NOAH’S ARK PROCESSORS, LLC D/B/A WR RESERVE 3
taken together, evidence of bad faith.
7
Additionally, the
Respondent’s refusal to include an arbitration provision,
while demanding a no-strike provision (and other broad
management rights) also suggests bad faith. Looking at
the totality of the circumstances, we adopt the judge’s
finding that these actions by the Respondent support a
finding of bad faith.
In light of our adoption of the judge’s finding of bad
faith, we also adopt the administrative law judge’s find-
ings that the Respondent unlawfully declared impasse and
implemented a last, best, and final offer in the absence of
a valid impasse.
8
AMENDED REMEDY
Despite having been found to have violated multiple
provisions of the Act in an earlier proceeding, having been
the subject of a successful injunction action in the federal
district court, and having been found in contempt of court,
the Respondent has continued to engage in some of the
same unlawful activity. By its actions, the Respondent has
7
The judge erroneously found that the Respondent’s pursuit of a
wage proposal that gave it the unilateral right to increase pay without
regard to definable objective procedures and criteria is unlawful in and
of itself. However, the cases cited by the judge merely hold that it is the
unilateral implementation of such a discretionary wage proposal, even
after reaching a valid overall impasse, that is unlawful, not the proposal
itself. See, e.g., McClatchy Newspapers, 321 NLRB 1386, 1390‒1391
(1996), enfd. 131 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997). While the wage proposal
is not, in and of itself, per se unlawful, “[a]n inference of bad-faith bar-
gaining is appropriate when the employer’s proposals, taken as a whole,
would leave the union and employees it represents with substantially
fewer rights and less protection than provided by law without a contract.”
Regency Service Carts, Inc., 345 NLRB 671, 675 (2005). In this case,
as the judge found, the Respondent’s discretionary wage proposal, ad-
vanced in conjunction with the elimination of arbitration, the continua-
tion of the no-strike clause, and insistence on a broad waiver and man-
agement rights, was part of such an unlawful bargaining effort. In any
event, we also agree with the judge that even without consideration of
the wage proposal, the Respondent’s bad-faith bargaining is amply
demonstrated on this record.
8
In so finding, we reject the Respondent’s single-issue impasse ar-
gument, as it is precluded by the bad faith finding.
9
We further note that the Respondent failed to raise particularized
exceptions to any of the remedies recommended by the judge. Because
the Respondent failed to raise a particularized exception to the recom-
mended affirmative bargaining order, we find it unnecessary to provide
a justification for that remedy. SKC Electric, Inc., 350 NLRB 857, 862
fn. 15 (2007) (citing Heritage Container, 334 NLRB 455 fn. 4 (2001),
and Scepter v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that,
in the absence of particular exceptions, the Board may issue an affirma-
tive bargaining order without specifically stating the basis for such)).
As to the notice reading, our colleague agrees that a reading is war-
ranted but would not order that it be done by CEO Ziegelheim or by a
Board agent in Ziegelheim’s presence. We find no merit in his objec-
tions, as we explain below in Sec. B.2.
As to bargaining expenses, we agree with the judge that the Respond-
ent’s “‘unusually aggravated misconduct’” has “‘infected the core of
[the] bargaining process to such an extent that [its] effects cannot be
eliminated by the application of traditional remedies[.]” Bemis Co., 370
NLRB No. 7, slip op. at 4 (2020) (quoting Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318
made plain its open hostility toward its responsibilities un-
der the Act, a hostility that by now must be obvious to the
Respondent’s employees. Under these circumstances, the
Board must carefully consider what remedies are neces-
sary and appropriate to remedy the Respondent’s miscon-
duct and to ensure that its employees understand their
rights under the Act and feel free to exercise them going
forward, despite what has come before.
In addition to the Board’s standard remedies for the vi-
olations found in this case, the judge has recommended
and justified additional remedies, specifically compensat-
ing the Union for all bargaining expenses from November
11, 2019 through the date in the future when good-faith
negotiations begin, and a reading of the notice to employ-
ees by CEO Fischel Ziegelheim, or at the Respondent’s
option, by a Board agent in his presence. We agree with
the judge that these remedies are warranted here.
9
We have also modified the judge’s recommended rem-
edy to include the same bargaining-schedule, progress-
NLRB 857 (1995), enfd. in relevant part sub nom. Unbelievable, Inc. v.
NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Here, as in Bemis Co., “an order
requiring the respondent to reimburse the charging party for negotiation
expenses is warranted both to make the charging party whole for the re-
sources that were wasted because of the unlawful conduct, and to restore
the economic strength that is necessary to ensure a return to the status
quo ante at the bargaining table.… [T]his approach reflects the direct
causal relationship between the respondent’s actions in bargaining and
the charging party’s losses.” Bemis Co., supra (citing Frontier Hotel,
supra at 859). In reimbursing the Union, the Respondent shall include
reimbursement for any lost wages the Union paid to employee bargaining
committee members for bargaining conducted during working hours.
See Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. d/b/a KOIN-TV, 371 NLRB No. 118, slip
op. at 2 (2022), and cases cited therein. Further, to the extent any em-
ployee bargaining committee members lost earnings because of bargain-
ing during working hours and were not reimbursed by the Union, the
Respondent shall make the employees whole for those losses. See id. at
slip op. at 2–3, and cases cited therein. We order these remedies because
the Union and any of its employee bargaining committee members ex-
pended significant time and expense bargaining with a respondent which
bargained in bad faith. Consequently, the Union was denied the benefit
of the good-faith bargaining required by the Act. It expended resources
and funds, and employees may have sacrificed wages, to engage in bar-
gaining that, because of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices, was de-
nuded of its statutory purpose. Accordingly, we find reimbursement to
the Union of bargaining expenses, including any lost wages the Union
paid to employees for bargaining conducted during working hours and
compensation to the Union’s employee bargaining committee members
for wages lost during time spent bargaining instead of working, neces-
sary to ensure that the Union and its representatives at the bargaining
table are made whole for the Respondent’s unlawful bargaining. While
we agree with the judge that an order requiring bargaining expenses is
warranted, we modify the duration of this remedy and order the Respond-
ent to reimburse the Union for bargaining expenses through January 24,
2020, the date the Respondent formally declared that the parties were at
impasse, and on that basis, unlawfully implemented its proposal. The
Respondent’s unlawful bargaining conduct continued through that date.
We leave it to compliance to determine the bargaining expenses reim-
bursable to the Union.