TACTICS OF DISINFORMATION:
Spread Targeted Content
Disinformation actors use a
variety of tactics to influence others, stir
them to action, and cause harm. Understanding these tactics can
increase preparedness and promote resilience whe
n faced with
disinformation.
While this document discusses open-sou
rce examples of disinformation
attributed by others to foreign governments, it does not represent the U.S.
government confirming the accuracy of any such attribution.
Description
Disinformation actors surveil a targeted online community to understand its
worldview, interests, and key influencers and then attempt to infiltrate it by
posting tailored influence content likely to resonate with its members. By starting
with entertaining or non-controversial posts that are agreeable to targeted
communities, disinformation actors gain “insider” status and grow an online
following that can make future manipulation efforts more successful. This tactic
may be used in combination with cultivating fake experts, who spread targeted
content over time, taking a “long game” approach that lends false credibility to
the campaign. Targeted content often takes highly shareable forms, like memes
or videos, and can be made to reach very specific audiences by methods such as
paid advertising and exploited social media algorithms.
Examples
In its effort to sow division within the United States during
the 2016 presidential election, the Russian Internet
Research Agency (IRA) deployed a vast network of
inauthentic social media accounts, pages, and groups to
target specific American communities, including racial and
ethnic groups and adherents to specific political
movements or ideologies. For example, the IRA attempted
to discourage participation among Black Americans in the
electoral process by creating an ecosystem of connected
fake accounts posing as media outlets. The network of
fake accounts pushed repetitive narratives and
sometimes manipulated legitimate influencers into
amplifying its content, lending it the appearance of insider
status within the community.
1
1
DiResta, Renee, Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox, Jonathan Albright, and Ben Johnson. “The Tactics & Tropes of the
Internet Research Agency.” DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln, October 2019. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/senatedocs/2/.
An extensive,
pro-China network of inauthentic online
accounts has expanded efforts to target global audiences
in recent years. The operation has spread to dozens of
social media platforms and websites, including alternative
forums catering to niche audiences, and has deployed
disinformation content in at least seven languages,
including Russian and Spanish. Like the IRA efforts, many
of the accounts in the pro-China network shared the same
content and linked to in-network accounts on other
platforms. The targeted content often seeks to spur real-
world action. For example, in April 2020, content targeting
Asian Americans sought to mobilize protests within the
U.S. against findings that COVID-19 originated in China.
2
2
Serabian, Ryan, and Lee Foster. “Pro-PRC Influence Campaign Expands to Dozens of Social Media Platforms, Websites, and Forums in at Least Seven
Languages, Attempted to Physically Mobilize Protesters in the U.S.” Mandiant. Mandiant, September 7, 2021. h
prc-influence-campai
gn-expands-dozens-social-media-platforms-websites-and-forums
ttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/pro-
.
Understand how your audience
receives their information, including
platforms and trusted sources.
Assess prior disinformation that has
affected your sector and other
potential vulnerabilities.
Clearly and creatively communicate
accurate information through channels
and media that are likely to appeal to
specific segments of your audience.
Invest in clear and concise content on
official websites to serve as accurate
and verified reference information.
Direct users to this content if
disinformation campaigns emerge and
ensure key stakeholder questions are
addressed in user-centered language
and framing.
Develop an incident response plan to
mitigate the impacts of significant
disinformation narratives.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) produced this graphic to highlight tactics used by disinformation campaigns that
seek to disrupt American life and the critical infrastructure that underlies it. CISA’s publication of informational materials about this issue are
intended for public awareness, and are not intended to restrict, diminish, or demean any person’s right to hold, express, or publish any opinion or
belief, including opinions or beliefs that align with those of a foreign government, are expressed by a foreign government-backed campaign, or
dissent from the majority. CISA respects the First Amendment rights of all U.S. persons and publications.