of compensation, it is the second prong—
reasonableness—that is at issue. In the case of monitoring fees, however, the first condition—
compensatory intent—is often not satisfied. It is well-established that if compensatory intent is
absent, no deduction will be allowed, even if the amount paid might be considered reasonable.
The clear trend is towards these 100 percent offset arrangements, though 80 percent offsets also remain
commonplace. In the case of 80 percent fee offsets, the pre-tax deal is altered to the detriment of the investors,
but once tax effects are taken into account, it will usually be a win-win for managers and investors. See Gregg D.
Polsky, The Untold Story of Sun Capital: Disguised Dividends, Tax Notes, February 3, 2014, at 561 n.36 (explaining
how fee offsets as low as 60 percent can leave investors better off).
See Polsky, supra note 29; Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Monitoring Fees as Dividends: Collateral Impact, Tax
Note, June 2, 2014.
See O.S.C. Associates, Inc. v. Comm’r, 187 F.3d 116 (9
th
Cir. 1999); Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm’r, 503 F.2d 359 (9
th
Cir. 1974), IRS Field Service Advice 200042001; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (“The test of deductibility in the
case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are in fact payments purely for services.”).
See, e.g., IRS FSA 200042001 (“[L]ack of compensatory purpose has been relied upon to find amounts paid to
employees are not deductible even though they might have been reasonable in amount.”); Electric & Neon, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 56 T.C. 1324 (1971) (“The test of deductibility of alleged compensation is, as we mentioned, two-pronged.
However, in this case, the [IRS] does not contend that the amounts which [the service provider] received from [the
taxpayer], including the withdrawals and his stated salary, constituted unreasonable compensation for his services.
Rather, the [IRS’s] position is that the amount which [the service provider] received from [the taxpayer] in excess