• Cherniack v. Home National Bank & Trust Co., 151 Conn.
367, n.2, 198 A.2d 58 (1964). “It is true that under § 46-12
a surviving spouse is given a stated interest in all of the
‘property, real and personal, legally or equitably owned by
the other at the time of his or her death.’ But this provision
gives no interest in the property of the other before death.
Since the plaintiff had no right or interest in the property of
the decedent during his lifetime, a valid trust agreement
could not be fraudulent as to her. One cannot be defrauded
of that to which he has no right. Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514,
518, 100 A. 441. (1917)”
• Sacksell v. Barrett, 132 Conn. 139, 145, 43 A.2d 79 (1945).
“Furthermore, since the adoption of the 1877 act, in deciding
whether a widow could by agreement bar her claim to the
share which the statute provides, we said: ‘On principle
there appears to be no good reason why such an agreement,
if fairly made and entered into, by a woman of full age, for
adequate consideration received, should not be binding upon
her.’ Staub’s Appeal, 66 Conn. 127, 134, 33 Atl. 615. The
same holds true of the plaintiff’s agreement releasing his
statutory interest.”
• In re Williamson’s Estate, 123 Conn. 424, 428, 196 A. 770
(1937). “Whether there has been abandonment within this
provision of the statute presented a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court upon evidence offered before
it.”
• Lewis v. Shannon, 121 Conn. 594, 599, 186 A. 540 (1936).
“In the following cases it was held that a surviving spouse,
having elected to take a statutory share instead of a
provision under the will, could not, in addition, take under
statutes of descent which apply only to intestate estates.”
• Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company v. McCarty, 100 Conn. 367,
371, 124 A. 40 (1924). “The widow’s election annuls all
testamentary provisions in her favor, but it does not annul
any testamentary provisions in favor of others . . . . The
result is that the provision of section (b) for setting aside
one quarter to the residue is temporarily suspended, the
provision for the payment of the income of such quarter to
the widow is annulled; and since her statutory life use is not
defeated by remarriage, the provision that upon her
remarriage the corpus of the fund disposed of in section (b)
shall go to the testator’s son Richard, becomes incapable of
execution.”
• Harris v. Spencer, 71 Conn. 233, 237, 41 A. 773 (1893).
“That statute gives a surviving husband a share of the
property owned by his wife at her decease; it does not
prevent the wife during her life from disposing of her