(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms
are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of
whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant
market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific
injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the
public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, the Court’s inquiry is
necessarily a limited one as the government is entitled to “broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the public interest.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d
1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public interest standard under the Tunney Act); United States v,
U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the “court’s
inquiry is limited” in Tunney Act settlements); United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965
(JR), 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3, (D.D.C. Aug. 11,
2009) (noting that the court’s review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires “into
whether the government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust
violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the
final judgment are clear and manageable.”).
10
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held,
under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the relationship between the remedy
secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government’s complaint, whether the decree
10
The 2004 amendments substituted “shall” for “may” in directing relevant factors for courts to
consider and amended the list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to address
potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. §
16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004
amendments “effected minimal changes” to Tunney Act review).
Case 1:16-cv-00759-RCL Document 7 Filed 05/10/16 Page 23 of 27